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Election 2007
The Shift to Limited Preferential 
Voting in Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea’s general election in 2007 attracted partic-
ular interest for several reasons. Not  only did it follow what 
was widely acknowledged as the country’s worst election 
ever, in 2002 (in which elections in six of the country’s 109 
electorates were declared to be ‘failed elections’), it was the 
first general election to be held under a new limited preferential 
voting (LPV) system; it also followed the first full parliamentary 
term under the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates, which had been introduced in 2001 in an attempt to 
strengthen political parties and create a greater degree of sta-
bility in the National Parliament, and was the first to embrace 
a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to electoral administration, 
through an Inter-departmental Election Committee.
This volume provides an analysis of the 2007 election, which 
draws on the work of a Domestic Monitoring Team organized 
through the National Research Institute, and several visit-
ing scholars. It addresses key issues such as voter education, 
electoral administration, election security, the role of political 
parties, women as candidates and voters, the shift to LPV, and 
HIV transmission, and provides more detailed accounts of 
the election in a number of open and provincial electorates.
It is generally agreed that the election of 2007 was an im-
provement on that of 2002. But problems of electoral admin-
istration and voting behaviour remain. These are identified in 
the volume, and recommendations made for electoral reform.
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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Every general election in Papua New Guinea, since 1964, has been the subject 
of a comprehensive collaborative study by Papua New Guinean and foreign 
scholars. And every study (with the exception, to date, of 2002) has been 
published. This volume continues a longstanding tradition. 
 
The election of 2007, however, generated particular interest: not only did it 
follow what has been described as Papua New Guinea’s worst election ever, in 
2002 (in which elections in six of the  country’s 109 electorates were declared to 
be ‘failed elections’), it was the first general election to be held under a new 
limited preferential voting (LPV) system; it also followed the first full 
parliamentary term under the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties 
and Candidates, which had been introduced in 2001 in an attempt to strengthen 
political parties and create a greater degree of stability in the National 
Parliament, and was the first to embrace a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to 
electoral administration, through the Inter-departmental Election Committee. 
 
Moves to set up a coordinated study of the 2007 election were initiated 
within the National Research Institute in 2005. Subsequently, the Registrar of 
Political Parties requested a Domestic Observation of the election by Papua 
New Guinean scholars and civil society organizations, and the AusAID-funded 
Electoral Support Program (ESP) also commissioned a monitoring of the 
election. These three initiatives converged. An ESP-funded Domestic 
Observation was organized through the National Research Institute, under the 
joint leadership of Dr Ray Anere of the National Research Institute and Dr 
Nicole Haley of the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program of the 
Australian National University, focusing on the administration and outcome of 
the election. The report of the Domestic Observation was submitted to the Inter-
departmental Election Committee, and to the ESP, in 2008 and was published 
by the National Research Institute in 2009. This volume draws heavily from the 
Domestic Observation (a number of whose team leaders have contributed 
chapters to this volume), but attempts, like the studies of earlier Papua New 
Guinea elections, to look at broader issue of electoral politics at both the 
national level and within selected electorates.  
 
As always, the tasks of pulling together a number of contributors and 
obtaining accurate electoral data have not been easy (as at May 2011 results 
were still not available for all electorates and the Electoral Commissioner’s 
report had not been tabled in parliament). This is reflected in the time it has 
taken to achieve publication.  
 
We are indebted to those who have facilitated the study and its publication; 
in particular we acknowledge the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission 
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(PNGEC), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the 
Inter-departmental Election Committee (IDEC), and the Electoral Support 
Program Phase 2 (ESP2). 
 
We take this opportunity to thank the authors of the chapters, especially Mr 
Andrew Trawen, Chief Electoral Commissioner and Mr Paul Bengo, formally 
the Chair of the IDEC. We thank certain individuals who have been 
instrumental to the publication of this volume: Dr Bill Standish, Dr Thomas 
Webster, Dr Musawe Sinebare, John Kalamorah, Sue Rider, Jim Robins, Tracy 
Harwood, Jenny Parina and Siling Geatulu.  
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1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2007 ELECTION IN PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA 
 
Andrew S. Trawen MBE, Chief Electoral Commissioner  
 
When I was invited to provide an introductory overview of the 2007 general 
election from the perspective of the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission 
(PNGEC) I was pleased to accept, given the past working relationship between 
the National Research Institute, the Australian National University and the 
PNGEC. What I present is a brief analysis from the PNGEC's viewpoint, 
outlining the challenges and presenting a road map for the PNGEC to follow as 
it strives to achieve greater efficiency in electoral administration and conduct. 
 
The election schedule 
 
Let me begin with the important dates for the national election. They are:  
• issue of writs, 4 May 2007; 
• close of nominations, 10 May 2007; 
• commencement of polling, 30 June 2007; 
• completion of polling, 10 July 2007; and 
• return of writs, 30 July 2007. 
 
Polling in parts of the country was slightly behind schedule due to prevailing 
circumstances beyond the control of the Electoral Commission, mainly to do 
with weather conditions, sudden changes in air transport schedules during the 
polling period, and numerous court injunctions. This was mainly in the 
Highlands Region and parts of the Southern and Momase Regions. Section 82A 
of the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections gives 
flexibility to the PNGEC to determine the timeframe for the elections and this 
worked very well in the 2007 election. 
 
Election statistics 
 
A total of 2,759 candidates nominated for the 109 seats; just over half of 
these (1,478) contested as independents. There were 2,658 male candidates and 
103 female candidates. 
 
The electoral roll had 3,938,839 registered voters. The highest number of 
candidates in any electorate was 69, the lowest 7. There were 34 registered 
political parties. 
 
Over 9,000 polling places were established, with 4,550 polling teams and 
approximately 27,500 polling officials. The number of ballot papers that were 
printed was 9,096,100, of which 8,519,200 were distributed. 
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The voting system 
 
Papua New Guinea used the limited preferential voting (LPV) system for the 
first time in a post-independence general election, shifting away from the old 
first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. Candidates and their supporters cooperated 
during the election, unlike the past where violence was the norm. The new 
voting system increased the percentage of popular support for members of 
parliament to over 50 per cent of the electorate. Early indications suggest the 
LPV system is user-friendly. It is my firm view that the new LPV system was a 
success. 
 
My estimate of formal votes cast is over 85 per cent, and I think that with 
better understanding of the system the percentage of informal votes will 
decrease. I believe we witnessed a high level of support for the LPV system. 
 
The electoral roll 
 
A complete review of the 2002 general election revealed that the electoral 
roll used was heavily inflated and absolutely corrupted. 
 
I made the decision in 2005, after being appointed Commissioner, to 
completely discard the 2002 electoral roll. The mammoth task of creating the 
new 2007 roll began immediately and enumerators across the country went from 
door to door. In a number of instances, they were not well received by 
households. This, as well as blatant refusal to enrol by some eligible voters, 
resulted in names not being on the 2007 electoral roll. 
 
By 18 June 2007 the PNGEC had processed all completed eligible voter 
registration forms. Upon completion, the 2007 electoral roll registered a total of 
3,938,839 voters throughout the country, compared to about five million in 
2002. The truth is that in Papua New Guinea it is difficult to remove names 
from the electoral roll, and it is also hard to counter the culture of getting as 
many names as possible on the roll. 
 
The electoral rolls were for the first time done at local-level government 
(LLG) ward level so they could be easily managed. Although there were 
problems in accommodating voters from other wards or LLGs voting in the 
same electorate, the PNGEC was able to control the movement of people to 
prevent voting twice or three times in the same electorate. 
 
Logistics 
 
Papua New Guinea is sparsely populated, with limited or poor road and sea 
transport infrastructure. This meant that delivery of important election materials 
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to polling locations within tight timeframes was extremely difficult. The 
majority of critical supplies, such as ballot papers, electoral rolls, candidate 
posters, voting forms, labels, and seals, was dispatched by air transport. Large 
items were sent by sea-freight where time permitted. In 2007, certain transport 
companies slowed down the election process by not delivering critical supplies 
to destinations on time. 
 
Awareness and education 
 
A voter awareness campaign was slow to start but picked up momentum as 
elections drew near, though there were complaints of insufficient awareness and 
education. Comprehensive awareness education on the voting process, using 
radio, television and the press, did not reach certain more remote parts of the 
country simply because the services were not available. It seems the PNGEC 
will always struggle in this area because of poor communications infrastructure. 
The Australian government-funded Electoral Support Program assisted 
considerably in the awareness process, through the use of civil society 
organizations. 
 
Security 
 
Security is always a major concern, especially in the Highlands Region. 
Polling was conducted over a shorter period in the Highlands instead of the full 
eleven days of polling. This was done to allow security forces to focus their 
limited resources on 'hot-spots’. The strategy worked well and general feedback 
suggests that security was generally considered to have been a success. 
 
Finances  
 
A new financial management system was introduced by PNGEC for the 
control, monitoring and expending of funds allocated by the national 
government. 
 
PNGEC submitted a financial estimate of K130 million to Treasury 
Department for election administration. However parliament appropriated a 
total of K130 million for the election, of which security consumed K50 million, 
leaving only K80 million for actual election administration. The amount was 
insufficient, and the PNGEC incurred further costs after the July election. An 
additional K15 million was requested in the government's supplementary budget 
towards the end of 2007. This was appropriated and the Commission managed 
to settle most of its outstanding debts. However, claims were still coming in 
from the provinces early in 2008 and there is a possibility of additional costs of 
up to K3 million. 
. 
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Election petitions 
 
The intensity of court petitions after the return of writs for a general election 
is a recurring issue of concern in Papua New Guinea. The number of election 
disputes reflects on the degree of success or failure of any general election. In 
2007 55 petitions were filed with the Court of Disputed Returns. This compares 
with 98 cases filed in the aftermath of the 2002 elections.  
 
This is a significant decline, which may be attributed to the new LPV system 
and the stringent imposition of court rules that determine the validity and merit 
of cases filed by losing candidates.  
 
Challenges 
 
I have given you a brief overview of the 2007 general election in Papua New 
Guinea. As a young developing nation in this part of the world, we are still in 
aggressive pursuit of that perfect election model which we ourselves believe is 
the right one. We are open to critics and will take the opportunity to receive and 
digest comments. 
 
We went through several reviews immediately after the election of 2007 and 
we know our strengths and weaknesses. Our immediate challenge is to address 
issues identified in the various election review workshops as ‘lessons learnt’ and 
to incorporate them into our electoral management system for practical 
application. 
 
Challenges facing the PNGEC come from all facets of election 
administration and conduct. There are problems in voting, electoral rolls, 
counting and scrutiny, finance, transportation, communications, security, 
training and recruitment, and awareness and education. 
 
There have always been problems with elections in Papua New Guinea, 
since the first general election in 1977. The general election in 2007 took a more 
positive twist with the introduction of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach. The 
national election steering committee known as the Inter-departmental Electoral 
Committee (IDEC) was formed. Its primary role was to coordinate all state 
agencies to effectively assist the Electoral Commission conduct the general 
elections. The Chairman of IDEC was the registrar of political parties, Mr. Paul 
Bengo, a veteran civil servant and one of Papua New Guinea's senior statesmen. 
The setting up of IDEC was a step in the right direction and I am proud to say 
that much has been achieved in 2007. Our focus now is to strengthen and 
legitimize IDEC to enable it to become more effective in its role. 
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Primary tasks awaiting the Electoral Commission’s attention are: 
• to continue to improve the integrity of the electoral roll and foster 
the ‘whole-of-government’ approach to elections; 
• to increase LPV awareness; 
• to improve on electoral procedures in relation to administration and 
conduct of elections; and 
• to review of the Organic Law on National and Local-level 
Government Elections and its Regulations. 
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2 IDEC: THE 2007 GENERAL ELECTION THROUGH A WHOLE-
OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH 
 
Paul B.B. Bengo 
 
The concept 
 
The staging and the conduct of the 2007 general election in Papua New Guinea 
was a success story as a result of effective cooperation and coordination among 
the relevant state organizations at national and provincial levels. 
 
This effective cooperation and coordination was forged and fostered by the 
electoral commissioner, who insisted on the need for a whole-of-government 
approach in the planning, staging, and conduct of the general election. 
 
Implementation and achievements 
 
In the implementation of this initiative an Inter-departmental Electoral 
Committee (IDEC) was established at the national level whilst provincial 
election steering committees were established in the provinces, chaired by 
provincial administrators. 
 
Through the operation of IDEC and provincial election steering committees 
it was possible to achieve a number of significant administrative and 
management outcomes. Among these five stand out.  
 
• In the staging and conduct of the election, there was compliance with 
nearly all constitutional and legal requirements, such as the general 
provisions of the constitution, the Organic Law on National and Local-
level Government Elections, the Organic Law on the Integrity of 
Political Parties and Candidates, and the Criminal Code.  
• An extensive and effective public awareness was conducted covering 
voter enrolment and registration, the limited preferential voting (LPV) 
system, voter turnout at polling venues, the need for respect and 
orderliness in the electoral process, etc. 
• An effectively coordinated security plan was drawn up among the 
disciplined forces for a free and fair election. 
• There was a well-coordinated government effort with support from 
international governments and donor agencies. 
• Superb teamwork mounted at the national level and supported by 
disciplined and dedicated members of staff from the provincial 
governments and their respective administrations succeeded in 
mobilizing and coordinating the resources at the disposal of 
governments. 
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Through these administrative and management strategies we were able to bring 
greater integrity and transparency to the entire electoral process. A number of 
Papua New Guinean authors will address some of these issues. 
 
Let me deal specifically with the provisions of the Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates relating to the election. 
 
Section 27 of the organic law allows only registered political parties to 
endorse or nominate and participate in elections. As required by Section 40, the 
registrar published in the National Gazette (3 May 2007) the necessary details 
of registered political parties. 
 
Section 63 of the organic law obliges the electoral commissioner, upon the 
return of writs for the general election, to officially advise the head of state on 
important matters relating to the staging and conduct of the election (National 
Gazette 3 May 2007). 
 
The advice indicated to the head of state which registered political party had 
the greatest number of candidates declared elected. Based on this advice the 
head of state issued an invitation to the National Alliance to form government 
(National Gazette 10 August 2007).  
 
With regard to the whole-of-government approach, the government of Papua 
New Guinea has recognized the initiative of the electoral commissioner and has 
now funded IDEC and the provincial steering committees to continue on a 
permanent basis. (IDEC was convened later in 2007 to coordinate arrangements 
for local-level government elections.)  
 
It is the intention of the Electoral Commission and myself to institutionalize 
the IDEC initiative so that it can be an effective administrative mechanism to 
assist the Electoral Commission to plan, stage and conduct elections in Papua 
New Guinea at both national and provincial levels. 
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3 BACKGROUND TO THE 2007 ELECTION: POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS  
 
R.J. May and Ray Anere 
 
Papua New Guinea’s sixth post-independence election in 2002 was widely 
described as the worst in the country’s history (see Siaguru in Post-Courier 28 
June 2003; Chin 2003; Gelu 2003; May 2003; Standish 2003). It was marked by 
inaccurate — often grossly inaccurate — electoral rolls, widespread voting 
irregularities and manipulation (sometimes by electoral officials), intimidation 
of voters, hijacking of ballot boxes, and violence amongst rival candidates and 
their supporters and in a few instances against polling officials. There was a 
number of election-related deaths. In Enga Province, ballot boxes held for 
safekeeping in a metal container outside a police station were bombed with 
drums of aviation fuel, and in the Southern Highlands, elections in six of the 
province’s nine electorates were declared ‘failed elections’ when officials 
became unable to control the election. The problems were concentrated in the 
volatile highlands provinces, but were not confined to the highlands.  
 
The 2002 election was also the first to be held under the new Organic Law 
on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) and the last to 
be held under the first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting system, which had replaced 
an optional preferential system under the colonial administration. The 
introduction of the OLIPPAC — which was intended to strengthen political 
parties and give greater stability to government — and amendment of the 
Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections to effect a shift 
from FPTP to limited preferential voting (LPV) were among measures which 
had been introduced by the government of Sir Mekere Morauta (1999-2002), in 
a bid to ‘to restore integrity to our great institutions of state’. 
 
Despite the turbulence of the 2002 election, results were declared in 103 
electorates, and in August 2002 the National Parliament met and Sir Michael 
Somare, as the leader of the party with the largest number of endorsed 
candidates — the National Alliance (NA), with nineteen MPs — was invited to 
form a government. Somare was duly elected as prime minister, securing 88 
votes to nil (with 14 abstentions). He headed a coalition of thirteen parties and 
twenty independents. Morauta became leader of the relatively small opposition 
coalition. 
 
A legacy of the electoral difficulties of 2002 was a determination by the 
government and donors — specifically AusAID — to ensure that the capacity of 
the government to run free and fair elections was strengthened before 2007. As 
part of this, in 2005 phase 2 of an AusAID-funded Electoral Support Program 
was mobilized to assist the Electoral Commission and help undertake electoral 
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awareness, and in 2006 the government established an Inter-departmental 
Electoral Committee (IDEC) to coordinate the government’s efforts across all 
relevant departments and agencies (see chapters 1,2,4 and 5).  
 
Parliamentary politics 2002-2007 
 
Under the OLIPPAC, measures were introduced to counter the fluidity of 
parliamentary politics which had marked the previous two decades. Popularly 
known as ‘yo-yo politics’, this had been characterized by constant shifting of 
MPs between parties, frequent shifts of parties in and out of coalitions, and 
regular motions of no confidence in the government of the day. In an attempt to 
promote greater political stability, the OLIPPAC provided for the registration 
and public funding of political parties, and introduced measures to restrict ‘party 
hopping’.1 These provisions, together with the numerical dominance of the 
Somare-led coalition, appeared to put the incoming government in a very strong 
position — and in fact the Somare government of 2002–2007 went on to 
become the first, since the Somare government of 1972–1977, to survive  a full 
term in office. But neither the legislature nor the executive was particularly 
stable.  
 
As early as June 2003, amid rumours of faction fighting within the coalition 
and even within the NA, there were changes in cabinet, with seven portfolios 
changing hands, and this was followed in August by a more substantial 
reshuffle.  
 
                                                     
1 Under the organic law, a member of parliament elected as a party-endorsed candidate 
may not withdraw or resign from that party during the life of the parliament (unless 
he/she can establish that the party or an executive of the party has committed a serious 
breach of the party’s constitution or that the party has been adjudged insolvent), and 
cannot vote against a resolution of the party concerning a vote of no confidence, the 
election of a prime minister, approval of the national budget, or a constitutional 
amendment (a member may, however, abstain from voting).  Contravention of this 
provision is regarded as resignation from the party and sets in motion a series of 
procedures which may culminate in the member having to reimburse the party for all 
campaign and other expenses received from the party, exclusion from appointment as a 
minister or committee chair, or dismissal from parliament.  A member elected as an 
independent may join a party after the initial vote for prime minister, and then incurs the 
same obligations to the party as a party-endorsed candidate.  A member elected as an 
independent who remains independent, but supported a particular candidate in the vote 
for prime minister, must not vote against that candidate or his/her government in a 
subsequent vote of no confidence, nor against a budget brought down by that 
government, nor against a constitutional amendment proposed by that government. 
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Nor was fractiousness confined to the government: in December 2002, after 
Morauta had sought to change the name of the People’s Democratic Movement 
(PDM), PDM deputy leader and member for Bulolo Open, John Muingnepe, 
announced that Morauta had been dismissed from the leadership of the party, in 
favour of its founder Paias Wingti, and that he, Muingnepe, was now leader of 
the parliamentary opposition. Morauta disputed this and called on the registrar 
of political parties and the Ombudsman Commission to investigate Muingnepe’s 
actions. The registrar of political parties subsequently ruled in favour of 
Morauta. 
 
Then, towards the end of 2003, Prime Minister Somare sought, ostensibly in 
the interests of furthering parliamentary stability, to extend the grace period 
after an election, during which a prime minister could not be subjected to a vote 
of no confidence, from eighteen months (already extended in 1991 from an 
original six months) to thirty-six months. A bill to make the required 
amendment to S.145 of the constitution passed a first reading in the National 
Parliament in September 2003, but on the eve of the decisive second reading of 
the bill, Morauta announced that the opposition would vote against the 
amendment, which he said had not been adequately scrutinized. The 
parliamentary leader of the People’s Progress Party (PPP) and deputy prime 
minister, Allan Marat, was also opposed to the amendment. In October, as a 
result of differences within the PPP, Marat was removed from the PPP 
parliamentary leadership by the party caucus (an action which he challenged 
unsuccessfully in the National Court), and having been confirmed as deputy 
prime minister by Prime Minister Somare in October he was removed from the 
position the following month. Marat’s successor as PPP leader, Andrew Baing, 
became deputy prime minister in November 2003. 
 
In the days prior to this there had been a burst of activity amongst the smaller 
parties. The United Resources Party (URP), which had one member (Sam 
Akoitai) after the 2002 elections, had increased its number to fourteen (mostly 
through the absorption of the ‘Kimbe Group’ of independents led by Milne Bay 
governor Tim Neville — who became the party’s new leader in November — 
but also through amalgamation with two smaller parties, the Pan Melanesian 
Congress (with two members) and the Advance PNG Party (with one). The 
URP, now the second largest party in the coalition, had reportedly signed a 
‘declaration of partnership’ with four other parties to form a coalition within the 
governing coalition. While the group spoke in terms of unity and stability, 
however, it was clear that there was amongst them some opposition to the S.145 
amendment. In the event, when the parliamentary vote was taken in late 
November, three parties (URP, PPP and People’s Labour Party [PLP]) split on 
the issue, and the government narrowly fell short of the two-thirds majority (73 
votes) needed to pass the bill.  
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Andrew Baing, who had voted against the amendment, was sacked from the 
deputy prime ministership. He was replaced by People’s Action Party leader 
Moses Maladina, who became the third deputy prime minister in a month. 
Several other ministers lost portfolios. 
 
A second vote in December 2003 again failed, and in May 2004 Somare 
announced he would not pursue the amendment. 
 
In accordance with the OLIPPAC, the speaker disallowed the votes of those 
members who were deemed to have voted against their parties’ resolutions, and 
notified  the registrar of political parties that they ‘may have contravened’ 
S.65(1) of the OLIPPAC. On advice from the attorney general and private 
lawyers, the registrar of political parties subsequently referred the members, 
who were ‘deemed to have resigned’ from their respective parties, to the 
Ombudsman Commission for investigation. But there was no further action on 
the matter.2  
 
With the grace period coming to an end in February 2004, and several parties 
split (in addition to the URP3, PPP4 and PLP, Pangu5 and even the two-MP 
                                                     
2 As explained by Registrar for Political Parties Paul Bengo, since the government 
rescinded the second reading of the bill before a vote was actually taken, no misconduct 
had occurred (see Post-Courier 22 January 2004). However, in May 2004 the 
Ombudsman Commission was said to be investigating eight MPs who had voted against 
party resolutions. 
3 In January 2004 Bengo ruled that Akoitai was the only parliamentary member of the 
URP — the later joiners not having paid party fees – and voided Neville’s leadership. 
This view was upheld in a ruling by the acting speaker of Parliament, Jeffrey Nape, in 
July, leaving Neville and the other MPs who had joined URP after the election, and 
were in the opposition, as ‘effectively independent MPs’ (Post-Courier 27 July 2004).  
Confusingly, however, in November it was reported that Bengo had ruled that Neville 
was the leader of the URP.  
4 In December 2003 five PPP members, including deputy party leader Paul Tiensten and 
former party leader Marat, voted for the S.145 amendment. Baing, as party leader, 
served a summons on the five for voting against a party resolution. The five countered 
by electing Tiensten as party leader. The PPP national executive promptly expelled 
Tiensten. However, Nape recognized Tiensten as party leader. Shortly after this, in 
January 2004, Baing was referred to the Ombudsman Commission for alleged 
misconduct in office. Two months later Nape called on the prime minister to dismiss 
Bengo for his ‘indecisiveness’ in the handling of the PPP leadership dispute issue. In 
November 2004 Bengo reportedly confirmed Baing’s leadership, but in June 2005 Nape 
ruled in favour of Tiensten. The dispute continued up till June 2006, when Baing was 
suspended pending the outcome of a Leadership Tribunal inquiry (which subsequently 
recommended Baing’s dismissal). Byron Chan, son of PPP founder Sir Julius Chan, 
took over the parliamentary leadership. 
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Christian Democratic Party (CDP) had fractured), there was talk in late 2003 of 
a vote of no confidence against Somare. In response, in January 2004, soon after 
parliament had resumed after the Christmas break, the government adjourned 
parliament to 29 June. The Ombudsman Commission, describing the  
government’s action as ‘dangerous’ and a ‘bad example’, told the government 
that if it did not recall parliament by mid March the Commission would initiate 
a court challenge — which it subsequently did. (In the event, the parliament met 
briefly in April to receive nominations for the election of the governor general.) 
January 2004 also saw a minor cabinet reshuffle. 
 
Tensions also became apparent about this time within the People’s National 
Congress (PNC), the party established by former prime minister Sir William 
Skate. In February Skate confirmed that the PNC supported Somare, but there 
were reports of a leadership challenge coming from Peter O’Neill, whose one-
MP People’s Solidarity Party had merged with the PNC in 2002. 
 
In early May 2004, fourteen opposition MPs, led by Neville and Wingti, 
voted to remove Morauta as opposition leader in favour of Andrew Baing. The 
registrar for political parties promptly released a statement recognizing Morauta 
as leader of the opposition, pending a ruling by the speaker, but in mid May 
Morauta and the majority of his Papua New Guinea Party (PNGP) joined the 
government, effectively ruling out a successful vote of no confidence. Three 
days later parliament was adjourned again and in another major reshuffle 
Maladina was dropped as deputy prime minister and the PNC was expelled 
from the ruling coalition. Prime Minister Somare also announced the creation of 
several additional ministerial and vice ministerial positions, a move which was 
challenged by Wingti, who called on the Ombudsman Commission to 
investigate the ‘rogue prime minister’. In April the People’s Action Party (PAP) 
and the NA had confirmed their partnership, but the following month some 
members of PAP reportedly joined an opposition group meeting in Alotau. 
Parliament resumed briefly in late May to re-elect a governor general (see 
below), and voted to remove Skate as speaker and elect Jeffrey Nape 
(unopposed) as his replacement. A challenge by Skate was dismissed by the 
Supreme Court. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
5 One faction, led by Sir Rabbie Namaliu, supported Somare; the other, smaller, faction, 
led by Chris Haiveta, was in opposition. In February 2004 the Namaliu faction 
announced that Namaliu had been elected party leader; this was refuted by Haiveta who 
claimed that Namaliu and his supporters had been expelled from the party. Both the 
registrar for political parties and the speaker recognized Namaliu as party leader, but the 
matter was referred to the National Court, which in October 2004 ruled in favour of 
Haiveta.  
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When parliament eventually resumed in late June 2004 it was clear that a 
motion of no confidence was forthcoming, even though the ombudsman, Ila 
Geno, urged ‘the registered political party executives, various lobbyists and 
parliamentary leaders of political parties to exercise restraint from getting into 
the habit of luring members of Parliament with material promises and/or 
benefits’ (Post-Courier 5 July 2004). There were reports of a ‘groundswell of 
numbers’ within the opposition, and of individual MPs crossing the floor in 
apparent disregard of the OLIPPAC. The leader of government business, Patrick 
Pruaitch, was quoted as saying, ‘Opposition MPs are carrying on as if the 
Organic Law on [the Integrity of] Political Parties and Candidates does not 
exist’ (Post-Courier 6 July 2004). The opposition camp in Alotau claimed about 
forty MPs including four government ministers, prompting the leader of the pro-
government faction of PPP, Paul Tientsen, to complain that MPs were being 
‘hijacked’, contrary to S.74 of the OLIPPAC, and that by not intervening the 
registrar of political parties was not doing his job (Post-Courier 12 July 2004). 
The recently-appointed opposition leader Baing having been referred to the 
Ombudsman Commission in January, the opposition caucus voted to nominate 
Paias Wingti as alternative PM in a vote of no confidence, but it was not a 
popular choice, and Wingti subsequently stepped down in favour of Peter 
O’Neill.  
 
On 7 July the opposition submitted notice of its motion of no confidence, 
only to have it rejected, on a technicality, by the government-dominated 
Parliamentary Private Business Committee.6 The opposition amended and 
resubmitted the notice, and filed the Supreme Court for a reference to validate 
the notice, however the government again suspended parliament, till 26 July. A 
frustrated and angry O’Neill declared that the opposition would boycott 
parliament until Somare and Nape were removed from office. Meanwhile, with 
MPs continuing to cross the floor, the registrar of political parties complained 
that, ‘The majority of the members of Parliament do not understand the 
provisions of the Organic Law’ and said that parties ‘continuing to cause 
headaches’ could be recommended for deregistration (Post-Courier 19 July 
2004). 
 
After meeting for a few days at the end of July, and amid claims that some 
MPs had carried firearms into the National Parliament, parliament was again 
adjourned, from 3 August to 2 November 2004, thereby again forestalling a vote 
of no confidence, though the chief ombudsman threatened court action against 
the parliament, which he said was breaching the constitution by failing to meet 
for the required sixty-three days in the parliamentary year. Opposition leader 
O’Neill accused Somare of attempting to establish an Indonesian-style ‘guided 
                                                     
6 In July Somare had removed all opposition MPs from the Private Business Committee, 
effectively enabling the government to block motions of no confidence. 
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democracy’ in Papua New Guinea (The National 6 August 2004). It was also 
reported that the Ombudsman Commission would look into the membership of 
the Parliamentary Private Business Committee following its rejection of two 
motions of no confidence (see Post-Courier 2 August 2004).  
 
Following the adjournment of parliament, Somare removed PAP leader 
Maladina (who had been sacked in April but subsequently reappointed) as 
deputy prime minister, accusing him of plotting against the government. 
Maladina had said he would resign from government because the PAP was not 
happy with ‘a lack regard for our standing within the coalition’. 
 
When parliament met again in November 2004 the opposition vowed to 
pursue its vote of no confidence, but there were also talks between government 
and opposition leaders about the possible formation of a ‘grand coalition’. In the 
event, the grand coalition did not eventuate, nor did the no confidence motion 
proceed, and in late November, after passing the budget, the house adjourned 
again, this time for three months. 
 
Meanwhile, MPs continued to switch parties and cross the floor with 
apparent impunity, and most parties remained split. In late October 2004 the 
National Court ruled that opposition-aligned Chris Haiveta was the 
parliamentary leader of Pangu, but that the expulsion of former prime minister 
Rabbie Namaliu, and two other pro-government Pangu MPs was invalid; this 
reversed earlier decisions by both the registrar of political parties and Speaker 
Nape who recognized Namaliu as leader. Pangu’s MPs were directed to meet 
and elect a new leader. The National Court also expressed concern that a 
number of party constitutions (such as Pangu’s) did not conform to the 
OLIPPAC.  
 
In November 2004 Southern Highlands governor Hami Yawari moved to the 
government ranks, bringing the number of PNGP members in government to 
seven, with two remaining in opposition. The two-member opposition-aligned 
Christian Democratic Party had also split, with Banare Bun joining the PNGP in 
government. Within the PAP, following his removal from the deputy prime 
ministership Maladina was reported to have been replaced by Brian Pulayasi 
(Post-Courier 4 August 2004). In 2007 Maladina stood for re-election as the 
leader of a new party, the Rural Development Party (RDP). In the PNC there 
was talk of a split between party founder Skate and newcomer O’Neill, but the 
party held together, with Skate moving to the middle benches early in February 
2005. Skate subsequently left the party, without objection from either the party 
or the registrar for political parties. O’Neill took over the party leadership. Skate 
died in January 2006. Rumours of a ‘planned merger’ of Pangu, PNGP and MA 
did not eventuate. 
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For several months after the August 2004 removal of Maladina there was no 
deputy prime minister. In May 2005, following an appeal to the National Court 
by Morobe governor Luther Wenge, the Supreme Court directed the prime 
minister to fill the position. The following month Sir Moi Avei, parliamentary 
leader of the Melanesian Alliance (MA), became the fourth deputy prime 
minister since 2002; four months later he was suspended from office pending 
the outcome of a Leadership Tribunal. He was replaced by Don Polye, in an 
apparent attempt to attract highlands support for the government as it 
approached the 2007 election. 
 
Amidst continuing rumours of a possible split within the NA, in early 2006 
there was a falling out between Somare and Bart Philemon. Philemon, as 
minister for Finance, had been a major architect of the government’s improved 
fiscal management, but his disciplined approach had not always been welcomed 
by MPs seeking funds to appease their electorates. In July 2006 Philemon lost 
the Finance portfolio, which was given to Namaliu, and Philemon and Somare 
clashed over the issue of succession to the NA party leadership. Philemon went 
on to form his own party, the New Generation Party (NGP), and contested the 
election under this banner, strongly opposing the NA (see chapter 9). 
 
In August 2006 the registrar for political parties announced that fourteen 
parties were to be deregistered for failing to submit financial returns and lists of 
members. By this time, however, new parties were beginning to emerge, among 
them the Melanesian Liberal Party led by former PPP leader Allan Marat, the 
PNG Conservative Party founded by former PNGP member Hami Yawari, 
Maladina’s RDP, and Philemon’s NGP. (A detailed discussion of political 
parties in the 2007 election will be found in chapter 9). 
 
In the final run-up to the 2007 election, OLIPPAC notwithstanding, there 
was continuing evidence of party fluidity: in May 2007 former PNG National 
Party leader Melchior Pep defected from the party and joined the RDP, and 
PNGP leader Morauta claimed that three candidates registered and endorsed as 
PNGP members had nominated under other party banners, prompting Bengo to 
warn that the election of party-hopping candidates could be declared null and 
void.   
 
When parliament rose in May 2007 the Somare government had survived a 
full term. But arguably this was achieved at a cost to parliamentary 
performance. Lengthy adjournments of parliament did not begin with the 
Somare government, but they were certainly exploited to avoid votes of no 
confidence during the seventh parliament 2002-2007. And the large majority 
which Somare had obtained in the vote for prime minister in 2002, 
notwithstanding the limited effect of the OLIPPAC on the stability of political 
parties during the parliamentary term, put the executive in a strong position to 
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dominate parliamentary outcomes. As a result, (apart from the opposition 
boycott in 2004) MPs commonly missed sittings, the legislative output of the 
parliament was poor, and what legislation was passed was often not subjected to 
due scrutiny.7  
 
By-elections  
 
Between 2003 and 2006, ten by-elections were held to fill seats which 
became vacant through the death or dismissal of sitting MPs.8 All these by-
elections were conducted under the new LPV system. 
 
The first, in Abau Open in 2003, followed a successful appeal against the 
election in 2002 of Puka Temu (see chapter 15). Temu won the by-election on a 
distribution of preferences, having secured 49 per cent the primary vote. In 
2004, there were a further five by-elections. In Angalimp-South Wahgi Open, a 
by-election following the death of the recently elected MP Paul Wai was won 
by PNG Country Party leader, Jamie Maxtone-Graham, who came from behind 
after the first preference count, in which he gathered less than 9 per cent of the 
vote. (After being elected, Maxtone-Graham applied to join PAP but was 
rejected by PAP MPs and subsequently joined the PPP.) In Chimbu Provincial, 
the death of the sitting member and governor, Fr Louis Ambane, led to a by-
election which was won by Peter Launa, who was endorsed by the United 
Resources Party. In Yangoru-Saussia, Bernard Hagoria lost his seat after being 
found guilty of misapplying public funds; the subsequent by-election was won 
by Peter Waranaka, a National Alliance candidate. In Moresby North-East 
Open, the sitting member, Casper Wollom lost his seat as the result of a 
successful dispute but regained it on a preference count in a by-election in 
which he secured 16 per cent of the primary vote. Wollom contested as a PDM 
candidate in 2002 but stood in 2004 for the PNC and, having been elected, 
defected from the PNC and joined the government. Similarly, in Wabag Open 
Sam Abal, son of former MP Sir Tei Abal and a National Alliance candidate, 
was returned after a court of disputed returns had voided his win in the 2002 
election. Abal secured 38 per cent of first preferences. In 2006 four by-elections 
were held. In Bougainville Provincial there was a by-election following the 
resignation of the sitting member John Momis to contest the Bougainville 
Autonomous Government election; the by-election was won by former 
Bougainville separatist leader Leo Hannett, who stood as an independent and 
gained 38 per cent of the primary vote. In the National Capital District a by-
                                                     
7 For a comment on parliamentary performance see, for example, Post-Courier 25 April 
2006. 
8 In two other instances, in 2003 the Supreme Court overturned National Court decisions 
in favour of appeals against sitting members (Ben Semri in Middle Ramu  and Robert 
Kopaol in Nipa-Kutubu), reversing the declaration in favour of the petitioner in the first 
instance and quashing the order for a by-election in the latter. 
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election for the seat left vacant following the death of Sir William Skate was 
won, controversially, by Port Moresby businessman Wari Vele of the National 
Alliance, who defeated Janet Sape and Powes Parkop. In Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
Open a petition against the election of the sitting member, Petrus Thomas, was 
eventually upheld and in the ensuing by-election independent John Kekeno was 
successful. And in Chuave Open, Jim Nomane was elected as an independent 
following a successful dispute against the election of David Anggo. 
 
Though polling in the ten by-elections was not without incident, they were 
generally seen as having been conducted successfully (see Institute of Policy 
Studies et al. 2004; Standish 2006), confirming the workability of the LPV 
system, despite some lengthy delays in the counting of preferences. 
 
Political issues and policy context 2002-2007 
 
Continuing public sector reform 
 
On coming to office in 2002, Prime Minister Somare quickly made clear his 
intention to maintain the previous government’s commitment to policies of 
recovery and public sector reform. In August 2002, faced with a deteriorating 
fiscal situation, the government introduced a Program for Recovery and 
Development which identified as its three main objectives: ‘good governance; 
export-driven economic growth; and rural development, poverty reduction and 
empowerment through human resource development’. As a framework within 
which to pursue this program, and after extensive discussion, the government 
presented a revised Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) for 2003–
2007 to replace the MTDS 1997–2002. This was subsequently replaced by a 
MTDS 2005–2010. The government also announced a Strategic Plan for 
Supporting Public Sector Reform in Papua New Guinea 2003–2007, which 
superseded the Morauta government’s Medium Term Plan of Action for Public 
Sector Reform.  In presenting the 2004 budget, the then minister for Finance 
and Treasury, Bart Philemon, announced that the government’s reform agenda 
would be supplemented by a new focus on improving the management and 
control of public sector employment and expenditures; restoring the integrity of 
budget institutions and systems to improve budgetary discipline; and reviewing  
the role, functions, and outputs of each spending agency to achieve improved 
allocative and technical efficiencies in public expenditure. Among new 
measures described by the minister were a performance management system for 
departmental heads, a medium-term budget framework, an integrated financial 
management system, and the creation of a budget screening committee.9 The 
                                                     
9 For a more detailed discussion and assessment of the Somare government’s public 
sector reforms see Kua (2006) and May (2006). 
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government’s procurement processes were centralized under a Central Supply 
and Tenders Board 
 
Reforms in public administration, however, failed to overcome a number of 
problems of poor governance, including recurring financial mismanagement, 
politicization of the public service (there were frequent complaints of a ‘Sepik 
tsunami’ among senior appointments), and a high turnover in senior public 
service positions. In 2006 Public Service Minister Sinai Brown lost his portfolio 
after removing three departmental heads (from Finance, Personnel Management, 
and National Planning and Monitoring), as well as the acting provincial 
administrator of the Southern Highlands, without cabinet approval. Brown’s 
decisions were reversed, but there was further turnover of senior appointments, 
several under controversial circumstances. 
 
It is tempting to suggest that these reform initiatives were stronger in rhetoric 
than in delivery, but, assisted by more favourable external conditions, the 
commitment to improving public sector performance helped to restore 
confidence in the government’s economic management and from 2005 there 
was a new inflow of foreign investment. 
 
The economy 
 
Despite the economic recovery measures introduced by the Morauta 
government, the incoming Somare government inherited a bleak economic 
situation. Mining operations at Ok Tedi and Porgera had been temporarily 
closed down, due to drought which made the Fly River unnavigable in the Ok 
Tedi case and clashes with landowners in the case of Porgera. A proposed gas 
pipeline between Papua New Guinea and Queensland, on which economic 
hopes had been largely pinned, suffered a setback when the biggest Australian 
potential customer pulled out (the project was later abandoned), and mining and 
petroleum exploration were at an all time low. Commodity prices had slumped 
and the international value of the kina sunk to a record low point of $US0.19 in 
November 2002. The Somare government, faced with a growing deficit and 
substantial public debt, responded with a supplementary budget which initiated 
severe budget cuts in 2003. 
 
After three years of negative growth (2000–2002), GDP growth rates were 
positive in 2003 and 2004 (averaging 2.5 per cent), and with a surge in mineral 
exploration and revenues — including the announcement of Chinese investment 
in the $US650 million Ramu Nickel project and start-ups at the Kainantu, 
Hidden Valley and Wafi gold and copper mines — GDP rose 3.9 per cent in 
2005, 2.3 per cent in 2006 and an estimated 7.2 per cent in 2007. By 2004 the 
kina had recovered to $US0.31.  
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Then in 2007 came news that a multi-billion-dollar liquefied natural gas 
project, drawing on proven reserves in the Southern Highlands and Western 
Provinces, was being planned, with construction likely to commence in 2009–
2010 and production to come on stream in 2014. The development was said to 
have the potential to double Papua New Guinea’s GDP. 
 
As the 2007 election approached, perceptions of Papua New Guinea’s 
economic prospects were thus improving dramatically — though a few 
commentators were warning of the need for realistic expectations and 
responsible financial management. 
 
Electing the governor general 
 
In September 2003 Sir Albert Kipalan was voted in as the country’s new 
governor general. However the assistant clerk of the National Parliament was 
reported as saying that the vote was procedurally flawed, and the Ombudsman 
Commission announced it would look into the election and might refer the issue 
to the Supreme Court; the Ombudsman Commission was supported in this by 
the state solicitor. In November the speaker of the parliament announced that 
Kipalan was to be sworn in, but a week later the Supreme Court declared the 
election void. In a new vote, Sir Pato Kakaraya was elected, defeating Kipalan 
and Sir Paulius Matane, and his name was passed on to Buckingham Palace. 
However the election result was contested by Kipalan, who claimed there had 
been a breach of voting procedures and undue influence on some MPs (at least 
one MP alleged that attempts had been made to bribe him). In March 2004 the 
Supreme Court ruled that the nomination process had been flawed and voided 
Kakaraya’s election. Finally, in May a further election was held and this was 
won by Matane, who was duly sworn in. A challenge by Kakaraya was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court in December 2004.   
 
As speaker of the National Parliament, Skate became acting governor 
general in October 2003, and remained in that position throughout the 
subsequent deliberations. However, in May 2004 he announced that he was 
stepping down to resume the speakership, precipitating what was described at 
the time as a ‘constitutional crisis’. In the event this situation was resolved by 
the election of Matane. 
 
Bougainville 
 
Under the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001, progress was made 
towards reconciliation and reconstruction, and in December 2004, after a 
controversial challenge by the attorney general, Francis Damen, the draft 
Bougainville constitution was approved by the NEC. Preparations began for the 
first election to the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) in May 2005. 
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John Momis, the Bougainville Provincial member, resigned after thirty-three 
years in the National Parliament to contest the election. Before his death in July 
2005, Me’ekamui leader Francis Ona opposed the ABG election, but in the 
event some Me’ekamui supporters took part and the election was conducted 
peacefully. The successful candidate was former North Solomons provincial 
premier and president of the separatist Bougainville Interim Government Joseph 
Kabui. Momis subsequently became Papua New Guinea’s ambassador to China. 
 
Privatization 
 
The controversial privatization of state enterprises, supported by the World 
Bank and pursued under the Morauta government, had led to the sale of a 75 per 
cent interest in the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation to the Bank of 
South Pacific and the divesting of the government’s interest in Orogen Minerals 
Ltd (a public company floated in 1996 which took over a substantial part of the 
government’s equity in mining and petroleum companies operating in Papua 
New Guinea). In the face of widespread popular opposition to privatization, the 
incoming government suspended the policy, calling off a nearly-completed sale 
of Telikom PNG to Fiji’s privatized telecommunications corporation and 
refusing an offer from a Zimbabwean company, and suspending moves to sell 
off Air Niugini and the PNG Habours Board. A commission of inquiry into the 
sale of the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation to the Bank of South 
Pacific was initiated; in July it reported, raising questions about the adequacy of 
procedures surrounding the sale.  
 
Under the Somare government, privatization was to be maintained as part of 
the public sector reform program, but ‘on the basis of a public-private 
partnership approach’ geared to ‘the long-term interests of the Papua New 
Guinean community’ rather than ‘the short-term financing requirements of the 
National Budget’. The Independent Public Business Corporation (IPBC) 
established by the Morauta government to implement privatization policy was 
to be maintained, but as a ‘long-term asset manager’ with the task of seeing that 
state-owned assets were rehabilitated and service levels improved, and an 
Independent Consumer and Competition Commission was created to regulate 
public utility services and prices. The activities of the IPBC were not without 
controversy during 2002–2007, but the privatization issue was defused and 
some turn-around was achieved in the performance of the corporatized 
commercial statutory authorities.  
 
The entry of Digicel to the telecommunications sector, under the newly 
announced policy of competition, notwithstanding some government 
obstruction, saw a rapid expansion of mobile phone use which not only boosted 
GDP but also impacted on electoral behaviour in 2007. 
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Forestry 
 
The forestry industry was again a source of controversy in 2002–2007. In 
2003 a World Bank-supported Forestry and Conservation Project, initiated in 
2001 and involving a World Bank loan of $US17 million and grants from the 
Global Environment Facility amounting to a further $US17 million, was 
suspended by the World Bank after the Papua New Guinea government failed to 
comply with conditions concerning sustainable harvesting and social and 
infrastructure obligations to customary landowners. In 2005, the World Bank’s 
requirements not having been satisfactorily addressed, the project funding was 
withdrawn. 
 
The same year, proposed amendments to the Forestry Act of 1991, which 
had been opposed by environmental and landowner groups, failed to go through 
parliament. The amendments would have given the National Forest Board 
power to suspend provincial forest management committees and revoke 
mandatory consultations between the National Forest Board and customary 
landowners and provincial governments. 
 
Police 
 
Security problems during the 2002 election highlighted ongoing issues of 
capacity and morale within the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 
(RPNGC). In February 2004 the minister for Police and Internal Security, Bire 
Kimisopa, initiated a review of RPNGC operations and management. The 
review, headed by the president of the Police Association, Robert Ali, reported 
in November 2004, concluding that ‘policing was close to total collapse’ in 
many parts of the country and identifiing an ‘almost total failure of discipline’. 
It made a number of recommendations, including a shift to community policing, 
but follow-up action was initially largely overtaken by the arrival, and 
subsequent departure, of Australian police officers deployed under the 
Enhanced Cooperation Program (see below). However, in early 2005 Kimisopa 
warned senior RPNGC management against failure to implement the 
recommendations of the review. Kimisopa himself was under fire in the 
National Parliament for proposing to disband police mobile units and tactical 
and rapid response units, as recommended by the review.  
 
In August 2006 it was reported that the Police Commissioner, Sam Inguba, 
was under scrutiny over allegations that he had blocked an investigation by the 
police Serious Crimes Unit. Despite support for Inguba from the Police 
Association and the minister for Internal Security, his contract was not renewed 
and charges were laid against him (but subsequently withdrawn). Deputy 
Commissioner Tom Kulunga was appointed acting commissioner, but he was 
removed soon after in the wake of the ‘Moti affair’ (discussed below), though 
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he appealed his dismissal to the National Court. Deputy Commissioner Gari 
Baki, who had been controlling the state of emergency in the Southern 
Highlands, was also charged, with ‘spreading disaffection within the force’, and 
suspended. Assistant Commissioner Fred Sheekiot became the new acting 
commissioner, but he too was removed when suspended by acting deputy 
commissioner Tony Wagambie. Finally, in December Baki was appointed as 
commissioner, and remained in the position to oversee the 2007 election.  
 
Instability was not confined to the position of commissioner. In April 2006 
Kimisopa lost the Internal Security portfolio, in what was generally seen as a 
demotion. His place was taken by Alphonse Willie, but shortly after, Willie was 
also removed — a casualty of the Moti affair. 
 
On becoming commissioner, Baki moved to set up an operation to 
investigate allegations of involvement in corrupt practices and links to Asian 
crime by senior police officers and personnel in other government agencies, 
including the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Internal Revenue 
Commission. 
 
The bitter factional infighting and obvious politicization of the police 
commissioner’s position did nothing to strengthen the RPNGC’s capabilities or 
raise police morale as they faced the daunting task of delivering a peaceful 
election — especially after the chair of the Parliamentary Permanent Committee 
on Law and Order announced that his committee would recommend deferring 
elections for twelve months due to the worsening situation in the highlands.  
 
Southern Highlands Province 
 
The failure of elections in six of the Southern Highlands Province’s nine 
electorates in 2002 was symptomatic of the general breakdown of law, order 
and governance in most parts of the province which had been ongoing for 
several years (see Haley and May 2007). An independent audit of the provincial 
government’s finances in 2003 confirmed the extent of the breakdown of 
governance, but there was little follow-up and no prosecutions at that time. 
Crime and political violence often prevented the delivery of government 
services, drove businesses away, and threatened the viability of the oil and gas 
projects from which the province, and the nation, hoped to derive wealth but 
which in fact had brought escalating inter-group competition for royalties and 
compensation. Teachers and other public servants were leaving their positions 
and pubic facilities had closed down. Police, for the most part, were 
outnumbered and outgunned and ‘warlords’ controlled large parts of the 
province. Elected leaders often spent more time in Port Moresby than in their 
electorates. 
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Prime Minister Somare’s repeated promise to create a new Hela Province 
within the Southern Highlands Province — a move strongly opposed by the 
man elected as governor in 2003, Hami Yawari — created additional tensions in 
the province. 
 
In June 2006 the Ombudsman Commission referred Governor Yawari to the 
public prosecutor for alleged breaches of the Leadership Code (specifically, 
misappropriation of public funds), and with the governor suspended, on 1 
August the national government declared a state of emergency in the Southern 
Highlands. Most Southern Highlands MPs supported the declaration, 
particularly opposition leader Peter O’Neill (the member for Ialibu-Pangia), 
who had earlier expressed concern at the build-up of weapons in the pre-election 
period. Yawari, on the other hand, condemned the move and threatened to block 
the proposed gas pipeline to Queensland. 
 
With the state of emergency in place, and some 760 police and PNGDF 
personnel brought into the province, a degree of order was imposed: stolen 
government vehicles were recovered and illegal residents evicted from 
government housing; several provincial officials were at last prosecuted (though 
Southern Highlanders observed that the guilty bigmen avoided prosecution), 
and some weapons were surrendered. A member of the parliamentary 
committee overseeing the state of emergency said that the committee had 
uncovered ‘a jungle of corruption never seen before’ (Post-Courier 19 October 
2006). The successes of the operation were marred, however, by poor logistics 
and frequent lack of discipline on the part of police and soldiers. 
 
The state of emergency was extended by the National Parliament several 
times but lapsed in January 2007, and Yawari resumed his governorship. The 
charges against him were subsequently dismissed for ‘lack of evidence’, but a 
new provincial administrator, William Powi — a senior bureaucrat with 
experience in Waigani — was appointed by the NEC to replace Yawari’s 
appointee. (For an account of the special police operations in the Southern 
highlands during the 2007 election see chapter 6.) 
 
Decentralization 
 
By 2002 there seems to have been general agreement that the 
decentralization ‘reforms’ embodied in the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial 
Governments and Local-level Governments (OLPGLLG) had not delivered the 
intended benefits. In a foreword to the Medium Term Development Strategy 
2005-2010 the then Minister for National Planning and Monitoring, Sir Moi 
Avei, suggested that deficiencies in the design and implementation of the 
OLPGLLG had been ‘a major factor impeding service delivery’ and referred to 
‘the dysfunctional system of service delivery’ that had arisen after 1995. There 
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was confusion over the distribution of functional and financial responsibilities 
between the different levels of government, a shift of service delivery functions 
to sub-national level had not been matched by a reallocation of financial 
resources, and administrative capacity at provincial, district and local level was 
generally weak. The critical role of national MPs in the allocation of funds, 
through the joint district planning and budget priority committees (and 
specifically through district support grants — popularly known as ‘slush 
funds’), had contributed to the weakening of provincial and local-level 
governments and the politicization of service delivery. 
 
In 2003 a study of the distribution of responsibilities across the different 
levels of government was undertaken, and in 2002 the National Economic and 
Fiscal Commission presented the first of a series of reports on the 
intergovernmental financial system, describing arrangements as ‘very unfair, 
with some Provincial Governments…having less than one-third of funding they 
needed to meet their service delivery responsibilities’. Critical reforms in these 
areas, however, did not come until after the 2007 election. 
 
Meanwhile, in 2005 a District Authorities Act, introduced by Peter O’Neill, 
was passed, to authorize the establishment of eighty-nine district authorities as 
the basic units of sub-national governance. Although there was significant 
support for O’Neill’s initiative, the act — whose compatibility with the 
OLPGLLG was not clear — was not debated, and though it was passed it was 
never certified and thus lapsed. A move to reintroduce the bill in 2006 did not 
gain support. 
 
Promises, dating back to 2003, to create two new provinces — Hela, to be 
formed from within the Southern Highlands Province, and Jiwaka from within 
the Western Highlands Province — were reiterated by the Somare government 
as late as 2006 but when parliament rose in May 2007 the necessary 
amendments to the Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries had not been 
presented.  
 
Relations with Australia and the ‘Moti Affair’ 
 
Relations between the Somare government and the Australian government of 
John Howard were already strained in 2002 after members of the Australian 
government had made clear their preference for a Morauta government to 
emerge from the national election that year. Relations were exacerbated by 
comments by Australian Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Affairs 
Minister Alexander Downer in the context of a review of Australian aid to 
Papua New Guinea and by the Australian government’s repeated reference to 
Papua New Guinea as a failing or fragile state.  
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There was consequently some reservation on Papua New Guinea’s part about 
Australia’s offer to increase development assistance to Papua New Guinea by 
$A805 million over four years, in part through the placing of Australian police 
and administrative support personnel in line positions. Nevertheless an 
Enhanced Cooperation Agreement was signed in June 2004 and some 260 
police and specialist advisers began to arrive in Papua New Guinea. Disputes 
arose, however, over the Australian government’s insistence that Australian 
personnel be granted immunity from Papua New Guinea laws. Legislation to 
give effect to the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) was passed in July but 
was challenged by Morobe governor Luther Wenge and subsequently ruled to 
be unconstitutional. The ECP was set aside, though some civilian personnel 
stayed in the country in advisory positions, and at the end of the year an 
Enhanced Defence Partnership Agreement was signed with Australia. 
 
In 2005 tensions were again raised by an incident at Brisbane airport in 
which Prime Minister Somare was required to remove his sandals for an airport 
security check, an incident for which Australian Foreign Minister Downer was 
conspicuously unapologetic. 
 
Then in 2006 a dispute between Australia and the Solomon Islands 
government spread to Papua New Guinea when the Australian government took 
exception to the appointment of Fiji-born Australian citizen Julian Moti as 
attorney general of Solomon Islands, with responsibility for setting up an 
inquiry into riots which followed the 2005 election in Solomon Islands. The 
Australian government anticipated that Moti, who had close associations with 
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, would divert blame for 
the riots onto the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) and sought to block Moti’s appointment by reviving 
allegations of a child sex offence by Moti in Vanuatu in 1997. The Australian 
Federal Police sought Moti’s extradition to Australia.  
 
In a series of somewhat bizarre developments, while in transit in Papua New 
Guinea in September Moti was arrested, released on bail, and secretly flown out 
of Moresby on a PNGDF aircraft to a small airfield in Solomon Islands. After 
two internal reports — one initiated by the chief secretary and one by the 
commander of the PNGDF — had been rejected, a Defence Board of Inquiry, 
headed by Justice Gibbs Salika, identified a litany of violations of laws and 
regulations, including: no flight plan had been lodged with civil aviation 
authorities, no proper clearance had been obtained for the use of the aircraft 
(which had been officially grounded since 2002 pending a major service), and 
the removal of Moti contravened domestic and international laws. Investigation 
of the funding of the operation also uncovered a record of gross financial 
mismanagement, fraud, nepotism and intimidation within the Defence 
Department. More seriously, the Inquiry was unable to establish who had 
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authorized the flight, with contradictory evidence implicating the director 
general of the Office of National Security Coordination and Assessment, the 
chief secretary, the prime minister’s chief of staff, and the prime minister 
himself (who denied giving the order but declined to appear before the Board of 
Inquiry). Counsel assisting Justice Salika commented that some of the witnesses 
‘would have qualified for Olympic gold medals for lying’ (quoted in The 
National 22 January 2007). Meanwhile, the chief secretary, the acting police 
commissioner and the commander of the PNGDF, Commodore Ilau, and his 
chief of staff were all briefly suspended, with rumours of a potential mutiny if 
Commodore Ilau were sacked.  
 
Several attempts were made to terminate the inquiry, which the prime 
minister and the Defence secretary accused of exceeding its powers. These 
attempts included an unsuccessful application to the National Court to have the 
proceedings of the inquiry declared void. The Defence minister, Martin Aini (a 
Pangu Pati MP), was instructed by the prime minister to stop the inquiry and in 
February 2007 was relieved of his portfolio, which was taken over by the prime 
minister. Somare later refused to release the report, which recommended legal 
action against some of those involved (the report was leaked to the Australian 
media, however, and became available online10). Somare’s attempts to suppress 
the report of the Defence Board of Enquiry were widely criticized in Papua New 
Guinea and Australia. The Australian high commissioner in Papua New Guinea 
was recalled briefly and the Australian government placed a temporary ban on 
visits to Australia by Papua New Guinean MPs and called off a scheduled 
bilateral ministerial meeting. Papua New Guinea’s high commissioner in 
Australia was also recalled. 
 
The Moti affair marked a low point in relations between the two countries 
but it also reflected poorly on the management of the PNGDF and on the 
behaviour of the Somare government (as well as on the behaviour of the 
Australian government, which in effect had precipitated the crisis). In the event 
it probably had little impact on the 2007 election, but occurring on the eve of 
the election, and receiving widespread media coverage, it contributed to a 
growing cynicism about the government’s style of governance. 
 
Deteriorating relations with Australia also encouraged Papua New Guinea to 
look towards its northern neighbours. In 2003 a high-level delegation from 
China had visited Papua New Guinea, and in 2007 Somare said that if Australia 
withdrew its aid from Papua New Guinea, ‘we are prepared’, and he observed 
that the large-scale Chinese investment in the Ramu mine was a ‘big step’ for 
Papua New Guinea. 
 
                                                     
10 http://media.theaustralian.com.au/pdf/070802-pngrz.pdf 
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Corruption and misconduct 
 
Corruption featured as a major issue in election campaigns in 2002, but 
notwithstanding the election rhetoric, during the life of the 2002–2007 
parliament corruption and misconduct remained core issues. 
 
In 2003 Yangoru-Saussia MP Bernard Hagoria (who had entered parliament 
in a by-election brought about by the dismissal of his predecessor for a similar 
offence) was found guilty of misapplying public funds and dismissed from 
office. Mendi MP Michael Nali was also before a Leadership Tribunal in 2003 
and stepped down from office; he was subsequently found guilty of 
misappropriation and it was later reported that a warrant had been issued for his 
arrest. However in March 2006 the Supreme Court surprisingly quashed the 
guilty verdict, freeing Nali to re-contest in 2007. 
 
Towards the end of 2003 the report of an inquiry into the National Provident 
Fund (NPF) was tabled in parliament. The inquiry had been set up in 2000 to 
look into the loss of some K170 million of public superannuation funds, through 
financial mismanagement and in some cases fraudulent transactions. It found 
widespread abuse of responsibilities by senior NPF officers and board members, 
including criminal acts, and recommended that a number of people — including 
current MPs O’Neill, Skate and Haiveta — be referred to the Ombudsman 
Commission or police.  
 
In 2004–2005 a number of MPs were referred to the Ombudsman 
Commission under the Leadership Code and subsequently passed on to the 
public prosecutor — though in August 2004 the chief ombudsman expressed 
frustration at his commission’s inability to charge leaders who breached the 
Leadership Code. Those referred included: the member for Angoram, Arthur 
Somare (referred to the public prosecutor 2006 on charges of misconduct in 
office, but found not guilty and reinstated as a minister); the member for Aitape-
Lumi, Patrick Pruaitch (referred to the Ombudsman Commission over 
allegations of misconduct in office, but still a minister at the end of the seventh 
parliament); NCD Governor Bill Skate (cleared of charges); Milne Bay 
Governor Tim Neville (charges dismissed); Enga Governor Peter Ipatas (found 
guilty on 16 misconduct charges, fined, and resumed office); the member for 
Wosera-Gaui, Gallus Yumbui (suspended in 2005 and recommended for 
dismissal in 2007); Usino-Bundi member Peter Yama (who initially pleaded 
guilty to 7 of 34 charges but changed his plea to not guilty and was 
subsequently found guilty on three charges and recommended for dismissal; in 
2005 the National Court overturned this decision and Yama remained in office); 
Manus MP Charlie Benjamin (found guilty on 19 misconduct charges and 
attempted bribery of the Leadership Tribunal and dismissed from office); the 
member for Maprik, Gabriel Kapris (found guilty on two misconduct charges in 
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2006, fined but remained in office); the member for Abau, Puka Temu (found 
guilty of failure to file returns under the Leadership Code, fined, and returned to 
office); and the member for Markham, Andrew Baing (referred to the 
Ombudsman Commission in January 2004; before a committal court in 
September 2005 on charges of misconduct in applying district support grants to 
his own use; suspended in June 2006 pending a Leadership Tribunal inquiry, 
which in December 2006 recommended his dismissal).  
 
The saga continued in 2006, with the member for Dei, Melchior Pep found 
guilty of three misconduct charges (for which he was fined and allowed to stay 
in office), Southern Highlands Governor Hami Yawari (misappropriation 
charges being dismissed for ‘lack of evidence’); the member for Bulolo, John 
Muingnepe (suspended pending the outcome of a Leadership Tribunal, which 
had not made a ruling before parliament rose), and the member for Kairuku-
Hiri, Sir Moi Avei (found guilty of five misconduct charges and recommended 
for dismissal in May 2007). In early 2007, Gulf governor Chris Haiveta was 
suspended but the Leadership Tribunal set up to hear charges against him was 
adjourned until after the election, and the acting public prosecutor requested the 
chief justice to set up a Leadership Tribunal to investigate allegations against 
Finschhafen MP Guao Zurenouc relating to his term as secretary of the 
Department of Lands and Physical Planning from 2000 to 2002. 
 
In addition, the member for Madang Open, Alois Kingsley, was charged in 
2003 with assault and damage over an incident at a Port Moresby club, but was 
acquitted; the member for Ialibu-Pangia Peter O’Neill was in court in 2005, 
facing eight charges of misappropriation and conspiracy stemming from the 
inquiry into the National Provident Fund, but escaped prosecution; the member 
for Rai Coast, James Yali was charged with rape in 2006 and sentenced to gaol 
for twelve years (in 2007 Yali was appealing the sentence and permitted to 
stand for re-election, but he lost the appeal, and his seat, shortly after the 
election), and the member for South Fly, Conrad Haoda, was sentenced to two 
months gaol for contempt of court. 
 
Misconduct was not confined to MPs. In 2003–2004 the auditor general, 
Mark Wari was found guilty of 33 misconduct charges under the Leadership 
Code and dismissed; the managing director of the National Forest Authority, 
Molean Chapau, (whose appointment reportedly had led to the suspension of a 
loan by the Asian Development Bank) was suspended pending investigation 
into alleged financial mismanagement, and Trade and Industry Secretary 
Jonathan Soten was suspended over allegations of misconduct and 
incompetence. Clerk of parliament Ano Pala was referred to the Ombudsman 
Commission in 2005 but was not prosecuted (Pala was elected to the National 
Parliament in 2007 and subsequently became attorney general). In 2005, amidst 
recurring allegations of corruption within the Department of Finance, Finance 
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Secretary Thaddeus Kambani was sacked and the following year a major 
inquiry into the Finance Department was launched. The inquiry had not been 
completed in 2007: the Commission of Inquiry subsequently complained that 
there had been active opposition to its work — the Commission was suspended 
and re-established five times between August 2006 and September 2008 — and 
that senior officers of the department, including the incoming secretary Gabriel 
Yer, ‘have at all times been difficult even combative with the Commission’ 
(Commission of Inquiry 2009:8, 57). Its report, finally presented in 2009, was 
damning. Also damning was an audit report on the Southern Highlands 
Province, presented by the minister for Inter-governmental Relations, Sir Peter 
Barter in 2003 (see above). 
 
Notwithstanding claims by its chairman that the Parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee was being threatened, the committee undertook a number 
of inquiries into government departments and agencies, including Air Niugini, 
Telekom, the National Capital Development Commission (NCDC), the 
Department of Lands and Physical Planning, the National Housing Commission, 
the Public Service Commission, and the Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring and Office of Rural Development. Some of these, notably those into 
the NCDC, Department of Lands, National Housing Commission, and 
Department of National Planning, were scathing in their criticisms of the 
management of the agencies concerned. 
 
Papua New Guinea on the eve of the 2007 election 
 
When the seventh parliament finally rose in May 2007, the Somare 
government had survived a full term, the first government to do so since 
independence. The provisions of the OLIPPAC had contributed to this, but so 
also had political manoeuvring within the National Parliament. Despite the 
OLIPPAC provisions designed to achieve political party stability, parties had 
split and members had crossed the floor with apparent impunity. A partisan 
speaker, the stacking of the parliamentary Private Business Committee, frequent 
adjournments of the parliament, and several cabinet reshuffles had all been 
elements of a strategy to keep the government in power, leading to widespread 
complaints, inside and outside the parliament, of under-performance by MPs 
and executive dominance which threatened Papua New Guinea’s democratic 
tradition. 
 
As against this, there had been a marked improvement in the county’s 
economic circumstances and prospects, and notwithstanding continuing 
problems of poor service delivery, weak governance and corruption, the Somare 
government was generally seen as having achieved a good record in its term of 
office. 
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As the election approached, there were growing concerns about electoral 
preparations — especially in relation to the electoral roll and last-minute 
changes to the format of ballot papers — and about the potential for election-
related violence; there were even calls for the election to be postponed. But 
overall Papua New Guinea was probably in a stronger position than it had been 
for some years. 
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4 THE VOTER EDUCATION PROGRAM: GROWING A DEMAND 
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
Susan Ferguson1 
 
Introduction 
 
Participation in voter education changed the lives of many people who ran voter 
awareness projects for the 2007 general elections in Papua New Guinea. It 
changed the voting behaviour of a proportion of those who took part in the 
program. This account of the voter education program through civil society 
organizations (CSOs) is a personal account from a participant in the process, 
since the key to electoral awareness lay in its participatory nature. My account is 
backed up by an evaluation of the program, but is essentially a subjective diary 
of what we did. 
 
In March 2006 I was appointed as the communications adviser within the 
Electoral Support Program. The Electoral Support Program was, at the time, a 
three-year program funded by the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID). The overall aim of the program was to support the 
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) run free and fair elections. 
I was specifically responsible for implementing a component of the program 
which aimed to improve awareness and understanding of the electoral system by 
voters and the community as a whole. Although my official role was capacity 
building within the PNGEC to run community awareness, the reality was that 
the program had a generous budget to fund CSOs to run voter education across 
the country. Inevitably I was drawn into running and managing an extensive 
grants program, which took me away from hands-on capacity building within 
the PNGEC itself. Since this grants program was not to be ongoing, nor 
considered core work of the PNGEC, there was no necessity to build the 
PNGEC’s capacity to run such a program, yet there was a necessity under the 
design of the Electoral Support Program to deliver the grants to run voter 
education. 
 
Within the PNGEC, I worked alongside the director of the Information and 
Community Awareness Division to develop a communication strategy that 
                                                     
1 As coordinator of the voter education awareness program I worked closely with Esmie 
Sinapa, the Electoral Support Program activity manager, and Daisy Taylor, who was 
contracted to develop a range of electoral awareness materials. This paper draws on my 
experience working within the Information and Community Awareness Division of the 
Electoral Commission and on an evaluation of the voter education process led by 
Stephen Gari. Other members of the team included Michael Unage, Suzette Holm and 
Pastor Solomon Minga. I am grateful for the work they did and acknowledge their 
contribution to this story. 
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guided the process of community awareness across the country. The strategy 
was called Election News! Election Sivarai! Eleksen Toksave! It included media 
awareness, development of electoral awareness materials, and the creation of 
partnerships within government and beyond, including the civil society aspect 
of the electoral awareness. 
 
This paper provides an account of the communication strategy, concentrating 
on the innovative grants program — innovative because, for the first time since 
the early 1970s, the Commission was involved in trying to grow a demand for 
better elections across the country, rather than simply providing information 
about the logistics of elections. It talks about what worked and what didn't work.  
 
Background 
 
It is well documented that Papua New Guinean elections suffer from a range 
of damaging voter behaviour entrenched within the public. This behaviour 
includes accepting bribes to vote for certain candidates, discarding the electoral 
roll in favour of ‘line up’ voting, voting more than once and in some cases many 
times, underage voting, and intimidation of voters by candidate supporters 
(especially intimidation of women, older people and illiterate voters). One 
aspect of behaviour which is damaging to the running of free and fair elections 
in the country is public collusion in the development of a fraudulent electoral 
roll. The basis of much of the illegal activity around elections is a fraudulent 
roll. For example, a vastly inflated roll means that certain wards will be 
allocated too many ballot papers; this allows for multiple voting. 
 
Much of this behaviour cannot be controlled during elections by presiding 
officers at polling stations, or by police or the army. It is too widespread. 
Although there are quite tough penalties for some offences, such as six months 
imprisonment for putting a ballot paper not your own into a ballot box, they are 
rarely enforced due to the extent of the behaviour (in some parts of the country, 
it would be necessary to charge 90 per cent of the voting population) and the 
general acceptance of such behaviour by the public. 
 
A report commissioned by the Electoral Support Program to assess baseline 
voter education issues revealed that:  
 
voters and candidates have their own picture about the purpose of 
elections, as well as the ‘real rules’ of how elections are actually 
carried out — this picture varies across the country in its 
compliance with formal rules and violence….there is a widespread 
view that elections are there to be won, by whatever means. Voters 
do not understand and accept core standards of voting, fairness, 
tolerance, and the connection to the wider democratic system 
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(Ladley and Williams 2007, quoted in Gari, Holm and Ferguson 
2008:189). 
 
The baseline study points out that research around the world suggests that the 
single most important factor in running viable elections that follow the official 
rules is voter compliance. Most voters must know the rules, accept the rules, 
and follow the rules in order for democratic elections to function. At least two 
things must be in place for this acceptance and compliance to occur. The first is 
knowledge of and agreement with the system: What is a democracy? Why do 
we have elections? What can we expect from leaders? What is the role of 
government? Why is our vote important? What is the purpose of actually 
voting? The second is faith in the system: If we follow the rules, will everyone 
else? Will our leaders represent us if we vote for them? Can we trust them? 
 
The voter education program that we ran with CSOs attempted to increase 
knowledge and understanding of the democratic system and to begin to grow a 
demand for properly-run elections that produced trustworthy candidates. 
 
The baseline study also showed that the most effective voter education 
programs have three elements: general civics education that provides people 
with information about the broad democratic system; governance education that 
gives people information about how the government system runs; and electoral 
information that educates people about how to vote and what to expect during 
elections. 
 
In the past, the PNGEC’s communication strategies had only seriously 
addressed the third of these. The design of the Electoral Support Program 
allowed for the other two as well. The communication strategy that the PNGEC 
agreed to reflected all three elements of voter education. 
 
There were three outcome areas within the communication strategy, Election 
News! Election Sivarai! Eleksen Toksave! The first was to improve awareness 
about the recently introduced limited preferential voting (LPV) system and the 
electoral process in the community. The aim of this was to enable free and fair 
elections through increased understanding of the electoral system and equal 
public participation. The second was to strengthen partnerships with 
stakeholders to deliver to the community awareness of LPV and the electoral 
process. The aim of the third was to design materials with strategic partners that 
had specific messages for different groups, recognizing the diversity within 
Papua New Guinea. 
 
The agreed principles of the strategy were: 
• elections are everybody's business so the electoral commission will 
need to work with everybody to get the messages out; 
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• messages need to be clear and effective; 
• all messages will be politically neutral; 
• coordination across different groups with an interest in elections will 
make the communication strategy more effective; 
• Papua New Guinea is very diverse so there will need to be many 
different ways of getting the messages to different groups – one size 
does not fit all. 
 
The PNGEC's communication strategy was the backbone of the civil society 
awareness work. Every two or three months, a communication advisory 
committee, chaired by the director of Information and Community Awareness 
Division within the Commission, met to overview the communication strategy, 
with particular emphasis on civil society awareness. In this way, civil society 
awareness was very much a part of the PNGEC’s concerns. But despite this, 
there were ongoing problems of ownership of the process. This problem is 
discussed below. 
 
There were other reasons to run an extensive new process of community 
awareness for the 2007 elections. LPV was new to most of the country and it 
was imperative that as many people as possible understood how to mark their 
ballot papers effectively under the new system. 
 
In addition, the PNGEC itself did not have the resources available to reach 
into the remote areas of the country with electoral information. Educating the 
public in Papua New Guinea is a real challenge due to the inaccessible terrain 
and lack of road transport systems into much of the country, the numerous 
languages and cultural differences amongst target audiences, and the low levels 
of access to the media. This is compounded by low literacy, particularly 
amongst women and older people.  
 
In the past, the Commission had relied principally on the mass media and 
publication of written materials which were distributed through the provincial 
electoral offices. It had also run a LPV awareness campaign through the 
provincial election managers. The idea was that managers would work through 
district and local-level government officials to spread the word across the 
country. This process was not evaluated formally but its impact appears to have 
been mixed. In areas where there was a better-functioning local-level 
government system, such as Milne Bay and East New Britain provinces, the 
results were better. In areas where local- and district-level officials were closely 
aligned with candidates, the process did not work at all and was in fact used to 
reinforce corrupt voting practices in favour of preferred candidates. 
 
The awareness process through the local-level government system was 
linked to the roll enumeration. Officials were trained in LPV at the same time as 
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they received training on how to enumerate the roll, and they were supposed to 
run awareness campaigns at the same time as gathering names for the new roll. 
It may be assumed, therefore, that where the roll enumeration did not work 
(most of the highlands provinces and National Capital District, for example), 
neither did the electoral awareness. Feedback from election managers 
themselves was that the election awareness took a backseat to the roll. This was 
because of the high interest in manipulation of the roll and because people were 
desperate to get their names on the roll. Feedback from community members 
about the roll enumeration process also suggests that in many cases election 
officials did not go beyond the end of road to collect names; it can be assumed 
that very little awareness went beyond the end of the road either. 
 
This is another reason that the civil society electoral awareness was 
considered important: we assumed that locally-based members of community 
organizations would be better able to take the message back to their local areas. 
 
We also assumed that community civil society workers would be able to use 
their local networks and languages to deliver election messages. With the high 
level of illiteracy, we hoped that CSOs would pass on messages verbally rather 
than use primarily written materials. Use of the media and development of print 
materials is also expensive; funding local people was much more cost-effective. 
 
Finally, CSOs and non-government organizations (NGOs) wanted to be 
involved. We did not formally advertise the grants through the Electoral 
Support Program but we were inundated with applications just the same. There 
was a huge demand from CSOs across the country to be involved in running 
electoral awareness programs. There seemed to be the beginnings of a nation-
wide movement; local groups wanted to educate people about the basics of a 
democratic system and the role of good leaders, as well as how to fill in a ballot 
paper correctly. It was opportune that the Electoral Support Program could 
nurture some of this energy to grow a demand for free and fair elections. 
 
The Campaign 
 
Administration 
 
First, we set up the Communications Advisory Group (CAG), chaired by the 
director of the Information and Community Awareness Division. Some key 
CSOs were represented, including Caritas, Transparency International (TI) and 
Papua Hahine. Government departments and community police were also 
represented, as was the Community Development Scheme, a large AusAID-
funded program providing resources for community groups across the country. 
The media was represented through the National Broadcasting Corporation 
(NBC).  
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Initially the role of the CAG was to oversee civil society funding, but 
subsequently the Group was given responsibility for overviewing the whole of 
the communications strategy. When this happened, the CAG still made ultimate 
decisions about who should receive funding but each reported under the three 
outcome areas of the PNGEC’s communication strategy. The CAG became 
more a participative group than an administrative one. The idea was to enable 
the CAG to have a voice within the PNGEC on voter education as a whole. 
 
Under the overall communication strategy, the PNGEC spent just over 
K588,000 on thirteen launches of LPV awareness materials. A further K2.3 
million was spent on awareness materials for radio, TV and newspapers. (After 
the election, there was still over K93,000 in outstanding claims from the media.) 
Under the Electoral Support Program K5.2 million was spent on funding CSOs 
and a further K1.5 million on media awareness and the development and 
production of awareness materials such as posters, pamphlets, and T-shirts. 
 
Forty-five groups were funded to run electoral awareness; five were de-
funded because of mismanagement. Incomplete records show that electoral 
awareness community teams contacted at least 750,000 people personally. 
About one third of these were women. This represents an expenditure of K7.4 
per person contacted.  
 
The largest amount of money (K785,125) was given to TI, which used this 
mainly to develop some excellent materials on governance which were used 
throughout the campaign by other CSOs and by the PNGEC itself. (In fact, due 
to the delay in production of official awareness materials, the PNGEC often had 
only the TI or Caritas materials for their electoral awareness launches in the 
regions.) The smallest amount (K10,830) was given to  Meri i Kirap Sapotim to 
fund electoral awareness for the Chuave by-election of 2006. 
 
The Electoral Support Program funded over six million pieces of educational 
material or media events which carried the message to the public, at a cost of 
K1.03 per person nationally. Difficulty of access in the rural areas resulted in 
urban people having twice as much money spent on them. We tried to equalize 
this by ensuring that the majority of CSOs funded were in rural and remote 
areas or in high-risk areas such as Port Moresby and Lae. 
 
Unfortunately, the PNGEC did not allocate funds to assess the effectiveness 
of the program funded through the Commission itself, so much of this paper 
relies on information received from the evaluation of the Electoral Support 
Program component of electoral awareness. 
 
Within the program, all expressions of interest and applications were 
assessed against rigid criteria, which included: 
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• the capacity of groups to run the program; 
• the inclusion of cross cutting issues such as participation of women, 
and HIV/AIDS prevention; 
• the degree of election risk; 
• population — we tried to make the grants correspond to population 
numbers across the country (more people live in the highlands so 
more money was spent there); 
• the kind of program groups wanted to run (preference was given to 
face-to-face, grassroots processes after a while, as we began to see 
that these were far more effective);  
• the budget (was it overblown or did it look legitimate?); and  
• involvement of election managers in development of the activity 
application.  
 
Later on in the program, once a number of groups had been funded, gaps were 
identified across the country, and proposed projects within those gap areas were 
given priority. Once the assessment of the hundreds of applications was 
complete, recommendations were presented to the CAG. There was lively 
debate within the Group, which provided a forum for sensible and informed 
decision-making. 
 
The capacity of groups was not taken into account in the first round of 
funding. Consequently, some of the first groups to receive funds needed major 
assistance to deliver their programs. Some rang the office five times a day for 
advice on anything from the content of their election awareness campaign to 
acquittal of funds. We could not sustain this level of contact, and in the end had 
to assess the capacity of groups to run their projects. 
 
The program officer, Esmie Sinapa, had the job of running initial project 
training for each group. Once groups had been deemed successful by the 
advisory group, she visited them on site to assess whether they were bona fide 
groups, and spent up to two days helping them draft activity plans and realistic 
budgets. We were not so much interested in saving money as in giving groups 
the right amount of money to run a viable activity. Budgets often changed once 
the activity plans had been written. 
 
The program officer always alerted election managers to her travel plans and 
invited them to the meetings with the group, but they rarely accepted the 
opportunity. Some felt the process of selection bypassed them and that groups 
should be vetted by election managers first and selected within the province. 
Others disagreed with the whole funding program because they felt the money 
should have gone to them to run election awareness. There was a strong 
resistance to changing the way in which voter education had always been done; 
it was seen as the territory of public servants, even though very few public 
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servants were interested in going beyond the end of the road to educate people. 
This kind of competition undermined the process throughout. Nevertheless, 
three or four election managers saw the funding as beneficial. They understood 
that working with CSOs could greatly extend the reach of community awareness 
and therefore alleviate their workload. They participated actively throughout the 
program and the CSOs in their regions benefited from their technical expertise 
in election matters. 
 
Once groups had undergone the project management training, they had to 
attend our electoral awareness training. 
 
Everybody’s Business: awareness training for civil society 
 
I developed a three-day course, entitled Everybody’s Business. This became 
necessary because every group we funded, except TI, Caritas and Meri i Kirap 
Sapotim (the only three groups in the forty-five who understood elections at all) 
expected us to train them before they went off to run their program. The 
program had not foreseen this need. 
 
The first training I ran was in the first two weeks of my arrival in Papua New 
Guinea. I went with my counterpart and another electoral official to observe 
them training district officials in Milne Bay for the roll enumeration and 
electoral awareness roll-out. The Electoral Support Program had funded the 
Milne Bay Theatre Troop to develop and perform a play on electoral issues 
primarily to educate remote communities. 
 
My only preparation was reading the material about LPV provided by the 
PNGEC for district officials, and reviewing potential training material TI had 
begun to develop. In this material, TI described a ‘paperless’ voting process in 
which the audience nominate candidates, who make ‘policy speeches’, and then 
the audience lines up behind their preferred candidate; a count is done; if no 
candidate reaches 50 per cent plus one of the votes, the candidate with the 
smallest number of supporters is knocked out and the people standing behind 
that candidate go and join the line behind their second preference, and so on. 
 
We met the theatre troop in the village, where the team leader attempted to 
explain the counting procedure on a whiteboard. He was met with blank stares; 
no one could understand the process. We conferred and agreed to run the 
paperless voting process. It was a great success, and gave me my first hint that 
participation in voting procedures was the best way of understanding how things 
worked. We returned two days later to view the performance; it was shaky but 
had potential. 
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From this experience, I developed a one-day course on LPV and trialed it 
with the Salvation Army. The course covered what the old first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) system was, how it differed from the new one, how the new LPV 
system worked, and why the roll was so important. Each exercise was 
participatory and involved lots of role-playing. People enjoyed the course but 
wanted more background information: Why did Papua New Guinea have a 
democratic system? What exactly was this, and what could be done about 
encouraging people to vote for leaders who were not corrupt? 
 
I developed a second day of additional material about what the system meant 
and how government works in Papua New Guinea, including what the role of 
elected representatives was and what kind of person made a good leader. The 
additional day included quiz shows and other ways of getting people moving 
around, and was enjoyed by all. I was indebted to Meri i Kirap Sapotim and TI 
for the use of some of their good governance training material in this second day 
of training. 
 
We trialed the revised training with Central Besena Mauri Ihatabuna and 
then the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA). Women’s issues 
were mainstreamed into each exercise. But I also wanted to include HIV/AIDS 
issues. By this time I had been in the country for several months, and concerns 
about elections being an enabling mechanism for the spread of HIV infection 
had become clear. There would be more than 36,000 male election officials with 
money moving around the country during elections. Men, mobility and money 
are three key factors in the spread of AIDS. As well, some of the cultural 
conventions that had grown up around campaigning in the highlands and in Port 
Moresby and Lae were a worry – in particular, ‘campaign houses’, meeting 
places built for candidates to gather with supporters. Risky sexual behaviour 
was rumoured to occur in these venues, which were an inherent element of the 
party atmosphere of elections in some places (see, for example, 12). 
 
I therefore wanted to include something specific about women and elections 
and about HIV and elections. Another day was added to cover these areas. The 
women’s section took the form of story about a day in the life of a woman 
trying to vote for the person she wanted to vote for, rather than the person for 
whom her husband said she should vote. The HIV section borrowed heavily 
from the National Aids Council Secretariat training manuals about the spread of 
AIDS.  
 
I also included three surveys in our training manual (see below) to assess the 
level of understanding of LPV and electoral roll-related behaviour; to assess 
how the training had affected people’s understanding of the system, and to 
assess the level of interest in changing some of their existing behaviour.  
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Finally, I added a code of conduct (based on one given to me by the 
Community Development Scheme) that stipulated that all CSOs should refrain 
from using their project to support particular candidates, should treat everyone 
(men and women) with respect, and should avoid risking transmission of HIV. 
The teams themselves became a risk of spreading the infection. This code of 
conduct became an important management tool; we came back to it several 
times during the program to enforce political neutrality. It was carefully 
explained during training, and everyone signed it and kept a copy. 
 
I trialed the training course successfully with about five other groups. No one 
understood LPV before the course but afterwards all did. All sorts of electoral 
roll-related behaviour were uncovered, which at least some people were keen to 
correct. Almost all felt they had enough technical knowledge of elections, along 
with some practical methods of imparting that knowledge through using the 
exercises they went through in the training. 
 
We prepared a training manual, entitled The Electoral System: Everybody’s 
Business, which included training exercises and other material required by 
trainers, and also the code of conduct. The manual was universally liked and 
used while people were out in the field. In hindsight, it should have been water-
proof, with laminated posters and mock ballot papers, so that people did not 
have to photocopy new material every time they went bush. A daypack would 
also have made it easier for people take the package with them with a small 
portable whiteboard. Another day could have been added to cover how to plan 
and run an election awareness project and how to manage the project cycle; 
many people struggled with these management issues. 
 
Once the program was complete and the manual printed, it was appropriate 
to contract the training out to Papua New Guinean trainers, who could run the 
training in Tokpisin rather than English. 
 
Ideally, there would have been four training teams: one in each region. 
However, as with almost everything else about this program, we had to hit the 
ground running. There was a backlog of about ten groups waiting for training 
before going out.2 A lengthy selection process was not possible. Instead, Meri i 
Kirap Sapotim was invited to submit a proposal to run the training (I had 
reviewed the training material they had created for their members and had seen 
they had training skills. I also wanted to have a gender balance of trainers). This 
organization was set up by women and their supporters to help women wanting 
to run for election; it subsequently broadened into general election awareness 
                                                     
2 After seeing the huge need for the training, we made it mandatory for groups to 
complete it before starting their project so we knew they had the technical expertise to 
give the public correct information. The training thus became a mechanism for quality 
control as well. 
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for women and men across the highlands. The group had competent, confident 
women trainers who understood elections and gender equity. I wanted them to 
bring this to the training and to show other women that elections truly were 
everybody’s business. As most groups we funded were based in the highlands, it 
also made sense to contract a local group from that region. 
 
Although more than 3500 people were trained, we have evaluations from 
only 459. The others were trained by CSO members who attended our official 
training first. The evaluations showed that people had the skills they needed to 
run their projects after participating in the training.  
 
When asked what three things worked best about the training, 98 people said 
‘the trainers’; 92 said something about the content (e.g. ‘the training was the 
best ever because it was just in time to equip us to cast our votes for the right 
people and in the long run, this will have a great impact on the lives of the 
people’); 87 people said the thing they liked best was learning how to train 
others. People particularly liked the mock election exercises (both with and 
without paper votes). 70 people said they liked the training manual itself and the 
other information given to them. 
 
The things they most liked learning about were LPV (299 responses), 
governance (151), HIV/AIDS (101), electoral processes like polling, the roll, 
etc. (100), democracy (97), vote counting (85), and women’s issues (56). 
 
Things people wanted were more role playing, longer training, and better 
training on HIV. The HIV/AIDS section should have been done by special HIV 
trainers; our trainers did not feel very comfortable running this section. Again, 
lack of time precluded coordination with provincial AIDS trainers. 
 
What happened? 
 
Much of this section draws on the evaluation we commissioned. 1071 people 
were consulted in the evaluation process, before elections, during elections and 
afterwards. There were also 10 site visits to 5 case study projects – 5 before the 
elections and 5 after. Case studies were chosen to represent a range of important 
parts of the awareness process: a national project that did grassroots awareness 
as well as development of poster awareness materials (Caritas); a provincial 
project which showed innovative partnerships (Chimbu community policing 
project, which linked with a range of CSOs to run awareness across the 
province); a foot patrol project in a high risk area (by Ima Kelo, whose members 
walked across five of the electorates that failed in the 2002 election in the 
Southern Highlands Province, over a period of seven months); a women’s 
project (Papua Hahine, based in the Southern Region, which also ran awareness 
for potential women candidates); and Morobe Theatre Troop, based in and 
44      Election 2007 
around Lae and closely coordinated with the election manager’s office in the 
province. 
 
In addition, the evaluation team talked by phone with every project manager 
and ran a number of pre- and post-polling focus group discussions with teams 
running awareness. At the end of the evaluation, 62 people attended a workshop 
in Port Moresby to verify or challenge the findings. All election managers 
attended this workshop and were invited to focus group discussions throughout 
the evaluation process. 
 
The team also sought feedback about materials developed by CSOs, from 
those who used them, as well as from other CSOs and the Electoral 
Commission. 
 
A major literature review was done of documents about voter awareness in 
general (see Gari, Holm and Ferguson 2008). The reviewer, Suzette Holm, also 
read the reports submitted by CSOs at the end of each funding tranche to 
ascertain progress, collate numbers of people reached, and generally monitor 
progress.  
 
The evaluation sought to answer two questions: Was funding CSOs to run 
election awareness efficient and effective? How did voter knowledge, attitudes 
and behaviour change as a result of civil society electoral awareness processes? 
 
Of 45 groups funded, five were de-funded, due to either deliberate 
mismanagement of funds or breaking the code of conduct through obvious 
involvement with candidates. Election managers were particularly concerned 
about this last — which is interesting, as many brought their own very clear 
biases to the workplace. Involvement with candidates was often used by election 
managers to support the argument that CSOs should not be trusted and that 
funding should revert to the Electoral Commission. 
 
In total, the time spent on electoral awareness by CSOs in the nine months 
preceding the election amounted to 230 months — almost 19 person years. 
Group reports showed that 750,000 people were contacted personally, though 
this is an underestimation as many groups neglected to collect such statistics 
regularly. About one third of those contacted were women, demonstrating that 
public awareness processes were not equally accessible to women and men. The 
total cost of the process was K5.2 million.  
 
Over 6 million units of electoral awareness materials were developed, 
including T-shirts, matchboxes with voting messages, posters, media 
announcements, talk-back radio shows, TV advertisements, and newspaper 
articles. A further K1.5 million was spent on this. Although this is an impressive 
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number of media units, it was limited largely to urban areas. Few people in rural 
areas saw or heard any of this information. Posters and T-shirts used by CSOs 
when they went out in the field were the exception. The evaluation showed that 
the materials developed were of a high quality and people liked them, but they 
were not an effective method of voter awareness when used as a stand-alone 
method; to really be effective, they needed to be used as part of an educative 
dialogue. 
 
A major problem in development of voter materials was the legislative 
changes to the format of the ballot paper. The materials that had been developed 
showed the ballot paper with 1, 2 and 3 against candidates’ pictures; suddenly, 
the ballot paper changed to having boxes in which people were required to write 
candidates numbers and/or names. As a result, most materials were not 
produced until after January 2007, although electoral awareness teams were in 
the field much earlier and needed materials showing the new format. 
 
Important ingredients of success in voter awareness were participation, and 
the use of relationships. Small group discussions were more likely to increase 
voter awareness than large market gatherings. Large market gatherings were 
effective in spreading the word about LPV and the mechanics of elections, but 
more complicated information about governance was mostly lost in such 
settings. 
 
The evaluation revealed that the Electoral Support Program itself lacked 
capacity to run the program smoothly. A major problem was that tranche 
payments were often late, leading to delays in CSO projects, and much angst. 
This lateness was a mix of insufficient staff and too much work, combined with 
delays in receiving funds from AusAID. Added to this was the fact that we 
seriously misjudged the ability of many groups to run basic projects. The first 
activities funded required a huge amount of support to keep them running. This 
led to the subsequent inclusion of existing capacity as one of the selection 
criteria for successful applicants. Pleas to the program team leader to increase 
staff levels brought no action. Full-time administrative support was needed to 
run such a grants program; instead, we had a series of ineffective accountants. 
 
The Electoral Commission itself lacked capacity to recognize the value of 
the program and use it to their advantage. A number of power brokers within the 
Commission saw the program as being in direct competition for funds. It ran 
against the culture of working only with public servants on election matters. 
Many provincial election managers resented the fact that final decisions about 
which activities should be funded came from the Advisory Committee, rather 
than themselves. The difficulty of turning over decision making to election 
managers was that many would have used the program as a way of furthering 
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their own connections with candidates. We could not be sure that final decisions 
would be fair and useful. Perhaps they felt the same. 
 
If funding of the program were to be a long-term part of the Commission’s 
work, we would have had to facilitate a process that did not necessarily involve 
the community’s participation. As it was, the program was a short-term donor-
funded initiative which had a much wider focus than the PNGEC’s usual work. 
It was about support beyond government to grow a demand in the community 
for free and fair elections. This was a legitimate aim in itself, yet poorly placed 
within the Commission, whose mandate was not that broad. Many of the 
PNGEC’s staff did not understand the concept of good governance, or what 
democracy was about. They saw their role as running an election – churning 
people through polling stations and getting all the ballot papers collected and 
counted. This is the main reason the evaluation recommended that CSO 
awareness should continue, but that it should sit within an independent body. A 
conflict between the objectives of voter education and those of the Commission 
was a sore point throughout the program and risked any beneficial outcome. 
Some powerful elements within the Commission denigrated the work of the 
program.  
 
One of the advantages of the program was that, for the first time, the public 
had a way of raising their concerns directly with the Commission. CSOs 
regularly fed information back to the PNGEC about what they saw in the field: 
where the roll was particularly bad; where the trouble spots were; the 
performance of election officials in the field; what women were saying about 
wanting to be included. However, very little of this information was used within 
electoral operations, because of the resistance towards and distrust of CSOs 
within the Commission. 
 
The design of the Electoral Support Program exacerbated these problems, as 
advisers were slotted into pigeon holes across the Commission rather than being 
able to relate directly across the Commission’s staff. I could only pass on 
information from the community to my counterpart or other advisers, and it 
depended on their levels of interest and power as to whether they effectively 
raised the issues with others. My counterpart, the director of the Information 
and Community Awareness Division, had her own interests to protect within the 
Commission and this at times inhibited what she could pursue. On the one hand, 
she was excited about the work and the success of the Communication Strategy; 
but on the other, she shared some of the misgivings of other PNGEC staff about 
broadening electoral matters beyond the public service. Changing the way 
things were done was a challenge, and required unceasing leadership on her 
part. 
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The evaluation also revealed a severe lack of capacity within CSOs at 
various levels. I remember on my first trip to work with the Milne Bay Theatre 
Troop realizing suddenly that the leader of the troop could not add up basic 
figures. I tried to teach him using the receipts he had already kept but became 
acutely aware that our project management expectations were far too ambitious 
for someone in his position, yet he would still need to acquit tens of thousands 
of kina in grant money. To his credit, he did, but it was a very trying process for 
him and for us in the Electoral Strengthening Project (ESP). Lack of skill in 
running projects was an almost universal problem, except for the larger, more 
experienced CSOs. Many groups did not understand what we expected of them, 
even after several days of explaining and training. 
 
As well, many CSOs were difficult to manage. During funding rounds, when 
groups were waiting to hear whether their applications had been successful, we 
had to employ a security guard to stay inside the office with us. Many groups 
used standover tactics in an effort to get their way if they had been unsuccessful. 
We worried about our safety during these times.  
 
We also needed to be constantly on the lookout for financial ‘sleights of 
hand’. In most cases this was due more to lack of skill than to corrupt 
behaviour. In some cases, though, groups had to be investigated and de-funded. 
The code of conduct was invoked several times when we heard that members of 
CSOs we had funded were going to run for election. We did not want to stop 
them running, we just did not want our project used in campaigning. 
 
Groups used a range of strategies: some worked in schools to educate 
students; some went on foot patrols across their regions, or hired boats to get to 
remote locations, some made up plays or used singsings. Almost all ran mock 
elections in market places or other public spots. Some even ran sessions while 
traveling on Public Motor Vehicles (PMVs). 
 
People risked their lives doing this work. There were stories of flash floods 
and people being swept downstream from their campsite by the river. I visited 
some teams who were using vehicles that were barely holding together, 
slithering around muddy mountain roads. On one occasion, in the Chimbu 
police project, when a massive spring snapped in the utility vehicle a member of 
the team walked back to town and got a replacement, weighing over 80 kilos, 
which he carried on his back for 5 kilometers. The Chimbu police team leader 
got a leech in his eye and had to put up with this for two days on patrol. People 
got stranded for long periods of time in remote locations due to mechanical 
problems with small planes or the weather. They had to create their own bridges 
out of bits of corrugated iron, or trees they chopped down. They endured 
hostility from villages who felt angry about lack of representation of their needs 
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in parliament and, not having access to their local member, hurled abuse at 
awareness teams. 
 
Very few people on foot patrols had decent equipment. They had not thought 
to ask for boots, raincoats, torches, etc. They expected so little. Once we 
realized this was the case, we remedied it, but many people took their messages 
to the people on bare feet, enduring lack of food and having slept in the open for 
many nights. 
 
If anything bad had befallen anyone on the program, apart from the horror of 
the actual event, there could have been a slew of compensation claims, not just 
against the Electoral Support Program but also against the Commission, and 
others in the awareness teams. One of the recommendations of the evaluation 
was therefore that before any similar program is undertaken, insurance needs to 
be sorted out. 
 
Growing a demand for better governance 
 
As argued earlier, personal interaction was the most effective ingredient of 
successful voter education. The awareness changed voter behaviour; it helped 
voters know how to vote, for one thing, but, more importantly, some people on 
the awareness teams changed their voting behaviour from culturally acceptable 
but negative use of the system (accepting bribes from candidates, getting their 
names on the roll as many times as possible, and so on) to commitment to free 
and fair elections. 
 
For example, the subject of one of the case studies in the evaluation was Ima 
Kelo, a local CSO based at Lake Kopiago, which worked in partnership with the 
Australian National University. It was funded to run grassroots election 
awareness across the five open electorates which produced failed elections in 
the Southern Highlands in 2002. The elections failed in 2002 due to massive 
fraud and use of violence. Despite the new roll there were still major problems: 
the rolls were grossly inflated yet many people were still not listed. This group 
reached out to over 100,000 people in their project. They walked, carrying 
portable whiteboards to run mock elections. They ran awareness sessions from 
PMVs for workers along the side of the road; in fact, they ran sessions wherever 
they could get a group together. They calculated they had covered at least 50 per 
cent of the voters in the province. Ima Kelo partnered with other local CSOs 
across the region. Core members were trained in Lake Kopiago by our trainers 
who stayed on to support the process. Men and women worked together doing 
this work.  
 
In the past, Ima Kelo members had been actively involved in typical 
electoral fraud and corruption. One team member had been the first to use guns 
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in elections in his electorate. However, during the electoral awareness process 
people in this team convinced voters living in South Koroba to clean their roll. 
Members of the awareness team sat with the community over a period of days 
and went through every name on the roll, verifying or filling in the necessary 
paperwork to alter the entries. They managed to reduce the numbers on the roll 
from 19,000 to 10,000, though they received threats from the supporters of one 
candidate who was disadvantaged by the corrections. 
 
Running daily awareness sessions in difficult conditions over eight months 
somehow changed them. Perhaps it was because repeating the messages raised 
their awareness about the need for free and fair elections. Maybe the sacrifices 
involved in months of walking the province made them determined to see some 
changes. The team suffered in the process: they were away from their families 
for months at a time and on their return many were physically exhausted. Their 
efforts illustrate the massive commitment ordinary people in Papua New Guinea 
made to run the education process.  
 
In Chimbu, the group running the community policing CSO partnership 
showed similar commitment and results. This project was coordinated by a local 
inspector of police (see chapter 7). His job was head of prosecutions, not 
community policing, but most criminal activity in 2007 was going to be 
associated with elections, so it was best to try and prevent such offences before 
they occurred. The Electoral Support Program had funded a range of CSOs in 
Chimbu:  Meri i Kirap Sapotim, Community Development Scheme Core Group, 
Tribal Arts, and the national projects, YWCA and Caritas. The inspector 
brought all groups together and worked out how to cover the province with a 
broken-down police vehicle and on foot. Teams worked with local leaders to 
arrange times to run awareness. They set up mock polling stations and showed 
how elections should be run. They worked with HIV trainers to give 
information about the risks of catching the disease through election-related 
activities. They also conducted role plays demonstrating acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour. They spoke to over 60,000 people across the province, 
sometimes in areas where local communities had rarely seen government 
officials. Women went on foot patrols too and participated alongside men. They 
were able to do this partly because they had police protection, but also because 
the team leader allocated special allowances (called ‘family allowances’) which 
were intended as a sweetener for their men staying at home – the whole family 
benefited directly if the women participated. As with Ima Kelo, some members 
of the team took it on their shoulders to try and clean their local rolls by taking 
copies to local meetings and urging people to check their names. 
 
After the election, some members of this team continued community 
policing, unpaid. One extraordinary woman, Pauline Kenna, a lawyer, using the 
contacts she had made with the police, went back to her electorate to consult 
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with her people about what they saw as their key problems. People responded 
that the use of marijuana and homemade liquor were a major source of violence 
in the region. She and police she could trust set up a community policing 
project; 250 people have now attended human rights training run by Pauline and 
the police and are working with the community to uproot marijuana plants and 
bring about more lasting peace. 
 
The team leader of this project also made valuable links with communities 
that he was able to use beneficially after the election. He established good 
connections with local leaders and knew where trouble was likely to occur. 
When tribal fights broke out due to disgruntled losing candidates, he went in 
with police and was able to broker peace, probably saving many lives.  
 
This project also brought significant wider changes. Women involved in 
electoral awareness were able to lobby the Electoral Commission to run separate 
polling booths for women as a way of reducing intimidation of women voters. 
This demand came from women voters across the highlands. Due to the 
confidence of the women involved in electoral awareness, the PNGEC finally 
heard their demands and agreed to give the idea a go.3 
 
As well, in Chimbu there was a significant decrease in the use of campaign 
houses. In one electorate there were only three, and these were used by our 
awareness teams warning people of the dangers of catching HIV/AIDS in such 
venues. The use of campaign houses went down in every highlands province 
except Enga, where there was a gap in CSO electoral awareness. 
 
Also noticeable in Chimbu was that a number of candidates used some of the 
good governance slogans from the awareness teams in their own campaigning. 
Indeed, the governor and two open candidates were elected without evidence of 
money politics – an outcome attributed to the layered approach to electoral 
awareness and a critical mass of people beginning to absorb its message. One of 
the key CSO people was put in charge of counting for the Chimbu regional seat, 
and he and others from the awareness campaign refused several large bribes (in 
his case K100,000) from candidates to rig the counting. He quoted the 
governance messages from the campaign as the key reason that he would not 
accept the bribe.  
 
Another project we funded, the Lower Unggai Community Development 
Foundation, provided a different outcome. This project was run by a capable 
                                                     
3 Unfortunately, it was not particularly successful due to poor organization on the part of 
the PNGEC (for example, not providing enough polling booths to allow for it), or 
because it was not enforced by polling officials. Many women in remote areas are 
illiterate and candidate supporters were still able to force themselves into polling places 
and convince women voters to write down what they wanted them to. 
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woman, Sallyn Lomutopa. She organized and trained a number of local people 
using the ESP training process, then ran awareness across the region. In the 
course of this awareness, she was approached many times by residents asking 
her to run in the election. After the project had finished, she decided she would 
do so. Without involvement in the awareness, she felt she would not have had 
either the technical skills or the confidence to try, especially in her highlands 
electorate where few women would attempt to run.  
 
Involvement in the process also changed those electoral managers willing to 
work with CSO members. The electoral manager in Chimbu told an Electoral 
Commission forum to discuss the local-level government elections in 2008 that 
elections had run smoothly because of the voter education process in 2007. 
Communities knew what to expect and were more willing to cooperate with the 
PNGEC than in previous elections. He was able to find people across the 
communities who understood elections and could run polling stations.  
 
It was not all good news though. CSOs were often male-dominated and 
fewer women attended electoral awareness sessions than men. Electoral 
awareness did not change the situation for many women voters, who continued 
to have their votes controlled by male clan members. It also did little to increase 
the vote for women candidates; only one woman was elected to parliament and 
she was a sitting member who had to fight for her seat in 2007. At ESP, we tried 
to ensure that CSOs reached out to women voters by not paying the next tranche 
of funding unless groups could demonstrate they had educated women. This had 
some impact, but, as noted above, only one third of those contacted in the 
education campaign were women. 
 
Some CSOs exhausted themselves in the process.  Meri i Kirap Sapotim fell 
apart during the course of the awareness. We funded them to run train-the-
trainer sessions, developing groups of interested people across the highlands. 
They completed this complicated task very well and emerged as a group with a 
great deal of capacity. Therefore, we asked them to run our training for us. 
Again, they did this well, although at one stage I had to insist they stick to our 
training manual rather than reverting to theirs. Running the training gave them a 
great sense of ownership over it, which was good but began to blur the 
boundaries between our responsibilities at ESP and theirs as consultants running 
our training course. We topped up their funding to continue regional awareness 
across the highlands but their capacity became overstretched and the 
organization started to implode from stress. Personal rifts grew stronger and 
became destructive, leading to the eventual collapse of the organization – a 
classic case of donors over-using capacity within CSOs. We needed the 
organization as they knew what they were doing and kept delivering, and they 
wanted our funds to make them sustainable. Sadly, this combination of needs 
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became damaging. I do not think that our funding was responsible for their 
demise, but it probably exacerbated existing tensions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The successful mix in voter education seems to have been a critical mass of 
awareness, as in Chimbu where a layered approach worked well, together with a 
substantial coverage of the province so people heard the messages over and over 
again in different ways. Involvement of Electoral Commission officials was 
important. In Morobe, the election manager’s staff coordinated and funded the 
Morobe Theatre Troop, so that Troop members had official support during their 
work rather than having to establish their legitimacy, as in some provinces like 
Gulf where election officials actually heckled the awareness team and tried to 
undermine their work publicly.  
 
There were also unintended consequences of the awareness. Some longer-
term partnerships developed between unlikely groups that have continued 
beyond the project, such as the police and CSOs in Chimbu. One outcome of 
this has been the establishment of a women and children’s desk within the 
police station to handle domestic violence complaints. 
 
Running awareness projects increased CSO capacity in project management, 
which should improve their ability to access further funding and make their 
organizations more sustainable. The awareness exercise also left a pool of 
trained people around the country who understand how polling stations should 
be run and how counting should be done; this provides an excellent resource for 
the PNGEC in the future.4 
 
The process also mobilized hundreds of ordinary citizens to observe the 
election process. Their desire was twofold: they wanted to check whether their 
awareness had worked and they felt a responsibility to witness elections as 
concerned citizens, believing that their presence might go some way towards 
encouraging better voting behaviour. Being involved in running voter education 
nurtured a demand for better governance and free and fair elections across the 
country. This was perhaps the most important outcome of the process: many of 
those who participated in running electoral awareness changed their own 
behaviour and wanted to help change others. Without this growing desire, 
elections in Papua New Guinea cannot be run democratically. 
 
                                                     
4 Before the 2007 national election, over 36,000 people were recruited to staff polling 
stations. The Commission tried to provide training for all these people but observation 
suggested that training was often sub-standard or non-existent. It is an almost 
impossible task to train such a vast number of people in the few months before 
elections. 
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The forces behind some of the fraudulent election behaviour are strong, 
especially the win-at-all-costs mentality of candidates and supporters. Poverty 
affects the running of elections: for many people, election time is the only time 
they can get cash, mostly through payments from candidates. Lack of education 
is another factor in poor behaviour during elections. Many people simply do not 
know why elections are run. They have not been taught what elections mean, 
what the role of parliament is, or indeed what their local members should be 
expected to do for them. In remote areas, the level of illiteracy is very high. In 
highly-populated remote areas, our groups estimated that nearly 90 per cent of 
voters were illiterate, especially women and older people. This provides a huge 
opportunity for supporters to manipulate people’s votes: if you cannot read your 
ballot paper, you have to rely on others helping you; at each polling station there 
are swarms of candidate supporters ready to step up and fill in peoples’ ballot 
papers for them. Illiteracy affects more women than men and contributes to the 
lack of power that women have in public affairs, including the election process. 
Women’s votes are more likely to be co-opted and lack of literacy enables 
further abuse of power. 
 
In the face of these entrenched societal problems, voter education which 
encourages a sense of community responsibility for free and fair elections is the 
key to positive change. We found that the election awareness training, combined 
with active participation in voter education, led to significant changes in the 
behaviour of some educators, and helped to create a widespread desire for good 
leaders. 
 
It remains to be seen whether this movement will continue to grow and 
become more effective in changing electoral culture for the better. Such a 
development will require long-term funding and support and a commitment 
from government to listen to the wishes of the people and allow them to 
participate beyond filling in their ballot papers. 
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Figure 5.1: Wilson Hauke conducting  
awareness at Pori, January 2007.  
5 ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
Nicole Haley 
 
This chapter, which provides an overview of electoral administration in the 
2007 election, draws heavily upon the findings from the 2007 Domestic 
Observation Report (Haley and Anere 2009). It finds that Papua New Guinea’s 
2007 general election was better managed and more peaceful than the 2002 
polls, which were marred by electoral irregularities and widespread violence 
across the highlands, and were generally regarded as the worst elections in 
Papua New Guinea’s history. In short, all the seats were declared, MPs in the 
new parliament were elected with larger mandates, government was formed, and 
for the first time in many years concerted electoral and civic education was 
undertaken in the lead-up to polling. There were also appreciable gains with 
respect to electoral administration — so much so that the elections ran smoothly 
in many provinces, particularly in the New Guinea Islands Region. Nevertheless 
there is room for further improvement. Specifically, electoral fraud and 
malpractice continue to be problematic in the highlands, and problems with the 
accuracy of the electoral roll persist, as do complaints about the untimely 
release of funds, delayed delivery of election materials and inadequate training 
of election officials. These issues will require attention in the lead-up to the 
2012 election. 
  
Observation and monitoring 
 
In 2007, for the first time in Papua New Guinea’s history, domestic 
observers were mobilized to monitor and review the election. The exercise 
involved a partnership between academics and civil society and was jointly co-
ordinated by myself and Dr Ray Anere from the National Research Institute 
(NRI). It was funded by AusAID through the Electoral Support Program, Phase 
2 (ESP 2). In total some 150 
observers took part in the Domestic 
Observation, the purpose of which 
was to generate and analyse 
quantitative and qualitative data in 
order to provide an impartial and 
accurate assessment of the 2007 
election, which might in turn be used 
by the PNGEC and other government 
agencies critical to the conduct of 
elections, to further improve the 
operational planning and delivery of 
future elections.  
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The 2007 Domestic Observation comprised eighteen observer teams, each 
covering a single open or provincial electorate. Typically, the teams consisted of 
an academic team leader (many of whom have contributed chapters to this 
volume) and six to ten civil society observers, depending on the type of 
electorate. Individual observers were engaged for up to 28 days over a two-
month period and were given the task of making observations during the 
campaign, pre-poll, polling and counting periods. To assist them in this task, 
observers undertook a day-long training program and were given an observer 
journal to complete. The journal was designed to record individual observations 
in a systematic way so that key aspects of electoral administration might be 
assessed. In most cases observers were able to observe the elections unhindered 
and in many cases received support and assistance from the security forces 
deployed to assist with the smooth running of the election. Given the length of 
time observers spent ‘in the field’ in the lead-up to and during the elections, 
detailed observations about electoral administration can be made.  
 
The new electoral roll 
 
Perhaps the most significant ongoing administrative challenge the PNGEC 
faces is the production of an accurate electoral roll. Indeed, political 
commentators have long been aware of problems with the electoral roll. It is 
well documented that enrolled voters have, for more than a decade now, far 
exceeded the number of eligible citizens in the highlands electorates (Standish 
2002, 2003; Haley 2004:20, 2002; Gibbs 2006). Recognizing this, a decision 
was made to do away with the old common rolls following the 2002 election. 
The PNGEC then embarked upon a nationwide re-registration exercise. This 
was a mammoth task, and one that began too late in the election cycle. 
 
On the face of it, the new electoral roll, the result of a re-registration exercise 
which commenced in late 2005/early 2006, appears more accurate than those 
used in 1997 and 2002 in that the number enrolled is considerably smaller. The 
new roll, containing the names of 3,938,839 registered voters, had 1.4 million 
fewer names than the 2002 roll. This was certainly an achievement, although as 
Ladley, Holtved and Kantha (2010:vii) note, the current Papua New Guinea 
electoral roll ‘does not provide a credible link between eligible electors and the 
votes counted during an election’. 
 
In 2007, observers around the country received complaints from people who 
claimed that they were not on the roll, and many reported seeing voters turned 
away from polling stations on polling day. Collectively, domestic observers in 
the highlands noted major faults with the voter re-registration and verification 
exercises, reporting duplications and ghost names as well as omissions. 
Specifically, they reported less than 25 per cent of adults surveyed in pre-
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polling and post-polling surveys in the highlands had completed a Claim for 
Enrolment form. Observations with respect to the rest of the country varied. 
  
The enrolment process 
 
The enrolment process, which was overseen by election managers in each 
province, was undertaken by district officials engaged and funded by the 
PNGEC. A common criticism repeated across the country concerned the 
partisanship of the local officials engaged to undertake this task (see Haley and 
Anere 2009; Ladley, Holtved and Kantha 2010:vii, and chapters 18 and 23 in 
this volume) and the hurried nature of the exercise. Observers in the highlands 
were particularly critical of the process, noting that enrolment teams did not 
travel to the wards but instead completed the forms themselves (see chapters 19 
and 21).  
 
By contrast, the re-enrolment exercise seemingly took place satisfactorily in 
the Islands Region and in urban areas. For example, survey work undertaken by 
the Madang and NCD observer teams revealed that enrolment teams in these 
urban areas did go door-to-door in an effort to ensure all eligible citizens were 
enrolled. Observers in Bougainville and Gazelle likewise reported that 
enrolment teams visited each ward.  
 
Verification  
 
Each of the nine highlands observation teams reported deficiencies with the 
verification exercise. Verification rolls were not displayed in the districts and 
wards and, in most cases, were not seen prior to polling day. In the Southern 
Highlands and Western Highlands, they were displayed only in the provincial 
headquarters and then only for a matter of days. A similar process was reported 
for Oro Province (see chapter 16). Gibbs (chapter 19 below) further reports that 
the verification rolls arrived in Enga in June — just one month before the 
election. As such there was little time for final checking. 
 
Where verification took place it seems to have been undertaken by 
individuals — many of the same people involved in the enrolment process. As a 
consequence there was little opportunity for public scrutiny of the roll. There 
were also claims of political interference at the verification stage. Certainly in 
the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate, enrolments in some of the 
previously over-enrolled wards increased further during the verification phase 
(see chapter 21 and Haley and Anere 2009:24). The Pacific Islands Forum 
Election Observer Team also noted suspicion that sitting members were 
inflating the roll in their districts, and observed in one sitting member’s village 
that the roll went from 2,800 names to 10,000 (Commonwealth Pacific Islands 
Forum Election Assessment Team 2007:8). 
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Despite the fact that less than a quarter of adults surveyed by observers in the 
highlands had enrolled to vote, electoral rolls in the highlands continue to be 
highly inflated. Detailed analysis undertaken by the Wabag and Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago observer teams, for instance, indicates that the Southern Highlands 
electoral roll is twice the size it should be (see chapter 21; Haley 2006, 2004; 
2002) while the Enga roll looks to be inflated by 45 per cent (see chapter 19).  
 
Under-enrolment was also a significant problem in some parts of the 
Southern Highlands. In some cases this seems to have been due to 
administrative errors but in other cases because enterprising candidates 
successfully managed to ensure that their opponents’ supporters were 
disenfranchised. In the Southern Highlands, observers identified whole families 
and clans which were disenfranchised by being placed in the wrong wards or by 
being left off the roll completely (see chapters 20 and 21). They also collected 
information from a variety of sources — including assistant returning officers 
— which suggested that supporters of particular candidates had difficulty 
gaining access to Claim for Enrolment forms, giving rise to widespread 
speculation and claims of bribery, mismanagement and corruption in several 
Southern Highlands electorates — namely Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Tari-Pori, 
Imbonggu and Kagua-Erave.  
 
Throughout the highlands, observers repeatedly heard the complaint that ‘not 
enough forms were sent out’ during the roll re-registration exercise. Clearly 
sufficient forms were in fact sent out as evidenced by the highly inflated roll. 
However it is the case that they were used inappropriately and in fraudulent 
ways (to enrol children and people who were already deceased) causing eligible 
citizens to be left off the new roll. 
 
Where claim forms were completed and signed on behalf of children, dead 
people or those long absent from the electorate — people who did not meet the 
legislatively proscribed residency requirement — correct procedures were not 
followed. For example, an official witnessing a claim for enrolment is 
legislatively required, by section 56 of the Organic Law on National and Local-
level Government Elections (OLNLLGE), to satisfy himself or herself that the 
statements made and information provided in the claim are true.1 In most cases 
the local village enumerators and witnesses — councillors and village recorders 
in most cases — would most likely have known which of the would-be voters 
were underage, deceased or non-resident. 
 
                                                     
1 This requirement is clearly spelled out on page 8, paragraph 3.3.6, of the Electoral 
Roll Training Manual which states, ‘You are signing to verify that you saw the elector 
sign the enrolment form and you are satisfied the information contained on the 
enrolment form is true (my emphasis)’. 
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A key factor concerning the problems associated with the roll is the absence 
of community ownership of the roll. Community participation in voter 
verification and roll cleansing is therefore vital for ownership of the roll. The 
present methods of voter verification and roll cleansing do not encourage 
community ownership of the roll. As such the roll is vulnerable to blatant 
manipulation by self-interested individuals. So as to mitigate this, verification 
rolls should, in future, be publicly displayed at both the district and ward level. 
Public readings of the electoral roll, in the presence of community scrutineers, 
the ward councillor and village recorder might also be incorporated into the roll 
cleansing and verification exercise, as a means of producing more accurate rolls. 
This would also help generate community ownership of the roll.  
 
Without a doubt, the ongoing problems associated with the roll have the 
potential to undermine public confidence in the PNGEC as well as in the 
principle of political equality between citizens as called for under Section 50 of 
the national constitution. Attention must be given to the electoral roll as a matter 
of urgency, in order to: ensure political equality between citizens; restore 
confidence in the PNGEC; and ensure that the elections have integrity.  
 
Administration and planning 
 
At the national level, electoral administration and planning was enhanced by 
the adoption of a whole-of-government approach and in particular the 
establishment of the Inter-departmental Election Committee (IDEC) (see 
chapter 2). IDEC was set up by an act of parliament in 2006. It comprised key 
government stakeholders including the PNGEC, ESP 2, Department of Finance, 
RPNGC, PNGDF, Department of Provincial and Local Government Affairs, 
Office of the Chief Secretary, and the registrar of political parties. The 
membership and participation of senior government officials, including the chief 
secretary, secretary of the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Affairs, the electoral commissioner, the CEO of the National Broadcasting 
Corporation, and the registrar of political parties, not only leant weight to IDEC 
but also to the decisions it made. For example, the 2007 Domestic Observation 
would not have been possible had it not been for the support of these senior 
government officials through IDEC.  
 
Improved communication at the national level did not, however, necessarily 
result in better administration at the provincial and district level (see chapter 8). 
There is still considerable room for improvement in terms of operationalizing 
national level plans. For example, despite high level support for the Domestic 
Observation and the whole-of-government approach to the 2007 election, there 
was surprisingly little knowledge about the presence of domestic observers. 
Several observer teams found that key electoral officials and security personnel 
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were unaware a domestic observation was being undertaken,2 and as a result 
experienced obstruction in the first instance — for example, the Mt Hagen Open 
observers were initially denied access to the Western Highlands counting centre, 
and one of the Southern Highlands Provincial observers was beaten by security 
personnel when he tried to observe a training session for polling officials. 
Thankfully the problems experienced tended to be quickly resolved, and in fact 
many teams reported receiving valuable assistance, from the security personnel 
in particular.   
 
Election management 
 
Only two of the eighteen observer teams deployed as part of the 2007 
Domestic Observation commended the performance of the key electoral 
personnel in their province and/or electorate (Haley and Anere 2009:19). The 
others reported poor performance on the part of provincial election managers, 
and/or returning officers and assistant returning officers, observing that they 
were difficult to locate and did not demonstrate a good understanding of their 
roles. It was also noted that many election managers and returning officers were 
conveniently absent when administrative issues, problems and complaints arose 
and, even when present, proved ineffectual.  
 
Observers in several electorates also reported concerns that key electoral 
personnel were partisan, that they failed to properly train polling and counting 
officials, and that the appointment of assistant returning officers, presiding 
officers, and other polling officials was subject to political interference.  
 
The three Southern Highlands observer teams and Wabag Open observer 
team reported that key electoral personnel were changed several times in the 
lead-up to the election. In the Southern Highlands the constant appointment, 
revocation and re-appointment of personnel, on the advice of the Southern 
Highlands provincial steering committee, hampered election preparations, and 
resulted in pre-polling and post-polling disputes. The appointment of the 
assistant returning officer for Lake Kopiago LLG is a case in point (see chapter 
21).  
 
The confusion about appointments in the Southern Highlands was 
exacerbated by a tussle between William Powi and Alphonse Hayabe over the 
                                                     
2 The first version of the security booklet prepared by the RPNGC (RPNGC 2007a), and 
issued to police, Defence and Correctional Services personnel, deployed under the 
National Elections Operation (NATEL) did not include anything about the domestic 
observation. A second version of the booklet, entitled Election Handbook 2007 
(RPNGC 2007b), which was printed in June 2007, did include a section on observers, 
but unfortunately was issued too late to be distributed to security personnel already in 
the field. 
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provincial administrator’s position. After being confirmed as acting 
administrator by the National Court on 13 April 2007, Hayabe sought to have 
key election officials recommended by his predecessor replaced. Specifically he 
wrote to the PNGEC deputy commissioner of operations on 16 April 2007 in his 
capacity as chairman of the provincial steering committee, recommending, 
among other appointments, the appointment of a new provincial returning 
officer. These recommendations were subsequentlyoverturned by Powi once his 
position as provincial administrator was confirmed by the Supreme Court. 
Needless to say, returning officers and assistant returning officers should be 
appointed early in the election cycle. 
 
The new ballot paper 
 
Election 2007 saw candidate photographs removed from the new ballot 
paper and the introduction of separate candidate posters. This change was 
effected very late in the election cycle, being certified by the speaker of the 
National Parliament in September 2006 — nine months out from the election. 
Despite concerted civil-society-led awareness campaigning concerning the 
changes, many voters were not aware of the new arrangements.  
 
The changes were not insignificant. The way people were required to vote in 
2007 was markedly different from previous elections. Rather than marking their 
ballot papers with an X, as they had in recent general elections, or with 1, 2, 3, 
as they had done in the LPV by-elections, voters were required to write three 
two-digit code numbers and/or the names of their preferred candidates on both 
the provincial and open electorate ballot papers. This proved very slow, 
especially when voters marked their own papers.  
 
The voting process was further complicated by the fact that the open and 
provincial ballot papers were very similar in appearance, being differentiated 
only by a pale blue or pale pink band at the bottom of the ballot paper. Voters 
found it difficult to differentiate between them — and this was used by 
presiding officers to justify the high levels of assistance in many areas. Many of 
the informal votes identified in counting rooms across the country arose because 
voters mixed up the forms, writing their open seat preferences on the provincial 
ballot paper and vice versa. There may well have been many more papers 
marked in error than were identified as informal. For this reason voters and 
polling officials around the country were universally critical of the new ballot 
papers; many have since called for the reintegration of photographs on the ballot 
papers, others have insisted that bolder colours should be used in the future or 
that the papers should be markedly different in size or shape.  
 
Despite the confusion wrought by the new ballot paper, the informal vote 
remained very low. This was due, in no small part, to the high level of assisted 
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Figure 5.2: Pre-marked ballot paper 
voting witnessed around the country. In the highlands the vast majority of voters 
were assisted, either by polling officials, police, campaign managers, 
candidates’ scrutineers or family members. Given low literacy levels, especially 
in remote rural areas, assistance proved necessary in many cases. Often, 
however, assistance was forced. It was observed too that completed papers were 
often checked as well. As a result very few voters were afforded a secret ballot.  
 
Worryingly, where ‘assistance’ was given the voters’ wishes were not 
always adhered to. In the Southern Highlands observers witnessed several 
instances where presiding officers marked ballot papers in a manner contrary to 
the voter’s wishes. Observers in the 
Southern Highlands also noted that 
polling officials at several polling 
stations had pre-marked the first 
preference prior to issuing ballot 
papers.  
 
It is difficult to ascertain just how 
widespread this practice was, but 
observers in counting rooms around 
the country observed that many ballot 
papers in various boxes were 
completed by more than one person. For example the first preference was 
marked in one pen while the second and third preferences were marked in a 
different coloured pen and/or different hand-writing.  
 
Awareness 
 
Efforts to create community awareness about the new voting system 
commenced late in the election cycle, due to the fact that the legislative changes 
introducing the new ballot paper and separate candidate posters were certified 
by the speaker of the National Parliament only nine months prior to the election. 
Voters and candidates around the country were critical of the late change. This 
problem was beyond the control of the PNGEC.  
 
Bearing in mind the narrow window for awareness, the PNGEC focussed its 
awareness campaign on television, radio and print media initiatives, 
supplemented by face-to-face awareness by election managers and returning 
officers. The media awareness proved most effective in urban areas. Observers 
across the country reported that the awareness conducted by the PNGEC teams 
was limited and in most cases delivered very late, due mainly to the fact that 
PNGEC funding for awareness was released only after the close of nominations.  
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Figure 5.3: Domestic observer 
Justin Wandi at Koroba,  
28 June 2007 
 
In the main, face-to-face awareness was 
undertaken by civil society groups, many of 
which were funded under ESP 2 (see chapter 
4). The awareness provided by these groups 
was observed to be generally comprehensive. 
Pre-polling and post-polling surveys 
conducted by individual observer teams 
revealed it to be particularly effective, 
especially in the highlands, where five times as 
many people reported having attended civil-
society-run LPV/civic awareness as as had 
attended awareness conducted by the PNGEC. 
 
Despite the extensive civil society 
awareness campaign, irregularities of various 
kinds were noted by observers on polling day, 
and many voters reported they found the new 
voting system confusing and had needed 
assistance when voting. Ongoing awareness is 
therefore needed. 
 
Pre-polling 
 
The findings of individual observer teams varied considerably in respect of 
pre-polling administration. The NCD teams, for example, reported that electoral 
administration was much improved, being better than both the 2002 general 
election and the 2006 NCD by-election. Observations from other parts of the 
country, particularly the highlands, were nowhere near as positive. Only six of 
the eighteen observer teams (NCD Provincial, Port Moresby South Open, 
Goroka Open, Wabag Open, Mt Hagen Open and Gazelle Open) reported that 
essential election supplies, including candidate posters, ballot papers, and ballot 
box seals, were received on time in advance of polling.  The remaining teams 
reported delays with regard to the release of funds and the delivery of essential 
materials. 
  
In the Southern Highlands funds that should have been released prior to 
polling were not received until after the polling was complete. In the absence of 
these funds the PNGDF arranged for and funded the insertion and extraction of 
polling teams (see chapter 8). The funding shortfall also resulted in reduced 
payments to polling officials, which in turn gave rise to much discontent and 
saw the majority of returning officers from Koroba-Lake Kopiago and Kagua-
Erave withhold their returns and refuse to attend the count.  
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Training 
 
Training of polling officials was not consistent. Lists of polling officials 
were finalised early in some areas (e.g. NCD, Bougainville, Western Highlands 
and the Eastern Highlands) and reasonably comprehensive training was 
provided. In Southern Highlands and Enga, however, polling officials were 
appointed on the eve of polling or on polling day itself, and the training was 
observed to be inadequate.  
 
Polling  
 
For the most part polling in the 2007 election proceeded peacefully, though 
the conduct of polling varied greatly across the country. Observers in the 
Islands, Momase and Southern regions reported that polling was generally well 
organized and managed and polling places set up in the recommended manner. 
For the most part polling stations opened on time and few disturbances or 
irregularities were noted. Nonetheless gender-segregated polling, which was 
official policy in 2007, was not observed except in NCD, Ijivitari Open and 
Madang Provincial seats. 
 
By contrast, voting in the highlands — particularly the Southern Highlands 
and Enga — remained generally chaotic. One-day polling proved unworkable, 
except in urban areas, and significant irregularities were identified in each of the 
highland’s provinces, particularly in relation to the conduct of polling. Other 
problems noted in the Southern Highlands included the relocation of polling 
stations from their gazetted locations and movement of polling stations from 
their historical locations.  
 
Inclement weather and a shortage of vehicles and air transport meant polling 
in the Southern Highlands, where the polling began, was delayed for several 
days in some areas. In Enga and Chimbu delays to polling were also 
experienced, and in both provinces it took a full week for polling to be 
completed. This had flow-on effects across the rest of the highlands. The delays 
also meant that the security forces were spread very thinly in many areas, and in 
some cases re-deployed before the completion of polling, which may have 
contributed to some of the irregularities and malpractice witnessed.  
 
In terms of the conduct of polling, a wide array of voting practices was noted 
in each of the highlands provinces. In Enga people tended to vote in family 
groups, with papers issued en masse to family heads (see chapter 18), although 
in some parts line-up voting was also employed, such that names were not 
called but marked off when people entered the polling place. Similar practices 
were noted at polling stations throughout the Eastern Highlands (including 
Goroka Open), Southern Highlands, and Chimbu.  
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In some places, particularly Chimbu, man-meri voting and ‘next’ voting 
were employed. In these cases names were not called, but rather the gender of 
registered voters in the order that they appeared, or when one person had 
finished the polling officials simply called out ‘Next’ (Chuave Open, Goroka 
Open, EHP Provincial, Koroba-Lake Kopiago team reports). In other cases, the 
roll was completely disregarded, serving only as the basis to issue a certain 
number of ballot papers. This was so in the more remote parts of Eastern 
Highlands and much of Southern Highlands — with several observers noting 
that polling officials in many polling booths did not check the roll at all.  
 
Voting irregularities 
 
Cheating and voting irregularities were reported across the country, but were 
certainly widespread and most pronounced in the highlands. Outside the 
highlands, irregularities such as underage voting and multiple voting were 
observed to be isolated rather than the norm. 
 
Underage voting, multiple voting, ‘line-up’ voting, serial voting, ‘outside’ 
voting and proxy voting were all commonplace in the highlands. Voting took 
place publicly and there was no secret ballot. The indelible ink was not used or 
was used randomly and excess ballot papers were used in many cases.  
Bloc voting was also observed throughout the highlands, especially in open 
electorates. In some cases this appears to have been the result of genuine group 
consensus (a group choosing to vote for their clan/local candidate) but in other 
areas it resulted from coercion, intimidation or outright malpractice. In many 
wards in Southern Highlands, Enga, Chimbu and Eastern Highlands polling 
officials were observed to do away with the pretext of individual voters casting 
their votes. This was particularly so in Enga. In many cases people in Enga 
voted in family groups, and in others ballot papers were simply filled out by 
scrutineers or candidate representatives. In some parts of Enga the majority of 
people played no part in the voting process. Similar observations were made in 
parts of SHP, where ballot papers were pre-marked or filled out by teams of 
young men or supporters. 
 
Observers in six of the nine highlands electorates (Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
Open, Kagua-Erave Open, Southern Highlands Provincial, Eastern Highlands 
Provincial, Chuave Open and Wabag Open) also witnessed bribery and 
intimidation on the part of candidates and their key supporters. Their 
observations were confirmed by post-polling surveys in Southern Highlands 
(see chapter 20) and Enga, where 38 per cent of male voters and 58 per cent of 
female voters surveyed reported that they had experienced intimidation when 
casting their vote. The same post-polling surveys revealed that just over 40 per 
cent of voters surveyed (41 per cent in Southern Highlands and 43 per cent in 
Enga) felt that the 2007 election was worse than 2002. Certainly many voters in 
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the Southern Highlands felt that this election had failed, as it had in 2002 (see 
chapter 20 and 21). 
 
Two key factors contributed to and facilitated the cheating and malpractice 
(underage voting, double and multiple voting, serial voting and outside voting) 
observed on polling day: first, the integrity of the new electoral roll in the 
highlands, which can be shown to include children, deceased people, people 
from neighbouring electorates, and several thousand duplicate entries, and, 
secondly, the location and positioning of polling stations, many of which were 
moved from their gazetted locations to facilitate ease of movement between 
polling stations. At Pureni, in the South Koroba local government area, four 
polling stations (Tumbite, Pubulumu 1, Pubulumu 2 and Tangimapu) were set 
up on Tumbite airstrip.  Three of the four polling stations were moved from 
their gazetted locations on grounds of alleged security threats, although the 
assistant returning officer later conceded that the polling stations were moved to 
‘make it easier for voters to move between polling stations’.  
 
Post-polling 
 
Post-polling arrangements around the country proved for the most part to be 
quite good, with observers reporting that ballot boxes were transported under 
security escort and properly secured in preparation for counting. Problems were 
however evident in the Southern Highlands, where observers noted that returns 
were completed after the fact, as was polling day paperwork. Few returning 
officers and assistant returning officers were observed to keep a register of 
unused ballot papers. There were also problems with the movement of ballot 
boxes from Tari to Mendi. The Hela people wanted their boxes counted in Tari 
and blockaded the Tari police station where the boxes had been temporarily 
secured. As a result, the transportation of the boxes to the counting centre in 
Mendi was delayed by ten days, and was only effected after an eleventh-hour 
intervention on the part of the deputy electoral commissioner, who entered into 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Hela candidates.  
 
Counting 
 
Counting is a fundamental part of election administration. Counting in 2007 
was generally well organized, though slow. As a result, the deadline for the 
return of writs needed to be extended by a week. For the most part, irregularities 
in counting were identified by the checks and balances that were employed. 
Observers in most electorates reported that individual ballot box counts were 
checked against the returns and serious anomalies were investigated and often 
gave rise to recounts.  
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Significant anomalies were, however, identified in the NCD Provincial, 
Eastern Highlands Provincial and Southern Highlands Provincial counts. 
Specifically, the NCD Provincial results reveal that Powes Parkop was declared 
without having obtained an absolute majority and without the final distribution 
of preferences taking place, while the Eastern Highlands Provincial results make 
evident that, despite a thorough two-day recheck count, figures during the 
elimination phase did not balance with those made earlier. Additional informal 
papers were identified, as were 1,438 additional papers that seemingly had not 
been counted in either the primary count or recheck count. A total of 3,848 
previously counted and rechecked ballot papers could not be located or 
accounted for during the elimination phase.  
 
In most provinces counting took place at a central location — often the 
provincial headquarters. In most cases, security was tight with a heavy police 
and PNGDF presence. Overall counting was conducted in an open and 
transparent manner and was well managed. For the most part, used and unused 
papers were reconciled, individual ballot box counts were reconciled against the 
ballots issued and the presiding officers’ returns, and checks and balances 
picked up papers that had been wrongly allocated in the first instance. 
 
Counting in all the highlands provinces was centralized in the provincial 
headquarters. Procedurally it varied — within provinces and between them — 
but overall tended to be well organized, with varying degrees of transparency.  
In Chimbu, ballot papers were subject to the highest level of scrutiny, with 
individual counting rooms set up in such a way that scrutineers could properly 
view the counting process, and in particular the sorting process. Ballot papers 
were checked for formality, sorted, rechecked, counted and recounted before 
being tallied. Importantly, the open and provincial papers were consistently 
reconciled as well, meaning that the vast majority of errors were picked up 
during the primary count.  
 
By contrast, few checks and balances were employed in the Southern 
Highlands Provincial seat counting room, and little or no effort was made to 
balance results against returns from individual polling stations. Similarly, little 
concern was shown when the number of open papers did not match the number 
of provincial papers. It is not known how often this occurred, because it has not 
been possible to obtain the full Southern Highlands Provincial results. A major 
problem with respect to electoral administration across the whole country has 
been the lack of completed returns.  
 
Counting for the Southern Highlands Provincial seat also proved very slow, 
taking a month to complete. The primary or first preference count commenced 
on 7 July and continued through till 28 July. Counting was then suspended 
following a court challenge by four of the provincial candidates, namely Hami 
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Yawari, Bob Marley Undi Nande, Dickson Pena Tasi and Michael Nali. These 
candidates claimed the ballot boxes from the Hela region had been tampered 
with and should be excluded from the count, and that the MOU entered into by 
the deputy commissioner should be declared null and void. The National Court 
dismissed the proceedings and ordered a re-check count prior to the distribution 
of preferences. Counting resumed at around midday on 4 August, with the 
recheck count. Although it had taken some three weeks to sort and count the 
first preferences, the recheck count, which involved the rechecking of close to 
384,000 ballot papers, was completed in less than five hours. Observers felt the 
recheck was cursory and that few cross checks were employed.  
 
The eliminations phase of the Southern Highlands Provincial count 
commenced at 5.15pm on 4 August, and continued through the night and into 
the following day, with the declaration being made exactly twenty-four hours 
after the eliminations commenced. It was observed that the eliminations were 
rushed and that countless mistakes were made, especially in relation to the last 
five eliminations. Specifically, observers noted that the distribution of 
preferences took place ‘in a split second’ and there was no checking of the 
redistributed or exhausted ballot papers. Observers felt many papers were 
wrongly allocated. By way of comparison, the elimination phase of the Tari-
Pori Open seat count took five days to complete, and involved only 37,000 
ballot papers, one tenth the number of papers in the SHP provincial count. 
 
Training 
 
As was the case with training for polling officials, there was much variability 
with respect to the training provided for counting officials. Counting officials in 
the Islands, Momase and NCD were all provided with one or two days training, 
and observers reported that counting officials appeared well versed in all aspects 
of the count. By contrast, observers across the highlands described the training 
provided to counting officials as inadequate. The Eastern Highlands Provincial 
team reported that only 200 of the 700 counting officials received training and 
those that did received only one hour’s training prior to the commencement of 
the count. Observers in Chimbu similarly felt the training provided to counting 
officials was inadequate and some observers were asked to provide additional 
training for counting officials during the early phases of the count. 
 
In the Southern Highlands, counting officials and scrutineers were provided 
with anything from an hour to a day’s training (depending on the counting 
room) immediately prior to the commencement of count. Observers described 
the training as confusing and noted that counting officials and scrutineers often 
appeared out of their depth and seemed confused about procedural matters. As 
counting progressed it also became evident that new counting officials were 
being appointed and admitted to some counting rooms, such as the Southern 
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Highlands Provincial counting room. Those counting officials appointed after 
the commencement of the count did not receive any training and were observed 
to make many mistakes. 
 
Security 
 
The 2007 general election was considerably less violent than other recent 
elections. How much this improvement can be attributed to LPV will become 
clearer over ensuing elections. Certainly it had been felt that LPV would 
contribute to improved security, and observers around the country did report 
that campaigning in the 2007 general elections was generally quieter, far more 
relaxed and more accommodative than in past elections (see chapter 13). They 
also noted there was little or no violence in the Islands, Momase and Southern 
region seats, and overall levels of violence in the highlands seats were 
substantially reduced. That said, there was a huge investment in security, 
especially in the highlands. 
 
In Southern Highlands, where polling commenced, the special police 
operations (SPO) security force, consisting of 200 regular police and 150 
PNGDF personnel, was boosted by 2,500 additional NATEL (National 
Election) security personnel (2,000 police — mostly auxiliary and community 
police — and 500 PNGDF personnel). Despite the large security presence, one-
day polling meant that the security personnel were still thinly spread, given that 
there were 862 polling stations, and the fact that many security personnel 
remained in Mendi and other key distribution points in the districts. Unarmed 
police provided the security at most polling stations, while armed PNGDF 
provided security at more high risk locations and acted as response units.  
 
One factor which contributed to the good security situation witnessed was 
the pre-deployment of NATEL forces a full two weeks prior to polling. The 
early deployment of these troops meant they were in a position to undertake 
detailed reconnaissance and attend to security threats well in advance of polling 
(see chapter 8). Importantly, they were also observed to undertake election and 
security related awareness, and to contribute to logistics and the conduct of 
elections. In some places it was only through their interventions that polling 
took place (see chapters 7, 20, and 21). 
 
Despite the overall good performance of the security personnel, they were 
observed to be unwilling or incapable of intervening to deter voting 
irregularities. This was possibly due to the fact that they were unarmed and in 
many cases poorly trained. Security personnel across the highlands, but most 
particularly the PNGDF contingent, reported that they had received no pre-
deployment training, and many seemed unclear about their role in general, and 
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about electoral processes and electoral offences more specifically. The small 
handbook prepared for police (RPNGC 2007b) was an excellent innovation. 
 
Communications 
 
Communications proved problematic across much of the country, but 
especially in the more remote areas where communications infrastructure is 
weakest. Observers consistently noted that electoral personnel — returning 
officers, assistant returning officers and presiding officers in the field (i.e. 
outside the urban areas and larger towns) — tended to be without 
communication, while the security personnel had either field radios which 
allowed them to communicate with headquarters (in the case of the PNGDF) or 
hand-held radios which could communicate over short distances (in the case of 
the RPNGC).  
 
In the main, security personnel in the field were observed to experience 
considerable difficulty communicating with those coordinating the security 
operations in the provincial headquarters, and with the security personnel 
inserted with polling teams, and they were reliant on third parties relaying 
requests for helicopter support or security back-up. In the highlands, electoral 
and security personnel were observed to rely heavily on mobile phones, 
however there were major network outages during the polling and counting 
periods. This was particularly so in the Southern Highlands and Enga, where the 
network repeatedly went down for days at a time.  
 
The lack of radios and an effective joint communications strategy also meant 
that there was no communication between election officials in the field and 
those in the provincial election office. The lack of communication was 
particularly evident at polling stations.  
 
Communications at the counting centres around the country, by contrast, 
proved to be very good. With a few exceptions, the crowds gathered outside 
counting centres were kept well informed at all times, with progressive tallies 
being broadcast throughout the day, and recorded on a huge purpose-built tally 
boards. Progressive tallies were also faxed to PNGEC headquarters in Port 
Moresby on a regular basis.  
 
Inter-agency coordination 
 
Inter-agency coordination appeared greatly improved, although hampered to 
some extent by a lack of effective communications equipment (see previous 
section).  The improved inter-agency coordination appeared to result from the 
adoption of a whole-of-government approach to the planning, staging and 
conduct of the 2007 election. At the national level the whole-of-government 
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approach was evidenced by the establishment of the Inter-Departmental 
Election Committee (IDEC), chaired by the registrar of political parties, and at 
the provincial level by the establishment of provincial election steering 
committees — chaired by provincial administrators.  
 
The extent to which the provincial election steering committees proved 
effective varied greatly, however. Many were established very late in the 
election cycle. Several committees were viewed as partisan, and in at least four 
provinces attempted to influence key appointments, for example by seeking to 
remove key returning officers and assistant returning officers and to make their 
own appointments. This caused much confusion on the ground and hampered 
election preparations.  
 
Overall assessment 
 
Papua New Guinea’s 2007 general election was better managed and more 
peaceful than the 2002 poll. Specifically, there were appreciable gains with 
respect to electoral administration. Nevertheless there is room for further 
improvement. The electoral roll needs further verification and cleansing, 
training needs to be prioritized and financial management needs improvement, 
so as to ensure that funds are available when needed and that essential election 
supplies reach all provinces on time.  
 
Electoral fraud and malpractice continue to pose problems in the highlands, 
facilitated in part by the poor state of the new electoral roll. Accurate electoral 
rolls are the administrative basis for free and fair elections. Problems with the 
electoral roll need to be addressed as a matter of urgency if the 2012 elections 
are to have integrity. More accurate rolls will also give rise to less costly 
elections.  
 
Once again, one-day polling in the highlands proved impossible. 
Recognizing that it took a full week to complete polling in at least three of the 
highlands provinces, it could well prove better to stage future elections in the 
highlands over several days in each province. Alternately, other polling modes 
— such as the use of mobile polling teams — might be considered. This would 
reduce the total number of polling officials needed, make training easier, and 
see the security forces utilized more effectively. 
 
Finally, civic awareness should continue and be expanded in order to 
generate and foster demand for good elections. Such awareness should, among 
other things, seek to educate voters about the electoral roll, the function it 
serves, and differences between the electoral roll and the census. It should also 
seek to educate voters about electoral laws and electoral offences, as well as 
voter rights and responsibilities. Such awareness will only work if it is coupled 
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with the confidence that other parts of the electoral process will work. For this 
reason every effort should be made to ensure that good, honest and reliable staff 
are engaged to conduct the 2012 elections and that they are properly trained and 
supported. 
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6 SECURITY IN SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCE 
 
Siale Diro  
 
This chapter is intended to give a background to the security situation in 
Southern Highlands Province (SHP) and to outline the security mission for the 
2007 election and its objectives. In so doing, it will look at the security force 
composition, its pre-election operations, the conduct of the election, and post-
election operations. Finally, it will reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the security operations in the province and make some recommendations for the 
future.  
 
The study is based on my observations and experience as the commander of 
the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) contingent in the Southern 
Highlands and the deputy commander of special police operations. 
 
Background 
  
Any analysis of the election in SHP must be cast against a background of the 
particular challenges that the province as a whole poses for security operations. 
SHP is the largest highlands province and has the biggest population — 
approximately 700,000 people. The province is rich in resources and contributes 
over 40 per cent of the national economy, with the Kutubu District alone 
producing K11 million per day. 
 
At the same time, SHP has the highest number of illegal weapons in the 
country and has experienced major breakdowns in law and order. 
 
In the 2002 election, ‘failed elections’ were declared in six of the open 
electorates, requiring supplementary elections in 2003. By 2006 the generalized 
breakdown in law and order, combined with corrupt governance, saw the 
declaration by the national government of a state of emergency (SOE) in SHP 
on 15 August 2006. Subsequent court action was taken by the then provincial 
governor, Hami Yawari, which led to the Supreme Court nullifying the SOE in 
February 2007. 
 
In the lead-up to the election, primarily due to the economic and security 
issues, there were grave concerns for the conduct of the election in SHP. The 
nation could not afford another failed election in 2007. Consequently, the 
national government introduced special police operations (SPO) in SHP on 1 
March 2007 to maintain the progress made by the SOE and prepare the province 
for the elections. 
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In 2007 the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) took the 
important step of ‘front loading’ what were seen as likely problem areas for the 
2007 election. This involved scheduling SHP to be the first province to go to the 
polls. 
 
The special police operations mission 
 
The mission statement for the SPO was to assist the Electoral Commission 
by providing security for NATEL 07 (National Election 2007), in order for the 
national government to conduct a peaceful, fair and successful national election. 
 
The objectives were:  
• security, peace and good order, removal of illegal weapons; 
• restoration of government services in SHP; 
• peaceful and successful conduct of National Elections in SHP, and 
• post-election stability in SHP.  
 
In the pre-election period the force was composed of 200 regular police men 
and women and 150 PNGDF personnel, comprising 90 infantry (security), 40 
engineers with plant and equipment (restoration), and 20 support staff (medics, 
military police, communications personnel, etc). During the polling period this 
presence was bolstered by the concentration of security forces from other 
highlands provinces, including some 2,000 police and 500 PNGDF personnel. 
For the counting period in SHP the security presence reverted back to pre-
election strength, providing a smaller contribution to polling in other highlands 
provinces so as to maintain a high level of presence.  
 
Conduct and rules of engagement  
 
As this was a small force with limited resources, operations required strict 
adherence to the rules of engagement (ROE), backed by strong discipline. Its 
operations were based on a high level of public law and order awareness 
conducted through the media, and an effective command and control 
mechanism. This was supported by a dedicated public relations strategy and, 
importantly, effective inter-agency cooperation.  
 
It was a ‘balanced force’ with appropriate posture (graduated response), 
intended to provide a firm but fair and neutral approach, remembering that the 
trust and confidence of the people is the centre of gravity.  
 
Pre-election operations 
 
Pre-election operations had a major focus on two aspects: security and 
restoration. Improving the security climate involved:  
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• physical patrols and a show of presence throughout the province;  
• law and order awareness in the media, and 
• swift and decisive action and discipline — or ‘zero tolerance’ — 
towards crime.  
 
This was successful in facilitating greater freedom of movement throughout the 
province. As a result, business and economic activity picked up and public 
confidence was boosted. It was also evident that the new limited preferential 
voting (LPV) system had relieved the tension. The end result was that during 
the pre-election period, the physical conditions were set for a peaceful election.  
 
The restoration aspect of pre-election operations involved PNGDF engineers 
and others working to restore:  
• the Kiburu to Mendi road;  
• the Mendi airport fencing;  
• culverts and earthworks for churches, and 
• Momei oval counting centre fencing. 
 
This period also saw engineer reconnaissance in Nipa, Upper Mendi and Kagua.  
 
The pre-election period involved coordination with the provincial election 
steering committee which was chaired by the provincial administrator, Mr 
William Powi. That committee consisted of the Electoral Commission, police, 
Defence, Correctional Services (CS), and church, business and community 
leaders. The committee commenced regular meetings in April 2007 and was 
very effective in coordinating the inter-agency effort, in line with the ‘whole-of-
government’ approach to national elections. The committee made many critical 
decisions, such as centralizing counting in Mendi. 
 
Finally, these measures required spiritual support. The Southern Highlands 
has an extensive Christian network, with over thirty Christian denominations. 
The people of SHP are tired of violence and corruption and it was considered 
time to encourage the spiritual community to take the lead in asking God to 
bring peace into the province. 
 
The spiritual measures commenced with a prayer breakfast with the SHP 
‘Body of Christ’ (BOC) in Mendi on 12 May. It culminated with a spiritual rally 
to invite the Holy Spirit into SHP. This rally was held under the theme of 
‘peaceful elections’ and the security force provided logistic support (including 
transport, fuel, rations, etc.) and combined youth worship groups from the 
PNGDF’s Taurama and Igam Barracks. The rally was held across SHP from 28 
May to 3 June 2007 and thousands attended in Tari, Nipa, Ialibu and Mendi.  
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Conduct of elections — the polling period 
  
SHP was the first highlands province in the country to vote when the polls 
opened on 30 July. At that time, 2,500 security forces personnel were deployed 
(the force was moved to Enga after polling in SHP was complete).  
 
With 862 polling sites, the election was always going to be a logistics 
nightmare. This, combined with the fact that SHP is a vast province with rugged 
terrain and bad weather, compounded the challenges faced by the security 
forces. 
 
Police and CS provided security for polling teams, whilst the Defence and 
police mobile squads provided patrols, escorts and vital asset protection. The 
whole operation required extensive inter-agency liaison and coordination. 
 
Due to bad weather, polling had to be extended in some parts and in this 
respect the electoral commissioner reacted in timely manner to extend the 
polling period.  
 
Despite late arrival of polling materials, and the challenges noted above, 
polling generally went well and the province was peaceful during polling. In 
suspected trouble spots such as Nipa and Upper Mendi, people exercised their 
democratic right free of violence. 
 
Conduct of the election — the count  
  
As stated above, counting for the province was centralized at the Momei 
Oval counting centre in Mendi. The PNGDF maintained an inner cordon, which 
protected the ballot boxes between the airport and the counting centre, and 
police and CIS maintained an outer cordon of road blocks and crowd control. 
Security was very tight and was successful in keeping the threat off-balance. 
The centre was designed for maximum transparency and counting was 
conducted in a peaceful manner in what was almost a festive atmosphere. 
 
Strict discipline ensured that security forces stuck to their designated roles 
and did not interfere with the electoral process. The SPO command was 
detached from the counting centre.  
 
By 29 July 2007 the people of SHP had peacefully elected their nine 
members into the eighth National Parliament. 
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Post-election operations 
 
At the end of July, the SPO was ordered to withdraw by mid August. This 
decision had a significant impact on operations, as people of SHP were 
expecting us to stay until 31 August. In response, the SPO conducted immediate 
awareness across the province to alleviate people’s fears and set the conditions 
for withdrawal. The decision brought forward strategic lift and extraction plans. 
 
The SPO formal presence culminated in a farewell parade which was held on 
the 11 August 2007 in Mendi. At this event the people were encouraged to 
maintain peace and a general warning was communicated to potential 
troublemakers. The farewell also involved a weapons destruction ceremony at 
which PNGDF Engineers destroyed five Mag 58s, nine SLRs , eleven M16s, 
fifteen AR15s, 86 factory-made shot guns, and 161 homemade weapons. The 
destroyed weapons were sealed in drums, taken to Lae, and dumped at sea.  
 
The public took part in the ceremony, which was a symbolic gesture of a 
new future for SHP, safe and free of guns. The event also involved a prayer 
luncheon in a gathering with the provincial BOC. Those at the luncheon thanked 
God for his blessings. It was a fitting spiritual closure to the SPO. By 15 August 
all Defence personnel were withdrawn from SHP and soon after all SPO police 
were withdrawn. 
 
On the 29 August, SHP governor, Anderson Agiru and the eight SHP Open 
members — James Marabe, Isaac Joseph, Francis Potabe, Philemon Embel, 
John Kekeno Kelewa, Peter O’Neill, James Lagea and Francis Awesa — 
walked together from the airport to Momei Oval, where they addressed the 
people of SHP. 
 
Assessing the SPO 
 
Strengths  
 
It was clearly apparent that the new limited preferential voting (LPV) system 
played a role in significantly reducing the security contingency. This, the whole-
of-government approach, a strong national will towards fairness, and excellent 
inter-agency cooperation through the provincial election steering committee, 
were all major strengths in the 2007 election in SHP.  
 
Public relations, spiritual linkage, and awareness to develop the ‘trust and 
confidence of the people’, created an important enabling environment.  
 
From a logistic and administrative perspective, the timely allocation of 
troops’ allowances was also a strength, as was the flexibility of the force. This 
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permitted ‘front loading’ in problem areas and allowed for economy of effort 
and concentration of force.  
 
The presence of the PNGEC’s legal adviser, Professor John Nonggorr, on 
location provided enhanced situational awareness. The improved command, 
control and cooperation of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary was also 
a contributing factor.  
 
Some of these strengths resulted directly from difficult PNGDF reform 
decisions, in line with the commander’s vision of a smarter and operationally 
focused force. Through Joint Forces Headquarters, the PNGDF’s air, sea and 
land assets were deployed extensively to support the elections, and command 
and control of operations was far more effective and responsive than in the past. 
There was also ‘24/7’ monitoring. The PNGDF has now commenced the ‘build-
up phase’ of its reform process and the success in 2007 justifies continued 
support for the reforms.  
 
Weaknesses 
 
There were, however, weaknesses that hindered the success of the operation 
and need to be addressed in the future. These were mostly in the areas of: 
• communications; 
• riot control equipment; 
• postal voting; 
• the common roll; and 
• delivery of election materials and payment of election officials’ 
entitlements. 
  
To address these weaknesses the following recommendations are put forward to 
improve the security mobilization at the next election:  
• Extend security pre-deployment to problem areas. 
• Formalize whole-of-government and inter-agency arrangements 
(training, etc). 
• Improve communications. 
• ‘Front load’ problem areas. 
• Purchase appropriate equipment (specifically riot gear). 
 
Overall, however, the whole-of-government approach and strong national will 
created the resource and psychological platform for improved security in SHP 
during the 2007 election. 
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7 POLICING THE ELECTIONS IN CHIMBU PROVINCE 
 
Thomson Fafungian 
 
National elections in Papua New Guinea, particularly the Highlands Region, are 
something that people look forward to — the educated elite, community leaders, 
churches, businessmen and village people alike. Elections are a time when 
money, pork and beer flow into the province and everyone wants to participate. 
This gifting culture started on a large scale in the 1982 national election in 
Chimbu Province when Sir Iambakey Okuk bought 34 pallets (3400 cartoons) 
of beer from the SP brewery for the Simbu people to consume as part of his 
election campaign. During this drinking spree people ran amok in the town and 
there was total chaos. The police arrested so many people the police cells were 
full, yet Kundiawa town was still full of drunkards who caused considerable 
violence, and the police could not do much. The 1982 election was a learning 
experience for the police, and since then they have sought to make thorough 
preparations for elections. The extent of gifting in Chimbu has meant elections 
are not fair or free, but are characterized by corruption, bribery, threats, and 
false promises by desperate candidates hungry for fame, power and glory.  
Campaign houses built by candidates to distribute food and money and conduct 
all sorts of illegal activities have proliferated throughout the Highlands Region. 
This kind of corruption reached its peak in the 2002 election.    
 
This chapter is based on my personal involvement and experience during the 
2007 election. It covers the pre-election, polling and post-polling periods. It 
does not necessarily represent the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary’s 
view on the management and running of the election but is my own personal 
assessment as someone involved in all aspects of election security.  
 
The Royal Papua New Guinea Police Constabulary (RPNGC) saw this event 
as a major operation for the constabulary. As set down in the commissioner’s 
mission statement, all the provincial police commanders (PPCs) were 
responsible for ensuring ‘a safe, secure, fair, democratic election’ and for 
planning and executing the RPNGC’s mission in their provinces. In Chimbu 
Province, the PPC, Superintendent Joseph Tondop, was the man responsible. 
 
In Chimbu Province police were involved in the preparation, polling, 
counting and post-election phases. The PPC’s planning was complemented by 
my proposal to secure AusAID funding through the Electoral Support Program 
and consolidate a partnership with civil society groups, churches, the Electoral 
Commission and the Provincial Aids Council in carrying out civic, HIV/AIDS, 
and law and order awareness in preparation for the election. The planning and 
security in the pre-polling operations and the counting involved Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) personnel and Correctional Services members. 
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The post-election management of tribal fights and disruption of government 
services in the districts as a direct result of election-related violence was 
included in the plan.  
 
Civic and law and order awareness 
 
Chimbu Province has had its share of violence and disorder during past 
elections. Violence has occurred in all six districts. The scars are visible from 
the roadside. For example, as one drives into Migendi Catholic Mission Station 
one can see the valley extending towards the Waghi River: what was once a 
flourishing valley was destroyed during post-election violence between 
supporters of two loosing candidates in the 1997 election, Peter Kuman and 
John Nopro. Across the province thousands of kina worth of property have been 
destroyed, villages have completely disappeared, food and coffee gardens have 
been destroyed, and people killed and injured, including innocent women and 
children. Indeed, past elections have taken such a toll that thousands of 
displaced people are now living in informal settlements in and around 
Kundiawa or have moved to other provinces because their homes and 
livelihoods have been destroyed by election-related violence. 
 
Police security during elections has typically been focused on the polling 
days only, with the greater part of the police effort put into ensuring adequate 
logistics and manpower at polling locations. Our main focus has been the 
security of ballot papers. This has meant that once polling was completed the 
police would move out with the papers, leaving innocent men, women and 
children to suffer at the hands of losing candidates and their supporters. In my 
experience, the violence usually starts after polling, and in many cases after the 
counting is complete. The release of the final results often triggers the violence. 
Unfortunately, with limited resources police cannot be in the villages at all 
times, and canot ensure the security of the people in the post- election period. 
The police do not have the capacity to contain violence when it occurs on a 
large scale throughout the province, and this often happens once the declarations 
are made. 
 
In the lead-up to the 2007 election, however, the PPC at the time, 
Superintendent Jimmy Onopia, resolved to take a more proactive approach in 
the hope of reducing the level of violence in the province.This involved drug 
reduction awareness and law and order awareness. He knew very well that the 
reactive policing measures typically employed did not achieve much when there 
was widespread violence. Police in other provinces shared the PPC’s concerns 
and had similar intentions but were constrained in implementing their ideas by 
funding and procedures.   
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Police in Papua New Guinea are faced with financial constraints at the best 
of times; the pressures of a general election exacerbate this. There was, for 
example, no money allocated to community policing for awareness before the 
2007 election. Realizing this, I put forward a community policing proposal to 
the Electoral Support Program Phase 2 (ESP) and fortunately my application 
was approved. I also thought that community awareness about elections might 
help make the job of policing elections easier, as the community itself needed to 
start taking on board the laws designed to make elections free and fair. I was 
assisted and advised by Dr Nicole Haley (research fellow, State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National University) whom I met 
during the Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election in 2006 when I was deployed as 
security contingent commander for polling in the Kopiago LLG area, and by Ms 
Susan Ferguson (communication adviser, ESP).  
 
The law and order awareness program came under the community awareness 
component of the AusAID-funded ESP, but because it was trying to make 
strategic links with police it was moved into the planning and operations area of 
ESP, where it was supported by Peter Pascoe, the police liaison adviser. Susan 
Ferguson maintained links with the program since, as a pilot project, it had 
implications across the entire awareness program. The proposal was approved 
for funding in late December 2006.  
 
I put forward the proposal for community policing as I believed it could 
reduce election-related violence and make for a fair and peaceful election and 
demonstrate how the community, the PNGEC, civil society groups, and the 
police could work in partnership to carry out an awareness campaign and enable 
the people to claim ownership of the election. The ESP was interested in 
working with the police, since the police are an important part of the election 
process — and sometimes part of the problem. 
 
I organized a team of people to run the project, selected from police and civil 
society organisations (CSOs). These included Meri I Kirap Sapotim, the 
Community Development Scheme, the Provincial AIDs Council, community 
leaders from all around the Chimbu Province, as well as the PNGEC. The team 
was made up of 50 police personnel (47 men and 3 women) from across the 
province, 12 Chimbu-based Meri I Kirap Sapotim members (5 men and 7 
women), 8 Community Development Scheme members (7 men and 1 woman), 
4 provincial AIDS educators (2 men and 2 women), 18 community leaders (all 
men) and 3 returning officers (all men). In all, some 95 personnel were 
involved. The partnership was coordinated and managed by me with the 
assistance of Pauline Kenna, a human rights lawyer. Her involvement in this 
project earned her the Papua New Guinea Woman of the Year for 2007 and a 
major Westpac prize. Other CSO members, such as Steven Gari, James Kalyale 
and Pastor Solomon Minga, gave technical advice. 
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 Before the teams were sent out to run awareness in the districts, all the 
members attended a week-long ESP training course. The training was conducted 
using the Electoral Support Program training manual. I wrote extra material for 
the police about election-related law and their role in enforcing the law. I also 
wrote material for them concerning police conduct, particularly what was 
expected of them during the election. Further to this, all members of the team 
agreed to abide by a code of conduct during the training. The code of conduct 
made clear the kind of behavior expected of everyone. 
 
Civics education was vital as it informed the team members about the laws 
concerning the illegal practices that were common in all voting places. It told 
the police about their role during the election and called on them to display a 
high level of discipline and to be firm and fair in providing election security. It 
educated the public about the rights of women to vote freely and safely. The 
people were taught about the new LPV system of voting and how to vote 
correctly on the polling day. The awareness promoted democracy and the 
importance of a good and accurate electoral roll for people when voting.  It also 
informed people about the risk of HIV/AIDS infection during elections. 
 
All the police who attended the training responded favourably. Many wished 
they had had this civic and governance education a long time ago. Importantly, I 
observed that it gave them both the motivation to go out into the field and the 
skills and knowledge to run the awareness.   
 
Our awareness started with an official launching in Kundiawa (the main 
town of Chimbu Province). Following this, messages were sent out to all the 
districts for the people to prepare to meet the team. The launch attracted about 
2,000 people and was a good way to demonstrate to the people that the police 
and other leaders thought this was important. 
 
During the awareness, the teams went far and wide, covering all corners of 
the province, reaching about 80,000 people. Sixty candidates attended our 
awareness, as did thousands of people who are illiterate and have no access to 
schools or media. In Karamui alone, 70 per cent are illiterate.  
 
The awareness ended before the writs were open as it was too dangerous to 
run such awareness during the campaign period. It was conducted for three 
months commencing February and ending March 2007. Its aim was to prepare 
people to think and act properly and not get misled by candidates.   
 
Establishing the partnership helped in the sharing of resources and expertise. 
Police allocated a full-time vehicle; the Provincial AIDS Council provided 
AIDS educators and materials; civil society groups provided skilled personnel 
and material, and the PNGEC provided awareness materials.  
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We carried out awareness district by district and managed to cover all ward 
areas. To do this we divided into four teams.  All teams had police personnel, 
civil society personnel, AIDS educators and community leaders, as well as a 
mix of men and women to ensure better gender participation. Each of the 
partners had its own networks in the districts and these were used to reach out to 
the people. 
 
As might be expected, there were many logistical difficulties in running a 
project of this kind, including bad weather, poor communications, poor roads, 
and remoteness. The weather presented many difficulties in that there was a lot 
of rain in the early part of the year. The majority of the awareness was 
undertaken by foot patrols, which walked long distances under frequently 
difficult conditions. All personnel were paid the same rate of allowance, 
regardless of whether they were public servants or volunteers. Protective 
clothing, boots, and sleeping bags were provided for them.  
 
Our teams sought to educate the people on the law and order aspects of 
elections, particularly electoral offences and their penalties; much attention was 
given to illegal practices such as under-age voting, threatening or offensive 
behaviour at polling stations, intimidation, and hijacking of ballot papers. As 
regards governance, we focused on the roles and responsibilities of elected 
members of parliament, how to elect a good leader, the separation of powers, 
bribery and inducement by candidates and supporters, and the rights and 
responsibilities of voters on polling day.  We also conducted HIV/AIDS 
awareness and informed people about election-related activities that might 
increase the risk of HIV transmission. We hoped that if people were better 
informed they would make better decisions during the campaign and polling 
periods. Generally, our awareness was very well received throughout the 
province. People in the remote districts claimed that they had never before seen 
police or public servants in their area; some even expressed resentment and said 
they would not to vote in the election. A similar protest occurred during the 
2004 Chimbu Provincial by-election, when the Haia people of Karamui-
Nomane electorate refused to vote and their ballot papers were sent back 
unused. 
 
Election security 
 
For the overall planning of the election, security was coordinated from the 
police headquarters in Kundiawa, in consultation with the Electoral 
Commission. PPCs provided intelligence briefings on their respective 
provinces. The management was particularly cautious after the failings of the 
2002 national election. The 2002 election was very violent and was generally 
regarded as Papua New Guinea’s worst election yet. People used every kind of 
fraud, voter intimidation, theft of ballot boxes, and violence, including rape, 
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destruction of properties and murder. These actions marred the election in some 
parts of the country; the polls were declared failed in six electoral districts in the 
Southern Highlands. New elections in those electorates were held successfully 
in May 2003, with very little violence. Australia gave about K60 million for 
these supplementary elections. In part, the smooth running of the supplementary 
elections can be attributed to the huge security presence.  
 
The purpose of the election security was to ensure that polling was 
conducted democratically, such that people could freely cast their votes without 
fear, intimidation or any form of threats by any person.  It was to ensure that the 
ballot boxes and ballot papers were conveyed safely into polling locations and 
returned back safely to the designated lock-up, protected at all times by armed 
security force personnel. Finally, the security was to ensure that counting was 
conducted transparently and legally, resulting in the declaration of a winner. 
 
Security planning 
 
The security planning for the province involved five stages. The planning 
process was at the critical stage of planning and implementation when the 
incumbent PPC, Superintendent Jimmy Onopia, was charged and suspended 
from duty. He was replaced by Superintendent Joseph Tondop two weeks 
before polling commenced, and it was under Tondop’s command and control 
that planning was carried out and executed. 
 
The first stage was intelligence gathering prior to the election. This was 
conducted by police intelligence officers. They gathered data from sources all 
around the province concerning arms build-up, people planning to hijack ballot 
boxes or destroy ballot papers, and destruction of road infrastructure into the 
districts. This enabled police to identify areas of high risk and low risk.    
 
The second stage was the pre-election operation, which focused on high risk 
areas to create a safe environment for polling to be conducted fairly and 
democratically.  The pre-election operation was carried out two weeks prior to 
the polling date in all districts. It focused on the intelligence gathered, and was a 
combined operation involving the police response unit and PNGDF personnel. 
Raids and searches were conducted in areas of known arms build-up around the 
province. Several successful operations were undertaken. In one, the home of 
Mathew Siune, the then sitting member for Kundiawa-Gembogl, was raided and 
searched. A rifle with full magazine and 400 SLR rounds was found and 
confiscated, and the then member was charged for possession of an unlicensed 
firearm and ammunition.1  
                                                     
1 Siune was later acquitted by Kundiawa Magistrate’s Court, even though the firearm 
and ammunition were found in his possession.  
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The third planning stage concerned the deployment of response units and 
polling security. The response units consisted of the PNGDF and police mobile 
units. The deployment of security personal to polling booths for the six 
electorates of Chimbu Province was detailed from the main operation order 
prepared by the election management team in police headquarters. The response 
units, pre-deployed to the province a full two weeks prior to polling, came under 
the command of the PPC, who was the operations commander for the election. 
He decided where and when they were to be deployed. The PPC chose to deploy 
the response units to problematic and high risk areas. Their deployment to pre-
election operations enabled them to crack down on arms build-up areas for a 
trouble free election on the polling day. By contrast, deployment to general 
polling security came late: because there were not enough personnel to cover all 
provinces at once, they were rolled over from province to province and came 
into Chimbu Province after completion of polling in Southern Highlands, Enga 
and Western Highlands provinces. 
 
The fourth planning stage covered security for the counting. This sensitive 
and high risk responsibility was given to the response units as it was considered 
that desperate candidates and their supporters could disrupt the counting by 
unlawful acts. The response units were to monitor the perimeters, inside and 
outside of the counting venue. They had to search counting officials, including 
the returning officers, before they entered the counting venue to make sure they 
were free of anything that might effect the counting. Armed personnel were to 
escort ballot boxes from the storage place into the counting venue. Local police 
personnel were barred from involvement in any duties close to the counting 
venue. This was strongly supported by the people of Chimbu, as local 
policemen were believed to have ties with certain candidates within the 
province. However, police managers such as myself and the PPC were 
permitted access to the counting centre so that we could supervise the security 
operation. 
 
The fifth planning stage concerned post-election operations, which were a 
major concern for the highlands provinces. Response units and local units were 
put on standby so as to attend to any election-related violence. Hired helicopters 
were meant to be available to transport security personnel into remote locations 
not accessible except by air, however after polling the helicopters were gone 
and security personnel found it difficult to get into these areas to address post-
election violence. 
 
Command structure  
 
Election security in Chimbu involved a combined effort by the RPNGC, the 
PNGDF, and the Correctional Services, but the police were responsible for the 
command structure. 
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Assistant Commissioner Mangae oversaw the entire election operation, whilst 
the Chimbu PPC Joseph Tondop commanded operations on the ground, issuing 
directions and orders to all subordinate officers. The PPC also headed the 
Provincial Election Steering Committee, which had an advisory and support role 
in facilitating the smooth flow of the election process and maintaining a positive 
working relationship with the provincial election manager, the Chimbu 
provincial administration and the joint forces commanders. The contingent 
commanders (police, PNGDF and Correctional Services) took charge of their 
respective districts in deployment and prioritizing command and control, 
reporting to the PPC for direction and assistance.  
 
Deployment of security 
 
The security units deployed to Chimbu Province, and their roles and 
responsibilities are detailed in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 below. In total, 898 security 
personnel, including approximately 60-70 female officers were deployed.  
 
I was security commander for Salt and Nomane LLG areas and took charge 
of one section of a PNGDF platoon (10 men), one section of a police mobile 
unit (10 men), 64 men Correctional Services personnel (including 6 women) 
and 10 police for polling security.  
 
The area was categorized as high risk due to the buildup of firearms. 
Inserting my personnel proved problematic, due to remoteness and poor road 
conditions. The polling security were dropped off at Sinasina District and had to 
walk about 10 kilometers into Salt as none of the hired Electoral Commission 
vehicles was roadworthy. The response units were meant to be inserted by 
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Figure 7.1: Command structure — Chimbu Province election security 
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helicopter with the ballot papers, and waited at Kundiawa; unfortunately the 
helicopter was delayed for two days due to the rollover (it was extracting 
personnel from Western Highlands) and as a result the ballot papers and 
response units were left waiting in Kundiawa.  
 
Table 7.1: Deployed security units and their roles and responsibilities 
Units (type) No. deployed 
Response units (armed units)  
Three police mobile squads  90 men (30 men per squad) 
One platoon of PNGDF  35 men 
Polling security  
PNG Correctional Services 142 personnel, including some women officers  
Western Highlands provincial 
police polling contingent 
142 personnel, including about 10 women  
 
National Capital District police 
reserve unit 
140 personnel including about 8 women 
 
Bomana police polling contingent 172 personnel including about 30 women 
East Sepik police auxiliary 172 personnel 
Simbu provincial police polling 
contingent 
130 personnel with about 6 women 
 
Table 7.2: District of deployment and responsibilities 
District Security contingent/unit Roles and responsibilities  
Kerowagi Bomana police contingent 
squad of police mobile 
section of PNGDF 
polling security 
deter violence 
deter violence 
Chuave East Sepik auxiliary police 
squad of police mobile 
section of PNGDF 
polling security 
deter violence 
deter violence 
Kundiawa-
Gembogl 
Western Highlands police  
squad of police mobile 
section of PNGDF 
polling security 
deter violence 
deter violence 
Gumine Western Highlands/Simbu police 
squad of police mobile 
section of PNGDF 
polling security 
deter violence 
deter violence 
Sinasina-
Yongomugl 
NCD reserve police  
squad of police mobile 
platoon of PNGDF (from Mt Hagen) 
polling security 
deter violence 
deter violence 
Karamui-Nomane PNG CS contingent 
section of police mobile 
section of PNGDF 
polling security 
deter violence 
deter violence 
 
As Salt LLG is closest to Kundiawa, and thus most accessible, it was selected as 
the location for the command post to cover both Salt and Nomane LLG areas. 
There I observed the candidates discussing with the two assistant returning 
officers where polling locations were to be. The returning officers proved 
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unable to make a firm decision in accordance with set procedures and gazettal. I 
stepped in and made a decision for them to avoid complications. Candidates and 
supporters issued threats and caused problems. One candidate, Michael Korry 
(who is owner of a security business in Port Moresby), rammed his vehicle into 
the security and polling command post at the Doliba High School, knowing that 
the response units were still in Kundiawa. However the situation was under 
control when the response units arrived. I directed the response units to round 
up the troublesome candidates. They were brought over and I sternly warned 
them that if they caused any more problems, they would be arrested when they 
came into Kundiawa for counting. We wanted to charge Michael Korry for 
damaging the school gate but the school principal requested payment instead.   
 
There were insufficient numbers of response units to cover both LLG areas 
on the same day, so polling was conducted in Salt on the first day and Nomane 
on the second. Polling was conducted without any disruption, however we 
witnessed widespread multiple voting due to inflated electoral rolls.  
 
Management issues 
 
The PPC provided the overall leadership of the combined forces during the 
election. It is at times difficult to manage a joint force of different disciplinary 
forces. In one instance, there was an armed confrontation between the PNGDF 
platoon and the local police personnel, when the PNGDF suspected that the 
local police were collaborating with some local candidates. Shots were fired by 
the PNGDF at the police and the general public and the situation looked tense. 
Fortunately, the PPC acted quickly and effectively and good working relations 
were restored. The PNGDF operation commander, Colonel Mae, and police 
operation commander Assistant Commissioner S. Kauba, were very supportive 
of the PPC who warned both the local police and the PNGDF that he would take 
disciplinary action against them if they failed to work together. He reiterated to 
both forces that he was the ultimate authority and that they were not to take 
matters into their own hands. The mutual working relationship was restored 
then and there.   
 
What worked well and what did not 
 
Whilst the overall security of the election process under police leadership 
depended heavily on the planning and deployment of security forces and polling 
staff, and the acquisition and distribution of equipment, the success of the 2007 
national election could best be measured by the cooperative efforts of all 
agencies in achieving an outcome that has been been acclaimed as ‘successful’, 
and ‘better than 2002’ — despite the many difficulties and criticisms, and 
complaints about the electoral roll, the number of polling places, poor 
communications, problems with finance, and other issues. 
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Although there were some instances of bad behavior or lack of action on the 
part of security forces, and incompetence or corruption in polling and counting 
situations, often attributable to lack of training, when looking at the deployment 
of some 1,200 troops and up to 3,000 election officials one might suggest that 
these incidents were isolated and that the cooperative partnership in fact 
contributed to a safe election.    
 
The following security aspects of the election worked well: 
 
• Cooperation between all agencies was very much improved.  
• Planning, deployment and extraction of a large contingency of men and 
women into Chimbu Province was achieved despite lack of transport 
(helicopters and reliable vehicles). 
• A better organized force with commitment to the elections and to the 
community was achieved. 
• Election awareness was improved (although much more is needed in 
some provinces). 
• The Provincial Steering Committee was coordinated well. 
• Timely payment of allowances to police eliminated risks.  
• Morale and discipline were high. 
• Planning and delivery of fuel for air operations in the province was 
good.  
• The use of provincial treasuries for the disbursement of funds by the 
PPC worked well. 
• Counting was well conducted by PNGEC officials and security forces. 
 
The following security aspects did not work well:  
 
• Planning was done at headquarters in Port Moresby without considering 
the local setting of Chimbu Province. 
• At times there was a lack of inter-agency communication on logistics. 
• An eleventh hour request for air transport by the PNGEC to move 
people and election materials caused delays in operations. 
• Post-election operations lacked manpower and funding. 
• Finance was inadequate and too late.  
• Provinces were unable to meet budgets, particularly in securing 
logistics. 
• Road infrastructure into districts was really poor. 
• Communication was a major problem at provincial level: there were no 
networks or integration; there were insufficient hand-held radios where 
polling security was deployed, and without hand-held radios no ground-
to-air contact; there had been no maintenance of police equipment, 
including repeaters, for twelve years. 
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• The cost of hire vehicles, which were often unsuitable and unreliable, 
was excessive. 
• There was inadequate provincial funding to secure local transport: 
police fleets were run down, with no replacements for up to fifteen 
years. 
• Field uniforms: there was only a pair to each police personnel so we 
could not get changed when it got wet. 
• No protective clothing or equipment was provided for wet conditions, 
which prevailed in many areas. 
• Training: many security personnel were unaware of their roles and 
responsibilities; further training was needed on election offences, and 
arrest and prosecution procedures. 
• Many Correctional Services personnel were unaware of the LPV 
system. 
 
The following electoral matters did not work well: 
 
• The electoral roll was inflated or deflated and largely unused, with line-
up voting widespread. 
• Polling materials arrived late. 
• There were delays in polling. 
• Too many polling places in close proximity promoted multiple voting 
and caused problems with deployment of security. 
• Polling places were moved against the advice of security forces, due to 
community pressure. 
• Election officials and police were involved with candidates. 
• PNGEC officials were not paid allowances, causing delays to the 
election process. 
• There was a lack of awareness and training for polling officials.  
• Returning officers and assistant returning officers lacked capacity to 
deal with electoral problems. 
• Widespread money politics was practiced by candidates.  
• One-day polling in the highlands did not work. 
 
One of the major issues which affected both security and polling personnel was 
the exceptionally bad weather across the whole of Chimbu Province. As a 
result, polling places which had been deemed accessible by road during the 
planning phase were rendered accessible only by air. Further delays in some 
districts were caused because helicopters were busy extracting polling security 
from Western Highlands Province and were not available to insert personnel 
into Chimbu Province for polling to start on time. Moreover, when the 
helicopters became available there were further delays in some districts because 
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the helicopters could not get off the ground due to the weather. This hampered 
the insertion of polling security and polling officials  
 
Local issues which affect law and order at election time 
  
Compounding the existing law and order problems are local issues that come 
into play in the highlands provinces at election time. These issues, which are 
deeply entrenched in the local political cultures, need to be critically addressed 
by government. 
 
The haus lain (clan) has assumed paramount importance in local political 
culture, so much so that there is often consensus to corrupt the electoral process. 
Candidates think that it is their ultimate right to get all the votes from their own 
council ward. Individuals face intense pressure to vote along clan lines and the 
majority of voters think it is wrong to give their votes to candidates outside their 
clan. This is a part of Simbu political culture that the law cannot override. 
Unfortunately, though, it deprives people of their free will to vote for a 
candidate of their choice  and denies their democratic right to a free and fair 
election. 
 
Under LPV, candidates sought to control their own ward areas during polling 
so as to secure the first preference vote. At most of the polling booths I went to, 
candidates or their campaign managers were physically present to ensure that 
they got all the first preferences.  
 
Many candidates also sought to influence polling by trying to shift gazetted 
polling locations to ungazetted locations in order to control the way people 
voted. Although this practice is illegal, polling stations in some parts of Chimbu 
were moved when presiding officers collaborated with the candidates. It was 
difficult for security personnel to stop this. Under law, the presiding officer is 
the designated authority at the polling station. Moreover, when security 
personnel attempt to intervene they put their safety at risk.  The biggest 
deterrent to this sort of behaviour is a large security presence, and in locations 
where there was an adequate security presence, candidates and voters were 
controlled and this allowed for good polling. This corrupt and unacceptable 
behavior needs to be addressed. 
 
Though police are authorized to make arrests at election time, they are often 
powerless against local populations which are heavily armed. This is a serious 
constraint for the law-enforcing body. I personally encountered instances where 
illegal firearms were being carried around freely — particularly in the Salt and 
Nomane LLG areas — but felt unable to arrest people without risking my life.  
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During the polling I, and the security personnel under my command, 
witnessed numerous instances of multiple voting, candidates controlling polling 
booths, and other violations around polling areas, in all the districts of the 
province. For the most part, the security personnel deployed to polling stations 
were unarmed and so could not do much. We were also conscious of the need to 
avoid decisions that might put polling officials’ and security personnel’s lives at 
risk. Geography was a major concern, as most of the locations were remote and 
we knew it would be difficult for more security personnel to get in and assist if 
the situation got out of hand. Offences were committed by people who took 
advantage of the situation, knowing that we could not arrest them all. In Salt-
Nomane multiple voting using inflated rolls was observed during polling. The 
response units were unable to contain the situation. We closed down only one 
polling station, at Ward 4, Salt LLG, and confiscated 200 ballot paper as all the 
eligible voters had voted. We arrested six people and took them to the command 
post where they admitted to multiple voting. But the location was remote and 
there was no transport to take them into Kundiawa to lay charges against them, 
so the suspects were cautioned and released back to the village.     
  
Aftermath of election violence 
 
For the most part, polling and counting in Chimbu was completed despite 
minor disturbances, two murders, and much multiple voting made possible by 
the inflated electoral roll. The 2007 election was widely seen to be a better 
election than previous national elections: no ballot boxes were destroyed, no 
polling booths over-run and no polling stations hijacked, as had happened in the 
past. 
 
In part this can be attributed to LPV. Candidates and supporters did not want 
to endanger the ballot boxes and hence no ballot box was destroyed or disputed. 
Their concern was that if a ballot box was hijacked their opponent might well 
lose all 1st preferences but they might lose 2nd ad 3rd preferences. This was one 
way in which the LPV system produced a better election. LPV also contributed 
to a more peaceful campaign period as there was more cooperation between 
candidates. 
 
All around the province the people were happy that there was less violence 
during the campaign and polling periods. Nevertheless, violence erupted as the 
counting proceeded to its final stages for all the six electorates of Simbu and 
after the declaration of the open seats there was violence throughout the 
province. Losing candidates and their supporters or tribesmen started attacking 
innocent men, women and children who had not voted for them. They 
complained that they had paid voters but had not received promised support. 
Public servants and community leaders who had helped ensure a peaceful 
election process were also attacked and their property destroyed. One notable 
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example was the burning down of Kaima and Munuma villages in Gumine 
District by a loosing candidate and his supporters. Not only did they burn down 
houses, they destroyed food gardens and livestock.  
 
Innocent school children were prevented from attending school, health 
centres were closed, and people were fearful of travelling into town, concerned 
that they might get attacked along the way. In Salt and Nomane where I had 
been stationed, bridges were dismantled and for four months people could not 
get into Kundiawa or Goroka.   
 
These provocative acts by losing candidates and supporters angered people 
from opposing clans giving rise to full-scale tribal fights, which resulted in 
damage to local infrastructure and disrupted normal service delivery to the 
districts. Added to this, there were constant road blocks on all district roads and 
harassment of the travelling public by criminal elements taking advantage of the 
situation. Bridges were destroyed, depriving people of access to schools, health 
services, and police assistance. Government employees could not perform 
normal duties as a result of high tension and violence. The costs were immense. 
 
Police in Papua New Guinea are often criticized for their slowness to 
respond when security incidents arise. Sometimes these complaints are 
warranted. But in Chimbu the Corrective Services personnel, reserve police, and 
auxiliary police from East Sepik were withdrawn after the completion of polling 
and the armed units (PNGDF and police mobile units) were withdrawn a week 
after counting, leaving only the provincial police to attend to the post-election 
violence.  Thus, despite the huge security presence during polling there was 
limited capacity to respond to post-election violence. With limited personnel 
and resources at his disposal, and given the remoteness of some of the locations 
at which fighting broke out, the PPC focused on mediation processes in an 
effort restore peace to the warring communities. Provincial peace mediators 
(gazetted peace mediators that solve conflicts through a mediation process) and 
police personnel went into fighting zones and camped out, negotiating with 
tribal leaders for peace. All parties agreed to mediation, and those involved in 
the fighting were asked to lay down their weapons and let peace and normalcy 
prevail in their communities. The mediation process proved successful, as 
people realized that fighting would only cause pain and misery for themselves. 
They recognized, too, that the candidates who had incited the violence had 
returned to Moresby or other centres and were not the ones suffering. The 
success of mediation processes was an advance on the use of force previously 
relied upon by police. 
 
The police mobile squads were originally established in the highlands to 
respond to tribal fights. Over the years, however, they have lost their 
effectiveness, so that the use of force by police to stop tribal fighting has little 
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impact in present-day Chimbu. In part this is because the public is equally or 
better armed. Instead, the police are now using restorative mediation approaches 
to solve tribal fights. These are proving far more successful. Mediation 
involving police, peace mediators, community leaders and representatives of 
warring tribes has been able to bring an end to tribal fights in Sinasina, Salt and 
Nomane. Table 7.3 below provides some information on the tribal fights around 
Chimbu during the post-election period.  
 
Table 7.3: Outcome of tribal fights in Chimbu 
District Number of 
tribal fights 
Dead Police action 
Kerowagi 5 4 Peace mediation stopped all the fights 
Sinasina-Yongomugl 1 4 Peace mediation stopped all the fights 
Chuave 1 2 Peace mediation stopped all the fights 
Gumine 4 4 Peace mediation stopped all the fights  
Karamui Nomane 2 6 Peace mediation stopped all the fights 
Kundiawa-Gembogl  1 3 Peace mediation stopped all the fights 
(2 killed by police in self defense) 
 
Simbu administration and police actions to end violence 
 
The Chimbu police sought to involve the Provincial Administration in 
addressing the violence that emerged in the aftermath of the 2007 election. This 
proved difficult, compounded by the fact that the new government was not yet 
in place and public servants were not performing to expectations.  
 
Some districts helped fund police operations in mediating peace. However, 
funding was delayed for more than a week; this hampered efforts in as much as 
police and mediation officials found it difficult to get into the fighting zones. In 
some of the districts, particularly Salt, Nomane and Karamui public servants did 
not help the police or involve themselves in the peace mediation process, which 
was undertaken by community leaders, peace mediators, and police. Generally, 
people in the communities involved in the peace process were frustrated at not 
being able to air their grievances to community leaders and government 
officials. They felt it was important to see government officials, church and 
community leaders, and police working hand-in-hand to address law and order 
issues in the communities and commended us for using community policing 
rather than heavy-handed tactics. The government should assist the people in 
restoring peace and order.    
 
Prior to the 2007 election, people in Chimbu had come to see election 
violence as a normal part of their lives in the five-year election cycle. They had 
also come to expect that the police would respond to post-election violence with 
force. The 2007 election in Chimbu marks a watershed in police-community 
relations in that, despite limited manpower, the police responded effectively to 
Policing the elections in Chimbu Province      97 
 
post-election violence, opening dialogue and restoring peace and normalcy in 
the province. Tribal fighting has now stopped and the people have started to 
reclaim their lives.  
 
Community involvement in the election and election aftermath 
 
In the two years I have been working in Chimbu, I have found the people 
understanding and easy to negotiate with. They responded well to the awareness 
we provided and this helped in dealing with problems during and after the 
election. Community leaders and elders took the initiative in helping to organize 
their people and find solutions to their problems.   
 
During the awareness period, local leaders helped to gather their constituents 
together to ensure a good attendance at every awareness session conducted — 
the awareness covered 80,000 people in three months. During the polling the 
leaders in most communities assisted by giving pre-polling speeches appealing 
for peace and calm during the polling in their respective ward areas. I am of the 
view that the election awareness helped create this beneficial partnership, 
because the police and leaders had had the opportunity to work together in the 
lead-up to the election. In some of the more remote areas people could not 
remember the last time police had visited. 
 
In the aftermath of the election, police manpower was strained. Only four to 
six police personnel were deployed into each fighting zone to address the tribal 
conflict. In many cases the police deployed were the same police who had been 
involved in the pre-election awareness. Again, the community leaders and 
people welcomed us, listened to what we had to say, and helped restore peace 
and normalcy. For example, in Salt LLG area, where I had conducted awareness 
and was deployed as contingent commander, two tribes at Yobai were in the 
middle of a tribal fight when myself and two policemen came into the area. We 
walked in unarmed, and were pleasantly surprised to find that the combatants 
laid down their weapons and withdrew back to their comfort zones. Personally, 
I was amazed. We visited both warring tribes and saw that they were still armed 
with weapons ranging from a semi automatic rifle and Bushmaster shotgun, to 
bows and arrows. Community leaders from the surrounding tribes came in to 
assist us in the peace negotiation, and  the leaders from the warring clans 
controlled their men, paving the way for a peace settlement.  
 
The people saw the law as a neutral body working for peace. They 
recognized that we were not there to support either of the conflicting parties. We 
chose to go into the war zone unarmed so as to indicate to the  warring tribes 
that the police were there to help mediate peace.     
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Conclusion  
 
Election 2007 has shown that partnerships between the police and the 
community are the way forward if we are to solve lawlessness in the highlands. 
Community policing produces a win-win situation: it saves police time and 
resources and allows communities the space to give their views on how they 
want to make peace. As the communities know the root cause of the problems, 
they can suggest alternative ways to make peace in accordance with their 
traditional ways of solving conflicts. They are the people who will live in the 
communities and they want to see peace prevail for a long time for the good of 
their families.   
 
The awareness we conducted yielded some impressive results. It reduced 
police work. It also resulted in fewer campaign houses and less corruption in 
some areas. Relationships built between police and community members helped 
in resolving problems during elections and in the post-election period. 
Understanding of the geography, through walking across the province doing 
awareness, proved invaluable for police when making logistical arrangements 
(especially as PNGEC officials did not always have this knowledge 
themselves). Much greater trust of police by community members, built through 
the awareness campaign, increased community respect for police and helped 
police sort out problems with the community during the election. Knowledge 
gained by the police through the ESP training and though the awareness, 
coupled with their past election experiences, helped individual officers in taking 
the initiative to step in when PNGEC officials were out of their depth. What 
Election 2007 has shown is that joint electoral awareness is both essential and 
invaluable. The PNGEC needs support and good leadership to conduct elections 
and this can be provided in part by the security forces and the wider community.  
 
In my view, the 2007 election in Chimbu was an improvement on past 
elections. But we must not rest on our laurels. Further civic and law and order 
awareness is needed and must be undertaken on an ongoing basis. We must look 
into the difficulties of enforcing election laws and further clarify the role of the 
police. 
 
Security units, including mobile squads and the PNGDF, need to stay longer 
after elections to help respond to tribal fights. In Chimbu we were lucky because 
the good relations we had established in the lead-up to the election meant that 
post-election fighting could be brought under control quickly. Sadly this has not 
been the case in other parts of the highlands. 
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8 CONDUCTING AND SECURING ELECTIONS IN A HIGH RISK 
SETTING: THE KOROBA-LAKE KOPIAGO EXPERIENCE 
 
Chris Kenny and Nicole Haley 
 
This chapter offers a security perspective on the elections in Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago Open electorate during the 2007 general election. It looks specifically 
at the challenges of conducting and securing elections in a volatile high-risk 
setting. It finds that the 2007 election was considerably less violent than recent 
general elections and this was attributable in no small part to the huge 
investment in security. It also finds that there is considerable room for 
improvement with respect to inter-agency coordination and electoral 
administration, and that the role of the security forces should be clarified and 
pre-deployment training provided to all security personnel prior to the 2012 
elections. 
 
Background 
 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago is a large electorate comprising four rural local-level 
governments (LLGs). It is situated in the far north-western corner of Southern 
Highlands Province, and is one of eight open electorates in the province. There 
is very little by the way of government service delivery and armed conflict is 
commonplace, as are illegal weapons (see Haley and Muggah 2006). Indeed the 
district is awash with weapons. Despite this there are only six regular RPNGC 
police stationed in the district (all at Koroba station) and no properly 
functioning village courts. Political leaders (including many of the ward 
councillors) spend little time in the district and vast majority of public servants 
are also absent. It is politicians and candidates who are largely responsible for 
the proliferation of small arms in the electorate. 
 
In the decade or so leading up to 2007, elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
had become increasingly violent, so much so that that the elections had failed in 
2002 due to widespread violence and electoral malpractice on a scale never 
before seen in Papua New Guinea elections. Dozens of people (including police) 
were killed; a high profile candidate was kidnapped and held for ransom; all 
airstrips in the western end of the province were closed following threats that 
planes would be shot out of the sky, and people throughout the province were 
threatened and intimidated by wealthy candidates and their supporters, often 
armed with high-powered weapons (Haley 2004). The failure of the 2002 
election saw the national government assume authority in the province and the 
greater part of the province’s population were without political representation 
for some ten months, until supplementary elections were held in April/May 
2003.  
 
100      Election 2007 
Post 2002, elections in the Southern Highlands have been secured by huge 
investments in security. The 2003 supplementary elections, for example were 
conducted under a national call-out with the assistance of 2,000 additional 
police, soldiers and prison warders; the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election 
involved over 800 police and Defence Force personnel, and the 2007 general 
election in Southern Highlands Province (SHP) involved both the special police 
operations (SPO) security force, consisting of 200 regular police and 150 Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) personnel, and 2,500 additional national 
elections (NATEL) security personnel. 
 
In the months leading up to the 2007 elections the Southern Highlands had 
been subject to a state of emergency (SOE) from August 2006 to February 2007 
and thereafter special police operations (SPO) which remained in force until 14 
August 2007, by which time the 2007 election had been completed. When 
announcing the state of emergency, which was subsequently declared to be 
unconstitutional, Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare advised that the executive 
government had taken this step as part of its ongoing efforts ‘to restore 
governance, security and public administration in the province’ and in an effort 
to ‘avoid at all costs a repetition of the events of 2002 where the national 
elections were declared illegal due to the use of arms by competing parties’.  
 
The SOE was accompanied by a gun amnesty, which had very limited 
success. Only a handful of the estimated 2,500 factory-made weapons thought 
to be in civilian hands in the Southern Highlands (Alpers 2005) were recovered 
and less than three hundred firearms in total. Like past weapons collection 
initiatives it yielded mainly home-made weapons (see chapter 6). In reality the 
SOE and SPO had little impact in Koroba-Lake Kopiago. This was because 
none of the SOE troops were stationed in the electorate, being deployed instead 
to the major urban centres and key locales on the Highland’s Highway and 
major trunk roads. In the case of Koroba-Lake Kopiago, much of the electorate 
is accessible only by road. 
 
NATEL 07 
 
In contrast to the SOE/SPO, a PNGDF platoon was deployed to Koroba 
District during the national elections security operations, NATEL 07. Lt Chris 
Kenny commanded the security operations in the electorate. That troops were 
deployed to Koroba-Lake Kopiago as part of the national elections security 
operations was hardly surprising, as the electorate was deemed to be high-risk, 
being one of the five open electorates in which the 2002 national elections had 
failed. What was surprising was that it had not been a focus of the SOE/SPO 
operations. Taskings under NATEL Ops 07 were to: 
• create an environment conducive to good elections; 
• foster community support;  
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Figure 8.1: Lt Kenny leading 
awareness at Koroba 
• conduct awareness; 
• gather intelligence; 
• identify and contain security threats; 
• oversee the conduct of polling, and 
• conduct post-election operations.  
 
Given the events of 2002, SHP was assessed as being a likely problem area with 
respect to the 2007 elections. On this basis the Papua New Guinea Electoral 
Commission (PNGEC) decided that SHP would poll first and on a single day, 
30 June 2007. For the most part, pre-polling operations in the highlands were 
focused on SHP, with insertion scheduled for 18-19 June, pre-polling operations 
20-29 June, polling 30 June, post-election operations 1-31 July  and withdrawal 
1 August. The decision to deploy security personnel to SHP well in advance of 
polling was prudent, particularly in Koroba-Lake Kopiago, given the absence of 
SOE/SPO operations in the lead-up to the elections. 
 
In terms of threats, we expected to find and have to deal with: 
• illegal weapons 
• unresolved election-related issues 
• candidates and supporters 
• criminal elements, and 
• organized syndicates. 
 
Pre-polling operations focused on minimizing these threats. Being deployed two 
weeks prior to the scheduled commencement of polling meant we were in a 
position to undertake detailed reconnaissance and attend to security threats well 
in advance of polling. It also enabled the 
security forces to make informed decisions 
about where best to deploy our limited 
security resources on polling day. 
Importantly, the pre-deployment of security 
personnel meant we were also able to 
undertake election and security related 
awareness, and this contributed to the good 
security situation observed on polling day 
(see Figure 8.1). Unfortunately, however, 
the security personnel were not well 
supported during this period, having limited 
rations, poor communication, and a shortage 
of vehicles and fuel. 
 
What the security personnel had not 
expected to encounter were chaotic 
preparations on the part of the PNGEC. Nor 
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did we expect that we would effectively have to conduct the elections. Certainly 
we were not trained to run the elections and in fact, unlike the police, did not 
receive election-related pre-deployment training. Instead we were merely issued 
with a little security booklet (RPNGC 2007a), with which we were expected to 
familiarize ourselves. Much of the NATEL 07 PNGDF contingent, who as it 
turned out were given special police powers and deployed to the most high-risk 
settings, were unclear about their role in general, and about electoral processes 
and electoral offences more specifically.  
 
Another thing we did not expect to encounter were international and 
domestic observers. The security booklet we were issued with did not include 
anything about the domestic observation. An updated version of the booklet, 
entitled Election Handbook 2007 (RPNGC 2007b), which was printed in June 
2007, did include a section of observers but unfortunately it issued too late and 
as a consequence could not be distributed to security personnel already in the 
field.  
 
Election preparedness 
 
It will, of course, always be difficult to conduct elections in remote rural 
electorates that lack basic infrastructure and are accessible for the most part only 
by air, but that said the planning, organization, administration and preparedness 
for the elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago was woefully inadequate. Logistics, 
administration and planning were hampered by the fact that the key electoral 
officials, namely the returning officer, Denny Hongai, and assistant returning 
officers, Don Piru and Haddick Sakopa, were absent much of the time – 
especially in the lead-up to polling. For instance, when the security personnel 
arrived in the electorate the returning officer was absent. He was reportedly in 
Mendi, the provincial headquarters, collecting his election materials. He arrived 
in the electorate, with his electoral supplies, approximately 36 hours ahead of 
the commencement of polling, claiming to have been delayed in Mendi waiting 
for pre-polling allowances and materials.  
 
Communications proved extremely problematic throughout the election 
period for both the election officials and the security personnel. A lack of radios 
and failure of the joint communications strategy meant that there was no 
communication between the election manager, returning officer and assistant 
returning officers once in the electorate and that it was difficult for those in the 
field to get accurate information about the movement of air transport. For much 
of the election period the returning officer had no idea what was going on 
outside his immediate purview. And his purview was limited indeed, as he 
choose to remain safely ensconced within the security of the Koroba hospital 
grounds where the security operations were based. The assistant returning 
officers for North and South Koroba LLG areas likewise chose to base 
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Figure 8.2: PNGDF distributing  
election materials 
themselves within the secured hospital compound and they proved as ineffectual 
as the returning officer. 
 
Communications for security forces were not ideal either, in that mobile 
phones, which worked and upon which we relied in other parts of the highlands, 
did not work anywhere in Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate. The PNGDF-issued 
radio also proved problematic. It enabled radio contact with headquarters in Port 
Moresby but could not be used to contact senior officers at the provincial 
headquarters in Mendi. Likewise, it did not permit contact with the police who 
were commanding the security operations in the province, who were operating 
on a separate radio system. Fortunately the domestic observers had a satellite 
phone and made it available to both the security and electoral personnel. Even 
with the phone, it proved impossible to contact the SHP election manager, and 
so desperate pleas for ballot box seals (see below) and later for air transport to 
insert polling teams into polling places that were accessible only by air, had to 
be relayed directly to the electoral commissioner and operations manager via 
advisers attached to the Electoral Support Program in Port Moresby.  
 
The day before polling was due to commence the security personnel and 
observers gathered in the hospital grounds to witness the distribution of ballot 
papers and election materials. Neither the returning officer nor assistant 
returning officers were interested in undertaking this important task, the latter 
being more interested in finalizing the lists of polling officials, which seemingly 
involved meeting with delegations representing key candidates and an endless 
stream of would-be election officials. As the day progressed several thousand 
people gathered outside the hospital fence, wanting to know the composition of 
polling teams, and who was to be engaged to conduct the elections.  
 
Around mid-morning it became evident that the key electoral officials, 
namely the returning officer and the assistant returning officers for North and 
South Koroba, were unwilling or unable to make the necessary election 
preparations. It was also evident to 
observers and security personnel that 
the returning officer and assistant 
returning officers were supporting 
different candidates, which was 
detrimentally impacting upon their 
performance. Accordingly security 
personnel, under the eye of the 
domestic observers, stepped in and 
sorted and distributed all the 
essential election supplies such as the 
ward rolls, pens, rulers, candidate 
posters, ballot papers and t-shirts. 
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Figure 8.3: Lt Kenny distributing ballot 
papers 
One of the most critical aspects of the election preparations took place 
without the active involvement of the election officials, namely the distribution 
of ballot papers. This was done by Lt Kenny and his section commanders, with 
guidance from the domestic observers who advised that the number of papers 
issued to each ward should match the enrolments in that ward and that each 
ward should be allocated only five additional papers. The observers and the 
security commander (but no electoral officials) kept a register of papers issued 
to each polling station. Several of the candidates subsequently became aware of 
this and wrote to the returning officer on 07 July 2007 seeking clarification 
about the total number of ballot papers issued to each polling place. In the same 
letter they also alleged that unnamed candidates had printed extra ballot papers.  
 
As the day progressed it became 
evident that the returning officer 
had given no real thought to the 
logistics of inserting the 51 polling 
teams he was responsible for. He 
reported that he had not received 
his pre-polling advance and so was 
not in a position to hire vehicles 
and/or purchase fuel. Key 
operational and logistical matters 
had been left to the last minute, and 
were dependent on the availability 
of funds. In the absence of these, 
the returning officer appeared completely paralysed. He spent much of the day 
before polling trying to make contact with the election manager and SHP 
finance officer seeking to enquire about his pre-polling funds, instead of 
undertaking the final election preparations. In his stead the PNGDF arranged for 
and funded the insertion and extraction of polling teams. They achieved this by 
using PNGDF vehicles and fuel and by commandeering local vehicles and or 
local fuel supplies for use during the election. Without this action the election 
would not have proceeded.  
 
Similar observations were made in Kagua-Erave Open electorate where the 
security forces were likewise relied upon to transport ballot boxes and polling 
teams because funds that should have been released prior to polling were not 
received until after the polling was complete (see chapter 20). The pre-polling 
advance the returning officer had been expecting was meant to cover pre-polling 
expenses, including the purchase of fuel to insert polling teams, hiring of drivers 
and security, polling team advances, and incidental allowances for polling 
officials. It was not received until two days after the commencement of polling 
and then the amount received was less than half of what had been expected. 
When the funds arrived, the returning officer requested that both authors witness 
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Figure 8.4: Lt Kenny reading 
out polling official's names 
and record the counting of the money, reporting that in the past he had received 
less that the full amount indicated on the paperwork he was expected to sign. In 
this instance, the paperwork accompanying the ‘advance’ indicated that 
K99,869 should have been received, although we confirmed that only K43,500 
was received. Similar observations were made by the Nicole Haley during the 
2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election, where official paperwork indicated 
that payments had been made to phantom polling officials. Whilst we 
understand that delays in the release of funds, in this case, were in part due to 
the late appropriation from Treasury, this does not explain the missing money. 
 
In Koroba the lists of polling officials were finalised at dusk (5.45pm) on the 
eve of polling and were still being read out and argued over as night fell (see 
figure 8.2 below).  Polling teams were instructed to return at first light on 
polling day for training. In the end, only presiding officers were offered training 
and this was very cursory, lasting only twenty minutes with no opportunity for 
questions. The training was cut short when polling officials tried to ask about 
their polling allowances and raised complaints about outstanding payments 
dating back to the 2003 supplementary elections and the 2006 Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago by-election. At Kopiago, polling officials received no training. 
Throughout the electorate polling officials were critical of this lack of training. 
Training manuals were not used during the training session at Koroba and were 
not issued to polling officials anywhere in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate. 
 
Around 3.30pm on the eve of polling an additional 60 unarmed police 
arrived to supplement the 31 Defence Force personnel deployed to oversee the 
elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate. Collectively we were expected to 
secure 51 polling stations against a potentially well-armed populous in an 
electorate where the 2002 general elections 
had failed. By way of comparison, the 2006 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election, which had 
taken place some eleven months earlier in 
July 2006, had involved a security force of 
over 800 police and Defense Force personnel.  
 
Knowing the history of the electorate, 
specifically that a police officer had been 
killed at Koroba during the 2002 elections and 
that there had been further election- related 
deaths in the lead-up to the 2007 elections, 
several of the unarmed police refused to be 
deployed with polling teams. They were 
redeployed to Enga province before polling 
was complete in SHP. 
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Figure 8.5: Block voting at Tumbite 
Polling  
 
In Southern Highlands, where polling commenced, the provincial police 
contingent was boosted by 2,500 additional NATEL security personnel (2,000 
police — mostly auxiliary and community police — and 500 PNGDF 
personnel). Despite the large security presence, security remained thin on the 
ground. Typically one or two unarmed police provided the security at most 
polling stations, while armed PNGDF provided security at more high-risk 
locations and acted as response units. That said, we are aware of several wards 
where polling proceeded in the absence of polling security. The Yatemali 
polling station is a case in point (see below). 
 
One day polling, scheduled for 30 June, proved unworkable in Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago due to poor planning and infrastructure, the late release of funds, and a 
lack of vehicles and air transport. Polling was delayed by up to two days in 
those areas where polling teams needed to be inserted by air. In total it took five 
days to complete the polling.  
In terms of the conduct of polling, voting irregularities were the norm rather 
than the exception in Koroba-Lake Kopiago. Security personnel and observers 
alike witnessed rampant cheating and malpractice, including underage voting, 
multiple voting, ‘line-up’ voting, and serial voting. There was no secret ballot 
and excess ballot papers were used at many polling stations. Assisted voting, 
much of it seemingly forced, was commonplace and at several polling stations 
polling officials were observed to be issuing pre-marked ballot papers. At other 
polling stations groups of young men were issued with entire books of ballot 
papers, which they were observed to be complete en masse (see figure 8.5 
below) 
 
In two cases where pre-marked ballot papers were being issued by polling 
officials and candidate scrutineers, security personnel stepped in and insisted 
that the polling station be closed down mid-afternoon. The presiding officers 
from both polling stations, namely Ereiba 1 and 2, subsequently complained to 
the assistant returning officer and to 
domestic observers, including Nicole 
Haley, insisting that voting had been 
‘going well’, that ‘people were 
voting for the candidate of their 
choice’ and that the ‘votes were 
being shared by all of the 
candidates’. They subsequently wrote 
to the returning officer requesting 
that polling be resumed on 01 July 
2007. The request was denied. As it 
turned out, over 80 per cent of first 
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preference votes in these two boxes went to the former MP, Herowa Agiwa.  
 
The location and positioning of polling stations clearly contributed to and 
facilitated the widespread malpractice observed. For example, there were seven 
polling places at Koroba Station (Teria 1, Teria 2, Pandu, Andiria 1, Andiria 2, 
Koroba Station and Kereneba Part 2). These were all set up within five minutes 
walk of each other, and voters were observed moving backwards and forwards 
between them. Three of these polling stations were moved, the returning officer 
explained, from their gazetted locations to ‘make it easier for voters to move 
between polling stations’. At Pureni, in South Koroba LLG area, four polling 
stations (Tumbite, Pubulumu 1, Pubulumu 2 and Tangimapu) were set up on 
Tumbite airstrip.  Three of the four polling stations had been moved from their 
gazetted locations on grounds of alleged security threats, although it should be 
noted that no such threats were reported to the security personnel. It is also 
worth noting that this is one of the locations where the most blatant fraud was 
observed, in that a group of approximately thirty young men sitting at desks and 
in small groups under tarpaulins completed close to 6 000 ballot papers in the 
space of six hours. Tumbite and Pubulumu are also two of the key areas in 
which enrolments in already over-enrolled wards increased further during the 
verification stage, so much so that at the time of the 2007 election enrolments 
were three to four times greater than they should have been (see chapter 21).  
 
In the immediate post-polling period, security personnel who had witnessed 
such irregularities reported confusion about the true nature of their role. They 
questioned whether they were there merely to secure the election process as 
tainted as it was, or whether they should have done more to prevent or deter 
voting irregularities, and whether they should have shut down the polling 
stations. Their questions evidenced the fact that they lacked a clear 
understanding of proper electoral practice and electoral offences more 
specifically, and that pre-deployment training needs to be more comprehensive. 
Some were clearly of the opinion that the law was being broken and that 
electoral offences were being committed but they remained unsure about their 
powers to intervene. Their uncertainty was compounded by the fact they were 
never officially sworn in.  
 
Post-polling operations 
 
Past elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago have seen ballot boxes highjacked at 
the close of polling. A key task for the security personnel on polling day was the 
safe transportation of ballot boxes back to secure distribution points. In this 
case, all boxes were safely returned to Koroba, although there was at least one 
well planned attempt to intercept some of the North Koroba ballot boxes. It was 
successfully thwarted by Lt Kenny. The attempted ruse involved a fake mobile 
squad vehicle, and supporters of a SHP regional candidate dressed in mobile 
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squad uniforms attempting to ‘collect’ ballot boxes at the close of polling. The 
same group was later reported to have made concerted attempts to intercept 
ballot boxes in Tari-Pori electorate as well, and somewhat incredibly was 
observed to fire upon the crowd gathered outside the Tari police station (see 
chapter 20).  
 
As polling teams returned to Koroba at the close of polling, it was evident 
that many of the presiding officers were incapable of completing their returns 
due to poor literacy and numeracy. Without exception returns and polling day 
paperwork were completed after the fact over several days. Many presiding 
officers sought and requested assistance from the security personnel and 
observers when completing their returns. They did so because the returning 
officer had failed to keep a record of ballot papers issued, or a register of unused 
ballot papers. Few presiding officers knew how many ballot papers they had 
been issued with. As presiding officers completed their returns, many ‘found’ 
books of completed ballot papers that had not been cast on polling day. Some 
went as far as to assert that boxes which had been sealed in the presence of 
observers and security personnel at the close of polling had in fact been sealed 
prematurely and that the boxes (which were sealed only with padlocks) should 
be reopened to allow the additional papers to be inserted.  
 
One such case, was that of Yatemali, where the presiding officer lost control 
of the polling station, including the ballot box and papers, after a fight broke 
out. The box was taken off into the bush by candidate supporters but was 
subsequently returned when a PNGDF rapid response unit turned up. The ballot 
box was returned with 212 completed ballot papers inside. Security personnel 
also demanded the return of the remaining 685 ballot papers issued to that 
polling station. Initially these were not forthcoming and on this basis the 
presiding officer requested fresh polling on 01 July 2007. In his written request 
he alleged that the returning officer and assistant returning officer had 
“deliberately failed to protect the polling” by “failing to provide essential 
security”. The request for fresh polling was denied. In the face of this, the 
missing papers were returned to the presiding officer the following day, with the 
instruction that they ‘must be counted’. The papers were evidently returned 
completed. Both the presiding officer and returning officer were quite insistent 
that the security personnel should open the ballot box so that the returned ballots 
might be counted. They claimed that they had both received death threats and 
that their lives were in danger if the ballots were not allowed. Security personnel 
refused to open the box, and although it was transported to Mendi for counting, 
the box was set aside and not counted.  
 
The delayed release of pre-polling funds, coupled with the funding shortfall 
detailed above resulted in reduced payments to polling officials, which in turn 
gave rise to much discontent and saw the majority of returning officers withhold 
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their returns and refuse to attend the count. It also saw polling officials, 
candidates, and their supporters initially block the transport of ballot boxes to 
Tari. A full day’s mediation on the part of the security personnel was needed in 
order to gain community consent to transport the ballot boxes to the counting 
centre. Once consent had been gained the ballot boxes were transported to Tari 
under security escort without incident. The boxes, along with those from the rest 
of Hela region, were held in Tari, at the Tari police station, while the Huli 
candidates argued with the electoral commission over the location of the count. 
The Hela people had wanted ‘their boxes’ counted in Tari and not in the 
provincial headquarters where counting for the entire province was centralized. 
As a demonstration of their resolve they blockaded the Tari police station where 
the ballot boxes were being held. As a result, the transportation of the boxes to 
the counting centre in Mendi was delayed by ten days.  
 
The observers and security personnel who had overseen the transportation of 
the ballot boxes to Tari spent several days in Tari waiting for a decision on the 
counting venue. This was completely unexpected and presented huge logistical 
difficulties in that all the local guest-houses were fully booked and being used 
by the electoral staff and security personnel who were deployed to Tari for the 
elections. Eventually the observers managed to secure the use of a three 
bedroom Evangelical Church of Papua New Guinea (ECPNG) mission house at 
Halenguali. It was subsequently used to lodge the thirty-one PNGDF security 
personnel who had been stationed at Koroba and ten domestic observers.  
 
Accommodation was not the only difficulty faced. Extended delays in both 
Koroba and Tari meant that the security personnel had exhausted their rations 
and allowances. Thankfully, the Porgera Joint Venture community affairs staff, 
based in Tari, assisted by providing additional rations. They later assisted with 
fuel as well, when the NATEL forces who had been based in Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago were redeployed to Enga Province.  Indeed, fuel became a real issue 
when George Tagobe, a candidate for Tari-Pori Open electorate and the operator 
of Hela Fuel Distributors (HFD), the sole commercial fuel distributor in town 
refused to sell fuel to the PNGDF and observer team claiming outstanding debts 
against both the PNGDF and PNGEC dating back to the 2006 Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago by-election and the SOE operations.1  
 
From Tari, the PNGDF platoon that had been based at Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
was redeployed to Wabag as part of the 1020-strong NATEL security force that 
                                                     
1 A fortnight or so before the issue of writs, Alphonse (2007) had reported that there 
were likely to be disruptions to the elections due to the “non-payment of outstanding 
monies for services and goods provided during the state of emergency operations”.  He 
specifically warned that HFD managing director, George Tagobe, was refusing to 
supply fuel to both security personnel and electoral commission staff on account of 
K100,000 in outstanding invoices. 
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oversaw polling and counting in Enga Province. They remained in Wabag after 
the polling, to secure the count and to respond to post-election violence, but 
were subsequently deployed back to Southern Highlands to respond to post-
election fighting in Kagua-Erave electorate.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored the challenges of conducting and securing 
elections in a high-risk setting. It has highlighted a raft of administrative 
deficiencies in respect of administration and planning on the part of the 
PNGEC. It has also identified aspects of the security operations that might be 
improved. These include more comprehensive pre-deployment training for 
PNGDF personnel, and improved communications so that there is secure 
reliable communication between all key stakeholders. The chapter finds that 
security in the highlands during the election period was much improved, and 
that a factor which contributed to the good security situation was the pre-
deployment of NATEL forces a full two weeks prior to polling.  
 
Over the course of the election period, the security personnel worked very 
long hours, with little rest. Throughout the country they were observed to be 
better behaved than in past elections and to have conducted themselves 
professionally in the main (Haley and Anere 2009:47). They were observed to 
use mediation and community policing to quell disputes and diffuse potentially 
volatile situations and were rarely seen to exercise any unnecessary force. 
Although it was not their role, they also stepped in to ensure the smooth running 
of the elections, contributing to both awareness and logistics. Indeed in several 
places the security forces not only contained potentially volatile situations, but 
effectively ran the elections (see chapters 7, 20 and 21). Were it not for their 
intervention it is likely the elections would have again failed.  
 
Although they performed well overall and made a significant contribution to 
the conduct of elections, the security personnel found it difficult to deter voting 
irregularities. This was possibly due to the fact that many were unarmed and 
most poorly trained. Those in the PNGDF contingent deployed to Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago open electorate reported that they had received no pre-deployment 
training. As a consequence many seemed unclear about their role in general, and 
about electoral processes and electoral offences more specifically. Clearly, the 
role of the security forces needs to be clarified and pre-deployment training 
provided to all security personnel prior to the 2012 elections, so that they are not 
seen to be securing a process tainted by fraud, malpractice and significant 
irregularities (cf. Institute of Policy Studies 2004:26) and so that they might 
make a significant contribution to electoral governance. This is particularly 
important given the role the security forces play at election time and the fact that 
elections are now a whole-of-government exercise. Clearly the RPNGC, 
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PNGDF and Correctional Service personnel deployed during elections need 
specific and consistent, as opposed to ad hoc, training on electoral procedures 
and electoral offences, guidance on when to intervene, and the extent of their 
special constable powers under a national call-out. Finally we recommend that 
electoral officials and security personnel charged with the responsibility to run 
and secure elections in known trouble spots and high-risk settings be better 
supported. Left to their own devices without effective communication or 
adequate funding they are deeply compromised. 
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9 POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 2007 NATIONAL ELECTION: 
ALIGNMENT TO REFORM? 
 
Alphonse Gelu 
 
Introduction 
 
Papua New Guinea’s parliamentary democracy took a new turn in the period 
2002-2007, by maintaining continuity in the political regime. This was probably 
attributable to an important reform that was instituted by the Morauta 
government in 2001, namely the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC). While this is a significant development, 
some sceptics are not comfortable with several aspects of the reform, such as the 
provisions for the formation of government and the continued success of 
independent candidates in the elections. 
  
The 2007 election was the second in Papua New Guinea to be conducted 
under the OLIPPAC, and the parliament of 2002-2007 was the first in which a 
post-independence government served a full term in office. In 2007 the 
incumbent prime minister, Sir Michael Somare, as leader of the National 
Alliance party, was returned to office.  
 
This chapter asks: what role did the ambitious political reforms, aimed at 
strengthening political parties, play in delivering this result? And how have 
Papua New Guinea’s loosely-knit and flexible political parties changed under 
the new institutional arrangements? 
 
There is a substantial literature on the role of political parties in Papua New 
Guinea (Wolfers 1970; Stephen 1972; Hegarty 1979; King 1989; May 1984, 
2002, 2006; Rielly 1999, Anere 2000; Okole 2006) and a general agreement that 
political parties are highly fragmented and have remained weak in terms of 
ideology and organization. They are essentially parliamentary factions and have 
not provided a link between government and society.  
 
Papua New Guinea has always had a multi-party system, with a record of 43 
political parties contesting the 2002 national elections and 34 contesting in 
2007. From 1977 to 2002, the number of parties contesting the elections was 
between five and ten. Despite the proliferation, parties remain detached from the 
people. Like parties in mature democracies such as Australia and New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea parties develop policy platforms, endorse candidates, and 
campaign to attract support for their candidates. However, their support base is 
limited and the large number of independents winning seats is an indication that 
the people do not vote along party lines. 
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Political parties in the 2007 election 
 
A total of 2759 candidates contested the 2007 election with 1478 standing as 
independents and 1281 endorsed by political parties. A total of 34 parties 
contested the 2007 elections. This number was a decrease from the 2002 
elections. The number of candidates endorsed by parties ranged from 91 by the 
National Alliance to 1 by the National Front Party. Those which endorsed more 
than 50 candidates were National Alliance (91), New Generation Party (90), 
Pangu (84), People’s Progress Party (72), PNG Party (61) and Peoples National 
Congress (51). People’s Action Party endorsed 48. 
 
Campaign styles by political parties 
 
As in the previous elections, political parties began their preparations early, 
in 2006. The process started with the different parties formulating their policies 
and holding party conventions to sort out internal matters relating to leadership, 
membership and party policies. 
 
The campaign in 2007 was not as intense as those of past elections. There 
was less of the fanfare and feasting that was characteristic of previous elections, 
though attempts were made to buy the loyalty of voters through the distribution 
of money and goods, especially in the highlands. Sir Michael Somare was 
accused of giving out K600 million for infrastructure projects in his electorate 
(East Sepik Provincial). The OLIPPAC authorizes the payment of K10,000 for 
each party-endorsed MP before the end of the parliamentary term and this 
favours the larger parties. It is generally accepted, also, that the parties in 
government enjoy greater access to funding for local projects, giving those 
parties a further advantage. 
 
However, the outlay of money did not guarantee success. A notable example 
was in the Western Highlands Provincial contest, where twenty-five candidates 
stood against the sitting member, Paias Wingti, a former prime minister once 
named as the richest man in the Pacific. They included a young unknown 
candidate, Tom Olga, a former student at the University of Papua New Guinea. 
Olga started his campaign soon after the 2002 election. With a very small 
budget, he walked from village to village, sleeping in the villages and talking 
with the people. His style of campaigning made him popular, and despite 
Wingti’s strong showing in the first preference count, Olga took the lead in the 
count of preferences and he was eventually declared the winner. Several high-
profile candidates, including Bart Philemon in Lae Open, Sir Joe Tauvasa in 
West New Britain Provincial and Powes Parkop in National Capital District, 
also ran relatively low-cost campaigns, with mixed results. Philemon won his 
seat but Tauvasa, despite an early lead, came second to National Alliance 
candidate Peter Humphreys, who spent thousands of kina on his campaign. For 
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Parkop, it was a tough battle against the incumbent, Wari Vele, governor of 
National Capital District who had won the seat in a controversial by-election in 
2006. Vele, a successful businessman, ran an expensive campaign with 
advertisements on television and a theme song performed by popular artist 
Moses Tau, which referred to Vele as ‘lightning and thunder’. Patrkop told the 
people he had no money to spend but encouraged them to vote for good 
leadership. He won comfortably. 
 
Several candidates campaigned on a platform of good leadership, integrity, 
and promotion of good governance through transparency, accountability and 
maintenance of the rule of law. The election of Parkop, and the re-election of 
Dame Carol Kidu in Moresby South and Sir Mekere Morauta in Moresby 
North-East, suggested that, at least in the national capital, such a platform had 
some appeal to voters in 2007. 
 
The lower intensity of campaigning might be ascribed to the use of limited 
preferential voting (LPV), which encourages alliances between the different 
parties and candidates. In some electorates, communities invited parties and 
candidates to come together and present their policies in a combined rally. 
Candidates and parties carried out more extensive campaigns than in the past, in 
order to collect preference votes. Candidates ventured into enemy territories, 
something that seldom happened in previous elections. 
 
Radio was the most common means of transmitting information about parties 
and candidates. Newspapers were also used by parties which could meet the 
high cost of printing campaign materials. Television was used by a few parties. 
 
Most of the political party campaigns kicked off soon after their party 
conventions. The first political party to use the media in its campaign was 
Pangu Pati, whose parliamentary leader, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, announced the 
four main policy pillars of the party. This was followed by the ruling National 
Alliance party, whose campaign preparations were interrupted by a struggle 
over the party’s leadership. This was settled when Bart Philemon, the deputy 
leader of the party, was expelled, allowing Sir Michael Somare to continue his 
leadership of the party. Soon after his expulsion (which was formally 
announced in April 2007), Philemon began preparations for the launch of a new 
party, the New Generation Party.  
 
The New Generation Party staged a strong campaign against the ruling 
National Alliance, with Philemon pushing for policies that were different from 
those of the National Alliance. Philemon, who was a minister in the Somare 
government of 2002–2007, was not happy with some of the decisions made by 
the government, especially with regard to financial management; he referred 
specifically to a ‘US bond issue’, which he had refused to endorse as treasurer 
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because he felt that the transaction would not be in the best interests of the 
country (see Post-Courier 13 March 2007). 
 
Other parties also criticized decisions and actions of the National Alliance-
led government, including the PNG Party headed by Sir Mekere Morauta, the 
People’s Party headed by Peter Ipatas, the People’s Progress Party led by Byron 
Chan, and the People’s Labour Party headed by Peter Yama. Yama declared an 
all-out war against the National Alliance, however he lost the Madang 
Provincial seat, which was won by Sir Arnold Amet, a National Alliance 
candidate. 
 
The 2007 campaign became personal when the parliamentary leader of the 
PNG Country Party, Jamie Maxtone-Graham, was publicly accused by the 
president of the National Alliance, Simon Kaiwi, of not having land, or ‘even a 
toilet’, in the electorate that he represented. This represented a new style of 
campaigning in Papua New Guinea, where parties and their executives have 
seldom said personal things against one another in the media. 
 
During the campaign period, the New Generation Party was to have 
launched its campaign in Wewak, the provincial capital of East Sepik Province, 
the prime minister’s electorate, but was told by the police that they did not have 
authorization to do so. This was another shift in campaigning style.  
 
Alliances between the different parties slowly emerged during the campaign 
period of March to June. The most salient was that between the PNG Party and 
the NGP, whose leaders, Sir Mekere Morauta and Bart Philemon, publicly 
announced their alliance and commented on the need for like-minded parties to 
come together to form a coalition government. The National Alliance and its 
coalition partners also maintained their commitment to each other going into the 
election. Some parties that remained broadly neutral, such as the People’s 
National Congress headed by Peter O’Neill, People’s Party headed by Peter 
Ipatas, People’s Democratic Movement headed by Paias Wingti, Rural 
Development Party headed by Moses Maladina, and Melanesia Liberal Party 
headed by Dr Allan Marat, eventually joined the National Alliance after the 
election, despite being dumped at some stage as coalition partners in the 2002-
2007 parliament. Marat, O’Neill and Maladina were all deputy prime ministers 
at some point in the Somare government of 2002–2007 and all decided to join 
Somare after the 2007 election. This was criticized by Sir Julius Chan, who 
made a comeback in 2007. Sir Julius decried the continuous breaking of 
coalition agreements between the National Alliance Party and its partners: ‘We 
helped put Somare in the highest office of the land each time with a clear 
coalition pact, sadly each time we signed the memorandum of understanding, it 
was broken before the ink got dry’. He vowed the People’s Progress Party 
would not get into bed with parties it was not comfortable with, echoing 
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sentiments New Generation Party leader Philemon had expressed (Post-Courier 
10 April 2007).  
 
Pangu Pati was the only major party that made no commitment going into 
the 2007 election. As a coalition partner in the Somare-led government of 2002–
2007, it was envisaged that it would go with the National Alliance; however, 
there were also signs that its parliamentary leader, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, was 
talking with Sir Mekere Morauta and Bart Philemon. Namaliu made a public 
statement that Pangu would go with like-minded parties — language that was 
also used by Morauta and Philemon. 
 
To maintain alliances between the parties, agreements were made in some 
electorates not to put up candidates against sitting members of coalition 
partners. This was evident in East Sepik Regional, for example, where a number 
of parties decided not to put up candidates against Sir Michael Somare. 
However, this arrangement looked suspect in some electorates, where parties 
that gave an undertaking not to put up candidates allegedly supported 
independent candidates. One such example was in Kokopo, where a number of 
parties decided not to put up candidates against Sir Rabbie Namaliu, but it was 
later revealed that the eventual winner was supported by the National Alliance. 
Namaliu, who calmly accepted his defeat, later expressed his disappointment to 
the media.  The practice of putting up ‘undercover’ candidates also contravenes 
the spirit of OLIPPAC, specifically Section 55 which states that parties should 
not endorse more than one candidate in an electorate — though this is very 
likely to happen where parties agree not to contest against sitting members who 
are vulnerable to defeat. 
 
Leaders of various parties travelled the country campaigning for their 
candidates. Sir Michael Somare, leader of the National Alliance, toured almost 
all of the provinces, hiring helicopters to travel to very remote areas. Peter 
Yama, leader of the People’s Labour Party, also toured widely, having declared 
war against the ruling National Alliance, which he said he would ‘kill’ in the 
election. (Yama, the sitting member for Usino-Bundi, decided to contest the 
Madang Provincial seat in 2007, but was defeated by former chief justice Sir 
Arnold Amet, a National Alliance candidate.) Pangu leader Sir Rabbie Namaliu, 
PNG Party leader Sir Mekere Morauta, Peter Ipatas, leader of the People’s 
Party, and Bart Philemon, leader of the New Generation Party also travelled the 
country campaigning for their party candidates. Political rallies were organized 
in the towns and districts they visited and promises were made. Attacks were 
made on other parties; the National Alliance was at the receiving end of most 
criticism, as was to be expected since it was the lading party in the coalition 
government.  
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Party politics 
 
With a large number of parties contesting, it was anticipated that there would 
be a wide range of policies from which voters could choose. However, looking 
at the policies in areas such as education, the economy, law and order, 
infrastructure, and resource development, many of the parties tend to agree on 
what they would do if they were in government. Nevertheless, some party 
policies were quite comprehensive and there was a number of differences. This 
was an interesting development since in the past parties have been criticized for 
the similarity of their policies. 
 
In an initiative carried out by the National Research Institute (NRI) in 
partnership with the various media organizations, a public seminar series was 
organized in early 2007 to allow political parties to present their policies.1 The 
NRI initiative was an attempt to break the tradition of voting along tribal lines 
and encourage voters to elect candidates on party policies (Post-Courier 7 
March 2007). Despite the popularity of the program, only eight of the thirty-
four parties responded and presented their policies.2 Five of the eight were 
either new parties or old parties attempting a comeback.3 
 
In addition to the seminar series, the NRI offered to assist political parties 
who requested help in framing their policies. Only two parties responded, Pangu 
and the People’s Party. As a result, these two parties had coherent policies and 
outlined clearly what they wanted to achieve if they were in government.  
 
The seminar series demonstrated that despite some similarities, party policies 
have become more detailed and comprehensive. This is an encouraging new 
development.  
 
Pangu, which was the first party to start its campaign and announce its 
policies, placed emphasis on income generation for the rural population, good 
governance with zero tolerance of corruption, and infrastructure development. It 
also wanted to increase the size of the Defence Force (Post-Courier 23 March 
2007). The last of these was initiated by former PNGDF commander, Jerry 
                                                     
1 The presentations were recorded and broadcast by the Karai Radio of the National 
Broadcasting Corporation which was a key partner in the seminar series. 
2 These included Pangu Pati, New Generation Party, Melanesian Liberal Party, National 
Party, PNG Country Party, People’s Freedom Party, PNG Party, and People’s National 
Congress. The presentation of policies was made by the party leaders, except in the case 
of Pangu, which was represented by its general secretary, Moses Taian. 
3 Two parties, the Country Party and the National Party, were formed in the 1970s and 
were trying to make a comeback in the 2007 election. Between them, they won only two 
seats and both were in the camp that eventually formed the government. 
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Singirok,4 who contested the Sumkar Open seat (in which he was runner-up). As 
the oldest party in the country, Pangu sought to project itself as a new party with 
new ideas, policies and leadership. This emphasis was important for Pangu 
because many people have come to regard it as an old party with outdated 
policies. 
 
The New Generation Party, formed shortly before the election, presented a 
detailed list of policies. Its emphasis was on good economic management, 
public sector reform, and a shift in foreign policy. According to Bart Philemon: 
‘Anybody who talks about doing away with overseas aid at the moment doesn’t 
really understand; they are kidding themselves’ (Post-Courier 30 March 2007). 
The party was accused of being a friend to Australia; its foreign policy was in 
sharp contrast to that of the National Alliance, which displayed anti-Australian 
sentiments in many of its public engagements. The New Generation Party put 
forward a sound plan for governance reform, which included the establishment 
of a commission to fight corruption, audit of units in all government agencies, a 
performance-based management system for departmental heads, and a strict 
code of professional ethics for public office holders. The New Generation Party 
took a strong stance against corruption and graft at all levels of government and 
civil society and advocated for transparency and accountability in all aspects of 
public administration (Post-Courier 19 February 2007). Party policy 
specifically outlined how this was to be achieved. 
 
The PNG Party, under the leadership of Sir Mekere Morauta, emphasized 
sound economic management, good governance, prudent leadership, and service 
delivery to the people. The PNG Party has attracted many educated Papua New 
Guineans. Morauta has had a record for instituting processes of good 
governance and he campaigned on this record in the 2007 election. He also 
proposed contracting out services, such as pharmaceuticals distribution which 
has been heavily affected by corruption. His lone fight in parliament to amend 
the National Capital District Commission Act to get rid of corruption was 
admired by many and the fact that he retained his seat by a big margin was an 
indication that voters in his electorate supported his fight against corruption. 
Morauta accused the National Alliance-led government of doing virtually 
nothing (Post-Courier 5 March 2007). The PNG Party was also the only party 
that acknowledged the dangers posed by HIV/AIDS and pledged to fight the 
epidemic. 
 
The People’s National Congress, under the leadership of Peter O’Neill, also 
emphasized good economic management and called for a review of foreign 
policy. It advocated the abolition of provincial governments and the 
                                                     
4 Singirok, a retired general, was a key figure in the Sandline Crisis of 1997.  
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establishment of district authorities, reducing government to two tiers instead of 
three, and called for a bicameral legislature. 
 
Of the smaller parties, the Country Party under Jamie Maxtone-Graham 
emphasized rural development through alternative means of transportation, 
agriculture, and income generation. The Melanesian Liberal Party, led by Dr 
Allan Marat, called for the use of Christian principles in governing the country, 
as well as supporting the creation of micro- finance credit schemes to assist the 
rural people to develop small agricultural projects; but the Melanesian Liberal 
Party’s most radical policy was a proposal to give 100 per cent ownership to the 
landowners of all the mining, forestry and fisheries projects in the country. The 
People’s Freedom Party, under Moses Murray, emphasized justice and technical 
education for the young; party policy was that leaders convicted under the 
Leadership Code should be banned from politics for life. The People’s Freedom 
Party proposed a similar scheme to the National Party’s national youth scheme. 
The National Party proposed to reintroduce the Village Services Scheme and 
improve service delivery. The People’s Party of Enga governor, Peter Ipatas, 
stated that the law and order situation must be a priority for any government; 
tribal fights and other law and order problems had hampered development and if 
elected to government he would apply zero tolerance of violence and would 
improve the conditions of the police by addressing issues of wages and housing. 
 
The National Alliance, as the ruling party, campaigned on its track record in 
office. According to the party, it had achieved a lot in the five years since 2002. 
When it assumed office, the currency was at an all-time low; foreign reserves 
were at a low K200 million; government infrastructure (roads, bridges, health 
centres and hospitals5) were in poor state; state businesses such as PNG Power, 
Post PNG, Telikom and Air Niugini were on the brink of collapse. All these 
were because of poor government decisions and over-spending by preceding 
governments. Since the National Alliance had come into office, the kina had 
climbed back up to 31 cents against the $US, foreign reserves had gone up to 
K5 billion, government infrastructure was undergoing major rehabilitation, and 
state enterprises were posting huge profits, and people were seeing real 
economic growth (Post-Courier 5 March 2007). On its campaign trail, Somare’s 
National Alliance reportedly distributed millions of kina to provinces for 
various projects. This was criticized by other parties as a tactic to gain support.  
 
The other parties in the National Alliance-led government, such as the 
People’s Action Party, United Party, United Resources Party and Melanesian 
Alliance, also based their policies and campaigns on their record in government.  
                                                     
5 Despite boasting about improvements in hospitals, between 2002 and 2007 the Angau 
Hospital in Lae faced closure several times due to lack of drugs and maintenance, and 
the Boram Hospital in Sir Michael’s electorate faced severe drug shortages. 
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Results of the 2007 election 
 
After the first declaration, in Manus, it quickly became apparent that the 
National Alliance would outperform the other parties. The National Alliance 
was not only winning seats through its endorsed candidates but was picking up 
independent candidates who were declared winners in their electorates (see 
Table 9.1). The National Alliance was criticized in the media especially for the 
use of the government owned Kumul Aircraft to collect winning candidates 
throughout the country (Post Courier July 31 2007, letter to the editor). 
 
The success of the National Alliance may be attributed, first, to the 
popularity and experience of its leader, Sir Michael Somare. Despite his age, Sir 
Michael was at the centre of the campaign for his party and his popularity was 
evident throughout the country. Huge turnouts greeted him wherever he spoke. 
Secondly, the party’s organization was better than that of other parties. 
Wherever Somare travelled, he was accompanied by the deputy party leader of 
the region and this proved effective in the election. The success of the National 
Alliance was shared by its coalition partners; a good number of ministers from 
the National Alliance and its coalition partners retained their seats. The 
exceptions were Bire Kimisopa in Goroka Open and Sam Akoitai in Central 
Bougainville Open.  
 
The losers in the 2007 election were Pangu Pati and the New Generation 
Party. The leaders of these two parties are from the generation after Sir Michael 
Somare. Despite the parties endorsing 174 candidates between them (Pangu 84 
and New Generation Party 90), Pangu managed to win only five seats and New 
Generation Party four with one independent candidate joining the party later. It 
became even worse for Pangu when its leader, Namaliu, lost his seat in Kokopo.  
 
Of the thirty-four parties contesting, only twenty-one won seats. Many of 
these were new and small and did not have an established party organization or 
any clear policies; some of them were single-issue parties.  
 
Eight party leaders lost their seats. The most notable (and to most, 
surprising) of these was Sir Rabbie Namaliu, leader of Pangu Pati and a former 
prime minister. Another former prime minister, Paias Wingti, also lost his seat. 
Other party leaders to lose their seats included Hami Yawari (Conservative 
Party), Michael Mas Kal (National Party), Moi Avei (Melanesian Alliance), 
Peter Yama (People’s Labour Party), Bire Kimisopa (United Party), and Sam 
Akoitai (United Resources Party).  
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Table 9.1: Political parties in the 2007 election 
Name of party Parliamentary party 
leader (pre-election) 
Number of 
candidates 
endorsed
Number 
of seats 
won 
Independent 
candidates 
joining  
parties 
Pangu Pati  Sir Rabbie Namaliu 84 5 - 
PNG Labour Party Bob Danaya 14 1 - 
People’s Progress Party Byron Chan 72 4 1 
People’s National 
Congress 
Peter O’Neill 51 5 1 
PNG Country Party Jamie Maxtone-Graham 41 2 - 
People’s Labour Party Peter Yama 46 2 - 
United Party Bire Kimisopa 45 2 - 
National Alliance Sir Michael Somare 91 27 13 
PNG National Party Michael Mas Kal 49 1 - 
PNG Party Sir Mekere Morauta 61 8 - 
Christian Democratic Party Dr Bahanare Bun 22 - - 
United Resources Party Sam Akoitai 25 5 1 
People’s Action Party Gabriel Kapris 48 6 - 
People’s Freedom Party n/a 10 - - 
People’s First Party Luther Wenge 23 1 - 
PNG First Party n/a 25 - - 
PNG Green Party n/a 3 - - 
Yumi Reform Party n/a 18 - - 
People’s Heritage Party Clement Nakmai 9 - - 
National Front Party n/a 1 - - 
People’s Resources 
Awareness Party 
n/a 10 - - 
Melanesian Alliance Sir Moi Avei 23 1 - 
Melanesian Liberal Party Dr Allan Marat 17 2 - 
People’s Democratic 
Movement 
Paias Wingti 54 5 - 
New Generation Party Bart Philemon 90 4 1 
Star Alliance Party n/a 72 - - 
People’s Party Peter Ipatas 67 3 - 
Rural Development Party Moses Maladina 56 3 - 
PNG Conservative Party Hami Yawari 59 1 - 
Mapal Levites Party n/a 8 - - 
True Party n/a 21 - - 
Pan Melanesian Congress unknown 9 - - 
National Conservative 
Party 
n/a 10 - - 
National Advance Party n/a 47 1 - 
Independents n/a 1478 20 3* 
TOTAL  2759 109 20 
Source: PNGEC Candidates List (2007) and The National, 7 August 2007. 
* From the total of 20 independent candidates, only three remained independent. One of 
these three, James Yali, a former National Alliance MP (who was serving a gaol 
sentence at the time of the election but was appealing against the conviction) had his 
win annulled soon after the election. The seat is now held by a member of the National 
Alliance. 
Political parties and the 2007 national election      123 
It is not uncommon in Papua New Guinea elections for leaders to lose their 
seats, and parties often disappear when their leaders lose. After the election, the 
the National Advance Party amalgamated with People’s Action Party. 
Amalgamation is allowed under the OLIPPAC, and it can bring like-minded 
parties together.  
 
The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates  
 
The 2007 election was the second to be held after the passage of the 
OLIPPAC and the first following a full parliamentary term under OLIPPAC. 
The new law was intended primarily to develop and strengthen the party system 
in Papua New Guinea. It makes it a legal requirement to register parties as legal 
entities under the Associations Incorporation Act and with the Office of the 
Registrar of Political Parties, and authorizes limited public funding for political 
parties.  
 
It also lays down conditions to maintain discipline within the party system. It 
has been well documented that in Papua New Guinea lack of party discipline 
and loyalty had led to instability within the parliamentary system. The existence 
of a ‘yo-yo’ culture, with members changing political party affiliation and 
parties changing coalition partners, contributed to the fall of governments 
through votes of no confidence. 
 
By limiting the ways MPs can vote on important measures, and imposing 
penalties if they transgress (Sections 77–80), the OLIPPAC makes it difficult 
for MPs to withdraw their support from a party. This helped Sir Michael 
Somare and his government stay in office for the full five years from 2002 to 
2007. 
 
Formation of government 
 
Under the OLIPPAC, ‘the Electoral Commission shall advise the Head of 
State of the registered political party which has endorsed the greatest number of 
candidates declared elected in the election, and the Head of State, acting with, 
and in accordance with, the advice of the Electoral Commission, shall invite that 
registered political party to form the Government in accordance with this 
section’ (S.63(1)). 
 
The National Alliance won the most seats (27) and was accordingly invited 
to form government. Since the National Alliance lacked an absolute majority, 
however, as in previous post-election situations, a process of coalition formation 
began.  
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In the expectation of forming government, the National Alliance and its 
partners met in Kokopo to put a coalition together by courting other parties and, 
most importantly, independent candidates,6 with offers of ministerial posts, 
appointments to parliamentary committees and other rewards. Of the 20 
successful independent candidates, 13 joined the National Alliance bringing the 
party’s total number of MPs to 40. The parties in the Kokopo camp signed a 
pledge to remain loyal to the National Alliance and its leadership.  
 
Although the OLIPPAC rules out multiple endorsement of candidates by a 
party in the same electorate, there were allegations of multiple or ‘hidden’ 
endorsements (generally referred to as ‘undercover candidates’), but this was 
difficult to prove. Such a practice was probably inevitable where parties had 
agreed not to put up candidates against coalition partners, but were not 
confident the endorsed candidates would be returned.  
 
In the weeks leading up to the election of the prime minister, a rival camp 
emerged, headed by Bart Philemon and Sir Mekere Morauta, at the Hideaway 
Hotel in Port Moresby and an open invitation was sent out to other parties and 
independent candidates to join the camp (Post-Courier 26 July 2007). In media 
statements, both the Kokopo camp and the Hideaway camp expressed 
confidence in their ability to form government (Post-Courier 2 August 2007).7 
The Hideaway camp teamed up with the People’s Progress Party and nominated 
Sir Julius Chan as its candidate for prime minister.  
 
On 6 August the National Alliance was formally invited by the governor 
general to form government and a week later, on 13 August, 86 MPs voted for 
Somare as prime minister (three fewer than in 2002). Apart from his National 
Alliance, Somare was supported by thirteen other parties from the Kokopo 
camp. The Hideaway camp managed only 21 MPs. The election of Somare 
made him the first MP to occupy the office of prime minister on four separate 
occasions (1975–1980, 1982–1985, 2002–2007, and 2007–).  
 
                                                     
6 Section 69(2) of the OLIPPAC states: ‘A Member of Parliament elected at a general 
election without endorsement by a registered political party may join a registered 
political party at any time after the return of the writs and before the first election by the 
Parliament of a Speaker following the date of the return of the writs in that general 
election provided that that registered political party had endorsed candidates at that 
general election’. 
7 Section 63(7), (8) provide that in the event that the party that is invited by the governor 
general to form the government cannot muster a simple majority, then the Standing 
Orders of parliament will be applied and another vote taken. 
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Independent candidates 
 
The OLIPPAC does not encourage candidates to remain independent: there 
are no financial benefits for independent MPs and under Section 86(1) 
independent candidates can seek membership of parties once they are elected 
into parliament. 
 
The success of independent candidates compared to party endorsed 
candidates is still high. The National Alliance won 27 seats, but independent 
candidates won 20, compared with the next most successful party, PNGP with 
8. Independent candidates have come to play a central role in the formation of 
the government, with the National Alliance picking up 13 additional MPs after 
they were declared. In 2007 only three remained independent.  
 
Elsewhere I have recommended a review of the OLIPPAC to impose 
guidelines on independent candidates (see Gelu in Post-Courier 15 August 
2007). Independent candidates should remain independent throughout their term 
in parliament and should not take any part in the formation of government. The 
formation of the government should be left to parties; this would encourage 
parties to work hard to get more votes and more seats in elections. All efforts 
should now focus on how the party system can be strengthened.  
 
‘One-man’ parties  
 
After the passing of the OLIPPAC, political parties proliferated. Forty-three 
contested in 2002 and 34 in 2007. In the 2007 election, however, 7 parties 
endorsed fewer than 10 candidates, with one endorsing 3 candidates and another 
only one. When the outcome of the election had been decided, 10 of the 21 
successful parties had only one or two MPs (four had two MPs, six had one); 13 
parties were without parliamentary representation, but still exist outside 
parliament. Many of the latter lack genuine platforms and have no support base 
or financial resources to carry out successful campaigns. Some commentators 
believe that the OLIPPAC has led to an increase in the number of parties and 
that it should now find ways to limit the number of parties contesting the 
election. 
 
MPs who have been expelled from a party may form new parties (S.62 of the 
OLIPPAC). In 2007 Dr Allan Marat, formerly the leader of People’s Progress 
Party, after being expelled from the Party, formed the Melanesian Liberal Party 
and was reelected. The Rural Development Party of Moses Maladina (who was 
expelled from the People’s Action Party), and the PNG Conservative Party of 
Hami Yawari provide examples of one-man parties formed to contest the 2007 
election. This is another aspect of the OLIPPAC that needs to be reviewed. 
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Conclusion 
 
The campaigns undertaken by parties in 2007 were intense but low key; this 
was probably due to the introduction of LPV. The bigger parties took the need 
to attract support seriously, and contested amongst themselves. But the time has 
come for parties to take another step by allowing party leaders to debate their 
policies in public forums. This would allow people to make informed decisions 
about whom to support. The majority of voters in Papua New Guinea are 
‘undecided voters’; they respond to the offer of material goods from the 
candidates. If this can be replaced by a focus on the policies of parties then 
elections might produce better outcomes.  
 
The OLIPPAC was clearly observed in the formal requirements concerning 
endorsed and non-endorsed candidates and in the formation of government.8 But 
arguably the OLIPPAC has done little to strengthen the party system. There is 
still a large number of very small parties, most of which lack organization, 
funding, a coherent policy platform and mass support. Independent candidates 
still play a major role in the formation of government, and ‘undercover’ 
candidates make a mockery of the requirement that parties endorse only one 
candidate per electorate. Women’s participation as candidates in the election, 
and more especially as elected MPs in the parliament, is minimal. There is a 
serious need to revisit the OLIPPAC to find ways in which the legislation may 
further strengthen the party system in the country.  
 
Despite the fact that parties have become part of the political landscape in 
Papua New Guinea, there is no meaningful relationship between them and the 
voters. This has led to suggestions that the number of political parties in Papua 
New Guinea should be limited, to make parties more meaningful. 
 
One suggestion is to tie parties to specific interests in society, such as class 
or workers’ interests, gender, youth, farmers’ or landowner interests, and so 
forth. This would enable the parties to develop coherent policies to cater for the 
interests that they represent. A party that does not represent any broad interests 
could be deregistered. 
 
A second alternative is set a minimum number of votes to be received during 
the election (identified by the Electoral Commission) and any party that fails to 
reach the cut-off point would be deregistered. If any of its candidates win a seat, 
they would be asked to join one of the larger parties. 
 
                                                     
8 More than twelve months after the election, however, not one party had submitted the 
statement of contributions and expenditures required under the OLIPPAC. 
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A third alternative is to set a minimum number of seats and deregister any 
party going below than the required number.  
 
The provisions for deregistration of parties would have to be incorporated 
into the OLIPPAC. 
 
Any of the above options would decrease the number of parties and make the 
parties stronger in terms of membership both in parliament and outside it, 
encouraging parties to provide the vital link between themselves and the people.  
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10 WOMEN AS CANDIDATES AND VOTERS: GENDER ISSUES AND 
THE KEREMA OPEN ELECTORATE  
 
Orovu Sepoe 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2007 national election in Papua New Guinea was expected to produce some 
pronounced changes in terms of its administration and conduct, and in the final 
outcome, particularly as a result of the introduction of a limited preferential 
voting (LPV) system. Certainly, a lot more work and higher costs were involved 
in administering the election, partly due to the lengthy counting process 
associated with LPV. In terms of its outcomes, the winners obtained a larger 
mandate from the voters than in previous elections. Whilst some observers 
commented that electoral violence was quelled as a result of LPV, others 
posited that a heavy deployment of security forces was primarily responsible for 
the more peaceful election. 
 
From a gender perspective, it was anticipated that women candidates would 
have far greater chance of success at the polls given the element of preference 
trading implicit in LPV and the widely accepted view that LPV could be 
anybody’s game. This, however, did not eventuate. It is important to understand 
why the 2007 election outcome, like all other elections in the past, did not prove 
to be advantageous for women. The main objective of this study is therefore to 
examine women as candidates and voters, with specific reference to gender 
issues in the Kerema Open electorate. 
 
The discussion and analysis here are based on personal observations of 
campaigning and polling as well as election information made available by the 
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC), in particular the final 
election results. In addition to media coverage, four local research assistants 
based in the Gulf Province through all phases of the election provided 
invaluable information about the election. 
 
The chapter is presented in three parts. The first briefly outlines the 
conceptual basis for the study. The second gives an overview of women’s 
participation and gender issues in the 2007 national election. The final part is a 
discussion of women as candidates and voters, and analysis of gender issues, in 
Kerema Open. 
 
Conceptual framework  
 
The discussion and analysis in this study is premised on several theoretical 
and conceptual tools relevant to the gender and feminist perspective. 
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First, the public/private split in social, economic and political realms of life 
infiltrates the entire electoral process. The prevailing cultural perceptions of 
men as the decision-makers results in the continuing domination of public 
leadership positions and roles by men. The large number of male candidates 
compared to female candidates not only demonstrates this perception but also 
reinforces it. The domination of political parties by men, and the relatively low 
endorsement of women candidates compared to men, further supports this view. 
The prevailing trend is for women candidates not to be taken seriously by 
political parties. Women’s role in cooking and hospitality during campaign 
rallies and feasts supports prevailing gender norms and division of labour. As 
voters, women’s choices are mostly determined or dictated by men. 
  
Secondly, the concepts of structure and agency allow us to understand 
women’s position relative to men as the dominant players whilst also 
accounting for women’s empowerment in a male-dominated system. The 
persistent view of electoral politics as a male preserve is reflected, for example, 
in the number of guns in the hands of ‘warlord’ candidates, and in access to and 
control over resources such as money and labour. ‘Bigman’ leadership style 
sends a clear message that women cannot be ‘bigmen’. However, it is important 
not to lose sight of the ever-increasing number of women contesting as 
candidates in Papua New Guinea elections, even standing against sitting MPs 
who are apparently well-established and well-resourced (Elizabeth Simogun 
Bade’s challenge to Sir Michael Somare in the East Sepik Provincial seat recalls 
the biblical story of David and Goliath). The evidence of women’s participation 
in politics demonstrates the empowerment of increasing numbers of women 
courageous and confident enough to challenge male candidates in a male-
dominated sphere. 
 
Thirdly, the idea of the state as a masculine entity entails an appreciation of 
the implications of women’s entry to the electoral process, which poses 
immense challenges and difficulties for women as candidates and voters. These 
include the heavy presence and involvement of security forces; electoral 
violence and intimidation, whose perpetrators are mostly men; the expenses 
associated with security during the election, which is essentially money spent on 
problems created by men; and the predominance of money politics, which 
illustrates male control of public and private resources. 
 
Fourthly, the issue of women’s rights as human rights requires appreciation 
of the fact that the constitution of Papua New Guinea grants women the right to 
vote and stand for public office. Questions need to be asked: how is the electoral 
process ensuring that women’s rights are exercised? What is the role of the state 
(specifically the PNGEC and the security forces) and of civil society in 
defending the rights of women? Is the cultural context supportive of women’s 
rights? Is the political environment conducive for women to exercise their 
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rights, especially with widespread corruption, bribery, violence and 
intimidation? 
 
Finally, analyses of women’s participation in politics have to acknowledge 
the concepts of difference, diversity and commonality. Women are divided by 
religion, culture, age, education, socio-economic class, rural-urban divide, and 
so on. This could explain why women voters are not voting for women 
candidates, or are even contesting against each other. 
 
Gender issues in the 2007 national election 
 
Women as candidates 
 
A total of 103 women candidates contested the 2007 national election (3.7 
per cent of the total of 2759 candidates), showing an upward trend in numbers 
of women candidates in all post-independence elections (see Table 10.1). A list 
of women candidates, showing the electorate contested and party affiliation in 
2007, is given in Table 10.7 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. Of these, 
39 (37.9 per cent) were nominated by political parties whilst 64 nominated as 
independents — fewer than in 2002, when 49 claimed party affiliation. It is 
highly likely that some of the independents in 2007 were in fact pro-party 
candidates, a practice quite common in Papua New Guinea politics.1 
 
Table 10.1: Women in national elections 1972-2002 
Year Total 
candidates
No. of female 
candidates 
% of  female
candidates
Female 
candidates 
with party 
affiliation
Female 
candidates  
elected 
1972 608 4 0.7 n.a. 1 
1977 879 10 1.1 1 3 
1982 1,124 17 1.5 0 1 
1987 1,515 18 1.3 7 0 
1992 1,655 16 1.0 0 0 
1997 2,372 55 2.3 12 2 
2002 2,870 71 2.5 49 1 
2007 2759 103 3.7 39 1 
 
Some provinces had more women candidates than others, the highest (12 
women) being Eastern Highlands and the lowest (one woman) Bougainville and 
West New Britain (see Table 10.2). For the first time in history, all twenty 
provinces had women contesting the national election. 
                                                     
1Personal communication (December 2007) with two female candidates who nominated 
as independents but received some financial support from a political party. 
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Table 10.2: Provincial distribution of women candidates 
Rank Province No. of candidates 
Highest number of women candidates 
1 
2 
3 
3 
Eastern Highlands 
Oro 
Milne Bay 
Central 
13 
11 
9 
9 
Lowest number of women candidates 
18 
19 
19 
East New Britain 
Bougainville 
West New Britain 
2 
1 
1 
 
On a regional basis, the Southern Region had the highest number of women 
candidates (45), followed by the Highlands Region (27), Momase (22) and the 
Islands Region (9). Generally, the peaceful nature of elections in the Southern 
region has encouraged women to contest. However, the Highlands Region, by 
far the most volatile and high-risk region, was ranked second. This may be 
largely explained by the work of civil society organizations in promoting 
principles of good governance and democracy, including rights of women, 
peace, and law and order.2 
 
Of the 34 registered political parties, 22 endorsed women candidates. The 
number of party-endorsed women candidates, however, fell from 49 in 2002 to 
39 in 2007. The largest number was recorded by People’s Action Party (5 
candidates) and the Melanesian Alliance (4 candidates). The Pan Melanesian 
Congress, New Generation Party and National Alliance endorsed 3 women 
candidates each. Three political parties endorsed 2 women candidates each 
whilst 14 other political parties endorsed 1 candidate each. These figures are 
low, and suggest that parties have yet to consider women seriously. The fact that 
the People’s Action Party (of which Janet Sape is deputy president) and the 
Melanesian Alliance (of which Dame Carol Kidu is parliamentary leader) 
endorsed the largest number of women candidates also illustrates the importance 
of having women actively involved in political parties to exert influence in 
decisions about candidate selection.  
 
The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 
(OLIPPAC) appears to have done little so far to encourage political parties to 
endorse female candidates. Political parties are fixed on getting the ‘strongest’, 
most ‘popular’ candidates, mostly men, though these are not necessary the best 
candidates, and often poll poorly.  
 
                                                     
2 In this regard, the work of Kup Women for Peace, Meri i Kirap Sapotim and other 
NGOs carrying out election awareness is acknowledged. 
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In relation to policies, women candidates generally focused on social, 
welfare, family, good governance and rights issues.3 They did not necessarily 
reflect party policies, even for women endorsed by political parties. This was 
partly to do with the fact that party endorsements were slow in coming and that 
preparations for campaigning, including policy platforms, were finalized well 
before party endorsements were confirmed. It also illustrates the nature of party 
affiliation: Parties and candidates do not necessarily have long-term 
relationships, a reflection of the weak party system in Papua New Guinea. Many 
of the female candidates endorsed by parties, like male candidates, neither were 
members nor had long-term affiliation with those parties. 
 
Some women candidates had experience as community leaders 
(CSOs/NGOs) and professionals (in both the private and public sectors). 
‘Money politics’ and corruption, however, deny women candidates a level 
playing field. 
 
Women as voters 
 
Women voters appeared to exercise free choice in Kerema, though their 
preferences were mostly predetermined. Elsewhere, intimidation of women 
voters ranged from obvious, through subtle to non-existent.  
 
However, just as the OLIPPAC seems to have had little impact on the 
mindset of political parties, LPV did little or nothing to change the perception 
and mindset of women voters, who seem (at least on the basis of observation in 
Kerema) to have generally preferred male leadership. The cultural and social 
environment remains largely unchanged.  
 
Gender issues and the election in Kerema Open electorate  
 
Women as candidates 
 
Three women candidates contested the Kerema Open seat, two from coastal 
areas and one from inland — the latter an historical first. One of the three had 
contested the seat in 2002. Two of the women had NGO leadership experience; 
the other was a primary school teacher. 
 
Two of the women stood as party-endorsed candidates — though lacking any 
long-term political party affiliation — and one stood as an independent.4 None 
of the women candidates undertook electorate-wide campaigning, campaign 
                                                     
3 This became apparent in a post-election diagnostic workshop for women candidates 
held at UPNG, 19-22 November 2007, sponsored by UNDP. 
4 This candidate was in fact a pro-party candidate (personal communication with the 
candidate, December 2007). 
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activities being essentially restricted to their own language and cultural areas for 
both coastal and inland candidates. One candidate could barely meet her 
election expenses. After a frantic search for funds from women’s organizations,5 
her nomination fee was provided by her son just before the close of nomination, 
and she was hard pressed to make it to Kerema in time to nominate. 
 
One of the women (who had contested in 2002) had lost her husband close to 
nomination. Some people said: ‘She is a widow; doesn’t she respect her 
husband?’ Because her husband was from another province, it was suggested 
that her allegiance should be to her husband’s people. 
 
Resource constraints were encountered by all women candidates. In 
comparison to some of the male candidates, mobility was restricted; without 
access to private transport (motorized dinghies or vehicles) all three campaigned 
mostly on foot. No candidate posters for the women were seen in villages or 
along roadsides or main travel routes. There was no money for feasting or to 
bribe voters. However, it was alleged that one woman candidate had accessed 
donor funding for LPV awareness and used it to her advantage in carrying out 
awareness about her candidacy. 
 
Women as voters 
 
Voters’ general attitude towards women candidates was one of indifference. 
None of the women candidates was considered popular in the electorate, though 
a few voters considered that one of the three women was more qualified than 
most of the male candidates. There was little awareness of notions of ‘women’s 
rights’ or ‘gender equality’. Rural voters in Kerema Open have little time for 
such principles — indeed, the identity of women candidates was challenged by 
ordinary village women, who saw their lifestyle as far removed from those of 
rural women. Some voters expressed the view that the candidates needed to be 
on the ground to experience villagers’ hardships and understand their lives (a 
comment equally applicable to male candidates). But most were simply not 
aware of women’s candidacy.  
 
In Kerema women voters generally follow the dictates of their husband or 
male relatives; failure to stick by the family choice could result in rejection and 
conflicts (post-election events attest to this, where family relations have soured 
as a result of election choices). Cultural norms are still strong and women are 
not taken seriously as leaders who can represent their people in parliament. In 
some cases, ‘money politics’ compelled voters, including women, to vote for 
men. 
                                                     
5 I am aware that she approached Papua Hahine Social Action Forum and Women in 
National Government Strategy for Change (WINGS) during the polling period. 
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On the other hand, women performed their gender roles as hosts, feeding 
campaign teams, and wives and female relatives of male candidates were 
actively involved in rallying support, especially for husbands from a different 
cultural area. Family networks were revived to build and draw voter support; 
every family connection was utilized and, in this respect, women were key 
linkages through marriage. 
 
Women also had much influence on how resources — especially food — 
were distributed: How much to whom? Who to look after? Elections are a time 
to eat and drink, and women at the fireplaces had much more than they would 
normally consume. Women also received cash rewards for their efforts.  
 
However, there is evidence of changing perceptions, and some women and 
men are supporting women candidates, acknowledging that the quality of some 
male candidates was poor compared to women candidates. 
 
Election outcome for women candidates in Kerema Open 
 
Tables 10.3 to 10.6 show the election results for women candidates in 
Kerema Open. Table 10.3 suggests that all female candidates received their 
primary votes from their respective ethnic communities (as represented by local-
level government [LLG] areas) — though this is not confined to female 
candidates, as most male candidates also received most of their votes from their 
respective ethnic (LLG) communities.  
 
Table 10.4 shows primary and final votes for the women candidates, their 
respective placing and when they were eliminated from the count. Table 10.9 in 
the Appendix to this chapter shows the same for all candidates, indicating voter 
support for men in comparison to women candidates.  
 
It is apparent from Tables 10.4 and 10.5 that women as voters did not give 
their primary votes to female candidates, either from choice or because their 
votes were predetermined by male kin.  
 
Informal votes for the inland LLG areas, Kaintiba and Kotidanga, where 
illiteracy rates are very high, were, paradoxically, very low (at 0.8 and 0.7 per 
cent respectively). By comparison, the informal votes registered in the coastal 
LLG areas were between 2 and 5 per cent (Table 10.6). This may be attributed 
to the abuse of ‘assisted voting’, where the bulk of ballot papers were marked 
by ‘helpers’.6  
                                                     
6 At the time of writing, a petition was before the Court of Disputed Returns relating to 
allegations that the ‘helpers’ were supporters of the winner. 
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Table 10.3: Female candidates’ and selected male candidates’ primary votes and 
percentages by LLGs, Kerema Open electorate, 2007 
No. Candidate 
name 
Total and percentage of primary votes 
received in each LLG 
Total 
 
KU CK EK K KOTI TL 
12 Kathy Karapa Tom 4 23 3 6 2 5 43 
9.3 53.5 7.0 14.0 4.7 11.6 100.0 
19 Pricilla Opa Kare 3 581 6 0 5 35 630 
0.5 92.2 1.0 0.0 0.8 5.6 100.0 
35 Josephine W 
Morova 
4 9 3 191 1,105 136 1,448 
0.3 0.6 0.2 13.2 76.3 9.4 100.0 
16 Pittom Titus 
Bombom 
91 39 21 3,427 74 122 3,774 
2.4 1.0 0.6 90.8 2.0 3.2 100.0 
51 George Mero 235 370 2,221 17 183 303 3,329 
7.1 11.1 66.7 0.5 5.5 9.1 100.0 
20 Dan F P Maravila 352 104 10 0 2 43 511 
68.9 20.4 2.0 0. 0.4 8.4 100.0 
55 Nixon Forova 26 19 435 0 1 8 489 
5.3 3.9 89.0 0.0 0.2 1.6 100.0 
28 Richard Panama 16 9 1 178 1,779 137 2,120 
0.8 0.4 0.0 8.4 83.9 6.5 100.0 
14 Sivore Lakou 5 24 45 0 4 686 764 
0.7 3.1 5.9 0.0 0.5 89.8 100.0 
Key: Kerema Urban (KU), Central Kerema (CK), East Kerema (EK), Kaintiba (K), 
Kotidanga (KOTI), Tauri Lakekamu (TL).  
 
 
Table 10.4: Female candidates, votes, placing and elimination, Kerema Open 
No. Candidate 
name 
Primary
votes
Primary 
placing
Final
votes
Final 
placing
Elimination 
12 Kathy Karapa Tom 43 47 43 47 5th  
19 Priscilla Opa Kare 630 16 1,190 13 39th  
5 Josephine W Morova 1,448 5 3,614 4 48th  
 
 
Table 10.5: Eligible voters by LLGs 
LLGs Male Female Total Total on roll 
Kerema Urban 
Central Kerema 
East Kerema 
Kaintiba 
Kotidanga 
Tauri Lakekamu 
855
3,410
3,622
2,799
3,523
2,493
865
3,090
3,084
2,235
3,063
1,990
1,720
6,500
6,706
5,034
6,586
4,483
2,800 
8,300 
9,400 
6,700 
9,300 
7,700 
Total eligible voters 16,702 14,327 31,029 44,200 
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Table 10.6: Total formal/informal votes by LLGs, Kerema Open, 2007 
Ballot papers KU CK EK K KOTI TL Total 
Total Formal Votes 
Total Informal Votes 
Total Votes 
Percent Informal Votes 
1,648
72
1,720
(4.2)
6,296 
  206 
6,502 
(3.2) 
6,540
194
6,734
(2.9)
5,087
  39
5,126
  (0.8)
6,584
45
6,629
(0.7)
4,384 
116 
4,500 
(2.6) 
30,539 
672 
31,211 
(2.2) 
Key: Kerema Urban (KU), Central Kerema (CK), East Kerema (EK), Kaintiba (K), 
Kotidanga (KOTI), Tauri Lakekamu (TL).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2007 national election saw many more women contesting than in the 
2002 election, continuing the upward trend observed since the first post-
independence election in 1977. 
 
However, money politics, as well as entrenched cultural perceptions and 
practices, effectively ruled out any chance of free and fair electoral competition 
for women candidates. Support for increased women’s entry into parliament is 
not ingrained in the mindset of voters, men or women. Reforms, such as the 
OLIPPAC and the change to LPV, appear to have done little, if anything, to 
change this. 
 
Meanwhile, behind the scenes women performed their gender roles, hosting 
campaign teams and utilizing family connections and linkages through marriage 
to rally support for husbands and male relatives.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 10.7: Female candidates in the 2007 election 
Name Province Electorate Party affiliation 
Odelia Virua East New Britain  Gazelle Open Independent 
Rosemary Vartuam 
Swek 
East New Britain  Rabaul Open Independent 
Ruth Mandra Kuma Manus Manus Open Independent 
Cathy Lee Graham New Ireland  Kavieng Open Independent 
Helen Fong Seeto New Ireland  Kavieng Open Independent 
Monica Maleigua New Ireland  Kavieng Open Independent 
Anna Ofu Central Kairuku-Hiri Open Independent 
Lady Rita Kipalan Central Kairuku-Hiri Open Independent 
Maria Andrew Laut Central Goilala Open Independent 
Philomena Kassman Central Central Provincial Independent 
Veronica Aawa Bera Central Kairuku-Hiri Open Independent 
Waila Koloa Central Rigo Open Independent 
Cathy Karapa Tom Gulf Kerema Open Independent 
Susan Ila Apopo Gulf Kikori Open Independent 
Dinah Halstead Milne Bay  Alotau Open Independent 
Judy Kauadi Milne Bay  Samarai-Murua Open Independent 
Leah Sharp Milne Bay  Milne Bay Provincial Independent 
Matilda May Pilacapio Milne Bay  Alotau Open Independent 
Selina Elijah Milne Bay  Kiriwina Goodenough 
Open 
Independent 
Helen Robert National Capital 
District 
Moresby North East 
Open 
Independent 
Margaret Kliawi National Capital 
District 
Moresby North West 
Open 
Independent 
Margret Morris National Capital 
District 
Moresby North East 
Open 
Independent 
Mary J Karo National Capital 
District 
Moresby South Open Independent 
Anita Yapuso Oro Oro Provincial Independent 
Clare Embahe Nenai Oro Oro Provincial Independent 
Deborah Eupu Emboge Oro Ijivitari Open Independent 
Josephine M Abajah Oro Sohe Open Independent 
Oliva Aripa Bunari Oro Oro Provincial Independent 
Shirley Otto Jipori Oro Oro Provincial Independent 
Ageda Mili Western Middle Fly Open Independent 
Naomi Kamai Western North Fly Open Independent 
Julie Trasis Kuri Chimbu Chimbu Provincial Independent 
Miriam Waie Kia Chimbu Karamui-Nomane 
Open 
Independent 
Rhonda Gande Baru Chimbu Karamui-Nomane 
Open 
Independent 
Botty Usima  Eastern Highlands  Bura-Wonenara Open Independent 
Ellen Hamena Eastern Highlands  Lufa Open Independent 
Esta Siru Joshua Eastern Highlands  Kainantu Open Independent 
Florence Jaukae Eastern Highlands  Goroka Open Independent 
Julie Soso Akeke Eastern Highlands  Eastern Highlands 
Provincial 
Independent 
Linet Mofeno Eastern Highlands  Henganofi Open Independent 
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Name Province Electorate Party affiliation 
Rhonda Morris Risepe Eastern Highlands  Kainantu Open Independent 
Robyn Belari nenda Eastern Highlands  Daulo Open Independent 
Susan Sam Fima Eastern Highlands  Henganofi Open Independent 
Maryanne Tokome Amu Enga Wapenamanda Open Independent 
Auana Janet Koriama Southern Highlands  Tari Open Independent 
Anna Nepa Western Highlands Western Highlands 
Provincial 
Independent 
Doris K Kentz Western Highlands Jimi Open Independent 
Elizaberth Simogun 
Bade 
East Sepik  East Sepik Provincial Independent 
Evangeline Kaima East Sepik  Wewak Open Independent 
Jennifa Bowie East Sepik  Wewak Open Independent 
Josepha Namsu Kiris East Sepik  Wewak Open Independent 
Margretha Apakia East Sepik  Wosera Gawi Open Independent 
Betty Rugei Higgins Madang Usino Bundi Open Independent 
Cecilia Pakule Madang Madang Open Independent 
Margaret Yusam Madang Usino Bundi Open Independent 
Mary Kamang Madang Madang Provincial Independent 
Delilah Kelly Morobe Tewae-Siaso Open Independent 
Gusu Tuhiana Morobe Finschaffen Open Independent 
Julie Kandi Morobe Nawae Open Independent 
Loujaya Toni Morobe Lae Open Independent 
Coretta Lema Naig West Sepik  Vanimo-Green River 
Open 
Independent 
Lena Miroi Napmuku West Sepik  West Sepik Provincial Independent 
Lespina Pupuwes West Sepik  Vanimo-Green River 
Open 
Independent 
Marry Tarp Lene West Sepik  Telefomin Open Independent 
Rita Jonah Oro Sohe Open Christian Party 
Anne Karo Karafae Eastern Highlands  Henganofi Open Mapai Levites Party 
Elizeberth Mary Sipos Manus Manus Open Melanesian Alliance 
Hilda Timan Kakawi West New Britain  Talasea Open Melanesian Alliance 
Dame Carol Kidu National Capital 
District 
Moresby South Open Melanesian Alliance 
Lilias Erepa Klapat Oro Sohe Open Melanesian Alliance 
Matilda Tagu Koma Central Goilala Open Melanesian Liberal 
Party 
Maureen Ambo Oro Ijivitari Open National Alliance 
Laottie Miriam Laurie Eastern Highlands  Kainantu Open National Alliance 
Agatha Yama Madang Madang Open National Alliance 
Priscilla Opa Kare Gulf Kerema Open National Conservative 
Party 
Jollyn Ambo Warome Eastern Highlands  Eastern Highlands 
Provincial 
National Conservative 
Party 
Monica Abia Aitsi Central Central Provincial New Generation Party 
Maggie Wilson Western Highlands Hagen Open New Generation Party 
Donna Harvey Hall Morobe Bulolo Open New Generation Party 
Goini Doilegu Loko Milne Bay  Alotau Open Pan Melanesian 
Congress 
Margaret Bacca Milne Bay  Esa'ala Open Pan Melanesian 
Congress 
Kruo Martha Kaiun Chimbu Kerowagi Open Pan Melanesian 
Congress 
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Name Province Electorate Party affiliation 
Damarise Buaga Oro Oro Provincial Papua and New 
Guinea Unity Party 
Erigere Singin Morobe Nawae Open Papua and New 
Guinea Unity Party 
Ruffina Peter Central Goilala Open Papua New Guinea 
Party 
Martha Kala Gulf Kikori Open People's Action Party 
Sahara Douglas Milne Bay  Alotau Open People's Action Party 
Janet Sape National Capital 
District 
NCD Provincial People's Action Party 
Julie Moide Western North Fly Open People's Action Party 
Dr Donna Plamnok 
Bikainbo 
West Sepik  Telefomin Open People's Action Party 
Susan Trose Mati Eastern Highlands  Kainantu Open People's Democratic 
Movement 
Margret Kawa Southern Highlands  Ialibu-Pangia Open People's First Party 
Maria Micjeal Menap Western North Fly Open People's Freedom 
Party 
Lynette Ona Bougainville  Central Bougainville 
Open 
People's Party 
Bella Eari Ameu Oro Sohe Open People's Progress 
Party 
Edna Kathy Kakaraya Enga Enga Provincial People's Progress 
Party 
Regina Aiarak Western North Fly Open People's Resources 
Awareness Party 
Rhonda Gaiosi Anakapa Milne Bay  Alotau Open PNG Conservative 
Party 
Julie Daniel Enga Wabag Open PNG First Party 
Monica Hasimani East Sepik  Yangoru-Saussia Open PNG Labour Party 
Epiya Janet Kang Nisa Southern Highlands  Ialibu-Pangia Open Star Alliance Party 
Josephine Wasi Morova Gulf Kerema Open United Party 
Theresia Noglai Chimbu Kerowagi Open Yumi Reform Party 
Table 10.7 (continued) 
 
Table 10.8: Voting statistics Kerema Open electorate, 2007 election 
Number of registered voters  42,160  
Total votes cast 31,205  
Informal votes 508 (1.6% of total votes cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 30,697  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 11428  
Total votes distributed 23594  
Exhausted ballot papers 19,269 (62.8% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 5715  
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11 THE KUP WOMEN FOR PEACE: A LOCALISED AND 
INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO FREE, FAIR AND PEACEFUL 
ELECTIONS 
 
Rachael Hinton, Michelle Kopi, Angela Apa, Agnes Sil, Mary Kini, Jerry 
Kai, Yanny Guman and Daniell Cowley 
 
Despite the longevity and success of some non-government organizations 
(NGOs) in Papua New Guinea, civil society is in its early days and is limited in 
its scope (Pelto 2007). However, in the absence of a strong state, civil society 
groups that have developed within a context of conflict are responding to issues 
of violence in their communities. Small-scale, localized interventions that focus 
on human rights and human security issues and develop their own strategies for 
violence reduction are seeing positive law and justice outcomes. A strong 
feature of the 2007 national election in Papua New Guinea was the involvement 
of civil society and NGO groups working in conflict areas. These groups were 
seen as instrumental to the drive for a free, fair and peaceful election.  
 
National elections in Papua New Guinea are keenly observed and well 
documented. The literature of the last decade has provided a thorough 
examination of electoral processes and systems (Standish 1996, 2002a, 2002b, 
2006, 2007; May 2003; Gibbs, Haley and McLeod 2004), the participation of 
women (McLeod 2002; Sepoe 2002; Kidu and Setae 2002) and the role of 
elections in contemporary conflict (Weiner, McLeod and Yala 2002; Dinnen 
1996). However, as McLeod (2004) asserts, the voices of those attempting to 
counter problematic trends and processes in Papua New Guinea’s electoral 
politics are given little space to be heard. The following discussion attempts to 
fill this gap. 
 
This chapter, based on interviews with men and women from Kup 
communities, examines a unique approach by a community-based organization, 
Kup Women for Peace (KWP), during the election period in Chimbu Province. 
KWP developed its own comprehensive and localized strategy, based on their 
peace-building work, and engaged the local community. Their approach sought 
not only to prevent election-related violence but also improve the electoral 
process and ensure a free and fair election. KWP applied new and creative 
practices, which developed outside the normal paradigms utilized by 
government and official bodies.  
 
Kup Women for Peace 
 
KWP is a local non-government organization from Kup, a sub-district of 
Kerowagi District in Chimbu Province in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. 
Kup sub-district has a population of 24,000, dispersed across many small, 
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isolated communities, many of which are inaccessible by vehicle and lack 
access to basic services. Although remoteness plays a part, the impact of two 
decades of tribal warfare in Kup has contributed significantly to a lack of social 
and economic growth in the area.  
 
The first tribal fight was recorded in Kup in the early 1970s, and although 
the major fights between tribes ended in 1990, fights between sub-clans 
continued, motivated in part by election violence (Garap 2004). Kup 
experienced a downward spiral in social order, laying the foundation for raskol 
activities, frustration, and limited social and infrastructure development. The 
court system, the police and other law-enforcement agencies of the central 
government declined in effectiveness, negatively impacting on livelihoods and 
contributing to the escalation of violence. The cumulative effects of tribal 
warfare resulted in social disruption, internal displacement and lack of access to 
government services, all significantly impacting on the lives of women and 
children.  
 
KWP was formed in 1999 by women who had experienced the negative 
impacts of two decades of tribal warfare and who mobilized women from 
opposing sides to put pressure on traditional leadership to stop the fighting. 
Now with representation and a strong collective presence throughout the entire 
sub-district, the organization has become a powerful force for peace and human 
rights in local communities. The primary objective of KWP is to reduce conflict 
and build peace through the cessation of tribal violence. They have had notable 
success in stopping tribal fighting in the Kup area and in promoting peaceful 
development. Specific to their work is an emphasis on community 
empowerment and encouraging men and women to take control of their own 
development in the absence of government support and infrastructure.  
 
KWP takes a collective and human rights-based approach to reinforce peace. 
Through capacity building and training, the aim is to increase respect and 
awareness of human rights and reduce gender violence. Restorative justice 
processes and partnerships are integral to their approach, as well as providing 
young men in particular with productive alternatives to crime. KWP mediate 
disputes to prevent outbreaks of tribal fighting and engage with groups across 
the conflict divide. They negotiate for communities to receive basic social 
services (such as health, water supply, education and police), and these are used 
to reinforce community unity and peace. KWP is also committed to 
strengthening their organizational capacity with a view to delivering more 
responsive training and improved peace facilitation. KWP receives widespread 
support throughout the sub-district and there is a realization that the relatively 
peaceful situation in Kup now needs to be consolidated through the further 
provision and strengthening of basic services and development initiatives. 
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Election-related violence was widespread during the 2007 election in 
Chimbu Province, resulting in multiple deaths (The National 8 August 2007), 
destruction of houses, displacement of communities (The National 8, 31 August 
2007), and women prohibited from accessing basic maternal health services 
(The National 13, 25 July 2007). Some high-powered weapons were seized 
(Post-Courie, 6 July 2007; The National 13, 25 July 2007) but guns were used 
during election-related tribal clashes (Post-Courier 20 July 2007; The National 
21 August 2007). Kup sub-district, however, presents a unique case for 
consideration. This rural community, widely known for its large-scale conflict 
and tribal violence, has been displaying a significant improvement in law and 
order due to the work of KWP. The success of the group’s work in communities 
was particularly evident during the recent election in Kup. This case study 
provides an insight into the dynamics of a grassroots organization working to 
improve election practices and processes and sustain peace in communities 
where governmental processes have proved insufficient.  
 
Previous election experiences in Kup 
 
Election-related violence and flawed democratic processes were prevalent in 
Chimbu Province during past elections (Standish 1989, 1996; Dika 2003). For 
example, during the 1997 election two candidates and their supporters in 
Kundiawa threatened voters with high-powered weapons during polling and 
counting. In Sinasina, ballot papers were stolen and sold for K1.00 each, after 
the presiding officer was forced to sign them. In another example, a candidate (a 
former police officer) allegedly arranged the kidnapping of another candidate’s 
supporter and demanded that they withdraw from the contest. The escalation of 
violence resulted in the deterioration of basic services, the destruction of 
property and restrictions on movement (Dika 2003).  
 
Violence between supporters in Kup erupted during the 1997 and 2002 
elections, mainly related to vote-splitting, inconsistent support for a candidate, 
restrictions on campaigning, bloc voting, and ballot papers being stolen or 
destroyed. It was rare for women to vote, as a result of men voting on their 
behalf or women feeling too afraid or intimidated. There was a strong presence 
of guns and limited freedom to cast a vote of choice. As a KWP member 
recalled, ‘There is always lots of pushing and shoving. And people bring guns to 
the voting stations so we feel afraid to go and vote under the threat of a gun’. A 
large police contingent was always present in preparation for outbreaks of 
violence. KWP were determined to prevent similar violence from erupting over 
what was seen as a short and unsustainable period of ‘election fever’, which 
would inevitably reverse the results of their ‘hard work’.  
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Pre-election activities 
 
As with past elections, the 2007 national election was assessed for its 
security threat and potential to fuel violence, particularly in areas of the 
Highlands Region marked by serious outbreaks of inter-group conflict (Post-
Courier 10 May, 26 June, 10 July 2007; The National 11 May 2007). In contrast 
to the national media discussion, which focused on the ‘peaceful’ component of 
the Electoral Commission’s campaign, KWP took practical steps to ensure the 
validity of the electoral process and in turn create conditions for peace. Their 
aim was not simply to police the elections but to ensure a fair and free process. 
Working in a context of long-term conflict, KWP are well aware of the danger 
of prioritizing a well-policed election to the neglect of a legitimate and valid 
electoral process.  
 
KWP decided on a three-pronged strategy: cohesive voter education, the 
launching of the Livelihoods Programme, and a Violence-Free Election 
campaign. Program and in-kind assistance was used to support these activities, 
with no specific funding support from the Electoral Support Program. Voter 
education was conducted over a two week period, throughout the entire Kup 
sub-district, and covered issues including limited preferential voting (LPV), the 
purpose and process of the election, voters’ rights, choice and definition of a 
good leader, and the purpose of political representation. KWP received positive 
feedback from their outreach activities and men and women made clear the type 
of leaders they wanted, such as a person who was committed to their 
community and moved beyond their own self-interest.  
 
Although candidates distributed cash throughout the sub-district, community 
members were resistant to vote-buying; as a KWP member claimed ‘Ol i no 
save tingim mipela, na ol i save go bildim “own castle” bilong ol, na ol save 
paulim mipela wantaim K10 or K50 long poket bilong mipela na mipela save 
strong long sapotim ol! Tasol nau nogat’ (‘They don’t remember us and they go 
and build their own castle and they simply confuse us with K10, K50 to fill our 
pockets and for that we support them! But not any more’).  
 
During voter awareness it became clear, however, that there was much 
confusion about the LPV system and about how preferences could be used. 
KWP members believe this was related to the delayed and rushed national 
electoral awareness campaign. Had the campaign been initiated earlier, 
undertaken over a longer period, and completed well ahead of the campaign 
period, understanding of LPV processes may have been dramatically improved. 
As a result, LPV awareness received specific attention during KWP voter 
education activities. Booklets were also delivered to campaign houses for 
candidates to discuss with people during the evenings. The KWP HIV 
The Kup Women for Peace      147 
 
coordinator also conducted awareness in campaign houses during the campaign 
period. 
 
The second component targeted youth as part of KWP’s Sustainable 
Livelihoods Programme. Fifty-four youth groups received project materials, 
including goats, rabbits, chickens, pigs, cement bags, and pipes for fish ponds, 
and the project was expected to directly benefit 3,000 to 4,000 people. Some of 
the youth had been part of a 2003 gun surrender organized by KWP yet were 
perceived to still have the potential to instigate violence. KWP’s intention in 
targetting youth was to ‘settle the youth down and keep them busy’ to reduce 
the propensity for election-related violence. By committing themselves to 
livelihood activities, the hope was that the youth would become responsible for 
their own development and wellbeing. 
 
The third component was more direct in its targeting of intending candidates. 
In conjunction with the launching of the Livelihoods Programme, KWP 
advocated a Violence-free Election 2007. The rationale for combining the two 
occasions was that young men often take the lead to fuel violence during 
political campaigns, supported by political candidates. The candidates, who 
thought they were attending the Livelihoods Programme launching, were asked 
to commit themselves to a violence-free election and sign an agreement in 
public. Of the 14 candidates invited, 11 attended and all gave assurances to the 
community that they would support a violence-free and gun-free election, and 
not encourage young men to fight. Of the three that did not attend, one shot and 
killed a man in Kup during an election-related dispute, and a second attempted 
to intimidate polling officials prior to the ballot papers being distributed to 
polling booths in Kup Station.  
 
Polling day — 9 July 2007 
 
The KWP response to illegitimate electoral practices and the threat of 
election-related violence on the day of polling was marked by innovation and 
adaptability. KWP understood the context and what was necessary to ensure a 
valid political process and fair outcome in the sub-district. KWP sometimes 
took an unconventional approach, but the group saw their actions as completely 
justified and necessary given the experiences of past elections in the area. Two 
examples are provided below.  
 
Several KWP members had received training from the Electoral Commission 
to work as polling officials in their area. When a member was organizing her 
ballot boxes and materials for delivery to Kup she became aware of three 
candidates driving with their supporters in what she perceived to be an attempt 
to hijack the ballot papers on route to Kup. In response, she waved down a 
passing car and the local leader inside agreed to take a message to the Kerowagi 
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District Office to ensure an alternative road or transport was used. As she said: 
‘I stood in the middle of the road to stop the car, I had no choice. They could 
have had guns’. As a result of her intervention, the papers were delivered by 
helicopter to Kup.  
 
Secondly, a large crowd had gathered to witness the ballot papers being 
delivered. The returning officer and presiding officer stepped from the 
helicopter, carrying a small bag and a large briefcase respectively. Because of 
the size of his bag, the crowd assumed the presiding officer had the papers and 
proceeded to follow him, while at the suggestion of two KWP members the 
smaller bag containing the ballot papers was taken by the returning officer and 
the police officer and kept in the care of the two KWP members for the entire 
evening. The story continues: 
 
At night everyone was hunting the presiding officer down. One 
man came and brought his gun and was making accusations that 
people wanted to sign the ballot papers. The presiding officer told 
everyone to leave him alone as he had the ballot papers and he 
didn’t want to fail in his duty. No one in the area where the 
presiding officer was staying or surrounding villages slept during 
the night. They were alert and awake and provided security for the 
ballot papers until dawn. We were relaxing! They wanted to take 
the police officer who was with us as well but we said it was late, 
and he needs to rest as the only one supervising the elections 
tomorrow. The presiding officer came to the centre with his 
briefcase the following morning. We fell about laughing on the 
grass. We couldn’t stop laughing. The presiding officer said, ‘all 
this time they think I have been carrying the ballot papers. I am 
such an actor! It was hard work!’ 
 
An unconventional approach was seen as the only alternative to prevent the 
ballot papers being stolen as was usual practice in past elections. KWP feel 
strongly that their actions assured people of the right and opportunity to make 
their own voting choices. As a KWP member said, ‘Who knows what other 
people would have done if they got the papers but we know that we looked after 
them, they were protected by us’. Further, when sorting the ballot papers 
according to ballot stations, a Kup candidate wearing a long coat (which could 
have concealed something), attempted to intimidate the KWP members and the 
presiding officer to reduce the number of voting stations in the Kup Station area 
from three to one. They refused to give in to his demands, reinforcing the need 
to follow due process. They gained strength from the fact that they too were 
from Kup, with their own support network. ‘What could he do to us?’, one of 
the KWP members present at the time asked.  
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With the assistance of polling officials and one police officer for the entire 
sub-district, KWP set up the polling booths and controlled the voting process. 
This included enforcing separate lines for men and women, the equal 
representation of male and female voters, and privacy to vote. Knowledge and 
understanding of the area was paramount, such as what clans were present, or 
who had to be watched as a security threat. If a man voted, a woman would 
follow. Tally sheets were crucial in ensuring due process and a balanced gender 
representation. If the tally sheets showed men were five ahead, five women 
were called to vote. KWP members were clear and forthright about the process 
that was to be followed, and open communication was seen as fundamental to 
the outcome. If some of the young men started to push or attempted to vote 
twice they were reprimanded, and in some cases voting was suspended until the 
issue was resolved. Again, being from the area was regarded as safety net, ‘I am 
from here too, so what can they do?’ (‘Ol as ples, mi as ples tu, bai ol wokim 
wanem?’), a female KWP member said. 
 
However, the capacity to control the voting process went beyond KWP 
members simply being from the area. Respect was shown by the community to 
KWP members throughout the election period, especially the women who were 
founding members and had shown their commitment to peace-work in their 
communities. ‘Ol mama wok na larim ol wokim long wanem we ol laikim’ (‘It is 
our mothers controlling it [the voting] so let them do it the way they want to’), 
was a comment regularly heard. As one of the KWP members commented: 
 
For us, over the years we have been working we have seen a 
marked difference in our community. We have respect and when 
we ran the election they respected us, we gave education, we told 
them about changes in the law so they heard it and came to vote 
peacefully. Towards the end they wanted to rush to get the papers 
but we told them that they couldn’t ruin it, we had done so well to 
that point.  
 
Discrepancies in the common roll and insufficient numbers of ballot papers 
assigned to the voting population were common problems throughout the Kup 
sub-district. Dissatisfaction was expressed by those who did not vote, as they 
saw it as a chance missed to participate in an election that was well-controlled, 
fair and open to all. Satisfied, however, with what was seen as a legitimate and 
locally-controlled voting process, everyone clapped as the last ballot paper was 
signed, and voters as well as candidates and scrutineers dispersed. The ballot 
boxes were locked and, unlike previous elections, left unguarded until the 
Defence Force arrived to pick up the boxes late in the afternoon.  
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A local response to local issues 
 
KWP utilized their extensive network, built on widespread voter education 
and the launching of the Violence Free Election Campaign to create an 
alternative election practice. KWP members and KWP community police were 
present at every voting station and it was the responsibility of KWP members 
who were working everyday on the ground to be alert and respond to problems 
in their community as they arose. Not one of the candidates who signed the 
agreement with KWP was involved in any election-related problems, and voter 
education combined with the Livelihoods Programme was seen as critical to 
keeping candidates from stimulating or sustaining conflict. Not one tribal fight 
occurred in Kup during or following the election period. No guns were present 
during voting and any pressure by young men to persuade voters to choose a 
specific candidate was immediately condemned. No ballot papers were stolen or 
signed prior to or following polling. There was a marked improvement in the 
representation of women. Female voters were excited by the opportunity to 
vote, as the following comment by a female community member highlights: 
‘Every election, I have had candidates I liked but I couldn’t vote for them, now I 
voted for who I wanted’. 
 
Much is being said in Chimbu about the non-violent election in Kup, 
compared with other parts of Chimbu where election-related violence was 
widespread. As one male community member noted, ‘In Simbu people think 
that, em nau, taim bilong eleksin na bai mipela lukim namba wan paia long Kup 
na ol bai kukim haus bikos ol save mekim olsem long ol yia i kam so ol bai 
wokim’ (‘its election time, we will see the first fire burning in Kup, they will set 
houses alight because that is what has always happened in the previous 
elections’). It was ironic that KWP community police were ‘camping out’ in 
Kerowagi in an attempt to prevent a tribal fight from erupting in response to an 
election-related death. Unlike previous years, only one police officer was 
delegated to the entire Kup sub-district on the day of polling. 
 
The pride and confidence shown by KWP members for the part they played 
in ensuring a violence-free and fair election is immeasurable. Their success is 
seen as a ‘dream come true’ and the ‘first of its kind in Kup history’. KWP is a 
women’s organization that has broken the barrier of male dominance, and men 
are showing respect for and confidence in the members of the organization and 
their activities. After many years of hard work ‘sweating, talking, sleeping out, 
lighting lamps to walk in the dark, in the rain’, and in the face of some criticism 
by community members for the lack of practical change in communities, KWP 
believe the result is indisputable. KWP members welcome the opportunity to 
oversee the 2012 elections in Kup.  
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This is not to say there were no election-related problems in Kup. Campaign 
houses, for example, were identified as a cause of conflict prior to polling, a 
drain on resources for both supporters and candidates, and, due to the increased 
movement of men and women at night, a determinant of domestic violence, 
unwanted pregnancies, rape and the spread of HIV. The role of campaign 
houses in Kup during the 2012 elections is being seriously questioned by some 
KWP members. Also, three men were shot by a candidate in Kup, one of whom 
died. The community reacted positively to the incident and requests were made 
to KWP to intervene and mediate the conflict. There is widespread recognition 
of the peacebuilding work of KWP throughout the sub-district and with it a 
realization that KWP can be depended on to support and assist with conflict 
resolution. KWP members accompanied the victims to hospital and liaised with 
police over the matter. Due to KWP’s mediation and associated activities, the 
community was able to remain fairly peaceful, when in the past such an incident 
would have erupted into tribal violence.  
 
Three of the four executive members of KWP had immediate family 
standing for election. Differing political preferences have proven to be a 
divisive factor in Papua New Guinea politics and a contributor to disputes and 
intra- and inter-clan conflict. However, the KWP executive continued their 
commitment to peacebuilding throughout the election period. Open 
communication and respect for individual preferences also helped to negate 
political divisions and the organization remained united and strong. Inherent in 
their work is an understanding that despite some differences KWP members 
must be unified in their approach and provide a positive role model for the 
community. 
 
Lessons to be learned 
 
The peace-building activities of KWP over the seven years to 2007, 
combined with widespread voter education, the Livelihoods Programme and the 
Violence-free Election campaign, had a two-fold effect. First, corrupt election 
practices were strongly rejected in favour of a legitimate and fair process. 
Secondly, by targeting what have in past elections been the underlying causes of 
conflict, there was a reduction in election-related disputes and violence. KWP 
applied practical measures to ensure a valid electoral process and in turn create 
conditions for peace. The two aspects are self-supporting. This must be 
recognized if we are to see a transformation in political trends and national 
approaches to electoral processes in Papua New Guinea. 
 
Voter education was more than awareness at a marketplace or displaying 
posters. Being from the community meant KWP members immersed themselves 
at the grassroots level, eating and sleeping with the community and talking over 
the issues at night. KWP feel strongly that people are less responsive to 
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awareness in towns or at the market as people are there to conduct their own 
business. Complex political concepts such as LPV and voters’ rights require 
time for discussion and clarification. In contrast, KWP believes the messages 
conveyed during their voter awareness were adopted and well understood by 
many members of the community in Kup. A KWP member clarified this point: 
 
You have to walk inside, where cars can’t go, and sleep in the haus 
man and talk to them in their house. We sleep in the community 
and at night we talk; next day we go to another place and from this 
we have seen success. Money doesn’t matter. We slept, got up, ate 
with the community. We work in a localized way but we see big 
achievements.  
 
The system of LPV voting was seen as exclusive and a potential source of 
conflict. It lacked simplicity, English was prioritized over a Tokpisin translation 
and even when an illiterate voter asserted his/her choice, there was still ample 
opportunity for those assisting the voter to mark the ballot for their own 
candidate.  
 
Throughout many parts of Papua New Guinea, polling officials working in 
their own communities were ineffective and unable to prevent illegitimate and 
unfair election practices from occurring. Much can be learned from the activities 
of KWP during the election period. The significance of engaging the local 
community and political candidates, combined with the influence of a strong 
and well-respected local organization, resulted in a non-violent election and an 
impressive improvement in voting rights, practices and processes. Despite this, 
the negative influence of a flawed common roll had the potential to undermine 
much of the positive work of KWP. The process of drawing up the roll, which is 
out of the hands of groups working on the ground, remains a serious potential 
trigger for conflict in future elections. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a snapshot of KWP’s unique role in the 2007 national 
election and offers insights and lessons for reducing opportunities for violence. 
An organic women’s organization, in partnership with the community, took 
ownership of the electoral process to ensure a free and largely non-violent 
election period. The underlying determinants of electoral conflict were targeted 
in an attempt to create a legitimate process and to reduce the likelihood of 
election-related disputes. The strategy of voter education, launching the 
Livelihoods Programme and the Violence-free Election campaign were 
localized responses. The ‘gunpoint democracy’ of past elections (Standish 1996; 
Gibbs 2004) was rejected and individual rights and values promoted in its place. 
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The success of KWP lay in its tailored and holistic approach and the 
attention that was given to issues that were contextually relevant and locally 
determined. Rather than a ‘one size fits all’ response, KWP identified 
overlooked problems and gaps, such as the poor representation of female voters, 
and developed their own solutions. A homegrown organization, KWP had the 
capacity to facilitate dialogue with those who were beyond the reach of 
government. Their responses to potential security threats were often 
spontaneous, unconventional and improvised but their capacity and confidence 
to respond lay in their commitment to free not only their own lives but also 
those of their families and communities from the devastating effects of conflict. 
KWP’s ownership of the election process was an attempt to challenge dominant 
and detrimental trends in current Papua New Guinea politics.  
 
It is encouraging that a grassroots organization could identify and implement 
innovative and appropriate strategies and as part of their peace-building 
activities create an environment in which corrupt electoral practices, violence 
and discrimination had little weight. Community-based approaches offer 
alternative options and fresh perspectives to addressing community-based issues 
such as poor governance, undemocratic electoral processes, and the 
disenfranchisement of women. The challenge is to ensure that these approaches 
are recognized, encouraged and supported by national and donor agencies.  
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12 THE CONTEXT OF HIV TRANSMISSION DURING THE 2007 
ELECTION IN ENGA PROVINCE 
 
Philip Gibbs and Marie Mondu1 
 
A team of civil society observers was commissioned by the National Research 
Institute to observe and study the 2007 election in Enga Province. One of the 
issues to consider was the impact of the election on the spread of HIV in the 
province. Arriving in Enga at the beginning of the nomination period, the 
writers found a widespread opinion that there was heightened sexual activity in 
the province during the election period.  
 
We chose a number of ways to look for trends in both protected and 
unprotected sexual behaviour. These included: comparison of birth rates for the 
2002 election year and the year following that election; STI figures around the 
time of the 1997, 2002 and 2007 elections; condom distribution and sale rates 
before and during the elections; money flow during and outside election time; 
the amount of time people stayed away from home campaigning during the 
election period compared to other times; the way and the extent to which 
candidates referred to HIV or AIDS in their election campaign speeches; the 
experience of ‘campaign houses’; and, more generally, attitudes of people 
towards sex and the HIV epidemic. 
 
Much of the information about sexual attitudes and behaviour was gathered 
in conversations with friends and wantok. When visiting Wabag Hospital and 
the nearby Yampu Health Centre to check birth and STI records we spoke with 
health workers there. We also observed what took place at night markets, at 
gambling places, in villages, and on the streets in Wabag town.  
 
What follows is an account of those aspects of the electoral context that may 
impact on the transmission of HIV among the people of the Enga Province.  
 
Risk occasions 
 
The National HIV/AIDS Support Project (NHASP) Social Mapping Project 
for Enga (2005:17) notes how elections are a ‘risk occasion’ in Enga (along 
with ‘church crusades’). As an occasion that affects the lives of the whole 
population over a number of months every five years, why is it so ‘risky’? The 
                                                     
1 We wish to acknowledge the National Research Institute, AusAID, the Electoral 
Support Program, the Research Advisory Committee of the National AIDS Council 
Secretariat, Caritas Australia, members of the Electoral Commission, particularly those 
in Wabag, the Enga domestic observer team, and all those people in Enga and elsewhere 
who assisted in any way in the research for this paper. 
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Mapping report notes that there are many rape cases associated with elections. 
This paper will show how the risk is far more complex than that. 
 
The Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) also recognized 
that elections can be risky occasions and commissioned Jane Cousins to help 
mainstream HIV and AIDS in the PNGEC and to develop strategies to counter 
what was perceived as an increased risk of infection at election time. The PNG 
National Elections 2007 HIV Prevention Intervention program produced a 
number of initiatives, including education workshops for returning and assistant 
returning officers, awareness materials, screening of a film on national 
television, cartoon strip messages in the national newspapers, and distribution of 
HIV and AIDS ‘kits’ containing posters, pamphlets, latex gloves and condoms.  
 
Our initial enquiries with a variety of people in Enga also revealed a general 
opinion that there is an increase in sexual activity during the election period and 
that this could lead to increased spread of STIs, including HIV.  
 
The challenge facing us as researchers was to develop methodologies to 
measure and assess the veracity of that opinion.  
 
Method 
 
We realize that there is little point in studying HIV rates given the limited 
timeframe for our study. There is no set time between exposure to the virus and 
a person getting tested and clinically diagnosed. A person might get infected 
during the elections but find out after many years. It is also possible for 
someone to be infected in one place, such as Port Moresby, and be tested in 
another, such as Wabag. With these limitations we looked for other measures 
indicating sexual behaviour that might lead to HIV transmission. 
 
With no quantitative baseline study outside of election time, the researcher is 
faced with a number of challenges. One can document behaviour that appears to 
enhance risk and contributes to an increase in HIV transmission, but without a 
baseline it is hard to know if there is a difference in behaviour more generally in 
the population or in particular groups outside or within the election period. This 
difficulty influenced our use of indicators in the study. For example, consider an 
obvious indicator — condom sales. Condom sales give no clear indication of 
condom use, and increased condom distribution could possibly indicate 
increased sexual activity, though there is no direct link. Moreover, increased 
condom use has no direct relationship to increased or decreased risk of the 
spread of HIV since it does not tell us if there was more unprotected sex.  
 
The indicators we chose do not supply proof in themselves; however, taken 
together they contribute to a picture of sexual activity and its context. Where 
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possible, we tried to gather diachronic data — for example, STI rates in clinic 
records over a number of years. 
 
We chose the following five markers for quantitative data: 
• birth rates: we presume that an increase in the birth rate indicates an 
increase in unprotected sex some nine months previously; 
• rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs): we presume that an 
increase in a biomarker such as the monthly STI rates at hospital clinics 
indicates an increase in unprotected sex in the previous month or two; 
this is compounded by the fact that there are various types of STIs, some 
being asymptomatic; 
• condom distribution and sales: increased distribution and sales is 
presumed to indicate a desire for protected sex; 
• cash flow: some link poverty to sex, others link excess cash; our 
presumption is that more available cash may lead to more opportunities 
to buy or sell sex, though, as we will show, cash is not the only 
commodity in transactional sex; 
• mobility: we presume that when people live away from home there is 
more chance of engaging in new sexual liaisons (this would most 
probably mean less opportunity for sex with one’s regular partner). 
 
As may be seen from the above discussion, it is difficult to show how elections 
‘actually’ increase HIV transmission. Indicators at best show trends, but do not 
provide proof. Qualitative methods help us to interpret the meaning of 
quantitative markers and help illustrate why and how there may be an enhanced 
potential for HIV transmission in the context of an election. Some of the 
questions for which we sought answers were: 
• Why do people think the elections may have an impact on increased 
HIV transmission? 
• Is changing sexual terminology over the last three decades also a sign of 
changing attitudes and behaviour?  
• Are there new dynamics influencing multiple sexual partnering during 
the election period? 
• Given the risks, why are men and women prepared to engage in 
unprotected sex? 
• What interventions have been tried and to what effect?  
 
Campaign houses are reputedly places associated with sexual activity. We felt 
that attending the nightly sessions in such houses would compromise our 
political neutrality. So, information about these houses was obtained from 
discussion with friends and other persons who did attend. We also asked several 
people who had extensive experience of campaign houses in 2002 and 2007 to 
give a first-hand account of life at those houses. Additionally, we observed what 
took place at night markets, gambling places, villages, and streets in Wabag. 
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Principal findings  
 
Birth rates 
 
Birth rates are obviously linked to unprotected sex. For this purpose the 2002 
birth rate figures were compared alongside those of 2003. Birth rates in the first 
months of 2003 were significantly higher than in 2002, indicating that more 
conceptions took place in May-July 2002 (the election period) than in the 
following non-election year 2003. Comparing birth rates in 2008 with those of 
2007, one can see a general trend of high birth rates in the first half of 2008 with 
a significant increase in April, just nine months after the election. 
 
 
         Figure 12.1: Monthly birth rate, Wabag General Hospital 2002 and 2003 
 
 
         Figure 12.2: Monthly birth rate, Wabag General Hospital 2007 and 2008 
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HIV and AIDS awareness education and public response 
 
As part of our election observation for Wabag Open, twenty-four campaign 
speeches were recorded, transcribed and analysed. Very few candidates 
mentioned HIV and AIDS. Exceptions to this were Maryanne Amu (who is a 
health worker by profession), Bart Philemon (who came to support his New 
Generation Party candidates) and Fr. Paul Kanda. The latter two did not focus 
on the HIV epidemic; rather, their focus was on corruption, and they used AIDS 
simply as an example of a problem with a negative effect on the community. On 
the basis of candidate posters, none of the contesting candidates had policies 
which addressed the HIV epidemic. As far as public campaigning went, HIV 
and AIDS appeared to be a non-issue.  
 
We also looked at some of the awareness strategies used during the election 
process, either by the Provincial AIDS Committee (PAC) or by civil society, 
noting strengths and weaknesses of the different strategies. Table 12.1 
summarizes our findings.  
 
Table 12.1: Strengths and weaknesses of awareness strategies 
Approach  Organization Weakness Strength  Comment 
Theatre or 
drama group 
Mambisanda 
Theatre 
Group, 
Sari Youth 
Group 
Performances 
not widespread. 
Taken as 
entertainment. 
Use of local 
language. 
Engaged 
community. 
The group experienced 
logistic problems, limiting 
the scope of their activities. 
Training of 
ROs and 
election 
officials. 
PAC 1 day for 2 hrs 
only as opposed 
to a full day. 
 
17 
participants 
attended and 
materials 
distributed 
Many were not interested 
and left the room one by 
one (report by attendee) 
IEC 
materials 
and condom 
distribution 
PNGEC 
2007 Election 
HIV Response 
Program and 
Enga PAC 
Late delivery; 
no follow up 
education 
Condoms 
and other 
materials 
available to 
the public 
 
Distribution began only on 
polling day. When asked, 
many people seemed not to 
know how to interpret the 
posters. Some obtained the 
colourful posters to 
decorate the walls of their 
houses. Others took 
condoms to sell. 
Mass media PNGEC 
2007 Election 
HIV Response 
Program  
Local public 
radio (NBC) not 
on air prior to 
election. 
Majority has no 
access to TV and 
print media 
 
 
NBC resumed broadcasting 
during the counting period, 
reporting full time on 
election results.  
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Figure 12.3: Total STI cases diagnosed for 2007 
at Wabag STI clinic 
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Most STI infections show symptoms within a few weeks of sexual contact. 
Hence data for the months of June, July and August of election years might give 
an indication of unprotected sex during the campaign period, normally the 
months of April and May. Data from the Wabag STI clinic records do not show 
any clear trends for 2002, however the data for 2007 shows a remarkable 
increase in people going for STI treatment in the months following the election 
(see Figure 12.3 below). 
 
 Apart from statistics, verbal opinions of clinic staff were noted. Staff of 
Wabag STI Clinic confirmed an increased number of patients after the 
campaigning months (May-June 2007). Mr. Joel Mosek, who heads the clinic, 
made the following remarks on STI infections for election years: 
 
After the elections, I am expecting more patients. In every election, 
the number of STI patients is usually higher than normal days. And 
I believe more people will come in for treatment after this election. 
(STI Clinic, Wabag, 13 July 2007).  
 
The high STI rate in Papua New Guinea has direct implications for HIV 
transmission. STIs are a sensitive marker of unprotected sexual behaviour that 
put people at risk of HIV infection, and are co-factors increasing the probability 
of HIV infection (Jenkins and Buchanan-Aruwafu 2007:79). Dr. William Waro 
from the Wabag General Hospital, basing his comments on the NACS Quarterly 
Report (December 2006), stated that Enga ranked second highest in the country 
on HIV infection by province. A total of 643 Engans were identified as HIV-
positive at different testing centres in the country in 2006. The level of stigma 
and discrimination is extremely high, resulting in many infected individuals 
travelling out of the province to be tested elsewhere — producing a lower 
detection rate in the Enga 
Province. The impact of 
the 2007 election remains 
to be seen. 
 
Condoms 
 
We sought data on 
condom distribution in 
order to assess availability 
and whether or not 
protected sex was common 
during elections. We found 
that condoms generally 
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were available from the Enga Provincial Aids Committee (PAC), shops, street 
sellers and local groups engaged in awareness activities. However, we have also 
identified attitudes affecting people’s inability or unwillingness to use condoms 
despite their availability.  
 
HIV/AIDS Response Program 2007 National Elections 
 
A total of 175 cartons containing information education communication 
(IEC) materials were received by Enga PAC two weeks prior to the campaign 
period. Distribution of these materials, however, came into effect two weeks 
after polling; thus polling teams did not receive the ‘HIV kit’ as planned. The 
delay was due to limited human resources at the PAC headquarters in Wabag. 
On polling day HIV/AIDS posters were given out to voters in some polling 
places. There was also a theatre group from Mambisanda that helped distribute 
IEC materials to campaign houses during the campaign period, and the assistant 
election manager obtained five boxes of male condoms from the PAC for 
provision to election officials.  
 
Groups and individual advocates visited the PAC office occasionally, from 
the beginning of the campaign period through to the time of counting, to obtain 
supplies of IEC materials (personal communication, Mr. James Balos, 
Coordinator of Enga PAC). Corporate houses and targeted workforce groups 
such as the Defence Force and Guard Dog Security personnel were supplied 
with IEC materials. Villages, schools and health facilities alongside the highway 
towards both Mount Hagen and Porgera were given similar packages, mostly 
during the counting period.  
 
Local distributors 
 
Local distributors comprise mainly local men and women who collect boxes 
or packets of condoms from health clinics, during awareness campaigns or 
directly from the PAC office. Local distributors sold condoms for 50 toea per 
packet. When the demand is high, a packet goes for K2. Selling of condoms 
provides a means of income for local distributors as well. One distributor said 
he was saving lives and making a little pocket money besides.  
 
Reporting on sales during the elections, one vendor told us that usually on 
normal days, before elections, he sells half to one box of condoms per day (a 
box contains twelve condoms). During the campaigning period he sold four to 
five boxes per day (50-60 condoms) as he moved from one ‘“animal” 
[campaign] house’ to another. However, when asked if he used condoms with 
his girlfriend, he denied it, claiming his girlfriend was a wapra [prostitute]. 
Through some sort of strange logic he expressed fear that condoms have holes 
in them and he could easily get infected, so he doesn’t use them with her. An 
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example like this indicates knowledge gaps about condoms as a preventative 
measure.  
 
Shops and retail outlets 
 
Apart from street sellers, retail outlets in town sell condoms. Two Asian-
owned shops were observed. One was selling male lubricated condoms that 
were commonly supplied by the National AIDS Council Secretariat (NACS). 
The shop assistant reported that the condom boxes were usually bought from the 
PAC office for K2.50 per box. Each condom was then sold for 30 toea. The 
second was selling imported condoms and claimed to have had many more 
customers purchasing condoms during the election period. 
 
A tradestore keeper at Yampu near Wabag said that just before the issue of 
writs a health extension officer gave fifteen cartons of condoms (each 
containing twelve boxes of twelve packets of condoms) to groups of young men 
in the area. Hence there was little need for people to buy them again, though he 
had customers from further afield. Before the election period he sold 10 to 12 
condoms per week, but during the campaign period he was selling at the rate of 
about 70 condoms per week. Another tradestore keeper in the vicinity of a 
campaign house near Wabag said that during 2006 he sold about two boxes of 
condoms per month. In 2007 he was selling two boxes per week, and during the 
campaign period the demand increased to three to four boxes (36-48 condoms) 
per week. After the campaign period and voting, the demand went down again 
to one or two boxes per week.  
 
Condom use 
 
A large volume of condoms distributed does not mean that they are used by 
everybody. It seems that both male and female condoms were used. A local 
condom seller reported that prior to the election she sold to only three female 
relatives but during the election period word got around and many people came 
buying both female and male condoms. Women would say, ‘In case the men do 
not have condoms we will use our condom’.  
 
However, on a number of occasions we heard comments such as:  
 
‘I don’t like using condom because skin to skin is very nice and 
[more] satisfying than using this plastic called condom. It disturbs 
my sexual enjoyment’ (19 year old male).  
 
‘I don’t use condom because using condom does not satisfy my 
sexual desires. When I don’t use condom I am well satisfied’ (25 
year old male).  
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‘I don’t use condoms because it disturbs my sexual interactions 
with the ladies and does not satisfy my sexual desires. Skin to skin 
is the best way to satisfy me’ (29 year old man).  
 
‘I don’t use condoms because most times I’m dead drunk. My 
attitude has changed. Usually before the elections I take alcohol 
and don’t engage in sexual activities. During the elections, there 
were surplus of ladies around so I took the opportunity. Whichever 
campaign house I visit I hit it (had sex) Mi save paitim yet. I had at 
least one or two ladies a day’ (Male leader at his local church). 
 
A woman who frequented campaign houses made the following comments:  
 
I don’t have to carry condoms around. That’s men’s responsibility. 
I don’t care if they use condom or not. It’s not only me who is 
going to be infected they will be infected too. So I don’t worry too 
much about using condoms during sex. 
 
 To the extent that such attitudes are commonly held, despite distribution of 
condoms a considerable number of people are at risk of becoming infected.  
 
Cash flow 
 
Money was chosen as an indicator 
because cash is associated with sex and the 
spread of STI infections. 
 
There is a trend toward a very high cash 
flow within the province at the time of 
election. Contesting candidates and their 
supporters used huge sums of cash to pay for votes, ranging from K5 to K100 
per head, and time spent on gambling increased. Shop managers were 
interviewed and financial reports for the months of April, May, June and July 
2007 were sighted. In all cases income had increased during the election period. 
Shop assistants confirmed that the election period was a peak period for 
business operations — one commented that the shop she was working in closed 
around 6pm during the election time — an hour beyond the usual closing time.   
 
With a ban on the open sale of alcohol in the province, Coca Cola often 
substitutes as a medium of exchange (along with money and pigs) at campaign 
rallies and other gatherings. It is difficult to obtain data on the amount of cash or 
the number of pigs exchanged. However, taking Coca Cola sales as a surrogate 
variable for cash flow, one can see from Figure 12.4 how sales increased almost 
seven-fold during the election period.  
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Figure 12.4: Wabag Coca Cola 
Depot income (millions of Kina) 
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Mobility 
 
One of our field assistants lives very close to a campaign house and made 
enquiries with people that he knew there. This was done verbally in the third 
week of June 2007 (part way through the election period) with a purposive 
sample of 10 males and 10 females who frequented campaign houses. He found 
that some people stayed away (campaigning) for long periods of time during the 
election. (We do not know their pattern of behaviour before or after the 
elections, but the presumption is that mobility enables people to encounter new 
sexual partners and that without the campaign house they might stay at home 
more often.)  
 
Table 12.2: Number of days people stayed away from their homes 
Participant Day/s out Marital status 
Female 
A Since issue of writs divorced 
B Since issue of writs divorced 
C 4 weeks single 
D 4 weeks single 
E 4 weeks single 
F 4 weeks single 
G 8 days married 
H 12 days married 
I 6 days married woman with children 
J many days married woman with children 
Male 
A 1 week married man with children 
B 15 days married man with children 
C many days married 
D many days married 
E since issue of writs single 
F 12 days married 
G since issue of writs single 
H since issue of writs single 
I since issue of writs single 
J since issue of writs single 
Note: Writs were issued on 4 April 2007. 
 
For many of these people, time away from home was an opportunity for 
liaisons involving pre-marital and extra-marital sex (see below). 
 
Mobility is not only about people moving between campaign houses but also 
about people moving between provinces. One woman said that before the 
campaign period she used to go around with one or two elderly men. However, 
during the campaign period she had a lot of clients including visiting Defence 
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and police personal. She claims that she had 5 to 6 clients a day and made good 
money during the elections. 
 
Experience of campaign houses 
 
Campaign houses, or as they are commonly known ‘animal houses’, are 
purposely built to house and gather supporters of a particular candidate during 
the campaign period. The term ‘animal house’ comes from the reputation 
campaign houses developed over the years: a lot of people who frequent them 
seem to act like animals, not thinking sensibly like human beings. During 
singsings or tanim het, members of opposite sexes whisper to each other and 
make arrangements to meet outside. A married woman commented, ‘Who is to 
stop them? They have a lot of freedom at that time’.  
 
Campaigning in Enga, like other highlands provinces, usually involves 
generous hospitality and where possible distribution of large sums of cash 
(Standish 2006). With the introduced LPV system voters were not restricted to 
one campaign house but had three or more avenues. Seizing the opportunity of 
enjoying candidates’ free handouts, they moved from one campaign house to 
another, and if engaging in unprotected sex, posing a greater risk of STI and 
HIV transmission. Free beverage and food, dusk-to-dawn gambling, and night 
entertainment are examples of election spoils from campaign houses. There 
have been reports of a good deal of sexual activity associated with campaign 
houses, aided by free alcoholic beverages, drugs and home brew, money, 
political pressure to win votes, as well as erotic songs sung during the tanim het 
courting rituals. 
 
Table 12.3: Risky activities and activities leading to people’s vulnerability 
Risky activities Activities leading to people’s vulnerability 
• Premarital and extramarital sex 
• Sex to win votes 
• Transactional sex 
• Fights resulting in bloodshed 
• Singsing, Tanim Het 
• Gambling (cards) 
• Alcohol and drug abuse 
• Money 
• Political pressure 
 
A few examples are given here from local people who witnessed activities in 
campaign houses.  
 
Extramarital sex 
 
One person reported that during the campaign period, some husbands and 
wives were no longer seen as married couples. The husband freed himself and 
so did the wife. If the husband went out to animal houses, the wife went out too. 
They claimed to have to fight hard to win votes for their candidates. 
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Figure 12.5: Number of sexual partners 
since issue of the writs 
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Another person noted, ‘The men said to their wives to free themselves and 
campaign. No man or woman was to say anything. After the election we would 
return to our homes and be husbands and wives. Now the women went their 
own way and the men went their own way during the campaign season. A 
woman who tried to complain couldn’t go on because no one would listen. All 
complaints would be heard after the election’ (35 year old married woman).  
 
One woman went to an animal house to claim her husband but the man 
swore at her and told her to wait in their house till the campaign was over and 
she could claim her husband. She wept and went home.  
 
Although adultery is ordinarily discouraged, some married couples use the 
elections as a chance to have extra-marital affairs. Some married people claim 
to be a yukupae a local term which means a man or woman who is unattached or 
separated and therefore available for 
sex with another yukupae. The 10 
men and 10 women from Table 12.2 
were asked how many sexual 
partners they had in the seven weeks 
from the issue of writs on 4 April 
2007.  Three women claimed to have 
had more than 20 different sexual 
partners over the seven-week period 
(see Figure 12.5). 
 
Sex for votes 
 
Women often play a significant role in attracting and entertaining male 
supporters: young female helpers in campaign houses were sometimes pressured 
into entertaining males sexually as a way of gaining votes. 
  
…one man came and complained that the girls in there were 
stubborn and ignorant; she (guardian) got angry with the girls and 
swore at them saying, ‘Yupela stap long plastic o? (meaning, are 
you virgins?). Why didn’t you talk with them at least even if you 
didn’t want to sleep with them?’ Then she told them not to come to 
the animal house because they were useless (from a written account 
of experience at campaign houses during the 2002 national 
elections).  
 
One of the reasons men have multiple sexual partners is to seduce females into 
voting for their candidate. Some would make false marriage plans with a 
number of girlfriends. Girls with this type of commitment in mind were easily 
talked into sex and gave their votes to candidates they did not initially support.  
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…I want to sex many women or girls in different places so that [a] 
woman can vote for my candidate with her close relatives and 
families so that they are convinced that I am going to marry her 
(married 29 year old male from near Wabag, 26 May 2007). 
 
Violence  
 
Physical violence poses a risk of HIV transmission if a wounded and 
bleeding person is infected. There were a number of election-related deaths and 
casualties observed in 2007. Dr William Waro from Wabag General Hospital 
reported one death and two election-related casualties brought to that hospital 
and the sister in charge at Yampu Health Centre reported eleven men being 
brought in, some with gunshot and bushknife wounds. These figures do not 
include a number of post-election casualties.  
 
There is a direct link between engendered sexual violence and HIV 
transmission (National AIDS Council of Papua New Guinea, 2006:18). Stories 
of rapes associated with campaign houses were reported in past elections, and 
2007 was no exception. For example, a woman described a planned rape that 
occurred at the animal house where she was staying: 
  
One of these girls didn’t know that her boyfriend was also at the 
animal house. When he saw her, she acted shy pretending to hide 
so he came over to her and asked how she came in. She admitted 
she came with another guy. She forgot who she came with and 
joined her old friend. When night came they ate their dinners and 
started their programs, singing and tanim het. While this was going 
on, the boyfriend planned the rape of his ex girlfriend. He told the 
boys that his girl friend came in with another guy and he hated her 
so why don’t the guys rape her. This man went into the animal 
house and asked her if she wanted to chew betel nut and she agreed 
and decided to come out and chew. They were sitting under a big 
tree and the man stood up and moved a little way to pee. Then a 
crowd of men came and carried her away through the kaukau 
[sweet potato] gardens and they raped her. After they had raped 
her, they sent her to the animal house and threatened her, telling 
her to shut up and just sleep. In the morning, the boys contributed 
K7.00 and gave it to her for her bus fare home.  
 
Gambling 
 
Participants of a peer education exercise conducted with the Catholic youth 
of Sari were asked to identify driving forces behind the HIV epidemic within 
their communities. Card games were listed amongst the popular risk practices 
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linked to direct transmission. The youth further explained that when all money 
is lost in gambling it is possible that people can sell sex. In campaign houses 
card games were the common entertainment enjoyed by all. At some point 
sexual terms and phrases were exchanged to signal sex for money. For instance, 
‘Nyoto dii’ (‘Give and you’ll get it’) or ‘lay it (card) down! I’ll beat it’, 
(meaning lay yourself down and I’ll pay for you to continue the game).  
 
Attitudes of people towards sex 
 
Cultural beliefs and taboos in the past had a strong hold on sexual expression 
in Enga. Males for instance, were instilled with great fear of losing their 
masculinity through eating food prepared by a female undergoing menstruation. 
Anthropologist Mervyn Meggitt, writing in the early 1960s, labels Mae Enga 
men’s attitudes to women as the ‘anxiety of prudes’ trying to protect themselves 
from contamination by women (Meggitt 1964:222). The resultant distance 
between the sexes thus naturally delayed sexual exploration at an early age for 
many, and suppressed promiscuity. Sex was seldom spoken of openly and 
women had very little say in sexual decision making, though they could be very 
assertive at times (Kyakas and Wiessner 1992). Women’s primary sexual 
function was that of child bearers.  
 
The social context influencing attitudes and behaviour described by Meggitt 
has changed dramatically. People within the 30-45 age group have developed 
new gender-based terminology for sexual matters. Females, for instance, might 
refer to their sexual organs as ‘passbook’ (a bank transaction booklet). Phrases 
such as, ‘I can sign my withdrawal slip at any time because I possess a 
passbook’ have been used commonly by females, meaning women have the 
power to say yes or no to sex for cash. From such sexual terminology one can 
see a new trend emerging. Women are participating more openly in sexual 
decision making and there is a more open acknowledgment of transactional sex.  
 
The younger generation speak of sex as a game or a sport, keeping scores 
and using phrases such as, ‘Nambame kanguingi’ (‘I have broken it’, referring 
to the loss of virginity). Some sexually active people are referred to as ‘training 
centre’ or ‘service providers.’ Youngsters are developing new forms of sexual 
slang as they experience more freedom in expressing their sexuality.  
 
Unprotected sex 
 
Many of the males we spoke with prefer ‘skin to skin’ sex and have more 
than one partner. Some sexually active individuals appear careless despite the 
availability of condoms. A male who claimed to have had six sexual partners 
during the election period, when asked if he used condoms made the following 
remarks. ‘I know most of them are good so I did not use a condom but I used a 
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condom on one. When I tried to use a condom with X, she refused and told me 
to remove the condom. I knew she was going around with other men but I had 
to remove the condom and do it because we were both naked and I could not 
control myself. I am still frightened but I pray that I don’t get infected’ (he is a 
leader in his church and says that the election has ‘spoilt’ him). 
 
Multiple sex partners  
 
The election brought a sense of sexual liberation for many. Some married 
couples agreed to be ‘free’ during the campaign period. Males, for boastful 
reasons, kept tallies of bedded females thus seizing the moment to expand their 
territories. The following were responses of sexually active males who said they 
preferred multiple partners as opposed to just one. 
 
…Because I feel tired or fed up of having sex with the same girl or 
woman and I feel useless. 
…I want to keep a record of how many I have sexual intercourse 
with in order to outnumber other boys/men. 
…I like different flavours from different age groups. I like very 
young girls or virgins because I enjoy sex ….very sweet and much 
better than older women. 
…I want to have many sexual partners in different places so that 
whenever I am stranded they may accommodate me in their homes. 
…I like convincing and sexing many girls/women by telling them 
that I will marry them so that they can vote for the candidate I 
support. 
…I want to sex many girls or women to marry them so that my 
brother in laws can support me or my clansmen whenever tribal 
fighting arises. 
…It is useless just sexing the same girl over and over again. 
…Sex is my game, my favourite game. 
 
Groups of sexually active woman displayed similar attitudes to men but their 
reasons for multiple partnering were either money related or sex for fun. One 
said that she normally had sex with men or boys behind her husband’s back 
before the election period. During the campaigning period, the limited 
preferential voting system gave her the opportunity to skip from one campaign 
house to another, totalling seven campaign houses. She looked for men with 
money and did not really care about protective measures like condoms.  
 
Another woman said that she used to be a faithful wife but started to go out 
with multiple sex partners during the election period. She did this to earn money 
in order to return her husband’s brideprice when he returns, as she plans to 
divorce her husband.  
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Some women just enjoy the opportunity for new sexual relationships. One 
divorced woman reported to our field assistant, ‘There is no secret in this. I have 
made deals for other men and girls to have sex. I did it too’. When asked how 
often she was doing it, she said, ‘I did not miss a chance because, you know, 
every time I am asked I have to go for it. That way I have money for smoke, 
betel nut and gambling. If I don’t go nobody is going to give me anything’.  
 
Viral load and HIV infection  
 
The infectiousness of people with HIV, which is related to the amount of 
virus present in the body, varies with the stage of infection (San Francisco 
AIDS Foundation 2007:1). Immediately after HIV infection, before the immune 
system produces antibodies in response to its presence, HIV multiplies rapidly. 
It can take two or more months for the body to produce antibodies to the virus.2 
People at this stage have a high viral load and the probability of infecting others 
through unprotected sex is significantly higher than when the viral load is lower. 
One research study estimated the risk of infection to be twenty times higher 
(AIDS.org Fact Sheet 2007:2).  
 
Studies have also shown that the rate of infection in communities varies 
according to whether people tend to have serial partners (one sexual relationship 
is followed by another, but a person has only one partner at any one time) or 
concurrent relationships (a number of regular steady relationships at the same 
time). In the latter case the chance of infection spreading rapidly is greatly 
increased (Epstein 2007). 
 
The situation in Enga during the elections differed from both these scenarios. 
In Enga, many campaign houses were open during the three months of the 
election period, a time, as this research shows, of significantly heightened 
sexual activity for both men and women. These factors could lead to a 
considerable amplification of the epidemic. If people were to become newly 
infected during this time period, they could pass the infection on to a number of 
their sexual partners who, unaware that they are infected, would themselves 
move into a period of increased infectiousness and in turn transmit the infection 
to their sexual partners. For example, a young man may become infected and in 
the following weeks visit a number of campaign houses and have unprotected 
sex with several partners at each of those houses. In the week or two after being 
infected he will carry a high viral load and if a condom is not used there is a 
high chance that he will pass on the virus to his partners. These partners in turn 
will be highly infectious in the weeks following and pass the virus on to their 
partners. With the election period extending over two or three months, there is 
time for the cycle to be repeated a number of times, leading to a very high rate 
                                                     
2 Elizabeth Reid, personal communication, Canberra, 7 February 2008. 
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of transmission of the HIV virus in the community. This is what makes the 
election period a particularly high-risk event. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We chose a number of indicators to help us learn about trends in sexual 
behaviour, particularly during the election period. Our data suggest that despite 
the lack of baseline studies for comparison, election time is a period of 
increased freedom, including sexual freedom. In this context many people seem 
unable or unwilling to protect themselves from HIV infection because of 
personal, cultural or other forces. There is an urgent need for further study on 
vulnerability to HIV and the interrelationships between attitudes, behaviour, 
culture, contexts, ideologies, norms and values (UNAIDS 1998). The extensive 
multi-partnering over a short period of time can fuel what Jenkins calls a 
widespread ‘hot’ epidemic which puts many people at risk (Jenkins and 
Buchanan-Aruwafu 2007:53). 
 
This study has raised the important issue of viral load and HIV infection in 
the context of heightened sexual activity over a limited period of time during the 
election event. Mobility, money and sexual freedom could well mean a period 
of increased infectiousness as people transmit the virus to their multiple sexual 
partners during their rounds of campaign houses and other venues. It is not only 
high-risk groups that one should be concerned about, but also high risk ‘events’. 
In Enga, elections are a high-risk event.  
 
Hopefully, lessons can be learned from this study. For example, the Sari 
Youth Drama Group played a limited but significant role in awareness during 
the election period, performing short 3-5 minute long plays on stigma and 
discrimination, violence against women, and general risk activities. A lot more 
could be done to develop participatory methods for designing educational 
messages, and behaviour change programs. Ways to deliver care and treatment 
need to be adapted to local conditions and concepts. In the months following the 
elections, local leaders came with large numbers of their communities to be 
tested for HIV at the Yampu VCT centre near Wabag. People were saying: ‘We 
vote in groups and we want to be tested in groups’. Admittedly the power of the 
group can have undesirable consequences, as in pack rape. How then can group 
solidarity be utilized to ensure the wellbeing and the survival of families and 
clans?  
 
Community mobilization may be one of the most effective means of 
minimizing further spread of HIV. A good example during the elections was the 
response of the people of Par in the Ambum-Kompiam electorate. This 
Tambukini community of 6,000 people decided not to host a single campaign 
house in their area during the 2007 election period. When asked why, a 
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community leader said, ‘Because of lessons learnt as we realized there are so 
many problems brewing from campaign houses’. This however, did not stop 
some people from moving to campaign houses in other areas.  
 
Traditional values surrounding sex and sexuality have little relevance to new 
options at the level of imagination and practice, particularly with the freedom of 
the election period. It is crucial that key community persons with political 
insight identify needs and advocate solutions that will empower communities to 
develop a safer sexual culture. This requires not simply focusing on elections, 
money, goods and services, but taking into account the whole of people’s lives 
and the way in which values, particularly community cultural values, relate to 
sexuality. Baseline studies need to be conducted in preparation for more 
comprehensive research during the next election. 
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13 ASSESSING THE SHIFT TO LIMITED PREFERENTIAL VOTING 
 
R.J. May, Katherine Wheen and Nicole Haley1 
 
As part of a package of economic and political reforms, the Morauta 
government of 1999-2002 amended the Organic Law on National and Local-
level Government Elections to replace the existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
voting system to one of limited preferential voting (LPV).2 This did not come 
into effect in the national election of 2002, but was used in ten by-elections 
between 2002 and 2007.  
 
Under the new LPV system voters were required to express three 
preferences.3 Once transferred, second and third preferences carried the same 
weight as a first preference. Failure to express three preferences constituted an 
invalid vote. 
 
A number of reasons was given for the decision to change to LPV.4 First and 
foremost, there had been growing concern that, with increasing numbers of 
candidates contesting successive elections (in 2002 the average number of 
candidates per electorate had risen to 26, with a record of 62 in Oro Provincial), 
and a weak party vote, members were being elected with increasingly small 
shares of the vote. In 2002, twenty-two MPs (20 per cent) were elected with less 
than 10 per cent of the vote and 62 MPs (57 per cent) with less than 20 per cent, 
the lowest winning vote being 6 per cent in Oro Provincial; the average winning 
vote was 19.7 per cent.5 This meant that MPs could be said to have only a ‘small 
mandate’ (Somare once referred to the National Parliament as a ‘house of 
rejects’ (quoted in Post-Courier 7 September 1999). Because LPV would 
produce what was commonly referred to as an ‘absolute majority’, and thus 
‘promote the election of more broadly supported candidates’ (Reilly 2006:189), 
                                                     
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge Bill Standish’s comments on a draft of this paper. 
2 Prior to independence in 1975 there had been an optional preferential voting system, 
though most voters had opted not to exercise their preferences beyond the primary vote. 
3 In the ten by-elections, candidates were required to mark their ballot papers, which 
listed all candidates with accompanying photographs, with the numbers 1, 2 and 3 
alongside their preferred candidates. In 2007 the format of the ballot paper was changed; 
posters showing the list of numbered candidates were displayed in all polling booths and 
voters were given ballot papers with three spaces, numbered 1,2,3, against which they 
had to write the numbers and/or names of their preferred candidates. 
4 For a more detailed discussion see Standish (2006). A major proponent of this ‘social 
engineering’ was Australian National University academic Ben Reilly (see Reilly 1996, 
2001a, 2002, 2004, 2006). More sceptical views were expressed by May (2001) and 
Standish (2002), as well as by the former electoral commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo 
(Kaiulo 2002:179). 
5 Calculated from the official results of the 2002 Election, released by the PNGEC. 
Results were available for 103 seats only, with the 6 failed election results excluded. 
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it was argued that LPV would yield better MPs with a ‘stronger mandate’.6 It 
was not generally made clear, however, that what LPV produced was a majority 
— 50 per cent + 1 — of live votes at the final count after eliminations, which, as 
will be seen below, may be well below 50 per cent of the total number of valid 
votes cast. Secondly, in many electorates, especially in highlands open 
electorates, the distribution of votes between a large number of candidates 
meant that a candidate who could hold together a relatively small clan or ‘base’ 
vote could have enough votes to win.7 This encouraged such malpractices as 
voter intimidation, enforced bloc voting, and discouraging outsiders from 
campaigning in a candidate’s home area — which in turn resulted in 
confrontational and often violent behaviour. LPV, it was widely believed, would 
lead to more accommodative behaviour, partly through preference-swapping 
alliances between candidates, particularly candidates from across regional, clan 
or ‘ethnic’ boundaries, and thus more orderly and peaceful elections. Thirdly, 
the fact that voters could express a preference for three candidates meant that 
voters who were under pressure from family, clan or others to vote for a 
candidate not of their choosing might be able to meet this obligation but then 
allocate their second and third preferences to candidates of their choice. This 
was particularly relevant for women, who were often obliged to vote as their 
husbands or male relatives dictated, and was seen as likely to benefit women 
candidates. Some people suggested that LPV would bring about a reduction in 
the number of candidates — though it was never explained why that would 
happen — and that it would strengthen political parties by encouraging electoral 
alliances between parties. In short, in the words of Electoral Commissioner 
Andrew Trawen, ‘LPV voting, we hope, will change the mindset of our people’ 
(Trawen 2006:3). 
 
Between 2003 and 2006 ten by-elections under LPV were held, in Abau 
(2003), Angalimp-South Wahgi, Chimbu Provincial, Yangoru-Saussia, Moresby 
Northeast, Wabag (all 2004), Bougainville Provincial, NCD Provincial, Koroba-
Lake Kopiago and Chuave (all 2006). An audit of three by-elections in mid-
2004 (Angalimp-South Wahgi, Chimbu Provincial and Yangoru-Saussia) 
concluded that, despite some problems, particularly due to inflated electoral 
rolls, the by-elections were generally peaceful, though this may have had more 
to do with heavy security than with the new voting procedures (Institute of 
Policy Studies et al. 2004). A subsequent analysis by Bill Standish of the first 
six by-elections (these three plus Abau, Moresby Northeast and Wabag) sought 
                                                     
6 As May (2001) has pointed out, however, the largest mandate ever received by a 
Papua New Guinean MP — 83 per cent of the vote — was that received by cult leader 
Mathias Yaliwan in Yangoru-Saussia in 1972, but Yaliwan subsequently lost his seat for 
not attending parliament — scarcely an endorsement for large mandates!  
7 For example, in an electorate of say 30,000 voters with say 40 candidates, a contest 
could theoretically be won with as few as 751 votes. 
Assessing the shift to limited preferential voting      179 
 
to identify ‘some early lessons’ from the LPV experience. Among Standish’s 
conclusions were: 
 
• ‘Many candidates had limited understanding of the significance of 
preferences, and most only campaigned locally, just as they had 
under FPTP’; 
• ‘…not all candidates had the ability to direct preferences towards 
allies….some candidates directed their supporters to give their 
preferences to minor candidates’; 
• ‘Campaigning was much more relaxed and accommodative’; 
• the ‘polls were less violent….[and] the levels of intimidation were 
greatly reduced compared with 2002’ (noting, however, ‘the strong 
police presence’ and that, as mid-term by-elections, ‘the stakes 
[were] not as high’); 
• voters spoke ‘enthusiastically about having a “free” second and third 
choice’ (though ‘in certain areas the primary vote was filled out by 
the presiding polling official’); 
• ‘For women, voting is more free under LPV, at least for second and 
third preferences’, though in Abau women said ‘they had followed 
family decisions on how to allocate preferences’, and the primary 
vote for women candidates remained very low; 
• the ‘overall mandates’ (primary votes plus preferences as a 
percentage of total valid votes in the initial count) of the new MPs 
were nearly doubled; nonetheless, in four cases the mandates ranged 
from 22 to 29 per cent — the count being drawn out till the third last 
candidate was eliminated — and in the other two were ‘around 50 
per cent’. 
 
Standish also noted that there were fewer candidates in the by-elections (though 
still, on average, more than 20) but that this was normal for by-elections, and 
that there was little sign that OLIPPAC had changed people’s voting behaviour 
towards political parties. Overall, his evaluation was that ‘LPV has had some 
real success….[but] has not achieved the exaggerated hopes of its proponents’. 
(See Standish 2006.)  
 
LPV in 2007 
 
Awareness and training of polling and counting officials 
 
Apart from those electorates in which by-elections were held under LPV, 
there were relatively few voters who would have retained a memory of optional 
preferential voting before 1975. Thus, in the lead-up to the election, electoral 
awareness campaigns were mounted, by both the PNGEC and civil society 
organizations, to prepare voters and candidates for the introduction of the new 
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voting system in 2007. (The AusAID-funded Voter Education Program is 
discussed specifically in chapter 4.) While these campaigns gave some attention 
to broader aspects of the election, such as the need for voters to choose 
candidates who possessed good leadership qualities, they were directed 
essentially at the more technical aspects of LPV, specifically how to cast a valid 
vote. And for the most part their coverage seldom reached to the more remote 
parts of electorates. Subsequently, during campaigning most candidates helped 
to educate voters about LPV, but again the focus was on making sure that 
potential supporters’ votes counted rather than on how preferences might be 
effectively used. Notwithstanding this, some candidates seem to have had a poor 
understanding of how LPV worked: observers reported cases in which 
candidates were under the apparent impression that all three preferences of all 
voters were totalled to give a final vote, and one candidate who should have 
known better complained, ‘As the rule had it, elimination began immediately 
after the conclusion of the count on first preferences. This immediately rendered 
the secondary and third preferences of the eliminated candidates useless — 
exhausted votes’ (Digim’Rina 2007:34).  
 
Training was also conducted for polling officials and counting officials to 
familiarize them with LPV procedures. The reports of observers involved in the 
Domestic Observer exercise suggest that in several instances this training was 
not adequate, but in general there seems to have been a good understanding of 
the technical aspects of the poll, and in most electorates the distribution of 
preferences seems to have proceeded fairly smoothly. Some commentators have 
cited, as an indicator of the administrative success in introducing LPV, the 
generally low informal vote (for the 102 electorates for which data was 
available at December 2010, the national average was 2.1 per cent); as others 
have pointed out, however, low informal voting might also be explained by the 
prevalence, especially in highlands electorates, of bloc voting (or ‘controlled 
voting’) and assisted voting. While assistance was often needed to enable 
illiterate or confused voters to cast their vote, candidate supporters (including, in 
some instances, polling officials) sometimes used this to deprive voters of their 
free choice. Thus, informal voting was lowest in the remote Kandep and Jimi 
open electorates (0.3 per cent) and averaged 1.3 in the Highlands Region, but 
was 3.3 per cent in the relatively well-educated Islands Region and highest in 
the National Capital District (5.7 per cent) (Anere and Wheen 2009:27). 
 
These aspects of the election are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this 
volume and in the Domestic Observation Report (Haley and Anere 2009:33-36). 
 
LPV and candidate strategies  
 
One of the most common arguments put forward in support of LPV was that, 
because candidates would need to secure preferences outside their base support 
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areas, it would encourage cooperative behaviour amongst candidates, and 
thereby reduce tensions associated with electoral competition. FPTP voting, it 
was argued, was a highly competitive process and encouraged behaviour of the 
type that had characterized earlier elections in some parts of Papua New Guinea, 
particularly in the highlands, where candidates or their supporters had blocked 
roads, fired on helicopters, and taken other extreme measures to prevent rival 
candidates from entering the candidate’s ‘support base’, not to mention 
hijacking ballot boxes from the home areas of rival candidates. In fact, under 
FPTP it was not uncommon for stronger candidates to put up ‘dummy 
candidates’ in the home areas of rival candidates to split their vote — which 
might be described as a form of ‘cooperative’ behaviour, albeit a negative one. 
The expectation was, however, that with the introduction of LPV, candidates 
would form cooperative alliances to exchange preferences with other candidates 
of similar interests but (usually) different support bases, and in this way reduce 
confrontational behaviour and promote more peaceful elections. 
 
Reporting on Abau in 2007, Anere observes that ‘candidates saw the need to 
exchange second and third preferences and in some instances campaigned for 
each other in areas that were not their strongholds’, though ‘most ran their 
campaigns independently of each other’. Generally, however, there was not 
much evidence of cooperative preference swapping. In Oro (where there was a 
strong ‘Oro for Oro’ campaign) and Madang there were reports of ‘ethnic’ 
alliances amongst local groups seeking to resist the influence of candidates 
whose origins lay outside the province (‘outsiders’) (see chapters 15 and 21), 
and there may have been similar ethnic cooperation amongst candidates in parts 
of several other  electorates (see, for example, Sepoe [chapter 10] on inland vs 
coastal voting in Kerema Open, and Kinkin [chapter 25] on Baining vs Tolai 
voting in Gazelle Open), and amongst ‘outsider’ groups in provinces like 
Madang and Oro. There were also instances (including East Sepik and East New 
Britain provincial electorates) in which several candidates ‘ganged up’ against a 
sitting member (as has occurred in elections prior to the introduction of LPV). 
But where such cooperation did take place it appears to have been mostly 
unorganized and informal and did not involve formal exchanges of preferences 
(over which candidates had little control anyhow). 
 
In Australia’s preferential voting system it is customary for most parties to 
hand out to voters a ‘how-to-vote card’, which indicates where the candidate — 
who generally represents a party — recommends preferences should go, in 
accordance with (party) strategy. But in Papua New Guinea this would be a 
dangerous strategy. Since the party system is poorly developed and voting is 
significantly localized and personalized, and given that in most electorates there 
is a large number of candidates, candidates are unlikely to risk alienating voters 
by telling them how they should allocate their preferences. Rather, if a candidate 
is campaigning in a place (typically a village or settlement) where he/she 
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expects to get strong support he/she will usually ask for the first preference but 
not presume to tell voters where their other preference should go; if he/she is 
campaigning in a place where he/she knows that voters are likely to vote for 
another candidate, he/she will generally acknowledge that, and modestly ask for 
voters’ second or third preferences. The candidate’s strategy will thus vary 
according to the local situation; a generalized how-to-vote approach is not 
appropriate.8 This was evidenced in the candidates’ posters which were on 
display on buildings and trees in villages and towns: the great majority urged 
voters to ‘Vote 1’ for the candidate, but indicated no second or third 
preferences. Even in an electorate like East Sepik Provincial, where coalition 
partners had resolved not to endorse candidates against Prime Minister Sir 
Michael Somare and the ten other candidates were all broadly ‘anti-Somare’, 
there was some collaboration between candidates opposing the sitting member, 
and a natural flow of preferences amongst the ten, but no coherent strategy of 
preference swapping. 
 
In most electorates, indeed, observers reported that when pressed on the 
question of preference strategies most candidates with an expectation of election 
told voters to give them the first preference (or second if there was a favoured 
local son or daughter) and give the other preferences to minor candidates (or 
rabis candidates) who were not likely to threaten the candidate’s chance of 
election. (This was, of course, more of a ‘spoiling tactic’ than a rational 
strategy, since so long as the candidate remained in contention his/her second 
and third preferences were irrelevant.) 
 
There were suggestions, however, that in those electorates which had 
experienced by-elections under LPV, voters tended to act more ‘strategically’, 
directing their votes to candidates with a broader support base. The primary 
evidence for this was a lower proportion of exhausted ballots. (This is discussed 
further below.)  
 
The impact of LPV on the election 
  
It is difficult to say how the impact of LPV should be measured.  
 
One obvious approach is to look at the candidates who were leading on first 
preferences — and who might therefore have won under FPTP voting — and 
see how many of these were eventually successful when preferences had been 
distributed. As at December 2010, complete results were not available, but for 
                                                     
8 Indeed, there have been instances in Australian elections in which parties have 
distributed different how-to-vote cards in different parts of an electorate. 
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the 102 electorates for which data was available,9 80 candidates who were in 
front on first preferences maintained their lead to become eventual winners. Of 
these 40 (half) were sitting members. Of the remaining 22 candidates who 
gained the largest share of first preference votes but subsequently lost on 
preferences, 7 were sitting members. They included former prime minister and 
Pangu Pati leader in 2007 Sir Rabbie Namaliu, who lost his seat in Kokopo, and 
former prime minister and PDM leader Paias Wingti, who had lost his seat in 
1997 but had been re-elected in 2002. Wingti was leading the count up till the 
last distribution of preferences but lost by a narrow margin when his rival, Tom 
Olga, received the bulk of the preferences. This result, also, was subsequently 
challenged, and was not resolved until after a second recount in 2010, which 
confirmed Olga’s victory.  
 
In several other instances, sitting members who were leading on the primary 
count held on to win, but saw a strong movement of preferences against them. 
For example, Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare received a healthy 36 per cent 
of the primary vote in East Sepik Provincial, well ahead of his nearest rival, 
who received 16 per cent, but facing a virtual ‘anti-Somare’ coalition he 
received only 14 per cent of preference votes compared to the runner-up, Moses 
Murray, who received 39 per cent (see Table 25.1 below). In Moresby South, 
Dame Carol Kidu saw her lead of 1,877 on first preferences whittled away by 
Pangu Pati challenger Justin Tkatchenko as preferences were tallied, but held on 
to win. 
 
According to preliminary figures supplied to the National Research Institute 
by the PNGEC, only four candidates (William Duma [Hagen Open], Don Polye 
[Kandep Open], Patrick Pruaitch [Aitape-Lumi Open] and Peter O’Neill [Ialibu-
Pangia Open]) won an absolute majority of first preferences. In Kandep, Polye, 
the sitting member, was declared winner with 69 per cent of the primary vote, 
but soon after the declaration an electoral official in Kandep was charged with 
offences under the Organic Law, and the election result was disputed by the 
runner-up, Alfred Manase. A by-election was held in November 2009 but in the 
face of local violence voting did not take place in three polling places and 
counting was moved out of the province due to security concerns. Polye was 
eventually returned, winning 53 per cent of first preference vote.  
 
Perhaps the strongest reason given in support of LPV was that it would 
‘increase the mandate’ of elected MPs. Much was made, over the period 2002–
2007, of the claim that under LPV all elected MPs would have at least ‘50 per 
cent + 1’ of the vote. This claim, made by the PNGEC among others, was, of 
                                                     
9 The following analysis uses both figures supplied by the PNGEC and, where official 
figures were not available, unofficial figures collected by domestic observers. Some of 
the data remains provisional. 
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course, misleading. While it is true that under LPV successful candidates must 
receive a majority of the ‘live votes’, with only three preferences and a large 
number of candidates it was inevitable that a proportion of the ballot papers 
would become ‘exhausted’ before a final result emerged, that is, there would be 
ballot papers with votes for three candidates all of whom had been eliminated 
relatively early in the count. A more meaningful measure of a successful 
candidate’s ‘mandate’ is the total of first, second and third preferences received 
by the candidate, expressed as a percentage of the total allowable ballots cast. 
When these figures are examined, it is evident that while a majority of 
candidates won with between 20 and 40 per cent of the total votes, and some 
with less, the national average mandate (for the 102 seats for which data was 
available) was 33 per cent. Given that LPV is bound to give a larger ‘mandate’ 
than a FPTP simple majority, this result was seen as a marked improvement on 
2002 outcomes under FPTP (20.5 per cent) — though still well short of 50 per 
cent.  
 
Interestingly, figures of primary votes also show fewer candidates leading 
with small first preference totals in 2007 compared to the totals of winning 
candidates under FPTP in 2002: 10 per cent won the primary vote in their seats 
with less than 10 per cent of the primary vote in 2007 compared to 21 per cent 
winning with less than 10 per cent in 2002, and 54 per cent won the primary 
vote with less than 20 per cent in 2007 compared to 60 per cent in 2002.10  
 
Analysis of ‘mandates’ and percentages of exhausted ballot papers by 
electorate and region, reveals some variation across the country. For the 102 
electorates for which data was available, the regional average mandate was, 
perhaps predictably, highest in the Islands Region (40 per cent) but surprisingly 
uniform in the other three regions (31 per cent in both Momase and the 
Highlands and 32 per cent in the Southern Region). The average proportion of 
exhausted ballot papers was high throughout the Highlands, Southern and 
Momase regions (44, 43 and 42 per cent respectively) and lowest in the Islands 
(26 per cent).11 These rankings roughly correlated with the regional average 
numbers of candidates: 28 in Highlands, 29 in Southern, 25 in Momase, and a 
relatively low 14 in the Islands. Further evidence of a the link between the 
number of candidates and the number of exhausted ballots was shown in the fact 
that in the twenty-two electorates with more than 60 per cent of exhausted ballot 
papers there were on average 41 candidates, whereas in the twenty-two 
                                                     
10 The average share of the primary vote of those leading on the primary vote (but not 
necessarily winning the seat) in 2007 was 22.5 per cent; the average share of the 
primary vote of the eventual winners (some of whom were behind on the first preference 
count) was slightly less at 21.9 per cent. This compares with the average winning vote 
in 2002, of 20.5 per cent. 
11 Sixteen electorates recorded in excess of 50 per cent exhausted ballot papers; half of 
these were in the Highlands Region. 
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electorates with less than 20 per cent of exhausted ballots the average number of 
candidates was 13. Mandates were higher and exhausted ballots lower in 
provincial seats (41 per cent and 26 per cent respectively) than in open seats (30 
per cent and 43 per cent). There is some evidence that those electorates which 
had experienced by-elections under LPV produced winners with larger 
mandates (and larger proportions of the primary vote) and fewer candidates than 
those which had not, but the evidence is weak: six of the ten did, four did not. 
 
Table 13.1: LPV comparison between by-elections and general elections 
            LPV by-election                    2007 general election 
Electorate No. of 
candidates
% of 
primary 
voteb
Mandatea
(%)
No. of 
candidates
% of 
primary 
vote 
Mandate 
(%) 
Chimbu Provincial 31 13 (1st)             21 19 18 (1st) 39 
NCD Provincial 23 23 (1st) 38 7 41 (1st) 49  
Bougainville 
Provincial 
6 38 (1st) 55 8 27 (1st) 46 
Chuave Open 24 13 (2nd) 20 29 16 (1st) 32 
Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago Open 
20 12 (3rd) 30 17 18 (1st) 37 
Wabag Open 19 38 (1st) 48 19 34 (1st) 45 
Angalimp- South 
Waghi Open 
30 NA 24 NA  
Moresby North-
East Open 
22 16 (1st) 28 31 13 (1st) 24 
Yangoru Saussia 
Open 
18 19 (1st) 30 15 25 (1st) 33 
Abau Open 6 49 (1st) 50 12 43 (1st) 49 
Source: Adapted from Haley and Anere (2009:71-77) with additional data from PNGEC 
results tables. 
Notes: a‘Mandate’ refers to winning candidate’s percent of allowable papers. b The 1st, 
2nd or 3rd in parentheses refers to the candidate’s placing after the primary vote.  
 
A particular question raised by the shift to LPV was whether the new system 
would benefit female candidates, since women voters who were constrained by 
customary obligation or intimidation to vote for a male candidate might be able 
to give second or third preference to a female candidate. The data is 
inconclusive. In East Sepik Provincial, Elizabeth Simogun Bade secured a good 
preference vote, almost certainly reflecting preferences from women voters, but 
did not poll strongly enough in the primary count to take advantage of this (a 
pattern already seen in the earlier by-elections in Angalimp-South Wahgi and 
Yangoru-Saussia). On the other hand, in Moresby South Dame Carol Kidu, who 
had a clear lead on first preferences, received significantly fewer second and 
third preferences than her nearest, male, rival. In Kerema, where three women 
candidates stood, there was no evidence that women candidates attempted to 
direct preferences towards the other women candidates, or even that women 
voters supported women candidates (see, for example, chapters 10, 22 and 27).  
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Overall, a number of candidates, voters and observers did express the view 
that the 2007 election under LPV was a ‘more friendly election’ than those of 
2002 and 1997, that candidates felt more free to move around the electorate 
without harassment and on occasion share a platform with rival candidates, and 
that LPV gave electors ‘more choice’, particularly significant in places where 
voters (especially women voters) were under pressure to support a communally-
chosen candidate.12 There appears to have been less election-related violence in 
2007 than there was in 2002 — especially in the Southern Highlands, where 
elections in six electorates had been declared ‘failed elections’ in 2002 but 
things went relatively peacefully in 2007 — although this was almost certainly 
due in large part to the heavy and well-coordinated presence of the security 
forces in 2007 (see chapters 6, 7 and 8). Nevertheless, in Chimbu there were at 
least three polling-day murders and almost as many post-election deaths as in  
2002 — 19 compared with about 25 (Bill Standish, personal communication 
September 2009). 
 
With regard to the other hoped-for benefits from the shift to LPV, there was 
little evidence that LPV reduced the number of candidates (which was slightly 
smaller in 2007 than in 2002, but still high, at 2,759), or that it did anything to 
strengthen parties (see chapter 9).  
 
Conclusion 
 
To the extent that almost a quarter of candidates leading on first preferences 
subsequently lost, it appears that LPV did produce different outcomes from 
what would have been produced by a FPTP contest. This was an implicit aim of 
the shift to LPV, but it was not overwhelmingly welcomed, particularly after 
Namaliu lost his seat on the preference count, prompting some observers to 
question the assumption that LPV, with its ‘stronger mandate’, necessarily 
produced ‘better’ MPs. In 2008, the then registrar for political parties, Paul 
Bengo, voiced some disappointment at the outcomes in some seats, and 
suggested that perhaps thought should be given to a weighted preference 
system, in which second and, a fortiori, third preferences should count for less 
than a first preference vote.13 
 
The general consensus seems to be that LPV has been a qualified success, 
though it has not, at this stage, done much to change deeply rooted patterns of 
                                                     
12 Bill Standish, however, suggests that in the highlands most people followed group 
decisions about preferences as well as primary votes, and that ballots were frequently 
checked or ‘controlled’ by ‘helpers’ at the polling booths (personal communication, 
September 2009). 
13 Such a system — the Borda count, named after the eighteenth century French 
mathematician, Jean-Charles de Borda, who first proposed it — has been used in Nauru. 
See Reilly 2001b.  
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behaviour in much of the country. LPV offered more choice, though this was 
frequently compromised by the lack of a genuinely secret ballot. Campaigning 
was generally more accommodative — but with ‘no distinctive evidence of any 
successful strategic alliances’ (Anere and Wheen 2009:21) — and less violent, 
though this may been due more to the more extensive security operation than to 
the new voting system. Mandates increased, as was to be expected of the new 
electoral arithmetic, though it remains to be seen whether this will yield better 
MPs. Otherwise, there was slight evidence that LPV had benefited women (at 
least ten women received more than 10 per cent of the primary vote [after 
redistribution of preferences], compared to one in 2002), and little to support the 
beliefs that it would reduce the number of candidates or strengthen political 
parties. Undoubtedly, as former electoral commissioner Reuben Kaiulo 
observed in 1997 (Kaiulo 2002:179), preferential voting is more complex than 
FPTP, and poor understanding of the system in some electorates resulted in 
errors in counting and delays in finalizing results.  
 
More dramatic improvements in electoral performance will require not just 
changes in electoral procedures, important though these may be, but radical 
shifts in deeply-rooted patterns of behaviour. As Standish warned in 2006, ‘we 
should not expect revolutionary changes overnight’ (2006:202). In its analysis 
of LPV in the 2007 election, an NRI report concluded, ‘Electoral engineering is 
not a silver bullet to governance problems. The system alone is only going to 
have a limited impact on improving the quality of candidates, the reasons why 
voters make their choices, and the quality of the MPs who are elected, in the 
context of the high-stakes political culture in PNG’ (Anere and Wheen 
2009:20). 
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Figure 14.1: Abau District map 
14 THE ABAU OPEN ELECTORATE: A SECOND GO AT LPV 
 
Ray Anere 
 
The electorate 
 
The Abau Open electorate lies about 200 kilometers east of Port Moresby and at 
the 2000 Census was home to some 38,378 people (National Statistical Office 
2000:13).  
 
There are three local-level governments (LLG) in the Abau electorate: 
Aroma Rural LLG, with a population in 2000 of 20,677; Amazon Bay Rural 
LLG with 8,099 people; and Cloudy Bay Rural LLG with 9,602. The fact that 
Aroma has more eligible voters than Amazon Bay and Cloudy Bay combined 
impacted on the conduct of the 2007 elections in terms of both the campaign 
strategies of the candidates and the Electoral Commission’s conduct of the 
elections. Of the twelve candidates that contested the Abau seat, ten were from 
the Aroma Rural LLG area.  
 
Historically, Abau was the first to trial the new limited preferential voting 
(LPV) system, in a 2003 by-election. The system was successfully used in that 
by-election, with around 1.9 per cent of informal ballots suggesting that most 
voters had understood the system and voted correctly.  Dr Puka Temu, who had 
been elected in 2002 but lost the seat following an appeal,1 re-contested the seat 
and again won with 49.0 per cent of first preferences, needing less than 2 per 
cent of second preferences for an absolute majority. Only two eliminations took 
place before Temu won the seat with 50.1 per cent of the total live votes. There 
were no exhausted ballot papers (Standish et al.: 2004: 28-29). 
 
Figures of estimated 
adult population and 
eligible voters in the 
Abau District developed 
by Standish et al. 
(2004:5) suggest that the 
rolls in 2002 and 2003 
were grossly inflated, 
with the number of 
‘eligible voters’ (34,905 
in 2003) exceeding the 
                                                     
1 Temu, who had recently stood down as Health secretary in 2002, took delivery of an 
ambulance for the Amazon Bay LLG during the campaign, and rival candidate Kilroy 
Genia successfully objected that this amounted to ‘treating’. The matter was taken to the 
Court of Disputed Returns which upheld the appealand therefore ordered a by-election.  
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estimated adult population by 82 per cent (and by 92 per cent in the Aroma 
Rural LLG area). After the new roll had been drawn up, the number of eligible 
voters was 29,652 — a reduction of 15 per cent but still excessive relative to 
estimated adult population. In 2007 the total number of votes cast was 22,037, 
giving an apparent turnout of 74.3 per cent. In 2002 about 60 per cent of those 
enrolled voted; in the 2003 by-election the figure was 53.1 per cent (PNGEC, 
Voter Enrolment in Abau, 5 November 2009). 
 
The Abau electorate has gained prominence at the national level. Since 1987, 
the voters have elected leaders who have become senior ministers in the national 
government — the late Jack Genia, his brother Kilroy Genia, and Deputy Prime 
Minister Puka Temu. Electoral competition has been intense, with 18 candidates 
in 1987, 21 in 2002, 6 in the 2003 by-election, and 12 in the 2007 election.  
 
Most candidates in previous elections have come from the Aroma Rural LLG 
area. In the 2003 by-election, for example, all six candidates — Vagi Mae, Puka 
Temu, Onea Thavala, Desmond Baira, Gideon Aruai and Kilroy Genia — were 
from the Aroma coast (Standish et al. 2004:6). The race narrowed to a contest 
between Temu and Baira. Tension rose between their supporters, who 
exchanged insults and gunfire. Standish et al. (2004) reported that the police 
opened fire in an attempt to quell the situation and a young man was shot dead. 
The conflict between Temu and Baira divided the electorate, and was evident 
again in the 2007 election. 
 
Nominations  
 
Twelve candidates contested the Abau electorate in 2007, six of whom had 
contested the by-election in 2003.  Eight of them (including the six who 
contested in 2003) were from the Aroma coast.  There were no women 
candidates. 
 
Temu was a National Alliance (NA) candidate. In 2002 he was elected, as a 
NA candidate, with 29.6 per cent of the vote under the first-past-the-post 
system. He was appointed minister for the Public Service but was ousted 
through a successful appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns by Kilroy Genia 
(see footnote 1). Temu, a medical doctor and former secretary of the Health 
Department, is from Viriolo village at the eastern end of the Aroma coast and 
has a grandfather from Wanigela village, with links to Waiori village, both in 
Marshall Lagoon.  
 
Kilroy Genia contested the 2003 by-election as People’s Action Party (PAP) 
candidate. He entered parliament in a 1994 by-election after the death of his 
brother, Jack Genia, who was a previous MP and Pangu Pati leader. Between 
1994 and 1997 he served as minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration. 
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Kilroy won again in 1997 and in 2002 he stood as a People’s Democratic 
Movement candidate and came third with 19.2 per cent of the vote. His father is 
from Domara village in the Cloudy Bay while his mother is from Lalaura 
village in Aroma. He has family ties in the Amazon Bay area.  
 
Desmond Baira stood in the 2003 by-election as a People’s Labour Party 
candidate. In 2002, he contested the Abau seat as a People’s Action Party (PAP) 
candidate and came second with 23.7 per cent of the vote. He also contested the 
seat in 1992, 1994 and 1997. He is a Port Moresby-based contractor and is from 
Wanigela village. He also has links to Waioro village in the Marshall Lagoon 
area.  
 
Reuben Kaiulo is a former electoral commissioner, and was commissioner 
when first-past-the-post voting was used for the last time in 2002. In his report 
on the 1997 election he was critical of proposals to introduce preferential voting 
(see Kaiulo 2002:179). After his term of office expired in 2005 he was self-
employed. He had not contested any previous election. He was endorsed by 
Pangu. Kaiulo is from Lalaura in the Aroma coast and received most of his 
support from voters there.  
 
All candidates nominated at the district office at Kupiano. The idea of 
holding nominations at Kupiano came from the Papua New Guinea Electoral 
Commission (PNGEC). The PNGEC was of the view that by having the 
nominations at the local district centre, with which people identify, the people 
would take ownership of the election. Each candidate gave a speech before their 
crowd of supporters, as it was important for the supporters to know what kinds 
of services the candidate would bring to their localities, and for the candidates to 
know that they could count on the votes of their supporters.  
 
The election manager, provincial returning officer, and assistant returning 
officer were present at Kupiano during the nomination period. All nominations 
complied with the necessary requirements, and the process was orderly. The 
returning officer conducted the order of draw for the candidates, who were 
generally satisfied with the nomination process.  
 
LPV awareness  
 
Voters in Abau were not new to LPV as they had voted under the LPV 
system in the 2003 by-election. Turnout was higher in 2007 than in the by-
election. 
 
Initial LPV awareness involved organizing public servants into teams and 
senior district officials became assistant returning officers. Coloured LPV 
posters and stickers for vehicles (‘LPV, 1, 2, 3 — Now That’s Fair!’) were used 
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as aids in carrying out the awareness. Voters generally understood that ‘1’, ‘2’ 
and ‘3’ stood for the order of preferences, and understood that they had to write 
a candidate’s name or code number against each of the three preferences in 
order to make their ballot formal.  
 
Mock polls were undertaken by awareness teams in some places to give 
voters a taste of the real election. Some community members missed out on 
awareness sessions, however, due to lack of forewarning. Many voters listened 
to FM 100 and FM Central radio services to get information on LPV prior to the 
polling. Port Moresby-based residents travelling back to Abau were another 
source of information.  
 
One civil society group, the Amazon Bay HIV/AIDS Committee, was 
involved in LPV and HIV/AIDS awareness in the Amazon Bay local 
government area, under the Electoral Support Program (ESP 2) LPV awareness 
program. Committee members Freda Magini, Lahui Magini, Esau Frank and 
Fred Mae undertook six weeks of LPV awareness in various wards in the 
Amazon Bay area from May to June 2007. The wards included Borebo, 
Sabiribo and Aroana. 
 
 The LPV awareness covered the following topics: LPV 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
preferences; voting under LPV; counting under LPV; mock elections; election 
offences; good governance; HIV/AIDS and elections; and, women and 
elections. The good governance component covered leadership, democracy, and 
democratic elections. 
 
The LPV awareness activities undertaken by the committee were generally 
considered successful. Evaluation forms filled out by people in the wards 
covered showed that people understood what LPV was all about; how to vote in 
terms of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd preferences; the equal importance of all three 
preferences; and the meaning of ‘50 % plus 1’ of total allowable votes. Many 
people indicated that they were satisfied with the awareness undertaken by the 
committee. The ESP was also satisfied with the committee’s performance in 
carrying out the LPV awareness.  
 
In the villages of Duramu, Domara, Moreguina and Baramata Number 4, in 
the Cloudy Bay local government area, no LPV or civic awareness activity was 
undertaken. However, in Aroma, LPV awareness was conducted by Electoral 
Commission staff and candidates in the Kapari Viriolo ward. Mock elections 
were carried out using local citizens as candidates and counting officials. 
Several informants said that the mock elections involving local people were 
very beneficial in enhancing the people’s understanding of the LPV system. 
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LPV and civic awareness, however, were not carried out in all wards in each 
local government area. Kapari, in the Aroma area, is the home of the sitting 
member, Puka Temu. As his support base, it was important for him to conduct 
LPV awareness there. Other wards in Aroma were not visited by LPV or civic 
awareness teams.  
 
The success of LPV awareness in Abau is suggested by the fact that there 
were only 328 informal ballot papers, a mere 1.5 percent of the total allowable 
ballot papers for the Abau electorate. In 2003 there had been 345 informal 
ballots. However, the low level of informal ballots could also be attributed to 
the way assisted voting is conducted (see below).  
 
HIV/AIDS awareness 
 
Most election observers reported that HIV/AIDS was not a prominent 
election issue. References were made to HIV/AIDS as a social and development 
issue in some of the candidates’ campaign speeches, but it was not a significant 
factor in the calculus of the voters. The only HIV/AIDS materials sighted were 
in aidpost buildings.  
 
With one exception, candidates for the Abau electorate were not members of 
provincial or district AIDS Committees and they were not engaged at the policy 
level and so had no clear strategies for addressing the effects of HIV/AIDS on 
the people of Abau. The exception was Dr Puka Temu, a former Health 
secretary and a member of the Parliamentary Committee on HIV/AIDS. Temu 
was involved in decision-making on strategies to deal with HIV/AIDS at the 
national, provincial and district/LLG levels, and campaigned on HIVAIDS 
issues throughout the electorate. 
 
No materials on HIV/AIDS testing or voluntary counselling were seen in the 
Aroma LLG area. The awareness situation was different in Amazon Bay. Freda 
Magini, Lahui Magini and Fred Mae, who were members of the Amazon Bay 
HIV/AIDS Committee, conducted election observations in Amazon Bay and 
reported that male and female condoms were distributed by them, in their roles 
as the HIV/AIDS Committee members and as implementers of election 
awareness, during the campaign period. According to Mae, both men and 
women openly accepted the condoms. 
 
Random interviews conducted with individual voters in Kupiano, Viriolo, 
Kapari and Lalaura wards suggest that development projects that enhance the 
delivery of basic services and generate income were considered directly 
beneficial in improving people’s living standards. While HIV/AIDS was seen as 
a significant issue among the people, it was not seen as being directly linked to 
people’s incomes.  
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Drugs such as marijuana were not used during campaigning, and there were 
no ‘6-to-6 discos’ or prostitution during the election period to warrant concern 
about election-related activities that could contribute to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. The team did not see any evidence of weapons of any sort in the 
hands of supporters or citizens.2 
 
The churches, through leadership of the elders, have a strong influence in 
Abau and this was a major factor in explaining why drugs and other 
unacceptable social behaviour were not evident during the election period.  
 
The campaign 
 
The campaign period lasted eight weeks, from 4 May to 29 June 2007. This 
timeframe was generally considered adequate, as a longer period would have 
exhausted the energies and resources of the candidates and their supporters.  
 
The campaign was generally peaceful; there were no reported instances of 
threats, violence or disruptions. LPV had some influence on the way 
campaigning was done: candidates saw the need to exchange second and third 
preferences and in some instances candidates campaigned for each other in 
areas that were not their strongholds. Candidates were generally free to move 
around (as they did in Abau in 2002 under the first-past-the-post system) and 
most candidates ran their campaigns independently of each other.  
 
Only five candidates campaigned in the Amazon Bay LLG area (in the 
eastern part of the Abau electorate). They included Puka Temu, Kilroy Genia 
and Reuben Kaiulo. Freda Magini, Lahui Magini and Fred Mae concluded that 
this was due to financial and logistic constraints, as well as limited networks for 
some of the candidates.  
 
The candidates’ campaign strategies included public speeches, handing out 
T-shirts, and the display of posters on PMVs, house walls and trees. Only a few, 
including Temu and Genia, held public rallies. Most campaigned in their local 
LLG wards, though Temu, Genia and Kaiulo campaigned across the Abau 
electorate. These three sought any preferences, but expected to get first 
preferences from their local strongholds and second and third preferences from 
wards which they knew were the strongholds of their rivals. Other candidates 
campaigned in their local areas mostly for first preferences. 
 
Campaign rallies were organized for Temu and Genia. The Enara family 
organized a rally for Temu at Maopa One, Paramana, in the Aroma LLG, at 
                                                     
2 The prevalence of general peace and order across the electorate throughout the election 
period was noted in all team members’ election journals. 
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which Temu was the only candidate to speak. A National Alliance official, Tau 
Po’o, was present to give support. Temu talked about health and education 
services, economic development projects, good governance, women’s rights and 
HIV/AIDS issues. He campaigned for first preferences only, probably because 
he felt that the voters he was addressing were his strong supporters.  
 
The audience was made up of a good cross-section of the community — 
men, women, youth and children. Although the rally was open to all, it was 
mostly men who spoke, on various issues. At one stage, supporters of rival 
candidates attempted to disrupt the rally, which went on into the night.  
 
Genia staged a peaceful rally at Lalaura village/ward, where he was the only 
candidate to address the audience. Like Temu, he talked about better health 
services, free education, and development projects that would generate income 
for the people, and good governance. He did not talk about women’s issues, nor 
did he talk about HIV/AIDS. Genia considered the ward that hosted the rally as 
a stronghold and accordingly did not campaign for second and third preferences; 
he asked only for first preferences and informed voters how to allocate their 
preferences at the time of polling. He did not talk negatively about any of the 
other candidates.   
 
However, most candidates relied primarily on their campaign managers and 
committees, and the use of campaign posters. One candidate (Desmond Baira) 
made an effort to transport truckloads of supporters from the Wanigela 
settlement at Koki (Port Moresby) to Wanigela in the Aroma LLG area, as he 
had in the 2003 by-election. Some of the Koki-based Wanigela voters 
subsequently revealed that they had voted more than once while at Aroma. 
Election observers in Abau were of the view that voters had access to the ward 
roll prior to polling and were therefore aware of the names of deceased voters 
and voters who had moved residence and were no longer living at Wanigela at 
the time of polling.  
 
One candidate — Vagi Mae, from Maopa in the western part of the Aroma 
LLG — was seen as a vote splitter, so that Temu and Kaiulo would be denied 
votes in western Aroma. The counting of votes from ballot boxes in western 
Aroma showed, however, that his candidacy did not have a significant impact, 
as Temu picked up a significant number of votes in those wards. 
 
Political parties 
 
Seven political parties endorsed candidates for the Abau seat. Puka Temu 
was endorsed by National Alliance, Kilroy Genia by PNG Party, Desmond 
Baira by People’s Labour Party, and Reuben Kaiulo by Pangu Pati. The 
National Advance Party, the People’s Resources Awareness Party, and the 
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People’s Progress Party also endorsed candidates. The remaining five stood as 
independents.  
 
NA’s endorsement of Temu did not come as a surprise. He was a popular 
candidate in the 2002 election and again in the 2003 by-election. He had also 
established a strong following among the voters in the Amazon Bay, Cloudy 
Bay and Aroma Coast LLG areas. Among the development projects he had 
initiated were a rural market in Kapari-Viriolo village and the sealing of ten 
kilometres of the Magi Highway from Omen Bridge in Eastern Rigo to Bukuku 
Junction in the Abau area. The sealing was carried out by Global Construction, 
a local construction company. Temu was also responsible for the introduction of 
a cassava ethanol project in Cape Rodney as well as collaboration with the 
National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) to render advice and other 
assistance to farmers in the Abau district. He had used his electoral funds to 
purchase water tanks for communities in Amazon Bay, dinghies for 
communities in the Aroma and Cloudy Bay areas, and a tractor for communities 
in the Cloudy Bay area. Temu had other development projects in mind in the 
ecotourism and forestry sectors as part of his vision for the development of 
Abau. He had proven his ability to deliver vital services and to adapt himself to 
the needs of the people of his electorate.  
 
Kilroy Genia first entered parliament in a 1994 by-election following the 
death of his brother and Pangu Pati leader, Jack Genia. He contested the seat as 
a Pangu candidate and won again in 1997. In 2002, he re-contested the seat as a 
People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) candidate and came third with 19 per 
cent of the vote. In the 2003 by-election, he contested as a People’s Action Party 
candidate, gaining 20 per cent of the primary vote plus preferences. Aside from 
his party hopping, Abau district had not seen major improvements in services 
between 1994 and 2002 during Genia’s term as MP, which may have eroded his 
popularity and explain his performance in the 2002 and 2007 elections. In 2007 
he was endorsed by the PNG Party, though he received little support from the 
party.  
 
Desmond Baira was endorsed by the People’s Labour Party, headed by 
Madang businessman Peter Yama. Baira had contested the seat in 2002, 
endorsed by the People’s Action Party, coming second with 23.7 per cent of the 
vote. He had also stood for the seat in 1992, 1994 and 1997.  
 
Reuben Kaiulo, the former electoral commissioner, was endorsed by the 
Pangu Pati, but received little support from the party.  
 
Of the parties that endorsed candidates, the leaders of the NA and People’s 
Labour Party campaigned in support of their candidates within the electorate. 
NA leader, Sir Michael Somare, was in Kupiano to inform people about the 
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party’s development policies and to campaign for Temu. He emphasized that 
Temu had solid public service experience, proven leadership ability, and a track 
record of delivering tangible services during his last term of office from 2003 to 
2007. According to Somare, Temu was the best choice for the people of Abau 
and NA was privileged to endorse him.  
 
People’s Labour Party leader Peter Yama came to Wanigela to campaign for 
Baira, who had been a strong contender in previous elections. Although Yama 
recognized that Baira had no prior political leadership experience, he drew 
attention to his business skills and practical experience which Yama felt were 
necessary for the delivery of basic services.  
 
Overall, political parties did not have a strong presence in the Abau 
electorate during the elections, which may partly explain why voters still vote 
predominantly along personal and clan lines. Parties do not have much 
relevance to voters. 
 
Gender issues 
 
Women voters throughout the electorate generally understood the LPV 
system and most voted freely throughout the polling period.3 Some candidates, 
for example Temu, campaigned explicitly on women’s issues in a bid to secure 
women’s votes. Notable topics were the lack of women in politics, 
discrimination against women, women’s employment, especially in managerial 
positions, and HIV/AIDS and sexual health issues. There appears to be a 
growing concern for such issues among people throughout the electorate, but 
despite this no women candidates contested the Abau seat in 2007 and none of 
the candidates was an active member of civil society groups within the 
electorate.  
 
Women in Abau were generally not a subject of much interest to candidates, 
party officials, campaign managers, supporters, electoral officials or police. 
Women’s issues, such as gender empowerment, women’s participation in the 
informal economy and increased enrolment for girls in community schools, did 
not figure prominently in candidates’ campaigns. Observers noted that while 
some candidates made reference to gender issues, there was lack of specific 
policy platforms, even for those who made reference to women’s issues. By 
implication, most women voted for candidates on the basis of proposed income 
generation projects and vague references to health, education and other basic 
services.  Candidates were aware of issues that had an electorate-wide appeal 
                                                     
3 In the Kupiano, Kapari and Lalaura wards where I observed polling, women where 
generally free to vote. Peace and order where maintained throughout the entire 
electorate in 2007.  
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and those that would appeal to a segment of the voting population or to a 
specific locality. They focused on collective and local issues and avoided issues 
that would fragment the vote.  
 
An exception was the Amazon Bay HIV/AIDS Committee, which carried out 
awareness on gender issues, covering: women and the elections in Abau; lack of 
women in politics; women’s voting rights; discrimination against women; and 
HIV/AIDS and women. 
 
Some women campaigned publicly for Temu, otherwise most women were 
involved in cooking food and providing hospitality. There was no intimidation 
of women during nominations, campaigning, polling or counting periods.  
 
Polling 
 
There were twenty-nine polling teams. Most officials were men. Cooperation 
between the polling officials and the Abau observer team was good. Polling 
officials did not always arrive on time (8 a.m.) to commence voting. In 
Paramana, for example, polling started one day at 1:50 p.m. Late polling was 
also observed in the Lalaura ward, where it continued into the second day. In 
Amazon Bay, polling commenced late due to bad weather and the consequent 
late arrival of ballot boxes and materials. 
 
In Kapari and Lalaura wards, there was no gender segregated voting. 
Moreover, the polling compartments were not always positioned to screen the 
voter from observation, and thus did not ensure a secret ballot. In many polling 
stations in Aroma, and also in Cloudy Bay and Amazon Bay, there was only one 
ballot box for both the provincial and open seats. 
 
Scrutineers were instructed by polling officials to stay ten metres away from 
the polling area to prevent any kind of undue influence on voters. They were 
generally well behaved. 
 
The Electoral Commission’s candidate posters for Abau Open and Central 
Provincial electorates were displayed in public places, as well as in the polling 
compartments. This allowed voters to think about their choices and decide how 
to allocate their first, second and third preferences. Presiding officers explained 
the polling procedures to the voters before they proceeded to the polling 
compartment, though nobody explained the procedures for gender segregated 
voting.  
 
Prior to polling, the ballot boxes were opened by the presiding officer in the 
presence of scrutineers, voters and police, and shown to be empty. At the end of 
polling, the boxes were fastened with a numbered inner tag and outer seal.  
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If a voter required assistance to vote, he/she could request a family member 
or policeman to assist. Practices varied from polling station to polling station. In 
Kapari ward, for example, family members were used most of the time when 
voters needed assistance; over two days a total of 221 women were assisted. In 
Amazon Bay, Freda Magini noted that in one polling station, a police officer 
was used more than fifty times to help voters who needed assistance. Observers 
reported that assisted voting was sometimes abused, particularly when women 
and older non-literate voters were assisted by male supporters of particular 
candidates.  
 
Polling was generally peaceful and orderly. Voters generally formed queues 
and voted in order of arrival. Their fingers were checked for ink as they entered 
the polling area, and ink was applied before they proceeded to vote. In a few 
polling places, voters’ names were called alphabetically from the electoral roll. 
Polling officials had little difficulty locating names on the alphabetical electoral 
roll, though in some instances, legitimate voters were denied the right to vote 
due to misspelling of names, two voters’ having the same name, or because their 
names were not on the roll. 
 
There were reports, notably from some polling stations in the Amazon Bay 
area that supporters gave out candidate posters and bio-data to voters while they 
were on the queue waiting to vote, and told the voters (especially women voters) 
to vote for particular candidates, but on the whole the atmosphere was voter 
friendly and conducive to voting. 
  
Voter turnout was generally good in all polling stations. Over 74 per cent of 
the 29,652 people enrolled turned out to vote.  
 
Electoral roll 
 
The rolls, based on LLG wards, were generally satisfactory, but certainly not 
perfect. In a number of instances, voters could not find their names on the roll. 
One observer noted that in Paramana as many as fifty voters were turned away, 
and in Amazon Bay eleven voters were turned away because their names were 
not on the ward roll. In the Wanigela ward, Aroma, where, as noted above, Port 
Moresby-based voters were allowed to vote in their place or origin, there were 
instances of multiple voting through the use of other people’s names. At the 
Magarida polling station, in Amazon Bay, a number of underage persons were 
allowed to vote as their names were on the ward roll. A school teacher at the 
Magarida High School confirmed that the persons who voted were in fact 
school students under the age of eighteen. 
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Personnel, security and inter-agency communication 
 
Police personnel arrived in the electorate four days prior to polling and were 
deployed to the appropriate LLGs on polling day. As usually happens, police 
had received their allowances before being deployed for polling. However, the 
deployment was delayed by the non-payment of allowances for electoral 
officials, and delayed payment for land and sea transport. There was no air 
transport to move police personnel to location for security duties. Once at their 
respective LLGs, police were properly accommodated in local guest houses and 
with local families.  
 
Communication between police and the PNGEC was good in the pre-polling 
and polling periods, and police and polling officials were seen working together 
at the polling places. Each polling team had about four police personnel to 
provide security. 
 
Security was generally good throughout the Abau electorate. Voters and 
police cooperated with one another, ensuring the safety of the ballot boxes, 
ballot papers, and polling officials. The general peace and order was widely 
considered to be an improvement on that in 2002 and was a major factor in the 
integrity of the election in Abau. Voters were not intimidated. Guns were 
generally not carried around by police, and police made no arrests.  
 
Counting 
 
Because of disruptions to counting in the 2003 by-election, counting for 
Abau Open was moved to Murray Barracks in the National Capital District, just 
as in 2003 when the count was conducted at the Institute of Public 
Administration Hall, in NCD. It took about ten days, from 13 to 23 July, 2007, 
to complete the count. Counting was suspended mid-way into the week as 
scrutineers did not want the returning officer to be present in the counting room, 
lest he influence the course of counting. They argued that the returning officer 
was associated with a particular candidate. The scrutineers stood their ground, 
forcing the counting officials to liaise with PNGEC, whose lawyer intervened to 
sort out the matter. A consensus was reached and counting resumed on the 
condition that while the returning officer would be present in the counting room, 
the provincial returning officer would be responsible for the counting.  
 
The counting room was spacious and there was a heavy police and army 
presence around the clock. Scrutineers and observers were allowed into the 
room to observe all phases of the counting. The progressive tallies were put up 
on a tally board at the back and front of the room; the figures were clear enough 
for all to see.  
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At the start of count for each box, the provincial returning officer announced 
the presiding officer who was responsible for the box. The presiding officer 
gave a brief account of events in the ward(s) concerned. A policeman who had 
accompanied the team then opened the box and emptied the ballot papers onto a 
sorting table. Sorters (a number of whom were women) were then called to sort 
out the provincial from the open ballot papers. Provincial ballot papers were 
then transferred, under police guard, to the other side of Murray Barracks where 
counting for the Central Provincial seat was going on.  
 
A second set of sorters then sorted the open ballot papers by first 
preferences, which were then counted. Although Puka Temu led from the 
beginning he did not secure an absolute majority of the first preferences, so 
losing candidates were eliminated and their preferences distributed.  
 
Security in the counting room was excellent and the scrutineers were well 
behaved throughout the counting and accepted the final outcome.  
 
The outcome 
 
Twelve candidates contested the Abau Open seat. When counting began, the 
top four contenders were Puka Temu, Kilroy Genia, Desmond Baira and 
Reuben Kaiulo. After the count of first preferences, Gideon Aruai with 50 votes 
was eliminated and his voters’ preferences distributed. The second exclusion 
was John Maru, with 93 votes. David Rakilea was the third to be eliminated, 
with 133 votes. There followed Vagi Mae (163 votes), Stephen Mera (364 
votes), John Holland (546 votes), Gavu Lama (752 votes) and Onea Thavala 
(978 votes). Reuben Kaiulo was ninth exclusion, with 3,517 votes.  
 
At the ninth exclusion, 9,698 became the absolute majority of the total ‘live’ 
remaining votes. At this point, Temu, having led all the way, had secured 
10,772. His closest rivals were Desmond Baira with 4,328 votes and Kilroy 
Genia with 4,295 votes. Temu was therefore declared the winner by the 
provincial returning officer. 
 
Temu led comfortably from the start, with 9,578 first preferences (43.5 per 
cent of the total allowable votes) compared to his nearest rival, Baira, with 
3,395 (15.4 per cent), and led all the way to the declaration. Temu was popular 
across the across the electorate, picking up 1,194 preferences (to give him a 
total of 48.9 per cent of the total allowable votes). Baira was the eventual 
runner-up, collecting 933 preference votes (mostly from the eighth and ninth 
exclusions). Genia picked up 1,078 preferences to finish third, and Kaiulo, with 
483 preferences came in fourth. These four candidates consistently gained a 
good share of the preferences from eliminated candidates. 
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Exhausted ballot papers (2,640) represented about 12 per cent of the total 
allowable ballots at the ninth exclusion, which was a reasonably low level of 
exhausted ballots.  
 
Temu’s victory can be attributed to a number of factors. During the 
elections, he campaigned in almost every ward in the Aroma, Cloudy Bay and 
Amazon Bay LLG areas. Visiting, meeting and talking to people, and shaking 
hands with voters, is very important for any candidate, and Temu was able to do 
that quite effectively. His campaign gatherings drew huge crowds of men, 
women and youth. Even those who were not his supporters, in all three LLG 
areas, were eager to hear how he would bring basic services to their 
communities. For the people of Abau, Temu had proven that he could deliver 
vital services. They also knew that he had a vision for the electorate. None of 
the other candidates had a comparable track record of achievements and proven 
leadership ability.  
 
Temu’s popularity goes back to 2002, when he first contested the Abau seat 
under the first-past-the-post voting system. Despite a court ruling nullifying his 
election victory, his popularity continued in the 2003 by-election. Standish et al. 
(2004:2) observe that ‘most candidates only had strong local support in certain 
concentrations. The exception was Dr Temu who had campaigned widely and 
had strong support across the three rural local level governments (RLLG) 
council areas in the electorate’. In the 2003 by-election, Temu collected 8,911 
first preferences (48.79 per cent of the primary votes), and 9,113 (50.09 per 
cent) of the final count. He has had a consistent level of popularity among the 
people in all the three LLG areas since 2002.  
 
Temu, Genia, Baira and Kaiulo are all from the Aroma LLG area. All four 
are well educated and experienced in administration and politics. Aroma thus 
continued to dominate Abau electoral politics in terms of both candidate 
numbers and election outcomes, as it did in 1997, 2002 and 2003.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Temu had a commanding lead in the primary vote and continued to lead in 
the count of preferences up till the declaration. He was popular across the Abau 
electorate. Voter participation was high, suggesting that Abau people valued the 
election as well as their participation and the need to elect a capable leader. 
Having the nominations done at the district office in Kupiano may have 
stimulated community interest (as in the by-election in 2003). Informal ballot 
papers were less than 2 per cent, suggesting that the awareness had improved 
voters’ understanding of how to vote correctly, though ‘abuse’ of assisted 
voting may have played a part in the low informal vote. This was evident in 
2003, where every one of the 3,865 votes collected from the Wanigela village 
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were ‘assisted’ by the ‘helpers’ provided by candidates — even the local 
candidate.  Exhausted ballot papers were around 12 per cent of the total, the 
relatively low figure linked to the small number of candidates.  
 
Candidates and voters need to realize that elections provide opportunities for 
political and civic education including awareness. There is, briefly, an intense 
interaction between candidates and voters, in which candidates are eager to talk 
about policies and issues while voters are eager to listen, learn and choose their 
candidates. In this context, it is important for candidates to address important 
issues such as HIV/AIDS and women’s empowerment.  
 
There was limited collaborative and cooperative campaigning between 
candidates with a view to exchanging preferences, as was expected to happen 
under LPV. Aside from financial and logistical constraints, some candidates did 
not address strategic campaign matters such as establishing committees in other 
LLG areas which could plan and organize their campaign activities.  
 
Certain groups engage in multiple voting through abuse of the electoral roll. 
The roll needs improvement in terms of eliminating multiple entries of voters’ 
names, names of under-aged persons and other irregularities. Public display of 
the roll during the verification stage, prior to polling, could help people take 
ownership of the roll. This was not done at the Kupiano district headquarters. 
Assisted voting was sometimes abused to ensure that voters voted for certain 
candidates. Electoral and civic awareness could make voters aware of their 
rights to a secret ballot. 
 
On the whole, well-managed security operations in all aspects of the election 
in Abau, from nomination to counting, combined with cooperation between the 
people, candidates, supporters and polling officials, led to a peaceful, orderly 
election and an undisputed declaration of Temu as Abau’s duly elected MP.  
 
References 
 
Kaiulo, Reuben, 2002. ‘Report to the Sixth Parliament on the1997 National 
Election by the  Electoral Commissioner’, in R.J. May and R. Anere 
(eds), Maintaining Democracy: The 1997 Elections in Papua New 
Guinea. Port Moresby: Department of Political Science, University of 
Papua New Guinea, and State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Project, Australian National University, pp.169-180. 
 
National Statistical Office, 2000. 2000 Census Data. Central Province. Port 
Moresby.  
 
208      Election 2007 
Standish, Bill, with Alphonse Gelu, Henry Okole, Orovu Sepoe, Agaru Kaiulo 
and Cecily Kome, 2004. ‘Limited Preferential Voting in Papua New 
Guinea: Report on Abau By-Election of December 2003’. Unpublished 
report. Canberra. 
 
 
Appendix  
 
Table 14.1: Voting statistics for Abau Open electorate, 2007 election 
Number of registered voters  29804  
Total votes cast 22365  
Informal votes 328 (1.5% of total votes cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 22037  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 19395  
Total votes distributed 9064  
Exhausted ballot papers 2642 (12% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 9699  
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15 THE IJIVITARI OPEN ELECTORATE: WOMEN’S 
PARTICIPATION AS CANDIDATES AND VOTERS 
 
Dixon Susub 
 
Introduction 
 
The general assumption is that women have always had a lower status then men 
in Papua New Guinea societies. This assumption is reflected in social indicators 
such as inadequate health services, resulting in extremely high maternal and 
infant mortality rates; low life expectancy; a high incidence of HIV/AIDS; 
vulnerability to abuse and violence; and low literacy rates. 
 
The political sphere is no different, but low status is reinforced by the small 
numbers of women in high decision-making jobs in both public and private 
sectors, and more especially in political leadership roles. 
 
While these indicators are common to most Third World countries, the 
dilemma of gender bias in political leadership can be traced back to the earliest 
form of democratic governance — Athenian democracy, in which women were 
not regarded as citizens and therefore excluded from the decision-making arena, 
as well as from holding public office. 
 
Papua New Guinea has had extensive contact with Western liberal 
democratic countries since the 1880s, and adopted a liberal democratic system 
of government at independence, along with the structures and laws that are 
deemed to be gender non-discriminatory. 
 
Although some may argue that traditionally women have always been 
subordinate to men in political decision making and leadership roles in Papua 
New Guinea societies, this is not entirely true across all of Papua New Guinea. 
Modern politics and governance, however, has encouraged men, effectively 
segregating women from the political arena. For example, in matrilineal 
societies such as in parts of Milne Bay and some New Guinea Islands provinces, 
women were the custodians of land and therefore featured prominently in 
decision-making processes and leadership roles. But records show that colonial 
administrations never took time to determine where power lay or to involve 
women in the administration of their colonies. Rather, they created governance 
structures that co-opted males, thus weakening female status within local 
societies. 
 
Feminist theorists have been quick to point out misconceptions in regarding 
women as a homogeneous group in politics, given the many differences in 
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 Figure 15.1: Ijivitari District map 
social and cultural spheres such as equality, opportunity, standard of living, and 
education. 
 
Non-gender-sensitive laws, governance structures and mechanisms, the 
emergence of the ‘bigman’ culture, alienation, and unbalanced growth in Papua 
New Guinea have all further led to the suppression of women’s participation in 
‘high’ politics. 
 
Oro Province provides a typical example. However, in setting out to study 
how women fared in the 2007 general election, Oro was chosen for two main 
reasons. First, it has fielded a large number of candidates for the one provincial 
and two open seats for two consecutive elections. As a result, under first-past-
the-post (FPTP) voting the winners won with very low proportions of the total 
number of votes. Secondly, of the total of 102 women contesting the 2007 
election, Oro had the second largest number (10) of contestants; Eastern 
Highlands Province had the largest number (12). Given the rigid patriarchal 
society, with its male stereotype cultures, the sudden increase in female 
candidates was interesting, raising questions as to whether this represented a 
shift in social and cultural perceptions amongst voters, or whether it could be 
attributed to the new LPV system. Of the two open electorates in Oro province, 
Ijivitari was given special prominence in the study as it includes the township of 
Popondetta (the provincial capital) thus providing an insight into the dynamics 
of the cultural mix amongst the population of Popondetta township. 
 
General background  
 
Oro Province is a coastal province situated to the north of the Owen Stanley 
Ranges and towards the eastern tip of the Papua New Guinea mainland, 
covering a total land area of 22,800 square kilometres. At the 2000 census Oro 
had a total population of 133,065, which 
represents a very sparse density of 5.8 
persons per square kilometres. Some 
81,367 people were registered on the 
electoral roll, however this figure may 
be misleading as the common roll was 
not properly updated before the 
commencement of the election.1 
 
Of the two open electorates, Ijivitari 
is made up of five districts or local-level 
government (LLG) areas and 88 wards, 
with a total of 41,210 registered eligible 
                                                     
1 For more detail see my report in the 2007 Election Observation.  
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voters; Sohe has four LLG areas and 74 wards, with 40,157 registered eligible 
voters. 
 
In terms of development, Oro is one of the least developed provinces in the 
country, despite the fact that it has huge marine resource potential and vast 
arable lands, including rich volcanic soils as a result of the 1951 Mt. Lamington 
eruptions. Successive governments have failed to turn this potential into 
tangible economic benefits for the people of Oro. Lack of skilled manpower, 
finance and infrastructure has produced a lacklustre provincial bureaucracy. The 
sorry situation of the province and its bureaucracy makes it makes it susceptible 
to corruption, which to quote Sir Mekere Morauta, is ‘endemic’. Deteriorating 
infrastructure, lack of basic service delivery, and ineffective governance 
mechanisms as a result of misappropriation, corruption and discriminatory 
behaviour by successive members of parliament (MPs) and line managers, have 
all contributed to a stagnant provincial economy. 
 
The only major economic activity in the province is the Higaturu oil palm 
industry. This is a very lucrative industry stretching from the Oro Bay LLG area 
to Kokoda and parts of Mamba. However, due to factors described above, the 
provincial government has not been able to participate meaningfully in the 
venture. Landowner participation is through smallholder schemes, whilst 
outsiders (both from within the province and from other parts of the country) are 
being lured either to work in the plantations or to settle in Oro Province under 
‘oil palm settler’ schemes. This has resulted in social and cultural problems 
associated with the growth of illegal settlements within and on the fringes of 
Popondetta township. 
 
Tourism is a potential income earner for the province. The famous Kokoda 
Trail, the Buna landing site and other World War II sites and relics, the unique 
Tufi fjords and diving sites, and the Queen Alexandra birdwing butterfly (the 
biggest butterfly in the world) could attract tourist dollars to the province. 
However, to date tourism has contributed little to the provincial economy.  
 
Over the past three decades, Oro has contributed to national leadership by 
having MPs with ministerial portfolios. But the benefits from this have not 
trickled down to the provincial and district levels. 
 
The dynamics of electoral politics in Oro Province  
 
In the past two elections, the people of Oro have gone to the polls with 
mixed feelings. The varying sentiments expressed in the lead-up to this election 
can be categorized into four groups. First, there were those who expressed the 
desire to find a true and charismatic leader who would stand above the rest in 
resurrecting the province. They further believed that given the many social and 
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cultural cleavages as well as endemic corruption, such a leader could come only 
from the churches. The different church groups were thus powerful political 
lobbyists in the electoral politics of Oro. This can be seen in the fact that the 
current governor of the province, Suckling Tamanabe, is a pastor of the 
Covenant Praise Ministries Church, a revival church group he founded, whilst 
his predecessor, the late Bani Hoivo, was a pastor of the Christian Revival 
Crusade church in Popondetta. 
 
Secondly, there were those that felt that they had to elect one of their own 
kin if they were to benefit at all. The group based its sentiments on the fact that 
successive members have set a precedent of assisting only their own districts 
and areas where their vote-bases lay. This group (which had the largest 
following) had a profound impact on electoral politics in the province: it 
encouraged bloc voting, which resulted in a large number of contestants for the 
three seats in two consecutive elections. With a large number of candidates, all 
one had to do to have a good chance of winning, in the last two elections using 
first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting, was to consolidate his/her own voter base 
whilst letting others split their vote. Hence the winning vote for candidates in 
the two open seats in the last three elections has averaged between 3,000 and 
4,000, representing only a small portion of the electorate. 
 
The third sentiment expressed (which had a big following amongst the 
people of Oro in the 2007 election) was the fear of becoming bystanders in their 
own province should ‘outsiders’ be voted in as MPs representing Oro. Growing 
illegal squatter settlements on government and customary lands as a result of the 
influx of people from other provinces were already becoming a burden on the 
meagre resources of the provincial government and were causing social and 
cultural problems. The fear was that an outsider, if voted in, would not be 
sensitive to the needs, traditions and cultures of the Oro people but would 
concentrate on the outsiders at the expense of the traditional inhabitants of the 
province. 
 
In 2002 and 2007 candidates of Morobe, Madang, Sepik, Highlands and 
Central origins contested the elections. The winner of the Sohe Open seat in the 
2002 election (Peter Oresi) hails from the highlands, whilst a former governor 
(Bani Hoivo) had mixed parentage. The 2002 election showed that the growing 
number of outsiders, when effectively mobilized, could determine the outcome 
of the election. The preferential treatment exercised by ‘outsider’ MPs during 
the 2002–2007 parliament reinforced the fear Oro people had of becoming 
bystanders in their own land. As a result, most candidates of Oro origins went to 
the 2007 election with extremist sentiments that were translated into slogans 
such as ‘Oro for Oro’. This created tensions which thankfully did not escalate 
into violence, due to a heavy police presence. 
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Finally, there were those who had no interest in the proceedings as they had 
given up hope of any government support. Knowing that government service 
delivery correlated with the origins of MPs and that none of the contesting 
candidates was kin or from the same area — or even if they were did not 
command enough support to have any real chance of winning — this group 
simply gave up and had no desire to participate. Such sentiment was expressed 
mainly by people from outlying districts. Some even confided to me that, 
‘Services like education, which is ours by right, are below standard if they exist 
at all, so why bother sending children to school when in the end they have no 
hope of getting anywhere and will return home anyway?...Government has 
forgotten us so why bother to participate in something that does not touch our 
lives’.2 One effect of this attitude was that people were susceptible to ‘gifting’ 
and vote buying, as they were interested only in the tangible gains from the 
election process and not so much the outcome. 
 
In the past, elections have always been low-key, and the cost to intending 
candidates minimal. When elections in Oro were contested by the people of Oro 
themselves, the principal modus operandi was rallies organized by candidates 
and their supporters in each village or at public venues where one or more 
candidates presented their campaign speeches; others preferred ‘door-to-door’ 
campaigning. The major costs were for the feasts organized by candidates and 
their supporters to lure more supporters to their camps and the logistic costs of 
moving around to campaign. 
 
Things changed during the 2002 and 2007 elections, however, when people 
from other provinces residing in Oro decided to run for political office. With 
them came the ‘high cost’ campaign style which involved ‘patron-client’ 
relationships and the expectations that went along with that. Gifting was not 
only accepted, but became expected. One candidate who had contested the 
Ijivitari Open seat three times consecutively lamented, ‘Gone are the days when 
candidates would travel with empty hands and campaign on empty stomachs 
and expect the villagers to feed them…this may be the last time I will contest as 
I cannot keep up with the big spenders’.3 On the other hand, a candidate for the 
Oro Provincial seat boasted of spending close to K3 million for the 2007 
election. When asked why, he replied that since he was not from the province, 
this was the only sure way of breaking through the strongholds of other 
candidates. 
 
This may have been true for the 2002 election. However the results of the 
2007 election show otherwise: none of the big spenders in Oro was elected into 
                                                     
2 From abstracts of interviews with people of Safia and Tufi LLGs. 
3 Interview with intending candidate. Examples of gifting during the 2007 election in 
Oro are documented in the Election Observation Report. 
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parliament, showing that the sentiments on the ground had more influence on 
the outcome than voter inducement. Nevertheless, the political landscape has 
been changed with the entry of money politics in the two elections. 
 
Gender issues in Oro Province 
  
Oro prides itself on being one province that closely observes and maintains 
its traditional customs and practices. Comprising patriarchal societies, Oro 
exhibits a clear demarcation between the roles and responsibilities of males and 
females in society, which are culturally entrenched. One such norm is the 
exclusion of women from the public realm which deals with ‘high politics’ 
(decision making, chieftancy, wars, and so on). Although Oro women have now 
broken some of these shackles, and some now hold down top jobs in both the 
public and private sectors, politics and political leadership are still seen as the 
male domain. This rigid male dominance of politics has resulted in a lack of 
women candidates in elections in the province prior to the 2007 election. 
 
Many theories have been put forward to explain the recent surge in women 
aspiring for political office. Some say it is because women believe their chances 
of winning have increased (marginally) with the introduction of the LPV 
system, whilst others argue that there is need for alternative leadership — after 
all, more than three decades of male dominance of politics has left Oro Province 
no better off (and maybe worse off) than it was. The fact that ten women stood 
as candidates in a male-dominated society is in itself worth noting. 
 
The 2007 election: women as candidates 
 
Although only one out of 102 female candidates contesting throughout 
Papua New Guinea was elected into parliament, women candidates in Oro 
province did well, better indeed than a number of male candidates. Of the total 
allowable votes cast, women in Oro scored votes ranging from 0.2 per cent to 
12.7 per cent (the lowest among male candidates for the three seats was 0.01 per 
cent). However, this was not enough to see any of them win a seat. Apart from 
the obvious constraint of the rigid traditional mindset of the Oro people 
(including women voters), there were other impediments to their success. 
 
Political party endorsement 
 
The record of political party endorsement of female candidacy was very 
poor. An interview with a party representative confirmed suspicions that parties 
were only interested in winning as many seats as possible in order to have the 
numbers necessary to form government. To be considered for endorsement, 
women candidates would have had to have been prominent people in their 
societies and electorates or prominent in either the public or private sectors, 
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with high chances of winning. High officeholders would not only be 
appropriately educated, and therefore have been exercising leadership roles 
within their electorates, and thus have experience, status and respect, but would 
also have access to resources, public and private, to ensure their win. Given the 
shortage of women meeting these criteria, women candidates had difficulty 
securing party endorsement. 
 
Political parties in Papua New Guinea are generally seen as either exclusive 
clubs or loose structures with no clear objectives other than to get as many MPs 
as possible in order to form government. Parties are removed from the masses, 
and do not have long-term member affiliations, nor are they vehicles for training 
and grooming future leaders. The great majority of the candidates seeking party 
endorsement are non-members looking for financial assistance to fund their 
campaigns. Women candidates had little chance of getting party support for 
their campaigns. 
 
The laws governing political parties are not gender sensitive: there are no 
provisions obliging political parties to take on female candidates (though the 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates does include 
provision for compensating political parties for the campaign expenses of 
women gaining 10 per cent or more of the total vote). Of the 102 female 
candidates only 37 were endorsed by political parties. In Oro, only four of the 
ten were endorsed by parties. Even then, the support given to endorsed women 
candidates was minimal, typically covering a small cash donation for campaign 
expenses. There was no actual campaigning by party officials for women 
candidates in Oro province. 
 
The absence of free and fair competition 
 
The perception of the ‘bigman’ culture has taken on a new meaning in the 
Papua New Guinea political context, which encourages a ‘patron-client’ 
relationship between intending candidates and potential voters. This makes 
elections in Papua New Guinea a very expensive exercise, as it raises the 
expectations of voters about receiving money and goods in return for votes. Oro 
became part of this pattern during the 2002 election, as a result of outsiders’ 
influence. Women candidates in Oro were seriously outdone in trying to keep 
up with the big spenders during the 2007 election, as none of them was 
financially well off. 
 
‘Money politics’ also fosters corruption, bribery, inducement, intimidation 
and violence, the perpetrators of which are mostly men. Their control over 
public resources, including transportation and security, give them a head start 
over women candidates. Land and sea transport were either too expensive for 
women to utilize effectively to cover the length and breadth of their electorates, 
218      Election 2007 
or were commandeered by male candidates and their supporters for the duration 
of the campaign period, using bribes, threats, and their positions in the pubic 
and private sectors. 
 
The failure of relevant agencies to enforce electoral laws on bribery, gifting, 
and other forms of election-related corruption, as well as the traditionally rigid 
mindset of the people of Oro, creates a very uneven playing field for women 
contestants in the province. 
 
Campaign activities, strategies and issues 
 
Most women candidates interviewed expressed the view that the eight-week 
campaign period was insufficient to cover their respective electorates. The high 
expenses involved as a result of ‘money politics’, as well as security 
considerations, were also cited as reasons for adopting certain campaign 
strategies. 
 
Some arranged low-key gatherings (without the hype and the feasting) in 
villages to deliver their campaign speeches, others conducted door-to-door 
campaigns. In both cases, the area of the electorate covered was restricted, 
mainly to the town and its environs, and the immediate vicinity of the 
candidate’s own village. Most villagers preferred to invite or accept requests for 
campaigns in their village by candidates who were willing to distribute gifts and 
fund feasts during their campaigns; one candidate was actually observed telling 
people to organize themselves and host rallies in their villages so he could go 
and donate goods and money as part of his campaign strategy. 
 
In terms of security, there were areas where male candidates and their 
supporters went where female candidates could not go, such as the strongholds 
of rival candidates, settlement areas, mountainous and rugged terrain, and 
remote outlying districts. Some villages in the central Kaiva area were charging 
‘rent’ for candidates wishing to campaign in their villages, as a result of the 
non-delivery on election promises of successive MPs. The threat of violence 
and intimidation made female candidates avoid those places. Candidates Rita 
Jonah (of Madang) and Josephine Abaijah (who was born in Oro but spent 
much of her early life in Milne Bay) had to contend additionally with the ‘Oro 
for Oro’ campaign by people of Oro descent, thus considerably hampering their 
campaign activities.  
 
In response to a question I posed to a woman candidate in the Ijivitari 
electorate, on the kind of support she expected from female voters, I was told, 
‘Women will not vote for us women candidates unless we take our campaign 
right to their doorsteps’. Personal appeal through physical presence was seen as 
a sure way to break through the traditional, imposed stereotypical view that 
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‘politics is no place for women’ and that ‘women cannot make good leaders. 
Further, attempt was made to appeal to the maternal instincts of women voters, 
on the basis that three decades of male dominance of politics in Papua New 
Guinea had not brought development for the Oro people and that it was time for 
women to set this right for the benefit of their children.  
 
In terms of issues covered in campaigns, all the women candidates in Oro 
built in gender components to their speeches, appealing to voters to set aside 
their gender-stereotype mentality and opt for a change in leadership through 
women. 
 
Voter support base 
 
With the exception of Maureen Ambo (a candidate for Ijivitari Open) women 
did poorly in the primary vote (all below 2.5 per cent) and did not receive many 
preferences (though in Oro Provincial Claire Embahe’s preferences were almost 
three times the number of her meagre 44 first preferences, and in Ijivitari Deboa 
Emboge more than doubled her vote by the addition of preferences before her 
early exclusion).  
 
Female candidates in Oro relied mainly on their kinship ties and voters in the 
immediate vicinity of their village as their support bases. The low number of 
preferential votes distributed to women suggests that female voters in Oro did 
not support female candidates. Possible reasons for this are discussed below. 
 
Campaign alliances 
 
Women candidates contesting the 2007 elections in Oro generally did not 
form alliances for preference sharing or alliances of provincial and open 
candidates to share supporters. This may be because they lacked understanding 
of the LPV system and therefore did not strategize appropriately, or because 
other candidates were reluctant to form alliances with them, perhaps thinking 
that female candidates did not command enough support to make alliance 
useful. 
 
Maureen Ambo 
 
Eliminated on the 35th count in a field of 38 candidates, the 6.2 per cent of 
preference votes amassed by Maureen Ambo was one of the highest. This was a 
reflection of the ‘voter sharing’ alliance she formed with Suckling Tamanabe, 
the successful candidate in the Provincial seat. 
 
The alliance between Ambo and Tamanabe demonstrated the power wielded 
by church-based groups. Several combined churches crusades were organized at 
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public venues in Popondetta, Oro bay, and other parts of the province just 
before the writs were issued. The crusades preached the need for Oro Province 
to vote for ‘Godly leaders’. At the forefront of these crusades were the Covenant 
Praise Ministries Church, led by its founder and pastor, Tamanabe, and the Fo-
Gave church group (a ‘cultist’ group) led by former Anglican bishop, George 
Ambo, Maurine Ambo’s father-in-law. Pledges were made by Maureen Ambo’s 
supporters in the Ijivitari electorate to give all their votes for the Provincial seat 
to Suckling Tamanabe, who reciprocated by urging all his followers to give 
their votes to Maureen Ambo in the Ijivitari seat. 
 
The success of this alliance can be seen in the exceptional performances of 
the two first-time candidates, one of whom led all the way in the Provincial 
count whilst the other came fourth in a field of 38 contestants. 
 
Women as voters 
 
The absence of free and fair competition 
 
Decades of suppression and alienation from ‘high politics’ as a result of 
strict adherence to traditional norms and practices in a largely patriarchal 
society has made women in Oro passive participants in the electoral process. 
The concept of village-, clan- or tribal-based consensus — mainly male 
consensus — results in bloc voting, which women are obliged to follow. 
Intimidation and violence (or the threat of violence) involved in electoral 
politics does not give women voters the freedom to choose as they please. 
Several women voters interviewed expressed their support for the LPV system 
since, according to them, they could now use the first preference vote to satisfy 
their traditional obligations, voting for their husband’s or clan’s first choice, 
whilst reserving the second and third preferences for their own choices. 
However, these preferences were not reserved exclusively for female 
candidates, as the results show. 
 
Support for female candidates/gender appeal 
 
With the exception of Maureen Ambo, women candidates in Oro Province 
did not command support from the wider society, including women voters. This 
can be seen from the distribution of preferences after the primary count for the 
three seats. 
 
One of the main reasons for this lack of appeal was that inaction by 
successive governments over the years had resulted in low levels of 
development, which demanded strong and charismatic leaders, appropriately 
educated and knowledgeable in governance issues, who commanded respect 
from their electorates. Unfortunately, my interviews with women voters 
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suggested that the women candidates were not seen as meeting the criteria and 
did not command respect through their personal charisma. Although some were 
activists on gender and social issues, such activities were mainly conducted in 
the town area and district headquarters and had little impact on the majority in 
the rural areas. As a result, they stood as effectively unknowns. As noted, 
Maureen Ambo rose above this by aligning herself with powerful church-based 
political lobbyists and exposing herself to the wider society through the 
strategically organized Christian crusades prior to the issue of writs. 
 
Campaign activities 
 
The roles women play during campaigns, for example, preparing meals and 
organizing venues for males to sit and talk high politics, although important, are 
often seen as peripheral, thus further diminishing women candidates’ appeal to 
women voters as alternative choices for political leadership. 
 
For the first time in Oro, women candidates appointed other women as 
campaign managers in certain areas and encouraged women lobbyists to deliver 
campaign speeches in a bid to appeal to women voters. This was a break from 
the peripheral activities that gender-biased cultures have imposed on them. 
Women voters were also observed openly discussing candidates both within 
small groups and during political rallies.  
 
The confidence, and in some instances daring, shown by women voters can 
perhaps be attributed to the fact that ten of their own gender were openly 
challenging male dominance in political leadership roles. However, this was not 
widespread, being confined to the Popondetta town area and the female 
candidates’ own bases. Women in other areas, especially outlying rural areas 
and male candidates’ support base areas, did not take up the call to openly 
campaign for female candidates. 
 
General analysis and LPV assumptions in Oro  
 
The change from FPTP voting to LPV was largely intended to encourage 
more free and fair elections in the country and encourage a less confrontational 
style of politics amongst MPs. In this, Oro Province had mixed results. While 
the election in general was a success and without major incidents, certain issues 
still need to be addressed. Major remaining issues of contention concerning the 
technicalities of the LPV system are listed below. 
 
Bloc voting 
 
Bloc voting has always been a feature of the electoral system in Oro 
province, especially in the last two elections. Given the large number of 
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candidates and the relatively small population this practice has yielded winners 
with very low numbers of votes (averaging between 3,000 and 3,500 — less 
than 10 per cent of the total population of the respective electorates). The results 
of this have been a lack of serious commitment by MPs to the overall 
development of their electorates, a ‘don’t care’ attitude to their duties, roles and 
responsibilities as MPs, and their indulgence in corrupt practices. The view has 
been that as long as the small proportion of the population which made up their 
voter support base was satisfied, MPs were assured of retaining their seats.  
 
The assumption of the shift to LPV was that having three preferences would 
encourage candidates to take a more holistic approach to elections, with greater 
awareness of the entire electorate, since support would be needed from the 
whole electorate to reach the absolute majority needed to win.  
 
However, the 2007 election results for the three seats in Oro Province 
suggest that voters have not shifted far from the FPTP mentality. For example, 
after the first preference count, the eventual winner in Ijivitari Open, David 
Arore, was placed third, while Benson Garui from the Afore area — the same 
area as Arore, and a relative — was placed first. The preferential counts that 
followed saw Arore still hovering around third and fourth place while Garui fell 
to fourth and fifth place. The margin between the frontrunner and the third 
placed candidate was mainained at between 400 and 600 votes. This changed 
when Garui was eliminated at the thirty-fourth count: almost 90 per cent of his 
preferential votes went to Arore, dramatically elevating him to first place with a 
lead of close to 1,000 votes. This was maintained in the final two eliminations 
and Arore was declared elected. 
 
On the other hand, Tufi District alone had seven candidates contesting. 
When boxes from the Tufi District were counted, almost 90 per cent of the votes 
were distributed amongst these seven candidates. 
 
Exhausted votes and absolute majority 
 
Of the total of 28,506 allowable ballot papers, 18,079 (63.4 per cent) were 
exhausted before the final count. As the Tufi example shows, the large number 
of exhausted ballot papers may be attributed to the large number of candidates 
(38) vying for the votes of a relatively small electorate in Ijivitari. The large 
proportion of exhausted ballots may also have reflected the behaviour of voters 
with little interest in proceedings (see above), who gave all three preferences to 
candidates with little chance of winning. 
 
It was popularly believed that LPV would ensure that winning candidates 
would have an ‘absolute majority’ (50 per cent + 1 of the total votes), as 
opposed to FPTP, which gave victory on the basis of a ‘simple majority’ — the 
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largest number of votes. This, of course, failed to account of exhausted ballots. 
In Ijivitari, with a total of 30,066 ballot papers issued, the absolute majority was 
15,034. However the high incidence of informal votes (1,560), and the large 
number of ballot papers exhausted, resulted in the absolute majority at the first 
redistribution dropping to a low 5,400. David Arore surpassed this figure with a 
total of 5,478 votes, to be declared the winner, but his winning vote represented 
only 18 per cent of the total votes cast and therefore brings into question the 
whole concept of fair representation of the electorate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Ijivitari case suggests that women candidates have a chance of winning 
elections in Papua New Guinea, however the current status quo of electoral 
politics stacks the odds heavily against them.  
 
Apart from going against a male-dominated society with all its rigid cultural 
and traditional forms, women candidates in Oro Province had to contend with 
structural inequalities in the system. The fact that ten women candidates 
contested the 2007 elections and that, at least in some areas, women participated 
openly in politics where previously none dared to venture, provides evidence of 
a mellowing in cultural constraints placed on women, especially in the realm of 
‘high politics’. 
 
Although this is encouraging, more participation alone is not enough. 
Structural issues in the system have to be addressed in order to bring about real 
opportunities for women contestants. Drawing on the Ijivitari experience, the 
following are some suggestions for removing obstacles to free, fair and equal 
participation of women in high politics. 
 
Awareness 
 
There has to be a whole-of-government approach to gender awareness 
throughout Papua New Guinea not just in easily accessible urban areas, as was 
the case in Ijivitari. Both males and females should participate in these 
programs as advocates and recipients. Awareness programs should focus on 
women’s rights, including the right to hold public office and participate in high 
politics. There is also a need to increase awareness about the LPV process, as 
the 2007 election in Oro displayed a lack of real understanding of the system by 
candidates and voters alike. 
 
Civil society organizations and government agencies should be encouraged 
to establish networks reaching to the far and isolated corners of the country. 
Through these, information should be disseminated not only to make people 
aware, but to encourage their full participation in democratic processes and 
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governance. In Oro Province, a thorough awareness program would probably 
contribute to lowering the numbers contesting elections. 
 
Election-related laws and policies 
 
Election-related laws and policies need to be revisited in order to make them 
more gender sensitive, while laws relating to bribery, vote buying, gifting and 
other forms of inducement and corruption in the electoral process should be 
strictly enforced. 
 
Creation of seats exclusively for women 
 
The above suggestions will take time to implement, given decades of 
inaction. An alternative would be for parliament to legislate for a seat reserved 
for women in each province. This seat could either be voted on by everyone or 
by women voters only. One suggestion under discussion is to replace provincial 
seats with a seat in each province reserved for women. 
 
Such measures might assist in reducing non-democratic practices in Papua 
New Guinea’s electoral system and enhancing women’s participation. 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 15.1: Voting statistics Ijivitari Open, 2007 election 
Number of registered voters  41826  
Total votes cast 30065  
Informal votes 1561 (5.2% of total votes cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 28504  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 10419  
Total votes distributed 23727  
Exhausted ballot papers 18085 (63.4% of total allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 5211  
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Figure 16.1: Eastern Highlands Province map 
16 COMMUNICATION, LOGISTICS AND INTER-AGENCY 
PARTNERSHIPS IN THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL 
ELECTORATE  
 
Michael Unage 
 
With the introduction of limited preferential voting (LPV), and the late 
legislative change to voting procedures in November 2006, many predicted that 
the 2007 general election would be a failure. Nonetheless, there was general 
satisfaction with the election outcome, with election-related violence in the 
highlands down significantly from 2002 levels. Among factors contributing to 
electoral success, communications, logistics and inter-agency partnership were 
critical. This paper examines issues of communications, logistics and inter-
agency partnership in the Eastern Highland Provincial electorate. 
 
Background 
 
Eastern Highlands is one of the nineteen provincial electorates in the 
country. It shares borders with Morobe, Madang, Chimbu and Gulf provinces. 
Eastern Highlands has eight open electorates — Daulo, Goroka, Unggai-Bena, 
Lufa, Henganofi, Okapa, Kainantu and Obura-Wonenara. At the 2000 census, 
Eastern Highlands had a population of 432,972. In 2007 the total number of 
votes polled in the provincial electorate was 354, 495. 
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There are twenty-four local-level governments (LLGs) in the province: two 
urban LLGs (Goroka Urban and Kainantu Urban) and tweny-two rural LLGs. 
Population is concentrated in the flat lands around Kainantu and Goroka, 
reflecting the gravitation of people towards the urban areas. Goroka town was 
established in 1939 and became the major administrative and commercial centre 
of the province.  
 
The province has rich temperate valleys and ridges, which attracted the 
attention of early gold prospectors such as Mick Dwyer and Mick Leahy and 
now support a thriving arabica coffee industry. Coffee, ‘the money that grows 
on trees’, is the lifeblood of the Eastern Highlands Province.  
 
Data for the study of the Eastern Highlands Provincial electorate was 
gathered through unstructured interviews with candidates, polling officials and 
voters. The interviews specifically sought both qualitative and quantitative 
information on communication, logistics and inter-agency partnerships.  
 
LPV awareness  
 
Though there was preference voting in Papua New Guinea before 
independence, most eligible voters were not familiar with the LPV system. It 
was therefore essential to conduct an awareness campaign before the 
commencement of polling. Several agencies were involved in this. 
 
The National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) in Goroka did an outstanding 
job in communicating electoral information through its radio network. Time was 
allocated for election awareness at 7.15 p.m. every Tuesday and Thursday, 
which was considered prime time. In the program, electoral officers explained 
in detail what people needed to know about the LPV system, and answered 
queries people had about their right to vote without undue influence from 
candidates, supporters or political parties. AusAID also funded a radio 
commentary and a drama program on elections and HIV/AIDS (respectively 
‘Autim tok na Tingting’ and ‘If to You’), as well as ‘HIV/AIDS spots’ at least 
twelve times a day. These were broadcast from late February till the end of 
August 2007. 
 
The Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC), with the help of 
local public servants, did three lots of LPV awareness throughout the Eastern 
Highlands Province. Election materials, produced by the PNGEC, were 
distributed by teams which visited rural areas. Mock elections were conducted. 
In a few electorates, the returning officers conducted training of trainers for 
LPV awareness. 
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A few civil society groups, funded under the Electoral Support Program, did 
LPV awareness in the Eastern Highlands. These included the Goroka 
Community Development Agency, Women in Agriculture, Pamusa Community 
Development Assistance, and Lower Unggai Community Development. Though 
the scope of the activity was limited, they managed to get the message across to 
people who might not otherwise have been reached. 
 
It was also reported that many of the candidates took up the responsibility for 
educating voters on the LPV system, out of fear that their votes might otherwise 
be informal. 
 
Observers reported that residents of Goroka and Kainantu towns had the 
opportunity to attend LPV awareness carried out by civil society groups, but 
LPV awareness did not penetrate many rural areas of the provincial electorate 
despite requests from rural voters. Those who carried out LPV awareness said 
that they were not adequately resourced by the PNGEC to carry out informative 
awareness. 
 
Few candidates appear to have talked about HIV/AIDS as part of civic 
awareness. In many polling places, there was no display of HIV/AIDS 
materials.  
 
Electoral roll 
 
The most important activity leading up to the 2007 general election was the 
electoral roll update. The update was done in two phases. First, four 
enumerators, accompanied by local councillors, went from village to village 
enrolling people over 18 years of age. The enrolment was then checked by the 
district supervisors and sent to Port Moresby for the printing of preliminary 
rolls. The preliminary rolls were given to returning officers for checking and 
sent back to the PNGEC’s head office. Secondly, in early 2007, the electoral roll 
was sent out for verification and update, a process which was controlled by 
returning officers. The verified forms were then sent to Port Moresby for the 
final print-out, which arrived before the start of polling. Civil society groups 
were not involved in the update of the electoral roll. 
 
Many voters did not register their names on the electoral roll out of 
ignorance or because the enrolment teams did not visit all residential areas at the 
ward level. Moreover, observers reported that many eligible voters did not fill in 
the claim for enrolment form when enumerators did visit their village. 
Consequently many voters were unable to cast their votes and people raised 
concerns that the electoral roll did not have a complete listing of people. On the 
other hand, in some newly-created polling places there were said to be ‘ghost’ 
names on the rolls.  
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Some observers claimed that the electoral roll was hijacked by greedy 
politicians, councillors, and candidates who did what they could to ensure the 
roll served their interests. The fact that candidates had tampered with the 
electoral roll suggests that politics in the province continues to be aggressively 
competitive. Concentrations of voters residing in Goroka and Kainantu towns 
means that clan loyalty has been somewhat weakened. Candidates now have to 
rely on cross-ethnic votes if they are to win. Abuse of the electoral roll is seen 
as one way of ensuring a win.  
 
Training 
 
In the 2007 election, training was especially important because of the new 
voting system. Training was conducted by returning officers in their respective 
electorates in the lead-up to the election. At least five training sessions were 
conducted, namely: a two-day session for presiding officers, which included 
setting up polling places and holding mock elections; a day’s training for 
polling clerks, doorkeepers, and ballot box guards; briefing of scrutineers on 
LPV and counting; a workshop for candidates; and a two-day training session 
for counting officials. 
 
Training of polling officials by the PNGEC, however, was generally seen as 
inadequate. Consequently, delays and confusion were experienced in counting. 
The Obura-Wonenara electorate did poorly in the regional count, delaying the 
counting by a day or so as papers were rechecked. The team supervisor had only 
had a two-hour training session. He stated that he did not know exactly what 
was expected of him. Only 200 of 700 counting officials (28 per cent) received 
training in the counting and elimination aspects of the LPV, which rendered the 
integrity of the elections vulnerable to challenge. 
 
Transport 
 
Some 240 hired vehicles, and six fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from 
the Defence Force, the police, the Summer Institute of Linguistics, and 
commercial contractors, were employed to transport election materials and 
personnel. Bad weather and the late arrival of helicopters caused a few delays. 
Some polling officials had to walk for days to reach remote polling areas. One 
polling team was picked up on the Madang Highway when a helicopter failed to 
pick them up from a remote polling place. 
 
The placement of aviation fuel at strategic points curtailed unnecessary trips 
to Goroka for refueling of helicopters, and the availability of the Summer 
Institute of Lingustics’s aircraft assisted in accessing remote polling places. 
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Security  
 
In addition to regular police from the Eastern Highlands, two mobile squad 
units (from Kerowagi and Laiagam) were deployed to the Eastern Highlands in 
advance to polling, and other police contingents from Port Moresby were 
deployed in time for polling. Besides the police, the Defence Force’s A 
Company from Lae was deployed during and after polling, and members of the 
Correctional Services (CS) from Bomana provided security assistance. Casual 
security personnel were also employed at the counting centre. 
 
However, police logistics were often a problem during polling. Police did not 
accompany polling teams to all polling places, and not all polling stations had a 
police presence. Especially in the towns, a heavy security presence provided 
some control over the voting, but in remote places the security presence was 
inadequate to guarantee voters’ security and free choice. Instead, village court 
officials took responsibility for security in many remote polling places. 
 
Notwithstanding these constraints, there was general peace and order, and no 
weapons were seen in the hands of civilians during the campaign or at polling.  
 
Electoral costs 
 
The cost of conducting the election in Eastern Highlands has been estimated 
at around K3.8 million,1 broken down as follows: 
 
Table 16.1: Election costs 
Expenditure item Cost (K’000) 
Security 202 
Transport    1,124 
Communication (mainly payments to NBC and Telikom) 26 
Printing of electoral roll  36 
Logistics (hire of premises, electricity, etc)  195 
Wages and allowances     1,766 
Activity grant to electorates (for awareness, training etc) 453 
Total 3,802 
 
Polling 
 
Officially, polling in the Eastern Highlands commenced on 9 July, though in 
a few remote areas, polling began some days later due to transport difficulties 
and bad weather. Polling was not conducted in a few places, due to fighting 
unrelated to the election.  
                                                     
1 These may not be final figures in all cases. The costs of the electoral roll update are 
not included, but were probably in the order of K300,000. 
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There were 663 polling teams, with 663 ballot boxes each for the provincial 
electorate and the open electorates. Ballot boxes for each electorate were colour-
coded, in an attempt by the provincial election manager to remove any suspicion 
that election officials were allowing candidates to produce their own ballot 
boxes and ballot papers. 
 
Polling was generally orderly, though at many polling stations polling and 
security officials gave into the demands of the voters and did not confirm names 
on the roll before allowing voters to cast their votes. In some polling places, 
there were reports of multiple voting and some underage voting. Frequently 
people were not able to cast their votes freely, because voting compartments 
were controlled by youths who told voters to vote for certain candidates; the 
security presence was inadequate to prevent this. In many places polling became 
disorderly towards afternoon.  
 
Counting 
 
Counting for all electorates in the Eastern Highlands was conducted at the 
National Sports Institute. Stalls were constructed for each electorate, and the 
regional stall comprised eight compartments for the primary count. All tally 
rooms had phone connections. Ballot boxes were taken to the counting center on 
designated vehicles, and kept under close scrutiny. 
 
Security arrangements at the counting centre were exceptional, with PNGDF 
personnel, police mobile squads, local police from Goroka, and casual security 
personnel providing security. Meticulous checks were conducted at the entrance 
to the counting centre, even for counting officials. Mobile phones were 
confiscated at the gate. Scrutineers had a good view of the counting process. No 
scope was left for election fraud. Indeed no one would have dared to hijack the 
process, even at gunpoint. There were, however, complaints that security was 
excessive and that many electoral officials were treated with disrespect. 
 
Despite the recent introduction of the LPV system, the counting process was 
generally good, though some problems emerged. The primary count was fairly 
straightforward except for Obura-Wonenara, which delayed the provincial count 
by a day while papers were rechecked. As the count proceeded, however, the 
scrutineers and campaign officials of losing candidates tried to freeze the 
counting, organizing informal protest meetings outside the counting venue. 
Sitting member Malcolm Kela Smith led from the start by a big margin, which 
created strong suspicion among other candidates and their supporters and 
scrutineers.  
 
Presiding officers (POs) sometimes failed to provide polling summaries. 
Consequently, figures were not available for verification. One PO was 
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questioned by police for holding on to returns. Counting was continually 
disrupted by scrutineers because of discrepancies between the totals on the 
counting board and those on the POs’ returns.  
 
A number of ballot papers were found in the wrong boxes (in most 
electorates, some ballot papers for open electorates were mistakenly put in the 
boxes meant for provincial electorates, and those for provincial electorates in 
the boxes meant for open electorates). These were sorted out and accepted, but 
took up time and effort. Further, about a third of the counting officials were laid 
off before the elimination counts, prompting complaints from them that they 
had been contracted for twenty-one days to do the counting. Checking of ballot 
papers took at least two days, during which more informal ballot papers were 
discovered.  
 
There were also miscounts of ballot papers, and miscalculation of figures. 
Discrepancies emerged between the final figures at the end of each exclusion 
and the total number of ballot papers per box, such that adjustments had to be 
made on nearly every exclusion. Informal ballot papers and unaccounted ballot 
papers continued to surface.  
 
Communication 
 
Communication between the election manager for Eastern Highlands 
Province and the returning officer was good; directions and instructions were 
received by the returning officer without any major difficulty. As a result the 
entire election process — from nominations to counting — was relatively 
peaceful and orderly. The chain of communication to assistant returning officers 
was also good. At the Lopi polling station, for example, all voters who turned 
up to vote were able to vote in secrecy and there was no multiple voting.  
 
Polling officials understood their respective roles. Presiding officers allowed 
those voters who were still on a queue between 5 and 6 pm to cast their votes; 
this brought satisfaction to the voters, whose patience had not been in vain. 
 
Election results were promptly communicated by the election manager to the 
PNGEC headquarters and the Media Centre in Port Moresby. There was 
generally good communication between the election manager and the returning 
officer and police, and between police and the PNGDF. Landline phones and 
faxes were available for all agencies to use according to their needs. 
 
Logistics 
 
Transport and security arrangements were generally in place for the 
protection of ballot boxes and papers, and for their prompt transport to the 
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appropriate LLG distribution points or police stations. Police were on hand to 
provide escort for the vehicles carrying the ballot boxes and papers; polling 
officials and scrutineers usually accompanied the ballot boxes. The returning 
officers took custody of any unused ballot papers, which were then transported 
with police escort to the appropriate LLG distribution point or police station.  
 
Inter-agency partnership 
 
Partnerships at the national level were well in place through the Inter-
departmental Electoral Committee (IDEC), chaired by the Registrar of Political 
Parties. Through IDEC, directions filtered down to the EMs at the provincial 
level. Partnerships between PNGEC officials, police, PNGDF, LLGs, ward 
councillors, civil society, and local communities in the Eastern Highlands can 
be described as cooperative, friendly, and conducive to peaceful elections. 
Information necessary for the sound conduct of duties for each agency was duly 
conveyed, allowing for the effective carrying out of activities at each stage of 
the election process. 
 
In consequence, most voters in the Eastern Highlands were pleased with the 
relative peace and order of the elections and the freedom to move around as well 
as exercise their democratic right to vote. 
 
Electoral outcomes 
 
The results 
 
Thirty-five candidates stood for the Eastern Highlands Provincial electorate, 
of whom eight were endorsed by political parties (see Table 16.2 at the end of 
this chapter). 
 
Malcolm Kela Smith, the sitting member led in the primary count, with 
77,254 votes, and eventually won with a final tally of 130,427 which was 37.7 
per cent of total formal votes. The runner-up, both in the primary and final tally, 
former MP Barry Holloway, scored 25,790 and 72,219 respectively. John Yogio 
came third with a primary vote of 22,511 and a final vote of 55,755. Julie Soso 
Akeke, the only female candidate contesting the regional electorate, polled 
16,651 votes, placing her in eighth position in the primary count; she was 
eliminated in the thirtieth count, with a total vote of 34,164.  
 
In the primary count of the Eastern Highland Regional seat, 355,203 ballot 
papers were cast, of which only 8,860 (2.5 per cent) were informal. It appears, 
therefore, that the introduction of LPV voting, in the Eastern Highlands at least, 
did not result in a significant informal vote. 
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At the thirty-second elimination, the remaining ‘live’ ballot papers numbered 
258,4012; that is, only 25.4 per cent of formal votes had been exhausted. This 
suggests that voters in the Eastern Highland directed their preferences strongly 
towards the top three candidates — unlike other electorates that saw more than 
50 per cent of ballot papers exhausted. Thus, we might infer that people in the 
Eastern Highlands have understood the intention of the preferential voting 
system by distributing preferences amongst the stronger candidates. 
 
Disputed election results imply malpractice and election anomalies. In 
Eastern Highlands in 2007, though six election petitions were registered, only 
two went for pre-trial, the other four being dismissed by the court. The 
implication would seem to be that the elections were accepted as generally fair. 
 
Since there was no significant election-related violence, we can surmise that 
people were generally content with the way election was conducted; the LPV 
system may have contributed to this. 
 
Assessing the outcomes 
 
The change from FPTP to LPV 
 
The shift to a LPV system had a major impact on election outcomes. The 
general peace in the Eastern Highlands during the elections can probably be 
attributed to the LPV system. Clan boundaries opened up for other candidates to 
enter, and parochial candidates were encouraged to go to other clans to 
campaign for preference votes. Intense negotiation and vote trading was evident 
everywhere. Voters felt free to move from one candidate’s domain to another’s, 
and the hijacking of ballot papers was uncommon in 2007. The general 
consensus was that the 2007 election was better than that in 2002 and that LPV 
contributed to this. 
 
LPV likewise made electoral logistics easier, as polling places were more 
peaceful and foul play at the counting centres was reduced – it was reported that 
several counting officials rejected bribes to rig the process, knowing that it 
would be difficult if not impossible to do so. LPV helped people in the electoral 
process do the right thing. 
 
                                                     
2 The figure for total ballot papers remaining in count on the official form 66B was 
261146, however this is not the correct sum of three ramaining candidates votes. We 
have used the recalculated figure because the former would not have Malcolm Kela 
Smith winning with an absolute majority.  
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Planning, consultation and participation  
 
Consultation and involvement of people was evident in the work of the 
provincial steering committee and the participation of key stakeholders in the 
electoral process. The Eastern Highlands election manager had long experience 
with the PNGEC, and took the initiative when needed. When funds were not 
forthcoming, he personally travelled to PNGEC headquarters requesting their 
release. The election manager enlisted a group of first-time returning officers 
whose enthusiasm and motivation to prove their worth contributed to the 
effective execution of election plans. 
 
The electoral steering committee was chaired by the deputy provincial 
administrator who was also responsible for the discipline of local public 
servants. Thus professional conduct was maintained and electoral fraud by 
public servants minimized. 
 
Key local stakeholders were members of the provincial steering committee, 
and the involvement of civil society in governance education and LPV 
awareness may have contributed to the successful outcome. 
 
There was also evidence of a change in people’s participation; with less 
feasting and campaigning, they took the time to educate themselves about the 
electoral process, especially the LPV system.  
 
Wider dissemination of information, increased popular understanding of the 
electoral process, and improved communications 
 
The NBC in Goroka took an active role in the electoral awareness campaign 
and in disseminating information to the local people. The Electoral Commission 
also promoted LPV awareness, and many candidates took on the responsibility 
of educating voters about the new electoral process. During the election, the 
accessibility of a satellite phone for all returning officers facilitated 
communication with the election manager.  
 
Better logistic support 
 
For the first time, provincial treasuries were used to process cheques, making 
disbursement of funds to election tasks more convenient. Other notable 
successes in logistics in the Eastern Highlands were the separate ballot boxes 
for the regional and the open electorates, making counting less tedious, and the 
colour-coding of the ballot boxes which reduced the level of suspicion of foul 
play. The set-up of the counting center was another remarkable achievement: it 
provided full transparency in the counting of ballots. Bad weather and delays in 
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other highland provinces caused minor disruption to the transportation of 
polling teams; otherwise transport arrangements were excellent. 
 
But despite some remarkable successes, election management needs to be 
improved in several areas. 
 
The electoral roll 
 
A disjunction was observed between the intention and the practice of the 
electoral roll. Ethnic bloc voting frequently replaced the electoral roll, and 
voters felt that calling and checking names was time-consuming (and LPV 
voting needed time). Hence, as reported by domestic observers, a majority of 
the polling places in the Eastern Highlands did not utilize the electoral roll. This 
needs to be examined. 
 
LPV awareness 
 
Despite the efforts of those communicating the LPV message, most 
observers reported that LVP awareness did not penetrate into many rural 
communities, where few people own radios and many people are illiterate. 
Patrols on foot by existing community groups may be more effective. 
 
Assisting illiterate voters 
 
Given the number of illiterate voters, one might be surprised at the low 
informal vote. The explanation is that illiterate voters were frequently assisted 
by educated people. However, it was noted by observers that in some polling 
places a few people marked the ballot papers for all the voters. And when votes 
were counted it was noted that in a few ballot boxes papers appeared to have 
been marked by the same hand. Perhaps this is an indication that many of the 
illiterate voters did not exercise a completely free choice.  
 
Ballot papers 
 
The fact that the provincial and open ballot papers looked alike caused some 
problems, with voters marking their choices for provincial candidates on open 
ballot papers and vice versa, or putting correctly marked ballot papers in the 
wrong ballot box. This might be fixed by using differently coloured ballot 
papers for open and provincial electorates. 
 
Training 
 
Training for counting officials was not adequate and this resulted in a slow 
start to counting. Some officials were briefed for less than one hour before 
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counting commenced. This particularly affected the distribution of preferences. 
There were discrepancies in the count where figures did not balance and had to 
be reworked. Partly because of this, counting was continually disturbed by 
scrutineers. Two days of checking revealed more informal ballot papers, 
miscounts of ballot papers, and miscalculation of figures. Adjustments were 
consequently made on each exclusion. The official final count of the Electoral 
Commission differs somewhat from the records kept by domestic observers. 
 
Security arrangements 
 
Despite the heavy security presence in Goroka and in the district 
headquarters, security was inadequate to guarantee voters’ security and free 
choice in remote rural polling places. There were several reasons for this: the 
security concerns in the Southern Highlands and Enga meant that less 
consideration was given the Eastern Highlands where election violence is 
comparatively low; the election-related problems in the four other highlands 
provinces delayed the arrival of police in time for polling in the Eastern 
Highlands; for the first time, police logistics for the provinces were drawn up in 
Port Moresby, which resulted in a lack of proper implementation in the 
provinces; and some lack of communication between police and returning 
officers posed problems for the movement of ballot papers during polling.  
 
Management and disbursement of funds 
 
Allegations of misappropriation of funds for election purposes recur in 
Papua New Guinea elections. Eastern Highlands in 2007 was no exception. 
Long after the election many people and organizations who had provided goods 
and services claimed they had not been paid, including police personnel 
engaged in the election who claimed not to have received due allowances.  
 
Regionalizing electoral responsibilities 
 
The planning of electoral operations at headquarters in Port Moresby seems 
to result in delays and frustration at the provincial level. Frequent trips to Port 
Moresby by the provincial election manager, to sort out logistic problems, and 
his consequent absence from the province, affected the planning of the election 
in Eastern Highlands. There is perhaps scope for a greater decentralization of 
electoral responsibilities in the interests of efficiency. This might include the 
appointment of a full-time electoral official in each electorate. 
 
Obstacles to electoral administration 
 
No matter how much planning and resources are put into making elections a 
success, two factors, in particular, continue to hinder free and fair elections in 
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the Eastern Highlands (and other parts of Papua New Guinea): clan politics and 
corruption.  
 
Clan politics 
 
In many parts of Papua New Guinea the pressures stemming from clan 
solidarity outweigh consideration of individual rights. Electorally, this is 
manifested in ethnic bloc voting and ‘line up’ voting; in manipulation of the 
electoral roll; in double or multiple voting; in insisting that voters give their first 
preference to a parochial candidate, and in inducing fear and intimidation. These 
were in evidence in the Eastern Highlands in 2007. The problem requires a 
broad response, including governance and human rights education conducted by 
civil society groups, giving special consideration to the Highlands Region, strict 
enforcement of the secrecy of the vote, with village courts having jurisdiction to 
prosecute offenders, and an increased police presence, in conjunction with 
community security arrangements, during elections. 
 
Corruption 
 
Not only has money been used increasingly to buy people’s votes, more 
disturbing is an emerging tendency for candidates and their supporters to 
attempt to buy out the election process, or bribe electoral officials to rig the 
process. Many cases of bribery were reported in the 2007 election by domestic 
observers. A statement by the acting provincial returning officer of Eastern 
Highland confirmed this: ‘The 2007 general election’, he said, ‘was a success; 
however, we cannot ascertain that it was a free and fair election’.3 Severe 
penalties must be imposed on candidates offering bribes and on polling officials 
accepting bribes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2007 elections were generally seen as being better than the 2002 
elections in the Eastern Highlands Province.  
 
The legislative change from FPTP to LPV appears to have resulted in a shift 
in attitude and election practice, and, as such, improved election outcomes in 
2007, though minor legislative changes may be needed to close some loopholes.  
 
Efficient communications and logistics, and effective inter-agency 
partnerships at the national and provincial levels are an integral part of electoral 
governance. Although the election in the Eastern Highlands in 2007 was not 
perfect, communication between the PNGEC headquarters in Port Moresby and 
                                                     
3 Interview with Kusindel Kalowai, Acting Provincial Returning Officer of EHP. 
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the provincial election manager in the Eastern Highlands Province, and between 
the election manager and polling officials, contributed significantly to the 
success of the election in the province. Aside from efficiently coordinated 
logistics, an effective partnership between all relevant agencies and civil society 
and community groups is important for sound elections; people must take 
ownership of the election and, in the process, understand the meaning of voting, 
and why it is important to elect good leaders. The pre-polling, polling and post-
polling periods were relatively peaceful in the Eastern Highlands Province, the 
latter an indication that people have accepted the outcome.  
 
Appendix 
 
Table 16.2: Voting statistics Eastern Highlands Province, 2007 election 
Number of registered voters  383471  
Total ballots cast 355203  
Informal votes  8860 (2.5% of ballots cast)  
Total allowable ballot papers 346343  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 258401  
Total votes distributed 220788  
Exhausted ballot papers 87942 (25.4% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 129202  
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17 THE ELECTION IN CHUAVE OPEN ELECTORATE 
 
William Steven Gari Kaupa 
 
The 2007 election for Chuave Open in Chimbu Province, which closely 
followed by-elections in Chuave Open in August 2006 and Chimbu Provincial 
in 2004, was quieter than previous general elections. In 2002 (and 1997) many 
candidates had been prevented from travelling widely to campaign, and there 
was a great deal of intimidation of voters and ‘forcing’ of the vote. 
 
The Chuave people have a high level of tribal contestation and also ample 
experience of preferential voting, so they knew how to exploit limited 
preferential voting (LPV) to their advantage. However, initial good impressions 
need to be re-examined in evaluating this election. Most candidates promoted 
good governance messages and discouraged corrupt practices in their opening 
campaign speeches, but the same candidates engaged in unscrupulous campaign 
gifting, exploiting customary practices and thereby displaying double standards. 
The administration of the election and the security environment were good, but 
in many places the polling could not be properly administered because polling 
officials and security personnel were powerless against community pressure.  
 
The member of parliament (MP) elected under the LPV system gained a 
greatly increased mandate compared with previous MPs. Yet observers’ 
findings reflect the underlying influence of Melanesian culture and the power of 
community consensus in influencing voting in the election. Voting was not free 
and fair; this had not changed much from 2002. In each polling place the LPV 
outcome was essentially the same as under the first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
system, in that community consensus overrode the secrecy of the ballot. A 
second major finding is that there was little impact from the Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC), which was designed 
to strengthen political parties, create legislative stability, and promote national 
interests rather than parochialism. People voted in the hope of gaining 
community projects and meeting their local aspirations, rather than for the 
policies and candidates of political parties. 
 
This chapter draws on the journals used by seven domestic observers at six 
polling places. Team members were asked to fill in eighteen sections of the 
journal, covering topics from election administration, through candidates’ 
tactics in campaigning and public reactions, to security responses, within a 
structured questionnaire.1 
                                                     
1 The questionnaire was prepared by Dr. Nicole Haley from the Australian National 
University and Dr. Ray Anere from the National Research Institute. The seven domestic 
observers were: Margaret Melton from Chuave, Doreen Ale from Kundiawa, Boney 
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Figure 17.1: Chuave District map 
The electorate  
 
Chuave Open electorate is in the 
east of Chimbu Province bordering the 
Eastern Highlands. Within Chimbu it 
abuts Karimui-Nomane Open electorate 
to the south and Sinasina-Yonggamugl 
to the west. The principal cash crop is 
smallholder coffee. A total of 30,876 
eligible voters were registered for the 
poll. The Chuave electorate has three 
local level governments (LLGs): 
Chuave, Elimbari and Siane. Chuave 
LLG has 13 wards with 10,077 
registered voters, Elimbari has 16 
wards with 10,794 registered voters, and Siane has 27 wards with 10,004 
registered voters. Some 69 polling sites were gazetted across the total of 56 
LLG wards for the 9 July poll. Multiple voting in Chimbu Province by Eastern 
Highlanders, which caused the 2006 by-election, is still very much in evidence 
across Siane LLG area. Border-crossing is also a problem in Chuave LLG, in 
the north at Mangiro and in the west at the border with Sinasina-Yonggamugl.  
 
Electoral awareness and CSO engagement 
 
Chuave people have good access to radio broadcasts and newspapers as the 
electorate is closer to Goroka and Kundiawa than other Chimbu electorates. The 
findings from our questionnaire indicate that people had heard the radio 
advertisements from the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC). 
They also mentioned that the LPV system was clearly explained by the Meri I 
Kirap Sapotim civil society organization (CSO) and Chimbu-based police 
during the awareness campaign. 
 
The voter survey 
 
140 voters (70 male and 70 female), most between the ages of 25 and 55, 
from around the Chuave electorate were interviewed on various aspects of the 
election. 40 per cent said that they did not know that there was a new electoral 
roll. 15 per cent indicated that they had filled out a claim-for-enrolment form 
while 40 per cent stated that they thought they were enrolled. 41 per cent of 
                                                                                                                                  
Waine from Gumine, Eric Uba from Sinasina, Matthias Kin from Karimui-Nomane, 
Kamane Kiage from Chuave and Limbia Tiagoba from Tari Pori in the Southern 
Highlands.  
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respondents said they had seen the verification teams in their areas, but only 14 
per cent reported that they had actually checked their names on the new roll.  
 
83 per cent of respondents stated that they were aware of the new LPV 
voting system and 54 per cent said that they felt that they knew how to vote 
properly under LPV. 43 per cent had attended LPV and civic awareness prior to 
the election, and of these 70 per cent indicated that the LPV awareness would 
change the way they voted, especially in terms of the distribution of preferences. 
68 per cent had seen, read, or heard of, the PNGEC election advertisements on 
EMTV, radio, and in the newspapers. 71 per cent indicated they would be able 
to vote more freely than in the 2002 election. 23 per cent had heard about the 
new procedures for gender segregation at the time of polling. 70 per cent of 
respondents also said that they were now more aware of the dangers of unsafe 
sex and other consequences of being unfaithful in their marriages. Those 
interviewed spoke highly of Meri I Kirap Sapotim as an effective medium of 
communication and awareness, and praised the Chimbu police for a job well 
done in ensuring security during the elections.  
 
On the whole, the voter survey suggested that LPV and HIV/AIDS 
awareness were well conducted in the Chuave Open electorate, such that the 
majority of voters cast valid votes under the LPV system, and many understood 
the dangers of unsafe sex during the election.  
 
After the poll, 46 per cent of people interviewed said that the awareness had 
changed the way they voted, but as revealed during the counting, local 
candidates still scored most votes. The awareness thus does not seem to have 
had much impact on voters’ attitudes and behaviour (see below). Voter 
education and awareness has to be a long- term program and not one started just 
months before the issue of the writs. Part of the process must be that people 
become aware of the need to get on the electoral roll to participate in a free and 
fair electoral process.  
 
The new electoral roll 
 
A new roll was prepared for Chuave in late 2005; it was amended before the 
2006 by-election and again before the 2007 general election. The 2002 common 
roll for Chuave Open carried 53,125 names, and 49,971 votes were used. The 
estimated adult population (projected from the 2000 census, which was itself 
inflated) was 23,156, so that 215 per cent of eligible citizens voted in 2002. That 
would have included many under-age voters. In the May 2004 Chimbu 
Provincial by-election the number of ballot papers distributed was arbitrarily 
reduced by 10 per cent and some 44,375 votes were collected. In order to 
correct such anomalies, what was intended to be a completely new roll was 
constructed in October-November 2005, which reduced the roll size by 36 per 
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cent, leaving 34,115 names on the preliminary roll, 137 per cent of the estimated 
adult population. In 2006, some 32,837 votes were collected (about 8,000 more 
than the adult population). Only 1,623 ballot papers (4.7 per cent) were unused 
(Standish and Kaupa 2006:18-20). In practice, the so-called ‘new electoral roll’ 
had been based upon the previous common roll. In 2007 some 30,136 formal 
ballot papers were collected.   
 
In contrast with the apparent success of the voter awareness program, there 
was little participation in voter registration. Only 15 per cent of the 140 
respondents to the questionnaire said they had completed their own enrolment 
claim forms, and only 14 per cent had checked to verify their enrolment status. 
The rest of the people failed to understand the importance of electoral 
registration. The general assumption was that the kiap (government officials) 
and councillors would do the roll work for them.  
 
The local observers reported that during the enrolment, forms had been filled 
in by ward councillors and kiap, not by the people. The kiap and councillors 
also did the verification of the new electoral roll. Most people said that the kiap 
and councillors who did the update did so according to their affiliations to 
candidates and their local interests. Most people never asked for an enrolment 
form or even gave their consent for the councillors or kiap to register their 
names on their behalf, and never bothered to verify their names on the new roll. 
The verification was done at Chuave district headquarters and the Kundiawa 
electoral office – both of which require quite an effort to get to.  
 
The electoral roll was thus still problematic, however the Chuave people, 
having experienced the 2006 by-election with the new alphabetical electoral 
roll, knew how they would vote, deviating from official procedures such as roll 
calls of listed names. People all over the electorate complained about the 
alphabetical layout of the roll, saying that in future the roll should be structured 
in accordance with how the community is organized through sub-clans and the 
lineage system. Unless that is done there is little chance of regulating voting and 
preventing fraud, because a poor roll leads to double voting, conflict over left-
over papers, and other problems. The electoral roll updating should use the 
existing LLG ward structures. Screening committees are needed to enable the 
appointment of enrolment officials with integrity (weaknesses in the roll are 
further discussed below).  
 
Nomination and candidate information 
 
A total of 29 candidates nominated (compared with 24 in the 2006 by-
election) of whom 13 were new candidates. Chuave LLG and Elimbari LLG 
each had 10 candidates and Siane LLG had 9, so all LLGs’ votes were 
fragmented. One candidate, Ananias Popo, died during the campaign period 
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while in Wabag. Two former members of Parliament, David Mai and David 
Anggo, contested along with the incumbent Jim Nomane. No women contested, 
although one had stood in 2002. 
 
Table 17.1: Candidate information 
No. Candidate Previously 
contested 
LLG Education/ 
occupation 
Party 
10 George King Yauwe  Siane UPNG; public 
servant  
Peoples Congress 
Party 
11 Supa Tony Tabie 2006  Elimbari Educator independent 
12 Jack G. Kaupa 2006 Siane  independent 
13 Bomai Philip Tonari  Elimbari  independent 
14 Jim J. Nomane Sitting 
MP 
Several times Siane Unitech; 
Engineer  
PNG Kantri Pati 
15 Peter Iori Moorewer 2006  Elimbari UPNG  
Independent 
16 Alfred Rongo Several times Siane UOG National Party 
17 Abraham Gene Tisa  Chuave Unitech Independent 
18 Songan Julius K. 
Famundi 
 Siane UPNG; 
Clergyman  
Independent 
19 David Mori 2006  Chuave Secondary 
school teacher 
United Party 
20 George Supa Several times Chuave Policeman  
21 Jacob Bongi Kai  Chuave Unitech  Independent 
22 Tony DinDongo Keago  Elimbari  independent 
23 Goerge Goi Mume Several times Elimbari UPNG Yumi Reform Parti 
24 David Goro Mai ex-MP Several times Elimbari UPNG; lawyer independent 
25 Barex Goro Bandi  Elimbari UOG; educator independent 
26 James Digal Supa 2002 Elimbari  independent 
27 Samuel Tine  Elimbari Primary school 
teacher  
independent 
28 David Anggo ex-MP Several times Siane Diplomat New Generation 
Party 
29 Huruena Copland 
Nomane 
Once before Siane  independent 
30 Goro Stone Arigae 2002 Chuave UPNG; food 
technologist 
Independent  
31 Ananias Popo  Siane Educator  
32 John Garua  Chuave Secondary 
school teacher 
Independent 
33 Joe Amu Eremugo  Chuave Unitech  Star Alliance 
34 Francis Kaupa  Siane Unitech; mine 
engineer   
National Alliance  
35 Simeon Gene 2006  Chuave PMV owner Independent 
36 Temai Timothy 
Komane 
Several times Elimbari Unitech; 
agriculturalist  
PNC 
37 Gunua Gene 2006  Chuave Unitech Independent 
38 Paul Gerry Gomia  Chuave Secondary 
school teacher 
PDM 
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The campaign: peaceful and more accommodative 
 
Compared to 2002, the campaigning under LPV in 2007 was more 
accommodative and peaceful, as in the 2006 by-election. Candidates were able 
to move freely across the electorate seeking necessary preferences from within 
each other’s base vote areas, and voters also moved freely, a contrast with the 
blocking of candidates’ territories in elections up until 2006. There was only 
one Chuave candidate in the 2004 Chimbu by-election, and his supporters 
blocked other candidates and voters leaving from Chuave District.  
 
The LPV system encourages a degree of cooperation between some 
candidates, if not all, and avoidance of loud confrontations. Freedom of speech 
and access to rival ethnic territories encouraged quieter behaviour. Candidates 
knew very well that primary votes were predetermined for local candidates, and 
made their public speeches diplomatically. At the same time, many 
unscrupulously facilitated large-scale campaign gifting. Vote-buying and 
enticement in various forms was widespread, both directly and openly or 
capitalizing on custom. Candidates could not resist political double standards, as 
when they made speeches on good governance and yet participated actively in 
political gifting. Voters went around, sometimes with more than three 
candidates, accepting gifts from all and then turned around to vote their own 
clan’s man. Voters sought and accepted campaign gifting thankfully, solemnly 
claiming that being Christians they would repay in votes what they gained by 
selling their freedom of choice. 
 
After the by-elections and awareness, the public had some knowledge of 
how the LPV system would operate in the counting process. Candidates and 
voters knew the importance of preferences. There were several public awareness 
sessions on good governance which emphasized problems like corruption, and 
highlighted the characteristics of good leaders. The candidates publicly 
supported good governance and good leaders at rallies but hypocrisy was rife as 
some renowned candidates dished-out cash openly and covertly.  
 
Elections in Chimbu are usually times of great excitement. People were 
accustomed to election festivities and fever, and some complained that this 
election was getting boring. ‘Once campaign gifting is stopped then elections in 
the future will have no flavour’, one said. Campaign gifting has become an 
accepted norm. The good governance awareness program pointed out that, 
‘Candidates who do political gifting are abusing people’s freedom of choice and 
the process contributes to corruption’. It is probable that this awareness 
impacted in the distribution of preferences at the poll, and some 46 per cent of 
those interviewed said it had changed the way they voted. However, this did not 
stop candidates trying to sway voters with their generosity. Campaign gifting by 
candidates was widespread, but the results revealed that the practice was 
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expensive and had little or no benefit. Thus, there are signs that the LPV system 
may eventually reduce political gifting if the awareness continues to change the 
mindset of people and if candidates come to see it as a waste of resources.  
 
The Chuave election was not entirely trouble-free, however. There were a 
few incidents during campaigning and polling of candidates being in possession 
of illegal firearms whilst their supporters controlled voters. One person was 
reported killed in Siane during voting. After the poll there was a tribal clash as 
an aftermath of the election at Gogo and Wangoi in Elimbari LLG.  
 
Some of the observers stated that supporters of two Siane candidates, Francis 
Kaupa (former head of the Mineral Resources Development Company, and a 
National Alliance candidate) and Jim Nomane (MP, Country Party), had 
violently attacked each other.  However, before the poll at Chuave police station 
the two sorted out their differences. Police later arrested Francis Kaupa for 
being in possession of firearms without a licence. The press gave front page 
coverage to the incident. When I interviewed Francis Kaupa he stated that 
money elections are becoming part of the culture; he himself spent ‘a fair bit’ 
during the campaign.  
 
Some supporters were seen with bush knives and axes and one was even 
seen with a home-made gun. Nevertheless, campaigning in the 2007 election 
was generally accommodative and peaceful.  
 
Campaign rallies 
 
There were no colourful party and nomination rallies as there were in 
previous elections. Only two campaign rallies were observed. The first, held in 
Chuave township, was organized by Meri I Kirap Sapotim, the good governance 
and women’s advancement advocacy NGO. The second was held at Gogo 
village, organized by the people of Elimbari. Meri I Kirap Sapotim had been 
requested to facilitate another rally at Gogo but declined as they were doing 
domestic observation.  
 
Most candidates who attended the rallies worked together for a peaceful and 
educated debate. The discussion focused on corruption and good governance at 
the two rallies. Another issue was the call to stop ‘campaign houses’ (see 
below). The candidates also stressed the importance of LPV and the use of 
preferences. According to the observers, a total of 1,200 males, 600 females and 
250 children witnessed the two rallies.  
 
Political party campaigning had no significant effect. Political parties 
mattered little to the people, though party leaders such as Sir Julius Chan and 
Peter O’Neill visited Chuave electorate.  
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Security 
 
Additional security personnel were deployed to Chimbu on 16 June, weeks 
before the commencement of ballot paper distribution and polling. 
 
Ballot papers and other polling necessities were escorted by polling officials 
and security personnel to designated areas. After the polling all the papers were 
returned to the police station under heavy security. 
 
The security provided by police and soldiers was commendable. The high 
levels of discipline shown by Defence Force personnel contrasted with previous 
deployments, which were marked by immorality and brutality. Community 
resentment of security forces changed to acceptance and morale in the security 
forces was high. Cooperation between the security forces and the returning 
officer was good. The security force radio provided an effective means of 
communication. The police with field radios were in control of entire polling 
teams but referred matters to the returning officer.  
 
There were a few instances where the security forces had to use force as 
deterrence to troublemakers, and mobile police squads defused some tense 
situations. Security forces contained most of the election-related violence until 
after the declaration of the result, but some violence erupted after the 
declaration, when the additional security forces had left. In one tribal clash in 
the aftermath of the election the West Elimbari people fought East Elimbari 
people, resulting in two deaths. 
 
HIV/AIDS and gender  
 
The many social gatherings associated with elections pose a threat of the 
spread of HIV/AIDS at election times. Activities are often centred on ‘campaign 
houses’, where reportedly women were sometimes used to gather support and 
collect votes. It is not clear whether the women were acting voluntarily. Security 
personnel were on their best behaviour ensuring that women were not abused by 
candidates or their male supporters. Campaign houses were watched to ensure 
that if there was any abuse of women it was kept to a minimum. Before the poll 
65 per cent of the 140 people interviewed said that they had attended election-
related HIV/AIDS awareness sessions. 
 
All candidates had women supporting them. Women openly spoke their 
minds, contributed through cooking, dancing and singing, and took control of 
hospitality. Five of the seven observers stated that on average 30 per cent of the 
population that attended day-time rallies and campaigns were women and 17 per 
cent were young girls. They also reported that on average 38 per cent of the 
population attending campaign houses at night were women and 24 per cent 
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young girls. In this context, it is notable that Defence Force soldiers were well 
behaved during the 2007 general election, compared with previous experiences.  
 
Observers reported that women were confident that they would be able to 
vote freely. In 2007 women were given the long overdue chance to cast their 
votes separately. At most polling stations there were separate voting 
compartments for female and male voters. Before voting, about one quarter of 
those interviewed said that they had heard about the new procedures for gender 
segregation during polling; after voting, 91 per cent said that they appreciated 
the gender-segregated voting. 
 
More women voted and more took part as polling officials than in the 2006 
by-election, and there were many women counting officials. In Kerowagi at 
least 80 polling officials were women. Gradually, male dominance in election 
culture is changing.   
 
Polling  
 
Polling took place over two days, 11-12 July, after two days’ delay because 
the security forces were unable to turn up on schedule. There were 69 polling 
teams, 27 in Siane, 21 in Elimbari and 21 in Chuave.  
 
In the few months prior to polling the weather was dry, so accessibility was 
tolerable despite the dreadful road conditions. But the week before polling 
teams moved out was marked by downpours of heavy rain which delayed 
polling. Only 3 of the 26 hired vehicles were able to traverse the slippery roads.  
 
At polling places, the administration of voting was often difficult to manage 
because of the communities’ determination to corrupt the processes to help their 
local candidates. Polling officials and the few security personnel at each polling 
place were quite outnumbered and presiding officers and the police were 
powerless to prevent electoral malpractice. The Defence Force personnel were 
constantly on the move, checking potential trouble spots with small teams, and 
not able to deal with routine polling administration.  
 
Nevertheless administration of the election was generally successful because 
of prudent forward planning by the experienced returning officer. Poor 
administrative support and lack of consistent funding from headquarters for 
polling preparation did not have much impact since in Chuave most officials 
and the public knew the routine and basic LPV requirements as a result of the 
by-election in August 2006. 
 
As expected, voting was peaceful, because ‘community consent’ was 
paramount at most polling places — in other words, community members had 
252      Election 2007 
 
little choice but to vote as a bloc. ‘Community consensus’ corrupts the election 
as an expression of citizen’s individual choice; voting may seem secret but it 
was ‘transparent’ in that everybody knew for whom each individual was voting. 
Voting was a community issue not a personal choice. If individuals wanted 
secret, personal voting they would have to answer to the community. Breaking 
the law for the benefit of the community was seen as heroic and mandatory. The 
community was driven to vote to the last registered voter on the roll, using all 
available ballot papers. Multiple voting was needed to keep their local candidate 
in the race. The principle of ‘one citizen one vote’, and secret ballot were not 
applicable. 
 
Chuave people, unlike their western neighbours, do not prolong ethnic 
clashes, perhaps because they have a different clan and tribal structure. 
However, they have strong clans and are a deeply divided society. This is shown 
in the common expressions: ‘G for G’ or ‘K for K’ (meaning ‘Gomia for 
Gomia’ and ‘Kamare for Kamare’). Clan and tribal affiliation results in 
community consensus which is manifested in controlled bloc voting. The poll 
results confirmed the practice of bloc votes, in that local candidates scored more 
than 90 per cent of first preferences in ballot boxes used at single polling places. 
‘Outside’ tribal or clan candidates who had strong connections shared the other 
preferences in the box. Under LPV the election is accommodative to a limited 
extent, however voter intimidation and bloc voting were still prevalent in 2007.  
 
The roll was not used to identify voters. At all polling stations, the voters 
formed two lines – one for man and one for meri – or a single line with both 
sexes queuing up to vote. Names were called in some places but mostly just 
‘Next!’ or ‘Meri!’ or ‘Man!’. The indelible ink intended to prevent cheating was 
of no use because it can be erased2. 
 
Among 120 voters interviewed after the poll, 97.5 per cent had voted, and 
over 60 per cent said that they had known how to vote properly. However, 42 
per cent said that they had found the new voting system confusing and a third 
said that they had required assistance in voting. 21 per cent reported that they 
had experienced intimidation while voting. However the great majority (93 per 
cent) felt that the 2007 election was much better than 2002 election conducted 
under FPTP voting.   
 
According to the observers at six polling places, on average 9 per cent of 
those who voted were clearly under the legal voting age of eighteen. Of the 14 
per cent who said they had filled in an enrolment claim, 97 per cent had voted. 
Some 40 per cent thought their names were on the roll. This information does 
not correlate, but many people registered the names of others, including under-
                                                     
2 The efficacy of indelible ink is also discussed in chapter 27. 
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aged people, and multiple voters voted on behalf of others. Of those interviewed 
after voting, 33 per cent admitted that they voted more than once. The extent of 
electoral fraud suggests that citizens did not have a fair and equal vote, and 
often not a free vote.  
 
The 2007 election introduced a new ballot paper, which was different from 
that used in the 2004 and 2007 LPV by-elections. Candidates’ pictures and party 
details were listed on posters, and each candidate was allocated a number. Using 
these posters, voters had to write the numbers or names of three candidates onto 
the ballot paper in order to vote formally, and do the same for both Open and 
Provincial seats. However candidate posters were issued very late and were very 
small and confusing to most of the voters. It took about three to six minutes for 
old and illiterate voters to vote. This helped justify the existing practice in 
Chuave (and the highlands generally) of local men ‘assisting’ voters who 
needed help, when there were insufficient polling officials to perform this task. 
These people, often the agents of candidates, then also checked each ballot 
paper for formality before it was deposited in the ballot box. Incorrectly marked 
ballot papers were deemed informal and removed from the count. In 2007, the 
informal vote was 0.7 per cent of the total vote, up from the 0.4 per cent 
informal vote in 2006. This is a very low informal vote, and can only be 
explained by the high number of assisted voters, who happened to ensure that 
the community consensus was followed.  
 
The public seemed to regard these flaws in electoral administration as 
acceptable, because 93 per cent of the respondents said that the 2007 election 
was a good outcome and better than previous elections.  
 
Counting  
 
The scrutiny of votes took place at Dixon’s Oval, Kundiawa, about 30 km 
west of Chuave. The counting centre was open and accessible to everybody. The 
scrutineers stood outside the makeshift shelter during the counting period and 
had a good view of the whole process. The candidates were allocated seats 
outside the counting fence, enabling them to watch but not take part.  
 
There was good liaison between the many parties involved during the 
counting — the provincial election manager, returning officers, counting 
officials, security forces, observers, candidates, scrutineers and the PNGEC 
headquarters in Port Moresby. Most of the parties communicated verbally; some 
used mobile phones.  
 
The observers noted that the security forces were very strict. There were four 
checkpoints with fully armed personnel doing thorough checks of bags, folders 
wallets, shoes and the entire person to prevent any counting fraud with extra 
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ballot papers or bribery of counting staff. Any suspected person, including 
counting officials arriving late, were punished on the spot and forced to do 
push-ups or sit-ups, or were kicked or belted, and most of the security personnel 
swore at the offenders. There were no serious offenders, as in previous 
elections, that warranted charges.  
 
Some of the observers reported that most of the counting officials were not 
fully trained and had little prior knowledge of LPV counting processes. Most of 
the scrutineers were ill-prepared and did not fully understand the LPV counting 
process. This led to some confusion and delay in the early stages of the count. 
Nevertheless, despite some recounts during the primary count to make sure 
figures were accurate, the counting process went well.  
 
About half the counting officials in the Chimbu provincial counting centre 
were women, following a pattern established in 2004. Women seem to be 
regarded as less likely than men to commit fraud in elections. 
 
Results  
 
The count by the Chuave team was more efficient than that in other open 
electorates and was the first completed. This was due to the selection of some 
senior experienced officers and the use of excellent management practices at the 
counting centre. Rotating of counting officials and appointment of supervisors 
for each shift helped make the counting efficient. Having an open and 
transparent process by double checking and allowing scrutineers to understand 
and witness every step reduced suspicion, and collaboration speeded up what 
was a complex process.  
 
The winner in Chuave was declared on the 25 July. The sitting MP, Jim J. 
Nomane from Siane, was declared with 56 per cent of votes in the final count. 
The runner-up, Temai Timothy Komane from Kureri village, Elimbari, collected 
44 per cent. Looking at the mandate as a proportion of total allowable votes, 
however, the winner scored only 31.6 per cent of total votes while the runner-up 
scored 24.8 per cent; exhausted ballot papers — those eliminated from the count 
– totalled 12,867, 43.6 per cent of the 30,611 allowable ballot papers.  
 
Nomane led on first preferences with 4,931 votes (16.1 per cent of allowable 
votes), while the runner-up scored 3,296 first preferences.  The winner collected 
4,740 preferences (49.0 per cent of his final tally) and so won with a wide 
spread of support, as he had in 2006. The runner-up, Komane, scored 3,296 
primary votes and gained 4,301 second and third preferences, which was fewer 
than the winner but 56.6 per cent of his final tally. (See results table in the 
Appendix at the end of this chapter).  
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Compared to the 2006 by-election, the 2007 election showed a reduction in 
the proportion of ballot papers exhausted during the eliminations, which 
suggests that voters directed their preferences towards stronger candidates, and 
that fewer preferences were ‘wasted’ on minor candidates. In 2006 some 20,381 
of 32,691 votes (62 per cent) were exhausted; that meant the ‘absolute majority’ 
was reached from only 39 per cent of the allowable ballot papers. In 2007 the 
corresponding figure was 56.4 per cent.  
 
With two previous experiences of LPV, the Chuave voters had clearly learnt 
how to use their votes more effectively. In 2007, with 29 candidates, five more 
candidates than in 2006, Nomane received a higher primary vote (16.1 per cent 
of the allowable first preference votes) than in 2006 (13 per cent).  
 
A more dramatic change is shown by comparison with 2002, when there 
were 37 candidates, nine more than 2007. In 2002 the winner, David Anggo, 
received 4,495 votes and his mandate under first-past-the-post was 9 per cent of 
the 49,909 votes counted. In 2002 Jim Nomane was the runner-up receiving 
4,403 votes (8 per cent). His mandate thus increased considerably in 2006 and 
2007.  
 
There is always a problem determining causation, and LPV was not the only 
factor which had changed Chuave politics by 2007, another being that 37 per 
cent fewer votes were allowed in the count. Nomane and Anggo both come 
from the Siane LLG, where the local political balance had changed. Nomane, 
the younger man, had created a stronger base than Anggo, as analysed in our 
2006 report (Standish and Kaupa 2006). In 2007 Nomane doubled his primary 
vote while Anggo lost more than half his vote, dropping to 2,075 (7 per cent). 
Nomane’s increased final tally in 2007 derived mainly from the receipt of 53 
per cent of preferences active in the final count. Given these major changes, 
Nomane’s 32 per cent mandate in 2007 is not directly comparable to Anggo’s 9 
per cent mandate in 2002.  
 
An overview of outcomes 
 
The 2007 election was an improvement on previous Chuave elections. The 
security forces sought public cooperation, rather than intimidating people. Their 
behaviour was professional and disciplined compared to behaviour observed 
previously. The heightened security probably deterred overt intimidation and the 
open use of firearms at polling booths, but the limited size of security forces in 
the communities meant that they had little effect on the actual polling, because 
they were outnumbered by highly motivated people determined to cheat to help 
their candidates. Voters managed their own polling places in their own way. 
Electoral officials empowered to manage polling were powerless at the polling 
sites. Political parties were regarded as insignificant by voters. How, then, was 
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the 2007 election in Chuave more peaceful, accommodative and better than the 
2002 election?  
 
Rather than challenging each other aggressively, as in previous elections, the 
candidates debated publicly, addressing neutral common issues such as 
corruption and the need to promote good governance, though they displayed 
double standards when they sought to exploit the customary ethic of reciprocity 
(‘give and take’) by practicing modern political gifting. Campaigning for the 
LPV election was expected to be more accommodative than under FPTP, and it 
was — although it seemed that the price of access was more widespread 
generosity by candidates in order to get a hearing and obtain pledges of primary 
votes or preferences. The LPV system allowed village people to accommodate 
their wantok and friends in distributing preferences while voting. Yet strong 
affiliations for local candidates predetermined the distribution of preferences. 
Paradoxically, voter intimidation, multiple-voting and underage voting enabled 
polling within local communities to be peaceful, with voters required to follow 
their community’s consensus. 
 
Compared with 2002, there were fewer campaign houses and feasting was 
less evident. No loud party rallies were held, and candidates attended only two 
public rallies on designated neutral locations to debate good governance and 
corruption issues. The winning candidate received a stronger mandate than in 
the 2006 by-election. Campaign gifting had worked in the 2006 by-election but 
not in 2007. Local communities overrode important election procedures. 
Nonetheless more women were seen voting freely and participating in the 
electoral process.  
 
All these good indicators failed to override the element of bloc voting. From 
observing the count, it was clear that primary votes and preferences were shared 
according to local affiliations, and local candidates scored more than 90 per cent 
in many polling places. The results from individual boxes from the 69 polling 
locations showed that results were still influenced by community consensus, 
with widespread bloc voting; preferences are controlled by local candidates and 
their supporters. In this sense, for voters in their villages, the LPV election was 
seen as much the same as the FPTP system.  
 
The LPV system provides scope for a greatly increased mandate, but in 
Chuave in 2007 the elected member still received less than half the votes in the 
electorate. The bulk of each candidate’s votes and preferences came from 
specific sections of the electorate; as in previous elections, community 
consensus was overwhelming. The change from FPTP to LPV has not, to date, 
helped create ‘people’s rule’. 
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The first full use of the OLIPPAC seems to have had little or no influence at 
the community level, in terms of mobilizing people to vote for political parties. 
In Chuave the outcome of the election was much the same as in the previous 
elections, in that local factors were of primary importance.  
 
In the highlands it will probably take a while before the people participate in 
a truly national election. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 17.2: Voting statistics Chuave Open electorate, 2007 election 
Number of registered voters  31034  
Total votes cast 30838  
Informal votes 227 (0.7% of total ballots cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 30611  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 17268  
Total votes distributed 22384  
Exhausted ballot papers 13343 (43.6% of total allowable papers) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 8635  
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Figure 18.1: Wabag District map 
18 LPV IN ENGA: THE WABAG OPEN ELECTORATE 
 
Philip Gibbs1 
 
Politics in Enga Province is known for its intensity and sometimes violence. I 
have written previously about the ‘political culture’ that has emerged (Gibbs 
2004, 2006). It is a culture which draws on traditions, but adapts to modern 
realities. 
 
The previous election in 2002 did not go well in Enga. The polling began a 
week later than planned and was drawn out for two weeks in a drama involving 
hijacked ballot boxes, the bombing of voting papers in containers beside the 
Wabag Police station, and fatal shootings at one polling place (The National 12-
14 July 2002:1-2; Independent 1 August 2002:2).  
 
Following the 2002 election, Daniel Kapi successfully challenged Samuel 
Abal’s win in the Wabag Open seat in the National and Supreme Courts. The 
ensuing 2004 by-election was the first in Enga to use the limited preferential 
voting (LPV) system, though the focus throughout the by-election remained on 
first preferences. Technically, Samuel Tei Abal won using preferences. 
However, he was well ahead across most of the electorate with the (38 per cent) 
first preference vote and the primary vote lead ensured his victory (Gibbs 2006). 
 
After a comparison with previous elections, this paper will consider issues 
from the campaign period, polling, and counting in the Wabag Open electorate 
in the 2007 general election. Voting patterns and reasons behind those patterns 
will be treated in detail, followed by 
reflection on the implications for 
democracy in Enga. Of particular interest 
is how the LPV system has functioned, 
and how Enga political culture is 
managing the LPV system.  
 
Data came from a study of the content 
of election campaign speeches, interviews 
with key persons and people ‘on the 
street’, observation of campaigning and 
polling, and the collation and analysis of 
polling results. 
 
                                                     
1 I wish to acknowledge the coordination of the National Research Institute and funding 
by AusAID through the Electoral Support Program, members of the Electoral 
Commission, particularly those in Wabag, the domestic observer team, and all those 
people in Enga and elsewhere who assisted in any way in the research for this paper.  
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Comparison with previous elections 
 
In the Wabag Open electorate in 2007 there were 19 candidates compared 
with 25 candidates five years previously. Of those19, 6 had stood in the 2002 
election and 5 in the 2004 by-election. Only 2 of these had stood before in both 
the 2002 and 2004 elections. 
Table 18.1 shows how the election in 2007 saw a radical drop in the number 
of papers issued, largely due to the creation of a new electoral roll. Also, in both 
2004 and 2007, almost all ballot boxes were counted, unlike the situation in 
2002 when containers at the Wabag Police Station were bombed.  
 
Table 18.1: Wabag Open: comparison 2002, 2004 and 2007 
Issue 2002 2004 2007 
Number of candidates 25 19 19 
Number of polling places 72 64 66 
Ballot papers issued to polling places 67,832 71,000 47,798 
Ballot papers counted 51,002 53,867 44,689 
Ballot papers unused and returned or burned by officials 4,178 17,133 3,109 
Ballot boxes destroyed or disputed and not counted 13 0 1 
 
Despite the changes, the electoral roll in Enga still had serious deficiencies. 
In most cases the enrolment teams did not bring enrolment forms to the people, 
but filled in the forms themselves for both the initial enrolment and the 
verification. This meant that some people missed out. For example, my 
checking of the roll for the Lakemanda ward revealed that the names of 289 
eligible voters were not on the roll. Nearly all these people thought their names 
were on the roll, and when it came to polling day and their names were absent 
there was a great deal of anger — so much so that they told the polling officials 
to take the ballot box back to Wabag and to return with a correct roll. Police and 
PNGDF personnel convinced them to vote the following day, but only with a lot 
of disruption from disgruntled clan members. 
 
Table 18.2 shows how, despite the fact that some people claimed their names 
were not included, there was still a major inflation of the roll compared to 
projected figures from the year 2000 census. Some names were missing, while 
at the same time inaccuracies inflated the roll, particularly names duplicated in 
different wards — for example, a woman whose name is recorded both with her 
husband’s clan and also in another ward with her family of origin.  
 
The late arrival of the electoral rolls in the last week of June meant that there 
was no time for last minute changes or corrections, since polling started on 3 
July.  
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Table 18.2: Comparison of enrolment numbers over three elections in Enga 
District name 
(Open seat) 
1997 
enrolled
2000 
census 18+
2002 
enrolled
Estimated 
2007 eligible 
voters 
2007 
enrolled 
Kandep 25,058  49,122 28,500 42,318 
Kompiam-Ambum 25,445  74,171 28,500 39,486 
Lagaip-Porgera 51,206 135,587 57,500 95,006 
Wabag 34,657  72,759 39,000 47798 
Wapenamanda 2,892  79,564 36,000 49,785 
Enga Total 267,728 169,258 411,203 189,500 *274,393 
Notes: *45 per cent over census estimate. 
 
Campaign period 
 
The campaign period in Enga in 2007 was quieter than that of the 2002 
election. There were few large rallies with public addresses, and candidates 
seemed to prefer smaller clan-level gatherings. The focus of our enquiry at this 
time was on the 19 candidates for the Wabag Open Electorate. Except for the 
murder of a ‘Rambo’ (renowned gunman) at an election rally at Lenki (though 
the murder itself was not necessarily election-related) and a shooting incident at 
a rally on 9 June in Kandep (The National 19 June 2007:1-2) the campaign 
period was relatively peaceful in Enga. Bushknives and axes were seen at the 
rallies and during the campaign period, but not guns. 
 
Generally, there was freedom of movement in the province during the 
campaign period. However, there was some disruption of roads. For example, 
people from the Piyao clan at Tole organized a rally for Samuel Tei Abal, but 
some of Daniel Kapi’s supporters dug a drain across the road which stopped 
Abal from attending the rally and caused the rally to be postponed for several 
days. There was a lot of bad feeling about this in the clan. Some roads such as 
the Wabag to Sakarip highway were closed at times by people demanding the 
sitting MPs pay them for upgrading the roads.  
 
Rallies 
 
Election rallies are events where supporters of candidates can congregate to 
see how much support each candidate has. Rallies are organized by ‘hot’ 
candidates so as to see their supporters from different parts of the electorate in a 
procession to the grandstand. Rallies are also a time when ‘local scientist’ 
interpreters look for signs and interpret these signs to predict the future for the 
candidates involved. 
 
In past elections, rallies were being held from the time campaigning started 
to the end of the campaigning period. In 2007, in the Wabag Open electorate 
there were only six rallies during the whole period. The change is probably an 
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effect of the LPV voting system. Candidates fear that if they organize rallies, 
those voters who are planning to give their second and third preferences will 
come along with the ones who are coming to give their first preference and they 
will find it hard to distinguish how many first votes they will collect from the 
supporters. Many think it is a waste of resources to organize a rally just to get a 
few first preferences and more second and third preferences. 
 
Popular themes in rally speeches were corruption and the use of public 
funds, lack of development in the province, and law and order. Candidates 
seldom mentioned the LPV system other than asking for first preferences (or in 
the case of Philip Neri, second preferences if people had already made up their 
minds about their first preference). 
 
Some of the speeches were on topics that run quite contrary to the spirit of a 
free vote in a preferential voting system. For example, Pato Potane, in a rally at 
Lenki (22 June 2007) encouraged clan bloc voting: ‘If any Dep, Lipin and 
Yakain votes for somebody else, that shows that you are insane. We can get this 
member because the Governor is giving it to us and why not. Before we, the 
Yakains campaigned hard for Governor and he won and now he formed the new 
party and he is going away to form the next government and he wants me to 
become caretaker for Enga’.  
 
At another rally at Kamas (26 June 2007) Pato Potane, referring to family 
ties, encouraged people to vote along family lines. His wife comes from there, 
so in addressing his in-laws he said that this was a chance for them to vote for 
their ‘sister’ (meaning to vote for him who was married to their sister). He 
reinforced this argument with the following image: ‘No fathers forsake their 
daughters and favour their sons. This is my land and thank you all my brothers 
and sisters-in-law. I want to assure you that I have base votes from the Yakain, 
Lipin and Dep and I am sure I will win this election and become the acting 
Governor so all my in-laws, please vote for me’.  
 
Samuel Tei Abal in his campaigning focused less on tribal ties and more on 
party politics for gaining first preferences. At Kopen (26 June 2007) he praised 
the Somare government: ‘The Somare government is likely to return to 
parliament and will take over the governing role again so I don’t want to be left 
out. I am unlikely to join Ipatas because I don’t want to be regarded as a yoyo 
by the people. I have a great interest in NA [the National Alliance party] and I 
encourage you to vote for me because I have done a lot for the electorate as well 
as the nation. Somare has accumulated funds of about K1.7 billion to save the 
country in the next five years, so I will be able to bring back to the people 
whatever portion of that amount would be given to me in terms of 
development’.  
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Some of the speech-making typically used metaphorical language which is 
fascinating yet hard to pin down to an exact meaning. For example, Philip Nere 
at Sari (25 June 2007) warned the Yapokon and Kalepetae clans that in listening 
to Daniel Kapi, ‘You are swinging in a wild man’s string bag’ (meaning that 
they might vote for a person who would come to take their votes and disappear 
like a stranger). In an allusion to the darker side of politics he continued, ‘I‘ll 
stay with you to do the marking and in the night I’ll come and check the list 
with 1st and 2nd votes or else I’ll press a button….’.  
 
Through such speeches candidates try to attract votes using various 
strategies. Maintaining a ‘base’ vote with one’s own clansmen and women is 
still essential. But with the LPV system, even more than before, it is important 
to exploit the opportunity for alliances. In some cases alliances based on links 
with clans who have more young warriors with high-powered firearms, or clans 
who have more members employed in the public and private sectors, 
overshadow traditional alliances maintained through intermarriage or pig 
exchange. 
 
Awareness 
 
Election awareness by the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission 
(PNGEC) was limited and late. Materials, including candidate posters, arrived 
only a week before polling. In previous elections, awareness was taken up by 
civil society groups, particularly by Caritas through the Catholic Church 
network. This time, because a (suspended) Catholic priest was standing for the 
Provincial seat, the Caritas awareness in Enga was very low-key, since they 
were concerned that they might be seen as supporting the priest candidate. Of 
the awareness that was conducted, either by the Electoral Commission or civil 
society groups, the focus was on the mechanics of the new way of voting rather 
than on issues of governance or civics (rights and the meaning of democracy) 
 
One of our observers commented, ‘People hear about democratic elections 
but they don’t really know what it means’. In fact, many leaders in Enga seem 
not interested in promoting a system of secret individual voting, as they stand to 
gain from the public group voting system which has become the norm in Enga 
electoral politics. If a few leaders decide who will receive the first preference of 
the clan as a whole, then what is the point of making people aware of an 
alternative system with individual secret voting? 
 
Parties and OLIPPAC 
 
It is hard to assess the impact of the electoral reforms: the Organic Law on 
the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates, 2003, and the new form of 
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limited preferential voting introduced in the August 2006 amendments to the 
Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections. 
 
OLIPPAC was supposed to strengthen political parties in election 
campaigning, voting and ultimately in the parliament and cabinet, in order to 
improve stability in governance. Parties did have a higher profile in the 2007 
elections than in 2002. Support or opposition to the National Alliance party 
(NA) was significant, with supporters of Governor Peter Ipatas’s People’s Party 
opposing NA. It seemed that NA was well funded. The sitting member for 
Wabag Open had access to over a million kina through District Support Grant 
funds. Though a party could legally only endorse one candidate in each 
electorate, it was common knowledge that there were independents with close 
links to certain parties; for example, Maso Samai, who stood as an independent, 
was known to be a NA supporter.  
 
LPV is designed to encourage candidates to seek preferences in each other’s 
base areas, leading to more collaborative campaigning, and ultimately to the 
election of MPs with wider popular mandates. This was the case in Enga, 
though as will be shown below, the people generally did not appreciate the 
significance of second and third preferences, and in many cases did not have a 
chance to utilize those preferences anyway because of group rather than 
individual voting. 
 
Bribery and treating prior to polling 
 
Elections are a ‘business’ in Enga. Candidates with money go around or send 
some of their supporters around with money to buy first votes from clans and 
families. We heard of only a few candidates or their supporters buying second 
or third preferences — at least until the night before the polling. The night 
before polling, near Wabag, first preferences were selling for K100, and second 
or third preferences for K30 or K20. Money would go to individuals or, more 
often, to councillors or clan leaders. 
 
There are various ways to gain favour other than with cash. Candidates also 
assisted with cars, food and drink, transporting bodies of the dead and 
contributing to funerary feasts. The sitting member for Wabag told people to 
‘clean’ roads and then paid money for it through the District Roads 
Improvement Program (DRIP).  
 
There does not appear to have been any policing of these practices during the 
2007 election, despite police (and civil society) warnings about bribery. How 
would one distinguish between genuine assistance and unacceptable treating? 
Bribery and treating appear to be well embedded in Enga political culture; such 
practice is called maiyu neo (give and eat) according to the principle of 
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reciprocity. After the 2002 election, those who supported losing candidates were 
called nanenge or ‘non-eaters’ (Gibbs and Lakane 2003). It seems that such 
gifting has a coercive dimension. When people found they could not vote at 
Lakemanda because their names were not on the roll, their complaints were not 
based on issues of franchise or democracy, but rather on the fact that they had 
taken money from a candidate and eaten his food and so were required to 
demonstrate on polling day that they were indeed giving their votes to him. In 
fact, LPV allows both candidates and voters to trade for three votes instead of 
only one.  
 
Polling  
 
Polling began on 3 July as planned. In most places polling commenced only 
in the afternoon of that day, so continued into 4 July, and for some outlying 
areas served by helicopters, such as Maramuni, it continued through to 9 July. 
There seemed to be a lot of confusion about transport and there was a bottleneck 
at the Wabag Primary School distribution centre with only one truck being 
allowed in at a time, thus further delaying the deployment of teams. 
 
Individual secret voting was a rarity in Enga. In some cases people did fill in 
their own ballot papers, but seldom alone or in secret. In many cases people 
voted in family groups, with the head of a family claiming ballot papers for his 
or her ‘family’ and then a small group of family members filling in the papers. 
In other cases, papers were filled in by scrutineers or representatives of 
candidates. Throughout Maramuni the common practice was for clan leaders to 
recruit a few literate young men to mark all the ballot papers according to what 
the leaders decided, while the majority of the population had no part in the 
voting. 
 
There was some serial voting — where people voted at different polling 
places (this is quite possible when there is ‘split’ voting for a ward, with copies 
of the same roll being used for several polling places, as happened at a number 
of locations in the Wabag Open Electorate). People who voted more than once 
might also have had their names enrolled in two or more resthouses or voted on 
behalf of absentees.  
 
At Tole, a candidate and his supporters had guns and controlled the voting so 
there was little say for the majority of the people of that resthouse. This practice 
was not acceptable to many members of the community. A person from Tole 
commented as follows: 
 
I heard three gun shots in the morning of the polling day. X fired 
again during the midst of the signing of the ballot papers.... Actual 
polling took place on the next day and we tried to force him to 
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leave the ballot papers and we would have secret polling but he 
never wanted to do so. Supporters of Potane, Kopamo and Sam got 
so mad that they marched in with bush knives and threatened to 
fight so he gave 250 to Kopamo, 30 to Potane and 30 to Sam. Ever 
since he started to contest in election, the Tole people have never 
exercised their democratic rights to vote a candidate. He has taken 
our rights away totally at gunpoint. He will never win any election 
because he robs his own people. All of us were looking forward to 
vote in the LPV system but it’s a sad thing that we never did. This 
is injustice! How are we going to choose good leaders when a 
gunman robs us off our democratic rights. We don’t want guns to 
rule this nation. Justice must prevail if we are to have good leaders. 
 
One wonders why no armed security personnel were stationed at Tole in 2007 
when it was common knowledge that guns had affected polling at Tole in 
previous elections. 
 
At Tumbilyam supporters of the local candidate came and took the box at 
gunpoint. The presiding officer was offered K250 if he would present the box 
for counting but he refused, so that box was ‘lost’ and was never presented at 
the counting centre. 
 
The box for Ainumanda was brought to Wakumare (Wabag Secondary 
School) because of fighting in the gazetted place. A candidate suspecting foul 
play brought security personnel who arrested the polling officials. The box was 
then taken to Wabag for polling, but after only 50 votes had been cast officials 
closed the polling after a commotion when it became apparent that anybody was 
able to come and vote there, not just people from Ainumanda.  
 
The electoral roll caused confusion in many places with whole families and 
subclans missing. Many of these people claimed to have given their names for 
the new roll and were incensed when the Electoral Commission claimed that it 
was their fault that their names did not appear on the roll. In some places, such 
as Maramuni, the roll was not used at all.  
 
In the Wabag electorate the returning officer (RO) used a method whereby 
several boxes shared the one ward-level electoral roll. These were referred to as 
‘split’ boxes (more correctly it would be a ‘split roll’). Thus, for one ward there 
might be two or even three boxes positioned in different places within a ward, 
catering for people from different clans or hauslain. The RO claimed that this 
was fairer for smaller clans to vote separately rather than risk being intimidated 
by a larger and more powerful clan. There were 16 ‘split’ boxes in the Wabag 
Open electorate. The idea has its merits, but does open up the risk of double 
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voting. When it came time for counting, ‘split’ boxes from the same ward were 
opened and counted together as if they came from one box or one polling place.  
  
Use of the roll 
 
Use of the rolls varied. In some places the names were called from the roll 
and a person answering to that name would go into the enclosure to collect 
voting papers. In other places names were not called, but simply marked off as 
people entered the polling enclosure. In other places names of a ‘family’ would 
be called and a small group would come to collect the papers for the whole 
family. In some places the roll was not used at all; in this case the roll merely 
served as a licence to receive a certain number of ballot papers. 
 
Table 18.7 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter shows the number of 
papers issued according to the roll, along with the number of marked papers 
returned for counting. An excess of papers presented for counting is regarded by 
the RO as a ‘miscount’ when papers were distributed in the pre-polling 
preparations the night before polling began. For the Wabag Open electorate 
there was no miscount greater than + 8, indicating that boxes were not ‘stuffed’ 
with more papers than were allowed for that box. 
 
There was some under-age voting, but this was not common, particularly 
when there was ‘family’ or ‘clan’ voting. With such voting a few senior family 
members collect and fill in voting papers for all the family members on the roll 
and there is no way of knowing if the name of the person called from the roll is 
under-age, a ‘ghost’, or not present at all.  
 
In many polling places fingers were not marked with ink and there appeared 
to be little attempt to prevent double or multiple voting. One woman told us that 
she had voted 25 times by going to get voting papers when names of people 
who were under-age or absent were called.  
 
Polling and LPV 
 
The LPV system was generally ignored in Enga in 2007. In the Wabag Open 
electorate, the 2004 by-election, using LPV, was essentially a race between two 
candidates, where the winner was leading all the way. In that by-election people 
did not see how LPV could affect the outcome of the elections. In the 2007 
election, most people were concerned only for their first choice and 
demonstrated little concern for the second and third choices. Sam Tei Abal was 
the favourite and many people thought that he could not be eliminated, so why 
bother about the other preferences? In this case, their prediction was right.  
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Some election awareness had been conducted in the province, mostly by 
civil society groups at schools and churches. People were shown an example of 
a voting paper and told that they would have three preferences, but it appeared 
that the awareness had little influence on the majority of the Enga populace with 
their strongly held practice of group voting for certain prominent candidates. 
Because of the group voting practice it is unclear whether LPV allowed women 
more freedom to vote.  
 
How then did those marking papers choose the second and third preferences? 
Our team asked ten people at each polling place and received a number of 
different responses. Some chose ‘hot’ candidates so that at least one of their 
choices would win. Some chose candidates who they were sure would lose so 
that the second and third choices would not possibly support a candidate who 
might compete seriously with the candidate of their first choice. Others said that 
they simply looked at the poster with the names and numbers of candidates and 
selected the second and third preferences at random. In a few cases, people 
traded second or third preferences as political credit for future alliances. Some 
traded second or third preferences for money. One man who had been chosen to 
fill in all the papers for his clan said: ‘I was so worried about first preference [I] 
didn’t care much about the second and third preferences’. 
 
A woman who filled in many ballot papers said, ‘I was very conscious and 
careful when I distributed the second and third preferences. If I gave the second 
and third preferences to the ‘hot candidates’ then it was like I was supporting 
them too and my first preferences would be a total waste. So what I did was that 
I had distributed the second and third preferences to the weak candidates. I did 
that purposely so that the weak candidates would be the first ones to be 
eliminated and my second and third preferences would become waste’. 
 
One person added, ‘This system is giving weak candidates chances to pick 
up during the counting process. It’s really hurting the ones who were in the 
lead’. 
 
In the minority of locations where people did actually vote, there were 
usually several helpers in the polling places and some would check all ballot 
papers before they went into the ballot box, perhaps checking for formality but 
also the direction of both votes and preferences.  
 
Comments by observers include the following: 
• Supporters were given ballot papers by family reps to mark. 
Women and older people had no chance of voting.  
• A wife of a certain regional candidate grabbed some ballot 
papers and marked them for her husband. The son came in 
later and did the same. 
LPV in Enga      271 
 
• Children voted in the parents’ names. Parents were too late to 
collect or mark ballot papers. Officials ignored the older 
voters.  
• A family I know well voted in three different polling places in 
two different electorates.  
• The polling officials had no control over the entire polling. 
They were forced to sit and sign the ballot papers.  
 
• To gain more votes, those who updated the common roll listed 
names of in-laws, cousins, ex-wives and deceased friends.  
• Voters who seemed unsure were asked if they could accept 
money.  
• A supporter said to voters in a whisper that anyone who has 
no choices of voting should see him.  
• An old man only gave his first preference to a scrutineer to 
mark. When asked why, he replied, ‘There was a fight about 
to erupt and I was scared!’ 
 
Someone said, ‘The LPV system is good but it’s anybody’s game! Anyone 
could win and this would create problems for us supporters if we have given 
first preferences to someone else. 
 
Perhaps the most telling comment heard was the following: ‘I did not 
practice my democratic rights. Someone else did on my behalf!’ 
 
Women and polling 
 
In the 2007 polling, there were supposed to be separate voting compartments 
for women, with women helpers (2007 General Election Bulletin No. 8). One 
would think that this would be culturally acceptable in Enga considering the 
separation of the sexes in many aspects of life, including in church. However, it 
seems that cultural separation does not count when it comes to the public realm 
and sharing power, so there was no separate voting of men and women in Enga. 
We observed one polling place with notices showing separate voting 
compartments for women, but this was not followed in practice. The rest of the 
notices remained in their original cartons in the Electoral Commission office in 
Wabag. 
 
Rights of women and gender issues were non-issues in the Enga elections. 
There were three women candidates in the province. At rallies, women were 
relied on for cooking food and for offering hospitality to those who came. 
Sometimes they would lead in singing. An Engan woman from Wabag wrote: 
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In most polling areas women have never voted themselves. When 
will the separate polling for women and men take place? We the 
females want to mark our leaders with our two fingers. I am 
frustrated to learn that separate polling never took place.  
 
Another woman commented: 
 
I am an LPV advocator in the province. I was proudly telling the 
female participants that we will have separate polling area for men 
and women. I am very sad that this never happened. When will this 
country start to recognize the potential of women? They think 
politics is men’s game and women have no part to play....There is 
an Enga saying: yana kuli nakandenge, mena kuli nakandenge, 
meaning you don’t see dogs or pigs bones. This is applied to 
women. The figurative meaning is that pigs and dogs have no 
history in the community. When they die that’s the end of them. 
Women are regarded as pigs’ bones and dogs’ bones because when 
they get married, they leave and go away to develop their 
husband’s place. With this mentality, they reckon women are unfit 
in the decision making body…. 
 
In this current election, very few of the females voted without 
intimidation. Most of us never voted through a democratic process. 
The big men have taken our rights away completely. The informal 
rate will be very low because certain individuals marked the 
papers. This is injustice to the female community. As a mother, I 
am very concerned for where my son’s future lies. Are the leaders 
driving this nation in the right direction? I hope the leaders are not 
acting the Titanic movie in PNG. 
 
Counting 
 
During the counting there was a problem with crossover voting – that is, 
people mixing the candidate numbers from open seats and provincial seats, 
writing the numbers or names of provincial candidates on open ballot papers 
and vice versa. This contributed to most of the informal papers. It is not obvious 
unless the voter writes names from the ‘wrong’ list or the numbers are 
obviously not valid numbers for that seat. It would help if voting papers for 
provincial and open seats were in obviously different colours. Despite the 
crossover voting, the number of informal votes was very low (293 informal 
votes from 44,673 votes cast in the whole electorate (0.7 per cent)), perhaps 
reflecting the manner of group voting done by just a few experienced people. It 
is notable that from the isolated Maramuni there are some boxes with no 
informal votes at all.  
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Counting for the Wabag Open electorate went quickly and relatively calmly. 
There was tension and a lot of delays with disputed boxes in other electorates. 
The way the disputes were dealt with – in many cases, telling them to take the 
case to the Court of Disputed Returns – left many people with a feeling that 
bold candidates and their supporters can get away with hijacking or tampering 
with ballot boxes; this may adversely affect the next election. 
 
After counting and notification of the results, in most cases people are able 
to see which group voted for whom and this has consequences, both immediate 
and long-term. A doctor at Wabag Hospital, when confronted by election-
related casualties coming in for treatment, commented:  
 
Probably after the counting we might have some casualties because 
some people claimed to be supporters and not have cast their votes. 
Moreover, they are not just counting the ballot boxes but stating the 
names of the places where voting took place. So then the 
candidates would know exactly where the votes are coming from. 
And if they know that they are going to get certain votes from 
some area, and if they don’t get those votes as they have used a lot 
of resources on campaign, that is when trouble will actually come. 
(Dr William Waro, Wabag Hospital 13 July 2007). 
 
Distribution of preferences 
 
Table 18.3 below shows how preferences were distributed during the 
exclusions for the Wabag Open electorate in 2007.2  Entries of particular 
interest are shown in bold.  In the seventh exclusion only 21 per cent of 
preferences went to the top three candidates. That 8 preferences (17 per cent of 
the preferences) went to Marinki is understandable as both Perano and Marinki 
are from Maramuni. However the 12 preferences (26 per cent) that went to 
Samuel Kopamo, and a further 11 (24 per cent) to Jonnes Kuringin are more 
difficult to explain.  
 
The fact that the majority of Kyangali’s preferences (tenth exclusion) went to 
Potane is probably because he comes from Birip which has close alliances with 
Potane’s base vote area. Besides, Kyangali’s candidature helped to split votes to 
disadvantage Abal. 
 
The majority of Samuel Kopamo’s preferences (twelfth exclusion) went to 
Daniel Kapi. They are from the same rest house. Also, despite Philip Nere’s 
                                                     
2 The figures for first preferences in Table 18.3 and Appendix 1 were taken from photos 
from the original tally sheets. Some figures for first preferences were changed as a result 
of scrutiny of votes as found in the official returns. 
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strong opposition to Daniel Kapi in the 2007 election, he used to be a manager 
with Kapi in the past and still has alliances with the same support base. 
 
Table 18.3: Distribution of preferences Wabag Open 2007 
Exclusions Primary 
vote 
Number of 
preferences 
distributed 
Abal Potane Kapi Percent of 
prefs going 
to the three 
1 David Kandiu Kaiti 1 1 - - 1 100 
2 Wialo Sakatao 5 5 2 2 1 100 
3 Julie Daniel  11 11 4 2 - 55 
4 John Kapi 11 11 4 2 1 64 
5 Simon Robert 22 22 3 6 3 55 
6 Micros Nea Apak 43 41 5 7 7 46 
7 Irai Isaac Perano 46 47 3 2 1 21 
8 Jonnes Kuringin 253 251 70 59 37 66 
9 Sakarawan Lomas 
Samuel Tulipet 
357 323 103 56 67 70 
10 Kandato Kyagali 872 867 21 256 79 41 
11 Minal Keoa Marinki 969 944 337 61 153 58 
12 Samuel Kopamo 1005 1045 219 138 355 68 
13 A1 Anton Wangae 1363 1381 433 561 239 89 
14 Philip Nere 1455 1362 554 186 319 78 
15 Maso Samai 2353 1984 577 501 622 86 
16 Malipu Yakali 6546 5200 1582 2274 1344 100 
17 Daniel Don Kapi 5914 2995 765 2230 100 
18 Pato Potane 8106  
19 Samuel Tei Abal 15065 
Votes gained through preferences 16490 4682
28%
6343
38%
3229
20% 
14254 
86% 
 
It is notable that 77.5 per cent of the formal votes were still live at the end of 
the final count and one can see that the first round leaders continued to lead with 
the top three candidates gaining 86 per cent of the preferences, indicating how 
the Wabag Open race was essentially a race between these three. Table 18.4 
shows how over the past three elections Daniel Kapi appears to have gradually 
lost support (from 20 per cent of the primary vote in 2002 to 13 per cent in 
2007), while Pato Potane has gained in popularity (from 9 per cent in 2002 to 18 
per cent in 2007). Pato Potane also gained the most from distribution of 
preferences. Samuel Abel has maintained his popularity, with 24 per cent of first 
preferences in 2002, 37 per cent in 2004 (when there were only two serious 
contenders), and 34 per cent in 2007 (when there were three principal 
contenders to share the first preferences). The winner won 58 per cent of the 
live votes after exclusions, but 44.8 per cent of the total valid votes. A summary 
of results appears in Table 18.8 in the Appendix of this chapter.  
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Table 18.4: Distribution of first preferences to the top three candidates 
     2002    2004    2007 
 First pref. Final count First pref. Final count 
 Votes  % Votes  % Votes  % Votes  % Votes  % 
Abal 12,438 24.7 20,230 37.9 25,754 53.2 15,065 33.9 19,939 58.0 
Potane  4,438  8.8 - - - -  8,106 18.3 14,449 42.0 
Kapi 10,234 20.3 15,922 29.8 22,661 46.8  5,914 13.3  
Total 27,110 53.8 36,152 67.7 48,415 100.0 29,085 65.5 34,388 100.0 
 
Factors influencing voting patterns 
 
Table 18.5 below details some voting patterns in the Wabag Open electorate. 
A selection of seven of the sixty-six polling places is included here. 
 
The seven polling places illustrate trends occurring throughout the electorate. 
One may see how people show solidarity in voting for certain candidates and 
also how they divide their votes to keep candidates and their supporters happy 
and to ensure their (the voters’) security. The following five factors emerge as 
the most significant factors influencing voting patterns:  
• Base vote. The candidate identifies with this place, and people consider 
him as ‘their’ candidate (see Aipanda and Teremanda). 
• Clan and tribal alliances. This might rely on traditional links such as 
blood ties or exchange of valuables, but may also include modern 
features such as fighting men with guns or public servants with 
influential jobs and regular salaries (see Rakamanda and Imi). 
• Intermarriage and relatives, either through men such as a brother and his 
relations through marriage, or through women such as one’s mother, 
sister or wife and their family (see Sopas, Lakayoko, and Teremanda). 
• Cash or projects — for roadwork, schools, health facilities. The link 
then is through the councillor who exerts influence on the voters of his 
ward (see Sopas and Kaiap). 
• Alliances with an influential person, for example with Governor Peter 
Ipatas, former Member Sir Albert Kipalan, or leading businessmen (see 
Teremanda). 
 
Other factors influencing voting patterns include the following: 
• Party influence (for example, the National Alliance had a strong 
positive influence at Kaiap and a negative influence at Tumbilyam). 
• Compensation — where a candidate has assisted with compensation to 
settle inter-clan violence, people feel an obligation towards that 
candidate. (See Sopas, Rakamanda and Pasalagus above). 
• Violence, real or potential (see Tumbilyam and Kaiap above). 
• ‘Tanim tebol’ — where leaders agree to give all the votes or almost all 
the votes to one candidate (see Aipanda and Pasalagus above). 
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Table 18.5: Results from Wabag Open with possible reasons for voter choice 
Polling  
station 
Roll Votes 
allowed
Major 
recipients 
Comments 
Aipanda 
Tumbilyam 
1462
 
950 
512 
Yakali 508 
Nere  3 
 
Yakali is from Aipanda. 
The Tumbilyam box went missing when the polling 
team was attacked by Yakale’s supporters. The 
Councillor at Tumbilyam is pro Sam Abal due to 
National Alliance party links.  
Philip Nere has some relatives living at Tumbilyam. 
Sopas 
Lakayoko 
970 
 
630 
340 
Abal  259 
Samai 218 
Kapi  112 
Abal had contributed a large sum of money from his 
District Support Grant funds for renovation and re-
opening of Sopas Hospital. He also promised 
compensation for a man who had been killed in 
2002. 
Samai is from nearby Kiwi, but from the same big-
tribe Malipini and his second wife is from Sopas. 
Kapi had many strong supporters from earlier times. 
His sister is married at Lakayoko, which is in the 
same council ward as Sopas. 
Kaiap 976  Abal  720 
Kapi  108 
Potane 87 
Abal is an NA candidate and the Councillor from 
Kaiap is NA party president in the province. Abal 
also gave funds from the District Roads 
Improvement Program to the councillor to distribute 
to the Kaimanawan people at Kaiap.  
Kapi has family ties and students gave votes to 
secure their road as they have to pass through 
Kapi’s territory to go to school. 
Potane’s wife’s grandmother is from Kaiap. 
Teremanda      
-Yaumanda 
-Lepetenges  
-Kwimas 
2441
 
 
947 
548 
946 
Nere 798 
Abal 720 
Kapi 336 
Nere is from here (Yaumanda and Taitengis). 
Abal has strong ties with influential men Roy 
Kipalan and Salan Ere (Kwimas). 
Kapi’s mother is from here. The Governor’s mother 
comes from here as she is Kapi’s mother’s sister. 
Rakamanda 598  Potane 284
Abal  252 
Yakali  22 
Potane is from the neighbouring Paliu clan. 
Refugees from a tribal fight at Rakamanda have 
been staying with Potane’s clan.  
Abal played a part in bringing peace to the area and 
assisted with compensation payments. 
Yakali’s brother is married at Rakamanda. 
Imi  
-Naputes  
-Makapumanda
899 
 
 
495 
404 
Potane 461
Abal  163 
Kapi   85 
Potane’s clan (Paliu) and the Lyipini clan border 
each other at Makapumanda. Pato Potane’s 
grandmother comes from here.  
Abal helped with road maintenance on the Wee- 
Naputesa road. 
This used to be a Kapi stronghold after he helped 
build a bridge here during the time when he was 
member of parliament. 
Pasalagus 915  Abal  885 
Potane 13 
Marinki 9 
 
Abal is said to have given a sum of money to a 
leader of the Pasalagus community to help them pay 
compensation for the death of a health worker at 
Birip near Wabag, killed by a person from 
Maramuni. Giving him most of the votes was a way 
of paying him back for his assistance.  
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Another pattern evident from the data in the Appendix is seen in the number of 
ballot papers not used or returned. Table 18.6 gives details of the seven polling 
places where significant numbers of papers were lost or destroyed. It shows a 
definite improvement over 2002, when thirteen boxes were either destroyed or 
disputed and not counted. However, it still shows evidence of problems due to 
thuggery, violence or potential violence at the polls. 
 
Table 18.6: Polling places where large numbers of papers were lost or destroyed 
Polling 
station 
no. 
Place No. of 
papers 
lost or 
destroyed
Explanation 
2 Tumbilyam 950  The box was hijacked by the supporters of one 
particular candidate. The polling officer would not 
accept a bribe and the box was never returned for 
scrutiny.  
17 Taitengis 324 There was a commotion because some people 
wanted to give regional votes to one particular 
candidate. Because of the tension, electoral officials 
ended polling prematurely and destroyed the 
remaining papers. 
19 Sakalis 257 The box was accidentally exchanged with the 
Sangurap box resulting in Sakalis having extra 
papers. (The presiding officer at Sakalis sent the 
left-over papers back with the polling box and they 
were burnt in front of the counting centre). 
22 Lenki 211  Time ran out and it was getting dark at Lenki so the 
unused papers were burned at the polling booth in 
the presence of security personnel. 
23 Ainumanda 455 Due to an on-going tribal conflict at Ainumanda, the 
box was brought to Wabag Secondary School at 
Wakumare. Security personnel assumed the box had 
been hijacked and after arresting the election 
officials brought the box to Wabag. Voting in 
Wabag the next day ended prematurely after a 
commotion erupted and ballot papers, tables and 
chairs were damaged or destroyed. 
28 Birip 391 Ballot papers were burned because the supporters of 
a candidate from the area wanted to take and mark 
the papers. 
37 Premier 
Hill and 
Hidden 
Valley 
116 Ballot papers were burned because of a commotion 
in which supporters of regional candidates 
demanded that votes go to their candidates instead 
of giving people a choice. 
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These are the places where there was official notification of papers being lost 
or destroyed. The writer observed one polling place where 100 papers were left 
after everyone had voted and leaders, in the presence of security personnel, dealt 
out those papers, which were marked for the candidate of their choice.  
 
Implications 
 
How did the LPV system function in the 2007 election, and what are the 
implications for democracy in Enga? I have noted above that there was little 
effective awareness provided about the LPV system, but more significantly 
there was even less political will amongst public servants and community 
leaders that such awareness take place. Some people voted as individuals 
(though not in secret). Most voted in groups: as family groups, or even as clan 
groups. Political parties had an influence, but generally people dealt out their 
votes with the prime consideration being the wellbeing of their clan. Moreover, 
in the Wabag Open electorate the focus was on first preferences with little 
importance given to second and third preferences.  
 
The focus on first preferences emerges from an Enga political culture which 
relies on the patronage of an influential ‘bigman’ who can attract projects and 
bring services to the area. Thus, campaign strategies in Enga extend over the 
five years between elections and are not limited to the few weeks of official 
campaigning prior to polling. Elections are a form of investment, with 
successful candidates rewarding their supporters and disregarding others. This is 
the importance of strategic alliances. Money, guns, and employment in both the 
public and private sectors contribute to both continuities and innovations on the 
traditional Enga systems of forming alliances, particularly for warfare and for 
the tee pig exchange. The LPV system may provide new avenues for forming 
alliances, and linking voters and candidates, however this is still at an early 
stage, and the traditional bigman system still predominates.  
 
The system that is emerging has distinct disadvantages. Attempts to establish 
bloc voting within a clan can provoke anger within the community. Winners 
will often favour supportive clans by funding their projects and providing 
services to their area while others miss out. Relationships soured during the 
elections do not mend easily. We are not aware of anyone having died in 
election-related violence in the Wabag electorate. However at least five people 
have died in election-related violence in the adjacent Ambum-Kompiam 
electorate. The lack of post-election tribal conflict in the Wabag electorate is an 
indication that the election result was generally accepted.  
 
Can we call such a system democratic? Democratic principles call for 
freedom of the individual to vote and, to ensure this, some form of 
confidentiality. A considerable number of people in Enga had no freedom to 
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vote because others voted in their place, and it seems that there was little 
confidentiality, if any.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Compared with the 2002 election, Enga in 2007 experienced relatively 
peaceful voting, largely due to the presence of over 1,200 security personnel. In 
some cases there was community-based calm. In other places the apparent ‘law 
and order’ was more a form of control under a new form of gunpoint democracy 
(with the guns in the hands of the security forces). 
 
Enga political culture is managing the LPV system by importing it into a 
political culture where there is little individual freedom of choice, limited 
freedom to vote for women, and where the confidentiality of individual voters' 
choices is not available to the majority of voters.  
 
For the situation to change, some hard issues will have to be faced. There is 
an urgent need to improve the electoral roll. There is also a need to convince 
people that everyone has a right to vote and that group voting has serious 
disadvantages. Also, there must be checks to counter political patronage and 
cronyism at all levels of the provincial administration, and better ways to deal 
with disputed returns so that justice may be done but also be seen to be done. 
These issues should not be taken in isolation but treated in an integrated way. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 18.7: Voting statistics Wabag Open electorate, 2007 election 
Number of registered voters  49633  
Total votes cast 44690  
Informal votes 293 (0.7% of ballots)  
Total allowable ballot papers 44397  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 34388  
Total votes distributed 21226  
Exhausted ballot papers 10009 (22.5% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 17195  
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Table 18.9: Used and unused ballot papers in Wabag Open, 2007 
Polling station Station 
no. 
Ballot 
box no.
Ballots sent 
(roll) 
Ballots 
counted 
Informal Differencea 
 
Tukusenda 1 0209 998 999 - +1 
Aipanda  2 0207 512 511 1 -950 
Tumbilyam 0208 950
Tambitanis 4 0206 949 944 5 0 
Lakolama 5 0205 1,168 1,157 10 -1 
Kubalis 6 0204 337 921 7 -36 
Yakananda 0170 627
Nandi 7 0203 991 988 2 +1 
Sakarip 8 0202 826 818 6 -2 
Sopas 9 0201 630 959 3 -8 
Lakayoko 0158 340
Kiwi 10 0200 1,109 1,103 7 +1 
Kaiap 11 0199 976 971 1 -4 
Kamas 12 0198 1,053 1,031 7 -15 
Kopen 13 0197 549 548 1 0 
Sari 14 0196 1,292 1,277 15 0 
Tole 15 0195 1,887 1870 17 0 
Yaumanda, 
Lepatenges and 
Kwimas 
16 0194
0167
0174
2,441 
(947/548/ 
946)
2,405 20 -16 
Taitenges 17 0193 1,235 908 3 -324 
Lakemanda  
Waipu 
18 0192 
0157
1,308
(458/850)
1,243 4 -61 
Sakalis 
Sangurap 
19 0191
0159
1,446
(868/578)
1,187 2 -257 
Keas 20 0190 2,015 2,008 8 +1 
Irelya  
Aipus 
21 0189
0161
2,922
(1753/1169)
2,917 4 -1 
Lenki and 
Pipi 
22 0188
0162
1,758
(914/844)
1,544 3 -211 
Ainumanda 23 0187 505 50 - -455 
Rakamanda 24 0186 598 596 3 +1 
Yokomanda  
Double Bridge 
25 0185
0163
689
(378/311)
686 4 +1 
Imi  (Naputes, 
Makapumanda) 
26 0184
0164
899
(495/404)
894 2 -3 
Wee and 
Yokota 
27 0183
0165
655
(393/262)
616 2 -37 
Birip and Birip 
Community School
28 0182
0166
2,458
(1229/1229)
2,061 6 -391 
Akom and 
Kapamale 
29 0181
0169
580
(464/116)
577 3 0 
Lukitap 30 0180 773 769 5 +1 
Waimalemanda 
and Takandu 
31 0179
0168
764
(464/300)
765 - +1 
Kerepusmanda 32 0178 598 542 57 +1 
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Polling station Station 
no. 
Ballot 
box no.
Ballots sent 
(roll) 
Ballots 
counted 
Informal Differencea 
 
Yailengis (Sirunki) 33 0177 572 572 1 +1 
Beat St & Wabag 
2nd 
34 0176 487 488 7 +8 
Police Barracks  35 b 0175 407 333 2 -72 
Premier Hill & 
Langress 
37 0173 734 603 15 -116 
Hidden Valley 38 0172 329 329  
Newtown -Aipus 39 0171 337 335 2 0 
Yakananda 40 0170 (627)  
Kepamale 41 0169 (116)  
Takandu 42 0168 (464)  
Kwimas 43 0167 (946)  
Birip C. School 44 0166 (1,229)  
Yakota 45 0165 (262)  
Makepumanda 46 0164 (404)  
Double Bridge 47 0163 (311)  
Pipi 48 0162 (914)  
Aipus 49 0161 (1,169)  
Waipu 50 0160 (458)  
Sangurap 51 0159 (578)  
Lakayoko 52 0158 (630)  
Biako & 
Pai 
53 0223 (720)  
Pai 54 0222 (129)  
Pokale Malandu 55 0221 1,128 1,129 3 +4 
Pasalagus 56 0220 915 912 3 0 
Wailep 57 0219 641 606 38 +3 
Tongori 58 0218 436 436 - 0 
Kaimatok 59 0217 615 614 2 +1 
Wangalongen 60 0216 481 482 - +1 
Neliyaku 61 0215 625 618 7 0 
Ilya 62 0214 474 470 1 -3 
Poreaki 63 0213 545 546 - +1 
Warakom 64 0212 813 813 1 +1 
Penale 65 0211 253 253 3 +3 
Net 66 0210 219 220 - +1 
Table 18.9 continued 
Notes: a Difference indicates the number of ballot papers lost or destroyed. b Box 0175 
does not appear in the official returns (Form 66 (F) and in the returns the figures for 
boxes 0173 and 0172 are changed to make up the difference due to the absence of box 
0175. 
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Figure 19.1: Kagua-Erave district map 
19 RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE ELECTION IN THE SOUTHERN 
HIGHLANDS 
 
Richard Eves 
 
This chapter looks at the issue of religion and politics in the 2007 election in the 
Southern Highlands, focusing specifically on the Kagua-Erave Open electorate. 
 
The great diversity in forms of religion in Papua New Guinea means that it is 
unwise to attempt to generalize about the effects of religion on politics. 
Although almost everybody in the country today identifies as Christian, the 
churches are very large in number and are widely divergent in beliefs and 
policies.1 Further, each denomination has its own local character, influenced in 
part by the many popular local religions drawn from traditional beliefs which 
remain extremely potent. In some areas, Christianity and local religion have 
been drawn on to produce elaborate syncretic forms of religion which are highly 
influential and some of which take great interest in the political arena.  
 
In this analysis I focus on Christianity, since it is this element of religion that 
appears to be having the widest and most visible effect on politics in Papua New 
Guinea. The mainstream churches — Lutheran, Catholic, United and Anglican 
— have a long history and remain by far the largest Christian grouping. 
However, the most spectacular growth in the last decade or so has been in 
converts to the ‘born again’ Evangelical, Charismatic and Pentecostal churches, 
which have such appeal that they are making rapid inroads on the traditionally 
large congregations of the mainstream churches. I focus mainly on these more 
recent forms of religious expression, partly because they are increasingly 
dominating the religious landscape 
but also for the more practical reason 
that it was these groups that I 
encountered in the area where I was 
working during the 2007 election. 
 
Most of the new Evangelical, 
Charismatic and Pentecostal churches 
are fundamentalist, since they read 
the Bible literally and take an 
extremely dualist view of the world, 
as a dire struggle between good and 
evil. They shun active involvement in 
politics, avoiding engagement with 
                                                     
1 According to Operation World, 97.28 per cent of the population is Christian today 
(2008). 
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the state in both civil society and electoral affairs (see Hauck, Mandie-Filer and 
Bolger 2005:22; Gibbs 2005:17).2 This general aloofness towards politics has 
been described as ‘political acquiescence’ (Schoffeleers 1991:89)3 and indeed 
some of these churches do endorse the belief that people should accept the 
authority of the government of the day (Gibbs 2004:4, 2005:18; Hauck, Mandie-
Filer and Bolger 2005:22).4 This does not mean that they do not have what 
Ireland refers to as, ‘critical citizenship’ — a critique of the social and political 
economies of the country in which they live (1995:136). Indeed these churches 
often articulate trenchant criticism of the corruption and the inability of the 
Papua New Guinea state to deliver services. Much of this criticism is cloaked in 
a particular kind of conspiratorial and apocalyptic language, as evident in the 
discussions with local pastors I describe below. These critiques rarely generate 
political activism; rather they are reactive, expressing an emotional feeling of 
moral outrage towards those responsible for corruption and poor governance. 
These problems are seen as evidence that people are not living Christian lives, 
and the remedy is for people to become good Christians, the emphasis being on 
individual moral reform rather than broader social reform, and to pray for God’s 
intervention for a good election result (Gifford 1991:18). Some commentators 
argue that such Christians are not passive spectators in political affairs since 
they use prayer in the hope of influencing outcomes. Sometimes this is framed 
in terms of ‘spiritual warfare’, conceived as an active challenge to Satan’s 
power through aggressive prayer (Jorgensen 2005:446). However, while it is 
true that this activity reveals the existence of interest in outcomes, it is hardly 
effective action. 
 
This chapter describes specific aspects of the 2007 election to show how 
politics and religion were interrelated. It is divided into two sections: the first 
deals initially with the national context and then with the Southern Highlands; 
the second section moves in to look more closely at the Kagua-Erave Open 
electorate, to examine the perspectives of a local candidate and several pastors 
from the village where he was based. 
 
The 2007 election 
 
The 2007 election bore some similarities to previous elections and also 
significant differences. Discussing the relationship between politics, religion 
                                                     
2 Much diversity characterizes the approach of conservative Protestants around the 
world to involvement in politics. A considerable literature explores the issue.  
3 How ‘political acquiescence’ is defined can present something of a problem, according 
to Schoffeleers, since what seems like acquiescence to one party may be described by 
another as a subtle form of resistance, or as the best a church can manage in a situation 
(1991:90). He concludes that a church is ‘acquiescent’, when its policy is to avoid 
political activism of a critical nature.  
4 Romans 13:1-7 is usually invoked in this context (Gibbs 2005:18 and 2004:4).  
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and churches in the 2002 election, Philip Gibbs suggests there was a blurring 
between the sacred and the secular, with political discourse and symbolism 
laced with Biblical and other Christian imagery. This involved candidates 
assiduously seeking to present themselves as ‘God-fearing’ people who could 
be trusted. The Saviour was also a common figure and Gibbs cites several 
examples of candidates comparing themselves to Moses leading the exodus 
from Egypt to the Promised Land.  
 
Also in the 2002 election, some candidates made extravagant promises to 
Christians to secure their vote. Peter Yama, the candidate for Usino-Bundi 
Open, declared that he would ‘ensure that 10% of the annual national budget is 
given to God’, proposing a tithing policy which would distribute 10 per cent of 
Papua New Guinea’s total earnings to churches through the Home Affairs 
Department (cited Gibbs 2004:7; see also 2005:3).5 In 2007, the People’s 
Freedom Party made similar promises, advocating support for the churches and 
NGOs by voluntary tithing of 10 per cent of the tax revenue. However, none of 
this party’s eight candidates succeeded in winning a seat. Other political parties 
and candidates were more restrained in their promises on this issue, simply 
saying they would support the work of the churches.  
 
Christian rhetoric was a persistent theme in the People’s Freedom Party 
statement which appeared in the Post-Courier. They considered it very 
important that the question of leadership be addressed before problems of 
development: leaders must be ‘truly repentant and resolved towards the God 
Almighty, oneself, family and community’ (Post-Courier, Election Special, 
June 2007). Leaders must also be physically fit, possibly a reference to the 
widespread idea that bodily health, especially outward appearance, is an 
indication of moral health (see Eves 1998:28-29, 1996). In the same paper, other 
Christians upheld Jesus as the model of leadership, defined in terms of 
‘shepherd-ship, servant-ship and sacrifice’ (ibid.). The Pangu Pati’s policy 
platform included creating a ministry of religion: ‘Pangu acknowledges the role 
of the church in promoting Christian values, and in social, economic, and 
spiritual development, and proposes to create a Ministry of Religion to improve 
government-church cooperation’ (ibid.). 
  
                                                     
5 This is not the first time this has been raised. Gibbs cites a case from 1987 in which the 
member for Alotau, Iairo Lasaro, quoting from the Old Testament prophet Malachi (3:7-
12), stated in parliament, ‘I believe if this nation makes the first move to allow 10 per 
cent of its budget to God, this country according to the word, God himself will open the 
windows of heaven and pour out more blessings in this nation. Law and order, tribal 
fights, natural disasters and all other problems, I can assure this Government that God 
will guarantee the total security of this nation’ (Hansard 20 November 1987: 22-24 
cited in Gibbs 2005).  
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A significant difference between the election of 2007 and earlier ones was 
the absence of a nationwide campaign like ‘Operation Brukim Skru’, which had 
featured in the lead-up to the 1997 election (see Schmid 1999; Gibbs 2005; 
Jorgensen 2005). Literally meaning to bend the knee, but conveying 
connotations of kneeling down to pray or seeking forgiveness, Brukim Skru was 
initiated at Government House in November 1996 by the governor general of 
the time, Sir Wiwa Korowi. Brukim Skru aimed ‘to bring PNG before God for 
his divine intervention for the evils of our time’ (Asia Pacific Network 1997).6 
A large number of churches was involved in this campaign, though Gibbs 
suggests that the initiative came mostly from the conservative evangelical and 
Pentecostal churches (2005:14). One plan, which evidently had the support of 
the Electoral Commissioner but which did not quite get off the ground, was to 
provide ‘prayer cover’ to keep corruption and evil spirits away during polling.7  
 
Operation Brukim Skru also involved local events, such as ‘crusades’, 
including a ‘Mega Prayer Crusade’ at the University of Papua New Guinea, 
organized by the Tertiary Student’s Christian Fellowship, which involved 
students praying for good government. As the president of the Tertiary 
Student’s Christian Fellowship, Bill Koim, commented at the time:  
 
We have been praying for a good government and honest 
leadership, and we have not been surprised to see a lot of the 
established leaders fall. We are not saying that they were bad 
leaders, but we are thankful because these are God’s own doings 
(The National 9 July 1997, cited in Schmid 1999:20).  
 
He added that the underlying theme of the crusade was that politicians needed 
the strength of God to perform well in the new government, human strength and 
wisdom being only secondary (ibid.:21). Since the country had lost its way, only 
divine intervention could help it to follow the right path.  
 
The 2007 election had no nation-wide campaign like Brukim Skru but prayer 
was still considered a useful strategy. This occurred at the local level but it was 
also widely advocated in the national discourse, with correspondents to the 
newspapers urging people to pray for the right leaders to be elected.  
 
                                                     
6 He was refuting claims by the National Intelligence Organisation that members of 
Brukim Skru were involved in the Sandline crisis which brought down the government 
of the day.  
7 The original plan was to have 20,000 Christian volunteers in this role, but when 
polling began only a few hundred offered their services (Gibbs 2005:15; see also 
Jorgensen 2005: 449). 
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Figure 19.2: ‘We want God-fearing  
leaders in Southern Highlands Province’ 
We want God-fearing leaders 
 
In 2007, as in 2002, a common campaign theme noted by Gibbs was the 
image of the God-fearing leader (see Figure 19.2). Indeed, the need for God-
fearing candidates and elected members was echoed constantly in popular 
discourse. It was aired on the faith page of the National newspaper when it 
reported on a radio talk-back show involving several church pastors who 
warned voters to choose God-fearing 
leaders and to be wary of those 
candidates who hardly ever attend 
church but who now, during the 
election campaign, carry Bibles and 
speak in Biblical terms. Such people, 
they warned, were not true leaders 
but were merely ‘switching to 
become “holy now” in order to lure 
voters’ (The National 5 July 2007). 
By contrast, the most appropriate 
leaders were those who maintained 
their integrity, honesty, loyalty and 
righteousness (ibid.).8 
 
The meaning of God-fearing was often unspecified but it was not simply 
synonymous with Christian, one person interviewed by the Post-Courier seeing 
them as two quite different things (Post-Courier, Election Special, June 2007). 
A young student from the NCD, who was actually too young to vote, thought 
that a ‘leader should be responsible, transparent and one who promotes people’s 
interests’. Such a leader should be God-fearing meaning that he would be 
dependent on God’s wisdom and guidance, which would prevent him from 
being corrupt (ibid.). Another student, eligible to vote, commented that she 
would not be voting for wantok and would cast her vote for a God-fearing, 
‘hardworking’ and ‘reliable’ leader. Another saw God-fearing as describing a 
person who abides by the principles of the Bible and ‘therefore has the heart to 
serve the people’ (ibid.). Others saw God-fearing in terms of ‘honesty’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘trustworthiness’. God-fearing conveys connotations of 
being fearful of God, putting the idea of a retributive God who punishes those 
who do not behave in a Christian manner. Others did not take up the God-
fearing terminology, seeing the need simply for a Christian, particularly one 
with high Christian values and principles, since a person like this would ‘most 
likely conduct himself according to Biblical principles’ (ibid.).  
 
                                                     
8 These pastors commended the prime minister for dedicating the nation to God during a 
Prayer Day ceremony during the year (The National 5 July 2007).  
290      Election 2007 
 
 
Figure 19.3: Anderson Agiru billboard, 
Mendi 
The view from the Southern Highlands 
 
Christianity featured less prominently in the Southern Highlands than it did 
nationally. With some exceptions, most SHP candidates avoided direct 
reference to their religious affiliation or beliefs.9 While some mentioned the 
need for God-fearing leaders and some used Christian imagery, religion did not 
predominate as it has in the past. Posters, in particular, focused almost entirely 
on secular and factual matters. Although a few election posters did give details 
of a broader policy agenda, they were very sketchy on the whole, presenting 
only basic details, such as a photograph with the name of the candidate, and 
asking for people’s votes. For example, the election poster of Dickson Pena 
Tasi, a regional candidate, displayed no policies and no slogans, featuring only 
his name, his picture (complete with cowboy hat decorated with bird of paradise 
feathers) and a request for voters to write his name or number in box 1, 2 or 3.  
 
Only one of the twenty or so posters displayed outside the largest Mendi 
store invoked the image of a ‘God-fearing leader’. This one, promoting Paru 
Hagnai, standing for the Tari-Pori Open seat and endorsed by the Papua New 
Guinea Labour Party, announced that he stood for ‘God-fearing leadership’, 
‘justice for the people’, ‘transparency/accountability for the people’ and 
‘economic prosperity for the people’.  
 
I saw no images of Jesus on election posters or billboards in the Southern 
Highlands, as was reported elsewhere during the 1997 election (Gibbs 2005:7), 
although a few featured more subtle Christian allusions. One striking example 
of this was provided by Anderson Agiru, the successful candidate for the 
Southern Highlands Provincial seat or governorship, who used several slogans 
with a Christian resonance. Declaring that it was time to ‘kirapim’ (resurrect) 
the province, he announced that it was the ‘Dawn of a New Future’, an image 
which echoes the evangelic rhetoric 
of being born again. On another 
poster, he presented himself as a 
humble Christian, saying, ‘My best is 
not enough, Lord Almighty!’. Since 
Agiru was aiming to be governor for 
the second time, his publicity was 
replete with suggestions of 
resurrection and veiled allusions to 
the second coming. One of his 
billboards, placed prominently in 
                                                     
9 Pastor David Ongol Paki, an independent for the SHP Provincial seat, for example, 
gave his policies as: ‘1. Spiritual Development 2. Free Education 3. Health Services 4. 
Infrastructure Development 5. Agriculture and Livestock Development 6. Justice, 
Fairness and Equality’ (campaign poster).  
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Mendi, showed him in shirt and tie, with raised fist, looking very much like a 
Bible-thumping preacher (see Figure 19.3).  
 
This recourse to Christian imagery surpassed even those church leaders who 
stood as candidates, whose slogans were comparatively straightforward and not 
nearly as cleverly crafted as Agiru’s. One pastor invoked a saying from 
Proverbs, declaring on his poster that: ‘Righteousness exalts a nation’ (while 
omitting the second clause which says ‘but sin is a reproach to any people’) 
(Proverbs 14:34). Pastor Francis Apurel, standing for the SHP Provincial seat 
with Agiru, simply announced that he was for ‘Progress and development – 
God’s way’. In the extensive policy platform on his poster, Thomas Handolwa, 
though not a pastor or preacher, wanted to reinforce church activities, and also 
included promoting community development, agriculture and tourism. Makire 
Tom (independent, standing for the Provincial seat) produced the only poster to 
mention AIDS, although this is a major calamity confronting Papua New 
Guinea. He construed this as a question of Christian morality, advocating the 
promotion of good ways to avoid AIDS (‘HIV/AIDS – Promotim ol Gutpela 
Pasin bilong Abrusim Sik AIDS’), with its obvious reference to abstinence and 
faithfulness.  
 
It was noticeable that those candidates who did articulate some Christian 
discourse rarely identified themselves with any particular denomination, except 
for the candidates who were pastors or priests, who usually gave their clerical 
title. This suggests not only that, due to the overwhelmingly dominance of 
Christianity in Papua New Guinea, Christian identity is being taken for granted, 
but also that, with the increasing fragmentation of the mainstream churches and 
the proliferation of smaller churches, it is expedient to direct appeals to the 
generic Christian. The introduction of limited preferential voting (LPV), which 
has brought the need to garner preferences more widely, has added to this 
impetus. 
 
The election in Kagua-Erave 
 
In terms of organization and procedures during the election, media claims of 
‘successful polling’ in the Southern Highlands Province were far from true for 
Kagua-Erave. The overwhelming consensus of those present, including voters, 
candidates, security personnel and even electoral officials, was that the election 
was a huge failure because the election was so poorly organized. People were 
dismayed at the inadequate electoral rolls, which omitted a great many 
residents’ names. Also, some voters had been unable to vote because ballot 
papers or electoral rolls did not arrive.10 One ward, for example, received rolls 
                                                     
10 The ballot box for Mungaro (Aliya LLG) held four ballot papers (the four names on 
the roll were from another electorate, Imbonggu), and that for Waro (Erave LLG) held 
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and ballot papers for only four constituencies, and these were actually from 
another electorate. A fairly common comment was: ‘Em failed eleksen, em 
bagarap tru’. One assistant returning officer’s comment was that the electoral 
commission has ‘failed miserably’, a claim echoed by many. Another polling 
official commented, ‘the running of the election in Kagua-Erave was very poor. 
The Commission as a whole has failed’. Some people considered themselves in 
mourning, with one man from Kumbianda, who was unable to vote, 
commenting that: ‘mipela stap long haus krai’, meaning that he and others in 
his village were in mourning over their disenfranchisement. Some even 
commented that the election failure was worse than the 2002 election. This is a 
damning indictment, given that the 2007 election was fairly peaceful compared 
with 2002, when people stormed the Kagua police station, disarmed police, 
forced down the police helicopter and stole and destroyed ballot boxes and 
papers.  
 
As one candidate remarked, the LPV system had changed people’s 
behaviour: ‘Before, the people ruined the process, but now it is the 
government’. Another man expressed his disappointment in the following way: 
‘The people are very quiet but the system is killing us’. Others, especially those 
whose names were omitted from the common roll, asked rhetorically which 
country they belong to now, since the government has rejected them: ‘Gavman i 
rejectim mipela, mipela stap long wanem kantri nau?’ (‘The government has 
rejected us, which country do we live in now?’).11 
 
Despite being a feature of some parties’ policy statements at the national 
level, few candidates in Kagua-Erave overtly identified as Christian, except in 
the most general terms. In none of the election speeches I heard did candidates 
specify their Church affiliation or articulate any specifically Christian themes. 
Probably in the interests of garnering votes from as wide a spectrum as possible, 
their election posters were similarly noncommittal. Neither did religion loom 
                                                                                                                                  
three. Pawabi (Aliya LLG), Pobu Worok 2 (Erave LLG) and Pawabi 2 (Erave LLG) all 
received neither ward rolls nor ballot papers. The following wards had ward rolls but no 
ballot papers Mendo 2 (Aliya LLG), Mapuanda (Aliya LLG), Kumbianda (Aliya LLG), 
Muguri (Aliya LLG) and Suiyaibu (Aliya LLG). It was not possible to vote at two 
polling stations in Erave LLG (Sirigi and Sopise) because the ballot papers and boxes 
could not be delivered before polling lapsed. 
11 Unfortunately, the failure of the Electoral Commission to carry out its mandated role 
nourishes the profound disenchantment with the Papua New Guinea nation-state widely 
felt in rural communities and cities alike. Many people responded to these failings by 
suggesting that Australia, through institutions like AusAID, should not only run 
elections, but take over the governing of Papua New Guinea, since the state institutions 
were totally incapable of doing so. Some people even wanted the electoral 
commissioner to be replaced by an Australian, since they had utterly lost confidence in 
the ability of the current commissioner to run an election.  
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large in debate in the council ward where I was based during the election. 
Overwhelmingly, campaigning there focussed on how little development there 
had been in the electorate and what development the candidate would bring. 
This is unsurprising given that the Southern Highlands is one of the least 
developed and most impoverished provinces in Papua New Guinea, despite 
having several large resource projects that generate revenue for the national and 
provincial governments (Haley and May 2008; Lewis 2008). Little of this 
revenue appears to be returned to the people of the province. The failure of 
development in the electorate of Kagua-Erave was largely blamed on the local 
member, people often commenting that they did not see any signs of his work 
(‘mipela no lukim wanpela mak bilong memba i stap long hia’). Neither had 
people seen any sign of him in the electorate, except during the nomination and 
campaign period when he was seen firing a high-powered automatic weapon 
during a conflict with the supporters of a rival at the district headquarters of 
Kagua.12 Indeed, it was a popular view that once a candidate is elected he will 
not be seen in the electorate for another five years, preferring to live in Port 
Moresby and administer the electorate by ‘remote control’ as it is sometimes 
described. 
  
Because of inadequate government services, there is extensive pessimism 
about the politics and government of Papua New Guinea throughout the 
electorate and doubtless the whole province. The view is also widely held that 
many of the candidates cannot be trusted, being motivated only by self-interest. 
‘Politics in PNG is no good, lots of liars are involved’ (‘Politiks long PNG em i 
no gut, plenti giaman i stap insait’). It is also widely held that independence has 
been a failure, with many people longing nostalgically for a return to the 
Australian colonial government.  
 
As in the wider province, Kagua-Erave candidates’ election posters gave 
little information about policies, relying largely on empty slogans. For example, 
one candidate alluded to his past political career to claim he was: ‘For Genuine, 
Strong and Proven Leadership’, and another, standing as a Papua New Guinea 
Country Party candidate, proclaimed: ‘We have the Answers’. One of the most 
elaborate posters was produced by the Pangu Pati candidate, Lalepa Patapu, 
who had once been chairman of the Defence Force Retirement Benefits Fund 
and more recently the church development officer for the Evangelical Church of 
Papua New Guinea. He utilized the metaphor of a hand-mark to emphasize that 
he had already made his mark elsewhere in Papua New Guinea and now wanted 
to do so for Kagua-Erave (‘Nau mi laik putim han mak long Kagua-Erave’). His 
poster featured three photographs of separate buildings, the last with his hand 
superimposed, as a reference to his work in the superannuation industry and 
                                                     
12 Some people were not even able to identify him when shown a photograph I had 
taken.  
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their investments around the country. He did list some policies, overlaying one 
on each finger of the large image of a hand, including Church, women and 
youth, law and order and health. Donald Yaki Rambua, standing as an 
independent, had a brief policy list on his poster, one of which was to support 
the work of the churches in Papua New Guinea. 
  
During the campaign period, I was based in the village of Ibia, in Ibia 
council ward, Aiya in Kagua-Erave electorate. Here, the face of Christianity is 
changing and churches of different denominations are proliferating, as is 
happening throughout Papua New Guinea. In the past each village would have a 
single church of the denomination that had established Christianity in the region 
during the colonial period. With a population of about one thousand people, Ibia 
council ward has several newer churches besides the first-established Catholic 
Church, including the Assemblies of God, the Bible Missionary Church, the 
Church of God, the United Pentecostal Church, the New Apostolic Church, the 
Church of Christ and the Lutheran Church. Also, some residents were members 
of other churches, such as SDA, Revival Churches of PNG or the United 
Church situated in a nearby village.  
 
This council ward was typical of many in the Southern Highlands, not only 
for its religious diversity but also for the distinct absence of the ‘hand of the 
government’, as people say (see also Haley 2008). The aid post at Ibia was 
derelict and had not been staffed for several years, though more recently it had 
received boxes of supplies from AusAID, which appeared to have been 
distributed by a self-proclaimed ‘doctor’ with no medical training.13 The local 
primary school also had an erratic existence and appeared to have been closed 
for a number of years, largely due to the failure of the so-called ‘free education’ 
policy, which has seen supplies to schools consist of dusters and chalk and not 
much else. Though it is currently open and has more than 400 students, it is 
severely understaffed, having only four teachers instead of the eight it should 
have. These are supplemented by three teachers’ assistants, adolescents who 
have attained a year ten education, but who have no training. The teachers run 
two classes simultaneously, moving between the two to spend half a period in 
one and half a period in the other. The bush material buildings have galvanised 
iron roofs, funded by a local council grant, but overall the facilities are very 
basic, with rough hewn desks and chairs and a library with no books.  
 
Though many hoped that their local candidate would be elected and that 
some services would be delivered, pessimism about the prospects of 
improvement in the local conditions was widespread. While the failures of the 
                                                     
13 It was difficult to arrive at a definitive date, since people had a vested interest in 
presenting their situation as particularly hard. The date of 2001 was given by the local 
councillor, though others claimed it was of the order of ten years or more.  
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Figure 19.4: John Yano, PNG  
Party candidate for Kagua-Erave  
 
state cause much of this feeling that adversity is inevitable, the kinds of 
Christianity espoused also encourage it, especially the newer churches, as I shall 
explain later.  
 
John Yano  
 
The village of Ibia was the home of one of the candidates for Kagua-Erave 
electorate, John Japhet Yano (see Figure 19.3), and so I was able to observe his 
campaign first-hand, and to interview him about his background and opinions. 
He was related to the powerful local leader, (Captain) Randa, who actively and 
financially supported his campaign.14 John was a 30-year-old married man with 
one child, and formerly a primary school teacher at Imena Primary School 
(2004-2006) in the Sugu Valley, the district of his wife and the sitting member, 
David Basua. It was his first time as a candidate and would probably be his last, 
as the campaign was very costly for someone who did not have a large resource 
base.  
 
John was a devout Christian, a member and leader of the Church of Christ or 
Lokal Sios, as it is called. Like the other ‘born again’ churches, this church 
opposed the participation of leaders in the electoral process. He was therefore 
suspended from his role as church leader and forbidden to preach or even 
initiate the singing in church, reduced, as he termed it, to being a ‘kristian 
nating’, who had to sit with the rest of the congregation. After the election, if 
not elected, he would be ‘disciplined’ for a 
further two to three months, after which he 
would have to kill a pig or organize a feast 
to which the leaders of the other 26 lokal 
sios in the Southern Highlands would be 
invited. There, they would pray over him 
and ‘release him’, allowing him to resume 
his leadership role in the church. 
 
Somewhat contradictorily, it was largely 
at the behest of the church that he had stood 
as a candidate. This exemplifies the general 
ambivalence towards politics displayed by 
many of the ‘born again’ churches. On the 
one hand, they object to their members 
taking an active role in the electoral 
process, but on the other hand, they are 
                                                     
14 Ibia Council ward comprised Ibia 1 and Ibia 2. Ibia 1 consisted of the following 
villages: Mai, Wokuma, Maribit, Molonda, Rakenda, Ibia, Arepe, Koi, Rendenasu, 
Petame and Kerelum. Ibia 2 consisted of Mutulum, Alalu, Wariputi, Yamerika, Mambu, 
Umbu Mapalu and Asala.  
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acutely aware of failings of the current politicians and the need for better 
political leaders. Motivated by a church member’s dream, in which God 
expressed his wish for a member who could bring services to the people of the 
electorate, the church leaders decided that it would be good for John to stand as 
a candidate. In their discussions, they turned to the Bible and saw the story of 
Moses leading the people to the promised land as a sign that God would single 
out a leader in difficult times. They told John that if God wanted to raise him in 
this way and give him this kind of power, it was something that God could do. 
They also compared John to David in his struggle with Goliath.  
 
Despite these Biblical allusions, Christianity did not feature much at all in 
John’s campaign. As noted above, this was generally the case for other 
candidates. John did advocate a tithing policy of 10 per cent, which would go to 
small ‘born again’ churches such as his own, mainly to help purchase musical 
instruments, lamps and kerosene for use at rallies, camps and crusades. This was 
less ambitious than another PNG Party candidate (for the Imbonngu Open seat) 
who promised to supply electricity to all the churches in the electorate, a very 
ambitious task given the lack of infrastructure in the area and the proliferation 
of small churches, many of whose assets consist of little more than a bush-
material house and a congregation no bigger than an extended family.  
 
John would undoubtedly have been considered one of the ‘God-fearing’ 
candidates that public discourse sees as desirable leaders, even though his 
Christian identity and beliefs were rarely mentioned in his campaign. In 
interviews about broader issues, he and his church appeared very fundamentalist 
in outlook, with the usual strong emphasis on being born again, repudiating 
one’s past life and a belief that good Christians would be whisked away in the 
Rapture prior to the Last Days. Also, as is usual, these Christians placed great 
emphasis on personal morality and were required to forsake many practices, 
ranging from drinking to playing sport. The maintenance of strict sexual 
morality was also considered important, particularly marital fidelity. A man was 
required to marry a Christian, preferably from within the same church, and 
polygamy and divorce were not permitted.  
 
Like some of the candidates standing in other electorates, John presented 
himself as a village man (‘man bilong ples’) or as he termed it, ‘manki bilong 
bus tasol’, — that is, as a person who did not have money or vested interests at 
stake and who could truly represent the wishes and aspirations of the villagers. 
Further, as a teacher who had worked in a remote rural community school, he 
believed he was aware of the needs of the rural villagers he sought to represent. 
Despite his identification as a ‘grassroots’ man, he could hold his own with 
other more educated and worldly candidates in public speaking. 
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John owned one of the few cars in Aiya LLG (five for a population of 
approximately 21,000), given to him by his brother who works at Ok Tedi, and 
bought second-hand for K35,000. Like the other vehicles, it was unregistered 
and unroadworthy. Usually severely overloaded with his supporters, it barely 
staggered up the local hills and occasionally didn’t. The campaign was reputed 
to have cost approximately K50,000. As a member of Mekere Morautu’s PNG 
Party, John received a little funding from the party, enough to print one 
thousand campaign posters. Mainly, his funding was garnered from his 
relatives, local support base, and another PNG Party member, Francis Awesa, a 
wealthy businessman, and owner of Global Construction, a major road-building 
company in Papua New Guinea.  
 
Like many candidates, John used the rhetoric of anti-corruption, good 
governance and anti-gifting, but was nevertheless forced to play the politics of 
gifting to secure the support of wavering voters. This involved making 
contributions to the sponsors of grandstands when he attended campaign rallies, 
and also handing out small amounts of cash to individuals and dispersing pigs. 
His priorities if elected were similar to those of other candidates: to bring 
development and services (sevis) to the electorate. This is an obligatory promise 
in Papua New Guinea electoral politics, having irrefutable appeal since nobody 
would contest the need for better roads, schools and hospitals. In Kagua-Erave 
electorate he saw road services as the greatest need, followed by schools, aid 
posts and then the development of plantations to utilize the large labour pool in 
the electorate. Well informed of the number of voters in each council ward and 
of how much support they had, John’s close supporters were convinced of 
victory, with all the confidence of cargo cultists that the goods would be 
delivered. Three weeks before polling, John confidently predicted that he had 
the support of 16 out of 24 council wards in the local- level government area, a 
confidence buoyed by the dreams of many supporters. Reputedly there had been 
101 dreams predicting his victory. However, the predicted support did not 
eventuate and he was not successful in winning the seat, though he was fourth in 
the contest with nearly 10 per cent of the first preference vote. 
 
Local churches and politics  
 
Prior to the polling, I also interviewed a number of the pastors of the newer 
churches in Ibia to ascertain their broad religious outlook and their attitude to 
politics, electoral politics in particular. I met with pastors of the Church of God, 
the Assemblies of God, the Bible Missionary Church, and a previous member of 
the Christian Revival Centres of Papua New Guinea.  
 
All of these churches put great stress on the radical conversion experience of 
‘tanim bel’ or being born again, with its emphasis on personal morality and 
bodily purity. To attain this purity, these churches prohibit many forms of 
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behaviour besides the usual Biblically-named sins. While there is some minor 
variation, particularly in relation to some aspects of local custom, such as 
mortuary rites and bride-wealth payments, the churches are broadly similar in 
their proscriptions, which include smoking, drinking alcohol, chewing betelnut, 
card-playing and sport. The latter is often associated with pride, but is also 
banned because the clothing worn during games exposes the body to the view of 
the opposite sex. Polygamy and divorce are not allowed, since family life is 
considered a mainstay of the church community. It is forbidden for a husband to 
beat his wife and in some churches married couples are counselled if conflicts 
occur. All of these churches can properly be called fundamentalist, seeing the 
world essentially as a crucial struggle between Satan and Christ. Some are 
Pentecostal and recognise that baptism by the Holy Spirit can bring miraculous 
gifts, such as healing and prophecy. 
  
Most of these churches held similar views on involvement in electoral 
politics, banning it and suspending members and leaders who broke the 
prohibition. The Church of God forbade all members to stand for election and 
for the pastor to support any candidate. According to their pastor, John Kuma, 
while a pastor had the right to vote as he wanted, he was not allowed to speak 
publicly in favour of a particular candidate. In Pastor Kuma’s view, politics is 
associated with candidates’ desire to increase their own prestige and renown 
(apim biknem bilong yu iet) and consequently they made many promises that 
they would not fulfil when elected. Like other Christians avoiding direct 
involvement in politics, members of this Church placed much faith in prayer, 
asking God to show them a leader who would look to the needs of all Christians 
and provide them with much needed schools, roads and bridges. Pastor Kuma 
felt that electoral politics in Papua New Guinea was characterized by many lies 
and much trickery, in contrast to Australia and America, where he believed 
politicians were trustworthy and elections valid. He was sceptical about the 
ability of elected members to bring development to their communities and, 
indeed, he thought that before long the nation of Papua New Guinea would 
collapse completely and another country would take over. He would not suggest 
which country this might be, but he did say that many people believe that 
preparations for a takeover are currently under way.  
 
The Christian Revival Centres also eschew involvement in politics. 
Contesting a seat in the elections is forbidden and any member choosing to do 
so is suspended. If a church leader contests an election, he is also suspended 
from church membership and is required to work his way back up to any 
leadership role following suspension. Neither can a member actively support a 
candidate by participating in campaign activities. The church refuses to accept 
donations from politicians and candidates or associate with other churches that 
do. Indeed, it was said that they would not attend the peace march and rally in 
Mendi for this reason. This eschewal of politics was explained in terms of 
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politics and God’s word being contradictory: ‘You cannot preach God’s word, 
you cannot be a Christian and do politics at the same time’. On another occasion 
this informant described this as being like light and darkness, which are 
opposites and cannot mix.  
 
The Assemblies of God took a similar radically dualist position. A member 
of this church was contesting the Mendi Open seat, and since this was not 
permissible, he was suspended from church membership. The pastor, Roki 
Awepe, said that although a candidate for Kagua-Erave (John Yano) was his 
‘brother’, he was not permitted to accompany or assist him in the campaign, 
which, for him, would mean breaking the laws of the Bible. As a Christian, he 
must think only of God and God’s word. Involvement in electoral politics would 
conflict with Christianity, since the kinds of thought involved were mutually 
opposed. Faith, he said, requires one hundred per cent commitment not partial 
or competing commitments. Moreover, he believed that involvement in politics 
was corrupting, as earthly thoughts would inevitably arise, destroying his 
Christian life and leading him astray from Jesus.  
 
This pastor considered that much as the year 2000 was a ‘Year of God’, so 
too was 2007. Therefore, it was desirable that 2007 should be a peaceful time. 
Since the electorate of Kagua-Erave was not a good place and was full of greedy 
people, when members were elected in the past, they just consumed the money 
and didn’t bring any services to the electorate. Pastor Awepe instituted a 
program of prayer to be followed by his congregation which sought to ensure 
that the election was not characterized by ‘trouble’. He hoped God would 
remove any bad leaders and ensure that only good leaders were elected. 
Personally, he was going to seek guidance from God about who to vote for, and 
if his spirit spoke to him he would follow this guidance.  
 
Pastor Awepe thought that in this Year of God they should be looking for 
signs of the end times. Like Pastor John Kuma of the Church of God, Pastor 
Awepe thought that a takeover of Papua New Guinea was imminent and would 
occur after the election. While on first reflection it may appear that he was 
alluding to the kinds of interventions into fragile and failing states that have 
occurred in recent years, such as the RAMSI intervention in the Solomon 
Islands or the ECP intervention in Papua New Guinea, his reference was 
decidedly Christian. Satan was behind this ‘take-over’ and he believed that 
following the election Satan’s distinctive number 666 would be visible in Papua 
New Guinea. As he remarked:  
 
The one world mission, one world government, all these kinds of 
things they have prepared them and they are ready but they are 
waiting for this government, all the new members to go to 
parliament and form a new government and administration. OK, 
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after this they will declare it and they will start to use this number 
and start to use the new law of the one world mission and one 
world government.  
 
He went on to say that ‘they’ had already recorded where everybody lives and 
that as part of the new order, members of the Catholic church were singled out 
to receive projects from the pope. As all Catholics are registered and their 
names recorded on a computer, they were eligible to receive the projects they 
wished for — small-scale development projects such as sawmills and farms. 
Though he did not say so, such stories usually mention that supporters of Satan 
have the number 666 tattooed on their foreheads and hands, and that those who 
do not wish to join with him are beheaded.  
 
The Bible Missionary Church has much the same policies towards elections 
as the churches described above. Members are forbidden to stand for election or 
be involved in politics and are suspended if they do so. The pastor, Simon Ewa, 
also believed that candidates in elections do not always tell the truth, a patently 
unchristian behaviour. He saw his role as giving guidance to his congregation, 
giving them good thoughts, so that they would remain good Christians and live 
the life needed to get them to Heaven. He encouraged the congregation to pray 
for guidance from God on whom to vote for and for help in choosing the right 
leader. Members of this church also subscribed to beliefs about the end times 
and the idea that this would be marked by the ascendancy of the one world 
mission, one world government and the number 666. Pastor Ewa believed that 
this apocalyptic scenario was set out in the Bible, though it also appears that his 
beliefs were influenced by foreign missionaries from his church, as well as 
rumours and stories. Like the Assemblies of God pastor, he believed that this 
would all be revealed after the election.  
 
We are waiting for the government to go inside [parliament] and 
OK the 666 number. It is all ready and is just waiting for the next 
elected government to go to parliament and sign the necessary 
papers. The number has arrived and is waiting. Once the politicians 
have signed the papers, the number will be revealed.  
 
Although he believed that this new world order would be controlled by one 
man, he did not connect it to the Catholic Church, as some do, suggesting that 
the Bible is not clear on who this man is.15 People would be under the control of 
this man and they would bear the number on their forehead or body. If this man 
said that they must go to church they would go to church. If he said that they 
                                                     
15 When I suggested that some people single out the pope he refuted this, saying God 
would not ‘bagarap’ another man.  
Religion, politics and the election in the Southern Highlands      301 
 
must do nothing, they would do nothing. If he told them to do some kind of 
work they would carry out the order.  
 
These kinds of belief are characteristic of many of the fundamentalist 
evangelical, charismatic and Pentecostal churches,16 many of which are 
premillennialist.17 Premillennialism predicts that Christ will return to rule over 
the earth for a thousand years. This will be preceded by the end times, a period 
of widespread social and economic disintegration, climatic changes and natural 
disasters (Boyer 1992; Weber 1987; Eves 2000).18 Many adherents see the 
present as just such a time of disintegration and disaster, pointing to the 
increasing levels of corruption, raskolism and the AIDS epidemic as clear signs 
of the end times. One aspect of this rather pessimistic view is the prophecy that 
Satan or the Anti-Christ will take over the world for a period, before being 
defeated by Christ, and the allusions by some of the pastors referred to above to 
the ‘one world mission’ and ‘one world government’ are examples of this. 
 
As most premillennialists believe Christ's return is imminent they await it 
anxiously (though if good Christians they are spared the tyranny of the Anti-
Christ’s rule, since they are whisked away in the Rapture), conducting their 
lives in perpetual readiness, keeping themselves sin-free and evangelizing 
zealously. In obedience to Christ’s request to spread the Word to all nations, 
called the Great Commission, they believe it imperative to convert as many 
people as possible before the end times. Some believers seek to spread the 
gospel in the belief that Jesus will return when all nations have been 
evangelized (Brouwer, Gifford and Rose 1996:18).  
 
Conclusion  
 
As events unfolded following the election, it is clear that the predictions of a 
post-election takeover of Papua New Guinea have not taken place. How 
Christians such as these pastors have made sense of this, and what effect it has 
had on their premillennial ideas, cannot be answered here.  
 
It is difficult to judge how widely these kinds of beliefs about the post-
election takeover of Papua New Guinea are embraced by the general population. 
Such beliefs became apparent to me as a consequence of rather lengthy 
                                                     
16 Especially in Pentecostal churches, and those mainstream churches influenced by 
Pentecostalism. 
17 Seventh Day Adventists also subscribe to premillennialism and put great stress on the 
end times scenario set out in the Book of Revelation.  
18 This contrasts with the more optimistic postmillennialists who believe that it is 
possible through human effort to bring on the reign of Christ and who expect the 
conversion of all nations to Christianity prior to Christ's return (see Erickson 1977:55; 
Ammerman 1991:7; Wessinger 1997:49). 
302      Election 2007 
 
interviews with Christian leaders and it is unlikely that they would be conveyed 
in everyday casual discussions. Moreover, church leaders have a much fuller 
understanding of Biblical prophecy than their congregations, so it is likely that 
the knowledge of others is more fragmentary. Certainly, these ideas are not 
nearly as elaborated in the Southern Highlands as I have found elsewhere in 
Papua New Guinea. In New Ireland, for example, there is a much more 
developed understanding and interpretation of these Biblical prophecies (see 
Eves 2000, 2003). This is probably a consequence of the longer history of 
Christianity there, as well as the higher levels of literacy and the greater 
availability of Christian literature that details these predictions. 
  
Even in their nascent and fragmentary state, the taking up of these ideas 
indicates a profound disenchantment with political processes and governance in 
Papua New Guinea. Moreover, the failings of the government in running the 
2007 election in the Southern Highlands has undoubtedly reinforced the 
widespread disenchantment with the governance of Papua New Guinea. It is 
inevitable that the state’s incapacity to deliver services will be seen as proof of 
the validity of the end times scenarios described above.  
 
The relationship between politics and religion in Papua New Guinea could 
perhaps best be described as thorny. On the one hand, their general aversion to 
politics leads many of the newer Evangelical, Charismatic and Pentecostal 
churches to shun active involvement in the electoral process and in politics more 
generally. On the other hand, these Christians often voice sharp criticisms of the 
failings of the government, longing for better governance, and especially the 
delivery of services. Although people are longing for better times and their 
criticisms are generally legitimate, due to their firm belief in the Biblical 
prophecies of the end times, they actually anticipate that the situation in Papua 
New Guinea (and elsewhere) will get progressively worse rather than better. In 
other words, rather than basing their critique on analysis of the social and 
structural factors which have led to the creation of inequality in Papua New 
Guinea, and the devastating failure of services, the Christians see these 
occurrences as part of the inevitable unfolding of God’s plan. This means that 
human intervention attempting to change the course of events is futile. As 
Gifford argues, this actively disempowers adherents, promoting a ‘passive 
acceptance of disasters, misfortune and a lack of social responsibility (1991:9). 
Rather than political activism, premillennialism stresses personal salvation, 
evangelism and prayer which are all that can be done within the compass of its 
beliefs. 
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 Figure 20.1: Southern Highlands Province map 
20 GUNS, MONEY AND SEX: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORM ON POLITICAL CULTURE IN 
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCE 
 
Nicole Haley and Ben Dierikx 
 
Overview  
 
Papua New Guinea’s 2007 general election offered the first nationwide test of 
the new limited preferential voting (LPV) system, which replaced the first-past-
the-post (FPTP) system, under which all previous post-independence elections 
had been conducted. In this chapter we make some observations about recent 
electoral reform in Papua New Guinea, particularly the impact of reforms on the 
Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections (OLNLLGE) 
which saw the introduction of LPV after the 2002 election. The chapter seeks to 
explore the extent to which electoral system reform, in particular the 
introduction of LPV, has influenced the conduct of elections and political 
culture in the Southern Highlands. The chapter draws on the reports of domestic 
observers in the Koroka-Lake Kopiago and Kagua-Erave open electorates and 
Southern Highlands Provincial electorate as part of the 2007 Domestic 
Observation (see chapter 5). It finds that although the 2007 election was 
considerably less violent than other recent elections, contestation has not 
diminished, as evidenced by the widespread fraud and malpractice witnessed.  
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It also finds that voting irregularities and money politics were more 
pervasive than in previous elections; individual voters were observed to have 
greater access to cash and were more mobile than in past elections, so they were 
better positioned to seek out transactional extra-marital sexual relations. The 
chapter finds that the 2007 election provided a context for heightened sexual 
activity, which has important implications with respect to HIV transmission.  
 
Background 
 
Changes to the OLNLLGE were in part a response to the proliferation of 
candidate numbers. Elections in Papua New Guinea have typically attracted 
large numbers of candidates and are fiercely contested. With each general 
election prior to 2007, candidate numbers had increased, and as a consequence 
MPs had, over time, been elected with smaller and smaller mandates. In recent 
elections single constituencies have been contested, on average, by upwards of 
25 candidates, and in some cases by as many as 50-60 candidates, and in the 
three general elections prior to 2007 the majority of candidates were elected 
with less than 20 per cent of the vote and many (16/103 in 2002) with less than 
10 per cent of the vote. Concerned by this trend, the Morauta government 
(1999-2002) embarked on a program of electoral reform which saw the 
introduction of LPV and legislation aimed at strengthening political parties. 
 
With the introduction of LPV it was hoped that the 2007 election would be 
more peaceful and would see the election of MPs with wider and more 
representative mandates.1 According to the then electoral commissioner, Reuben 
Kaiulo, the reintroduction of preferential voting was ‘premised on the need to 
reduce the number of candidates to ensure that the MP has a wider basis for 
support and endorsement, and also to promote collaboration among candidates 
and counter the surge in violence’ (PNGEC 1997:13). 
 
Assessing the impact of LPV 
 
We do not seek to offer a comprehensive assessment of the impact of LPV in 
this chapter, but instead seek to explore some aspects of changing political 
culture in the Southern Highlands, particularly those that seem to be linked to 
the introduction of LPV. (Chapter 13 tests some of the more general claims and 
presumptions about LPV.)  
 
Without a doubt, the 2007 general election in Southern Highlands Province 
(SHP) was less violent than either the 1997 or 2002 elections. How much this 
improvement can be attributed to LPV and how much to the huge investment in 
                                                     
1 Standish (2006) provides a detailed exposition of the reasons for and claims used to 
promote preferential voting. 
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security (see chapters 6, 7 and 8) will become clearer over ensuing elections. 
Certainly it had been felt that LPV would contribute to improved security, and 
observers around the country reported that campaigning in 2007 was generally 
quieter, far more relaxed, and more accommodative than in past elections and 
that overall levels of violence, particularly in the highlands, were substantially 
reduced (Haley and Anere 2009).  
 
Compared to 2002, there was only a handful of election-related deaths, no 
airstrips were closed for security reasons, and there were few road closures. One 
exception was the Tangi road, between Koroba and Lake Kopiago, which was 
closed for extended periods due to election-related violence which saw a young 
man (the brother of one of the SHP domestic observers) killed and the threat of 
payback killings. For the most part, campaigning was more accommodative, 
with candidates in the Southern Highlands able to move around freely and 
campaign more widely than they had been able to in the earlier first-past-the-
post elections − something that had also been observed in the various LPV by-
elections (Standish 2006:200; Haley 2006). That said, there were individual 
candidates (e.g. Ben Peri in Koroba-Lake Kopiago and David Basua in Kagua-
Erave) whose freedom of movement was curtailed due to unresolved disputes 
from previous elections, and there was certainly less freedom to campaign 
across ethnic boundaries in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case, as compared with 
campaigning during the 2006 by-election (see chapter 21). 
 
While candidates were generally able to travel around more freely, they 
tended to campaign in much the same way as they had under the old FPTP 
system — that is, by concentrating their efforts on areas where they believed 
they had base support. There was little concerted collaboration and no serious 
evidence of widespread preference-swapping either between parties or between 
individual candidates, although Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye did enter into a 
formal preference-swapping agreement (see chapter 21).  
 
Even though there was less overt violence overall in the 2007 election in the 
Southern Highlands, intra-provincial regionalism which resulted in a fair degree 
of pre-polling tension and post-election-related violence remained evident (cf. 
Ballard 1989; Haley 2007a). Ethnicity and regionalism were also observed to 
play a huge part in campaigning in the Kagua-Erave and Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
Open electorates and were reflected in the way people allocated their 
preferences. In both electorates ethnically closed campaigning was the norm 
with candidates and voters alike espousing the view that preferences should be 
retained within the one cultural, linguistic or ethnic area.  
 
In the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case, this is particularly noteworthy because the 
2006 LPV by-election had seen candidates move about freely and successfully 
campaign across the ethnic divide — something that had not happened in either 
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the 1997 and 2002 general elections or the 2003 supplementary elections (see 
Haley 2002; 2004; 2007a). The return to ethnically closed campaigning is 
significant and signals the need to rethink the assumption that LPV will enable 
candidates and elected MPs to develop cross-electorate support bases. 
 
While the 2007 election was generally more peaceful than previous 
elections, it remained highly competitive, as evidenced by widespread fraud and 
malpractice (see chapters 5, 8, 20 and 21). Observers across the Southern 
Highlands also witnessed bribery and intimidation on the part of candidates and 
their supporters. That intimidation was commonplace was also reflected in post-
polling surveys. In a survey of 400 Southern Highlands voters (200 men and 
200 women), 73 men (37 per cent) and 97 women (49 per cent) reported that 
they experienced intimidation when casting their vote, and a similar proportion 
felt that the 2007 election was worse than 2002 (see chapter 5). Many even felt 
that the election had failed (see chapter 20). 
 
Influence of guns 
 
Guns did not feature as extensively in this election as they had in the 1997 
and 2002 polls, although they were present in the Southern Highlands in 
significant numbers despite the imposition of a ten-month state of 
emergency/special police operation in the lead-up to the election. Members of 
the SHP Provincial, Kagua-Erave Open and Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open 
observer teams all reported seeing firearms during nominations, the campaign 
period, in the lead-up to the poll, and even on polling day, but these and other 
weapons such as bush knives, axes and bows and arrows tended not to be 
openly displayed at polling places or used to intimidate and/or influence the 
vote, as they had been in the past.  
 
During the campaign period, in particular, observers throughout the Southern 
Highlands reported seeing homemade weapons and a variety of high-powered 
weapons, including M16s, AR15s, SLRs and an Ultimax 100 in civilian hands. 
They also noted the presence of black market ammunition in the province in the 
lead-up to polling. Observers reported that ammunition costs ranged from as 
low as K5-7 per M16/AR15 (5.56 x 45mm) round to as high as K25 as one 
moved from west to east across the province. Shotgun cartridges varied between 
K10 and K20 per cartridge and observers reported that the price of SLR 
ammunition was consistently around K25 per (7.62 x 51mm) round. This is 
consistent with pre-state-of-emergency pricing (see Haley and Muggah 2006) 
and suggests that there was no shortage of ammunition at the time of the 
election despite the fact that the Southern Highlands had been under a state of 
emergency since August 2006.  The variation in prices reflects the geographical 
location of the observers in relation to supply sources, rather than any artificial 
inflation or deflation due to the campaign or election.  
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Key candidates in the Southern Highlands were also reputed to have armed 
their own militia. One sitting MP even provided police uniforms to his militia. 
These were distributed on 31 January 2007 in the presence of an observer, who 
photographed the distribution. Another sitting MP had a fake Mobile Squad 
vehicle kitted out in Port Moresby, shipped to Lae and then transported to the 
highlands. Observers saw this vehicle being loaded at the wharf in Moresby and 
photographed it in SHP. On polling day the occupants of this vehicle made 
several unsuccessful attempts to intercept ballot boxes known to contain votes 
for an opposing candidate (see chapter 8). Their attempts were thwarted by 
conscientious polling officials and the PNGDF. There was also another incident, 
which observers caught on film, in which the occupants of this same vehicle 
fired upon the crowd in Tari after they were denied access to the Tari police 
station where the ballot boxes for the Hela region were being held. 
 
During the campaign period observers repeatedly witnessed armed police 
travelling with or in the company of high profile candidates and electoral staff. 
Uniformed mobile squad officers were seen providing security to the MP for 
Mendi, Michael Nali, while uniformed general duty police were seen providing 
security to the then Tari-Pori MP (Tom Tomiabe), Koroba-Lake Kopiago MP 
(John Kekeno) and Kagua-Erave MP (David Basua). Auxiliary or reserve police 
were seen with Francis Potape (the current MP for Komo-Magarima) and Alfred 
Kaiyabe (the former Komo-Magarima MP).  
 
While the overall visibility of guns and other weapons remained low 
throughout the campaigning and polling period, threats of violence did overhang 
the election in some places. For the most part these threats tended to be 
successfully contained by the deployment of armed security forces, although 
there was significant and ongoing post-election violence in Kagua-Erave Open 
electorate, following the withdrawal of the PNGDF in early August 2007.  
 
Influence of ‘money politics’, vote buying and gifting 
 
Although guns played a less significant role in this election, ‘money politics’ 
was more significant than ever before. During the campaign period huge 
amounts of money and gifts of various kinds were observed to change hands 
and many candidates (winning and losing alike) were reputed to have spent 
upwards of K1 million. The then sitting member for Kagua-Erave, David Basua, 
for instance, was widely reported to have distributed K300,000 to men and 
women at Kagua station in the week leading up to the poll (Eves 2008), while 
the then governor, Hami Yawari, was observed to be distributing both cash and 
cheques at a rally in Tari late in the campaign period. In the Southern Highlands 
voters and observers alike asserted that LPV had contributed to the proliferation 
of ‘money politics’ in that candidates were able to move around more freely, but 
having done so were under pressure to reward people for pledged support. 
312      Election 2007 
Observations made by domestic observers during the 2007 election indicate 
a shift in gifting and vote buying culture in the Southern Highlands, and suggest 
that LPV has ushered in a new era of opportunism with respect to vote buying in 
particular. Under LPV voters have three preferences to allocate. Many voters 
made the most of this by courting and promising support to several candidates 
in return for modest cash payments. The amount being paid by individual 
candidates to individual voters was observed to vary from place to place and 
candidate to candidate, although typical payment configurations were K100, 
K50, K20 (Tari-Pori); K50, K25, K10 (Nipa-Kutubu; Tari-Pori) and K20, K10, 
K5 (Koroba-Lake Kopiago) for 1st, 2nd and 3rd preferences respectively. On 
the eve of polling one particular SHP candidate was observed to pay K1,000 per 
person to voters willing to commit their first preference to him. By contrast, an 
observer based in Ialibu-Pangia reported that a flat rate of K20 was being paid 
per vote, regardless of preference.  
 
Payments to individual voters were much less common in past elections. 
Indeed where vote buying occurred it typically took the form of a single 
payment to a local leader or household head in respect of a certain number of 
promised/guaranteed votes. Such payments were made on the basis of name 
lists provided to candidates or their campaign managers. LPV of course 
provides the opportunity for multiple payments, and for multiple configurations 
of voting preferences, which seems to have diminished the role of local leaders 
in vote buying/selling while enhancing individual agency. 
 
The movement of voters across ward and electorate boundaries also seems to 
have increased with the introduction of LPV. In SHP thousands of people were 
seen capitalizing on the new opportunities LPV presented by moving across 
electoral boundaries, to sell their votes to other candidates, turning three 
payments into up to twelve payments per person. This was particularly so in the 
Hela region2 where many Huli voters were witnessed or reported to have voted 
in the Komo-Magarima, Tari-Pori and Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorates 
as well as for the provincial seat. Similar movements and voting practices were 
observed in the eastern end of the province, with many voters voting in both the 
Ialibu-Pangia and Imbonggu electorates.  
 
On an even larger scale some particularly enterprising voters (mostly men) 
capitalized on the rolling elections in the highlands by voting in several 
provinces. Mt Hagen youth, observed voting in Koroba, reported that they had 
                                                     
2 The people occupying the western end of SHP, namely the Duna, Huli and Bogaia, 
along with their Paiela neighbours in Enga Province, share the view that they descend 
from a common ancestor, Hela.  On the basis of this connection they have been pushing 
for more than three decades for a separate Hela province, which would incorporate the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Tari-Pori and Komo-Magarima electorates. Collectively these 
electorates/districts are referred to as the Hela Region (see Haley 2007a). 
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accepted payments from candidates in three provinces and that they had 
promised to vote in SHP, in their home province of the Western Highlands, and 
then again in Chimbu.  
 
Grandstands and opening 
ceremonies also served as money-
making ventures during this election. 
They were erected and organized by 
clans, church congregations, youth 
and women’s groups, and school 
committees as an innovative means 
of generating funds. As noted above, 
campaigning in the 2007 election was 
far more accommodative than in the 
past. Candidates travelled in each 
other’s company, were for the most 
part permitted access to each other’s 
base areas, and were present in large numbers at rallies, sports events and 
opening ceremonies in previously unprecedented ways (see Figure 20.2). 
Groups that had erected a grandstand were observed to send out invitations to 
both the open and provincial candidates inviting them to speak at their event, 
whether it be a church opening, the opening of a new classroom or teacher’s 
house, a youth or church rally, or a women’s group meeting. Invited speakers 
were expected to pay for the privilege. Observers confirmed that hire rates 
ranged between K100 and several thousand kina per speaker, and that some 
events netted upwards of K20,000 (see chapter 21). In addition there were 
unconfirmed reports of candidates paying as much as K30-40,000 for the 
privilege of using a grandstand to campaign in Kagua-Erave (Eves 2008). It 
seems that this particular enterprise has been made possible by the introduction 
of LPV, in that what candidates were clearly vying for at such rallies were 
second and third preferences.  
 
Gifting was also observed throughout the Southern Highlands and manifest 
in a multitude of ways. Some candidates financed people’s travel home, paying 
for air fares, chartering planes and hiring PMVs for days on end. Others gave 
road clearing and/or road, bridge and airstrip maintenance contracts, while 
others offered inducements in the form of food and drink, pigs, building 
materials and household items such as blankets, spades, bush knives, stereos 
and even cars. Several candidates were also reputed to have assisted with the 
transporting of dead bodies, while contributions to funerary feasts were 
common. 
 
Although not widely reported, some observers in the Southern Highlands 
reported credible accounts of women, but more particularly young girls, being 
 
Figure 20.2: Candidates at a rally in  
Koroba
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gifted to candidates, campaign managers, electoral officials, police and Defense 
Force personnel during the election period. 
 
While vote buying and gifting assumed some novel forms in the 2007 
election in the Southern Highlands, one thing that remained the same was the 
element of implied or explicit coercion that the acceptance of money carries. 
For example, the then sitting MP for Tari, Tom Tomiape, was seen by one 
observer travelling from church to church visiting congregations and making 
donations to support church activities. He was also observed to be making 
congregation members sign an oath to the effect that they would vote for him in 
return for his donation. In another case, voters were warned that ‘God would 
strike them down’ if they failed to honor their commitments. Similar such 
threats have been used by candidates in the Southern Highlands in the past (see 
Robinson 2002). 
 
Throughout SHP people expressed dismay about the amounts of money that 
had changed hands during the election, saying they had seen ‘nothing like it 
before’. Many people interviewed claimed to have voted for, or to have given 
preferences to ‘the money candidates’ out of fear – not because they had 
received money but because the candidates concerned were clearly ‘connected’. 
It is evident then that money was not merely used to buy votes or to display 
prestige, but to generate fear. In some parts of SHP money took the place of 
guns in this regard.  
 
It is not merely the huge amounts of cash distributed that set the 2007 
election apart from earlier elections in SHP, but the way it was used. We have 
noted the declining use of name-lists in favour of cash payments to individual 
voters, and the increased mobility of voters seeking out inducements for 
pledged support. It is also evident that candidates are now having to rely on 
larger and larger networks in order to finance their campaigns, and that wealthy 
individuals (businessmen and community leaders) are financing or contributing 
towards candidates’ campaigns in order to create indebtedness and to ensure 
that the candidate is beholden to them should they win. Indeed it is not 
uncommon to hear talk of ‘backing’ candidates. This happens at the local level 
as well. Instead of candidates hosting huge campaign rallies and supplying 
voters with pigs and beer, as was common in the past, voters themselves are 
now killing the pigs as a show of support for their preferred candidate as well. 
Supporters who provide financial or other assistance to candidates expect to see 
their investments repaid with interest. 
 
Over the course of the last election cycle, then, cash has seemingly begun to 
be used differently. Although it continues to play a central role in SHP politics, 
it is not so much a case of cashed-up candidates coming home once every five 
years to distribute largesse as a means of securing votes; rather, money or 
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support in kind is now being used by voters, willingly or otherwise, to secure a 
share of the much sought-after spoils of public office. A Kopiago woman in her 
early thirties complained bitterly about this. She summed up the shift by 
explaining that in 1997 her local candidate had paid her K900 for a large pig 
that was killed at one of his many campaign rallies; in 2002 he had paid her 
K400 for a similar such pig and had promised the balance of the payment upon 
election; in 2003 he had killed one of her pigs entirely on credit; and in the 2006 
by-election he had returned, seeking yet another of her pigs. In both 2006 and 
2007 she was expected to provide a pig gratis as demonstration of her ongoing 
support. From her perspective, she had no choice but to give the pigs, as she felt 
she needed as much as anything to protect her earlier investments, in the event 
that the candidate in question proved lucky on this occasion. Elsewhere in the 
Southern Highlands, voters told of contributing to their local/preferred 
candidate’s campaign so that he might bribe the polling officials, security 
personnel and counting officials to his advantage. 
 
The inflationary aspect of elections seems to be of particular concern to 
candidates in the Southern Highlands, with several complaining that LPV has 
inflated voter expectations. Several candidates expressed concern that the 
incredibly large amounts of money now being spent on electioneering would 
mean that the winning candidate’s discretionary funds would be unlikely to 
suffice when repaying the debts incurred in financing a highlands-style election 
campaign. Late in the campaign period, Ben Peri, who was contesting Koroba-
Lake Kopiago Open for the seventh time, lamented that even if he won, he 
would never be able to the repay the debts incurred over seven elections. He 
further asserted that he would have been a much wealthier man if he had never 
entered politics, and that the expectation to contest is crippling. In so much as 
standing for election can increase individual and group prestige, not standing 
can diminish one’s standing within the community.  
 
Women’s participation 
 
In the lead-up to the 2007 election there had been concerted electoral and 
civic awareness in the five SHP open electorates in which the 2002 elections 
had failed (see chapter 4). This was conducted by the Ima Kelo Group under 
Nicole Haley’s coordination. In total 104,163 individuals (men, women and 
children) attended 343 awareness sessions conducted over a six-month period 
(November 2006 to April 2007). Bearing in mind the extent to which the SHP’s 
electoral rolls are inflated (see chapter 21), we estimate conservatively that 50 
per cent of the eligible citizens in the activity area were reached. Of more than 
100,000 people who attended the awareness sessions, 36,951 were women of 
voting age (Haley 2007b:7). 
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Figure 20.3: LPV awareness 
at Waneke, November 2006 
 
 
Figure 20.4:  Civic  aware- 
ness at Lake Kopiago 
 
 
Figure 20.5: LPV awareness 
at Lake Kopiago 
 
Observations made during the campaigning 
and polling periods suggest reasonable levels of 
awareness regarding the new voting system 
amongst women voters in the Southern 
Highlands. Observers throughout the Southern 
Highlands also reported a mood of optimism 
among women voters and particularly high 
voter turnout of women on polling day. At 
many polling stations in SHP women appeared 
to outnumber men two to one. We attribute this 
to two things: the awareness and the large 
security presence. Many women interviewed on 
polling day expressed optimism that they 
would be able to vote freely, although for many 
this proved not to be the case. As noted above, 
97 of the 200 women voters (49 per cent) 
interviewed in post-polling surveys in SHP 
reported some form of intimidation when 
casting their vote.  
 
Of the 201 candidates who contested the 
2007 elections in SHP only three were women, 
namely Margret Kawa (Imbonggu Open), 
Epiya Janet Kang Nisa (Mendi Open) and Janet 
Koriama (Tari Open). Observations made 
across the province reveal that very few 
candidates explicitly discussed gender issues or 
sought to secure women’s votes, although some 
strong assertions by women of their rights and 
opinions were observed during the 
campaigning and polling periods. Only two 
SHP candidates consistently raised women’s 
issues, these being Joseph Warai and Janet 
Koriama, both of whom contested Tari-Pori 
Open electorate. Janet Koriama was observed 
to campaign on issues of women in politics, 
women’s rights, development and services, and 
good governance. 
   
2007 saw the official introduction of 
separate voting compartments intended to allow 
for gender segregated polling. These were 
meant to ensure women more freedom of 
choice when exercising their vote. In the 
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Figure 20.6: Women protest-
ing at Koroba, 28 June 2007 
Southern Highlands this policy change was met with outright opposition. 
Awareness teams attempting to convey the policy change were confronted by 
angry men opposed to the changes. One observer in Tari-Pori Open electorate 
reported being confronted by a group of men who were yelling ‘we do not 
support women’s rights to vote separately from men as we have already paid the 
bride price of pigs and money, they are ours, and we own them’. The asserted 
ownership of women clearly extended not only to their votes but to their names. 
Indeed some observers reported widespread consternation about the notion that 
women should be afforded the opportunity to exercise their own choices. They 
further reported that if women were permitted choice they might choose to vote 
for candidates other than those their husbands and brothers might be supporting 
and this meant men would lose some of the ‘sure votes’ they were seeking to 
claim. At Koroba, election officials went further, asserting that the policy 
change was a cultural affront inflicted upon them by outsiders from other 
countries. Interestingly, the policy change came about after intense lobbying 
from women and civil society groups in Chimbu, particularly Meri I Kirap 
Sapotim. 
 
On the campaign trail only two candidates, Joseph Warai and James Marabe, 
were seen to have engaged women campaign managers. Both candidates 
contested Tari-Pori Open electorate. Across the province observers noted that 
women tended to play mainly support roles during the campaign period — 
cooking food, providing hospitality and entertaining guests. Accounts of women 
attending rallies varied somewhat and were dependent on both the time of day 
and location as well as the role women were playing at the particular rally.  
Upper estimates suggest that between 40 and 50 per cent of participants at 
rallies during daylight hours were women, while lower-end estimates suggest 
only 20 per cent of participants were women 
during the evenings. Young girls were also 
observed to attend rallies in significant 
numbers. The majority of women at rallies 
were reported to be either observing or 
participating in singing and dancing or in a 
logistically more supportive role such as 
providing hospitality or cooking. In one 
instance a group of beautifully dressed young 
women claimed prominence at a large rally at 
Koroba airstrip, by mounting a silent protest, 
weaving their way through the crowd carrying 
blood-red knives bearing the name of a young 
man who had been killed in election-related 
violence in the lead-up to polling (see Figure 
20.6). These women were seeking to provoke 
their menfolk into avenging his death.  
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Figure 20.7: HIV awareness in Pakule,  
Ialibu, 22 April 2007 
HIV/AIDS and the 2007 election in SHP 
 
The 2007 election revealed that HIV/AIDS is not a pressing electoral issue in 
SHP, with very few candidates making mention of it at rallies or elsewhere. 
This is consistent with observations made elsewhere in the country (see Haley 
and Anere 2009:63) and not particularly surprising, because what voters want of 
their political leaders are basic services — roads, schools, medical supplies, 
police and magisterial services, not policy statements and prevention strategies. 
That said, observers across the Southern Highlands noted that HIV and AIDS 
had a higher profile in the 2007 election than in earlier elections. Indeed as 
documented elsewhere (Haley 2008), the HIV/AIDS epidemic had not figured 
at all in campaigning in either the 2002 general election or the 2003 
supplementary elections in SHP.  
 
Those observed to explicitly raise the issue of HIV/AIDS included Joesph 
Warai and Janet Koriama (Tari-Pori Open), Petrus Thomas (Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago), and Jacob Sekewa (SHP Provincial). Warai was a member of the 
provincial HIV/AIDS committee and former director of the Community Based 
Health Care Program in Tari, while Janet Koriama was head of the Tari 
women’s association. Both had established histories of community engagement.  
 
Although the electoral and civic awareness undertaken in the lead-up to the 
election had included material on HIV and elections (see Figure 20.6), 
HIV/AIDS awareness materials were largely absent during the campaigning and 
polling periods. Observers in SHP reported the presence of awareness materials 
at only three polling stations visited. This represents a lost opportunity because, 
although HIV/AIDS awareness is not a core PNGEC function, elections provide 
the opportunity to conduct HIV/AIDS awareness in areas that are generally 
beyond the reach of the state and lack the formal infrastructure (due to the 
breakdown of essential services) through which awareness messages might 
ordinarily be channelled. Election-related HIV/AIDS awareness is also 
important because experiences from 
Africa have shown that HIV/AIDS 
impacts on the costs of running 
elections because by-elections 
brought about through the death of 
the incumbent MP are increasingly 
commonplace.  
 
While HIV/AIDS awareness in 
SHP was limited during the election 
period, there was widespread 
evidence of behavior that appears to 
enhance the risk of HIV transmission 
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and strong evidence to suggest that elections provide a context for heightened 
sexual activity (see also chapter 12), which further increases the likelihood of 
HIV transmission. Specifically, individual voters were observed to have greater 
access to cash and were more mobile than in past elections (see above, 
concerning groups of young men travelling from province to province under the 
sponsorship of candidates), so that they were better positioned to seek out 
transactional and extra-marital sexual relations, both by increased fiscal capacity 
and by the greater geographical opportunities afforded by increased mobility. 
Coupled with this, observers in SHP reported that campaign houses and discos 
featured significantly in campaigning and politicking in SHP and that both were 
popular meeting places. Individuals were reported to frequent multiple 
campaign houses seeking out inducements from candidates. 
 
Across the region campaign house opening hours varied widely, with some 
observers in Tari-Pori noting that one campaign house was open only during 
daylight hours. Others in the same area were observed to be open twenty-four 
hours a day.  In the first instance no women were seen frequenting the campaign 
house, although they were observed to be patronizing other campaign houses in 
the same area. Generally, observers noted not only the presence of local sex 
workers but also of young girls and married women engaging in transactional 
sex. Observations made at some night-time events suggested that young 
unmarried girls accounted for around a fifth of all the night-time attendees at 
campaign houses.  
 
Typically, observers reported cannabis use, the consumption of free food and 
alcohol, and evidence of transactional sex along with political campaigning and 
strategizing at campaign houses. They also observed that many establishments, 
particularly discos, did not charge women a gate fee, as a means of encouraging 
women’s attendance, and that there seemed to be less surveillance of women’s 
sexual activity during the election period. Some observers and local leaders 
specifically reported that women who did not ordinarily engage in transactional 
sex were seen to be doing so in the context of the election. This is consistent 
with Gibbs and Mondu’s detailed findings in respect of campaign houses in 
Wabag (see chapter 12).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The introduction of LPV has influenced the conduct of elections in the 
Southern Highlands and brought with it some significant changes to SHP 
political culture that have important ramifications for future elections. Of these, 
local innovations in respect of gifting, vote buying and money politics have seen 
the quantity of money and gifts being made available increase markedly in the 
face of voters’ ability and willingness to pledge support to multiple candidates. 
LPV also saw record numbers of women voters at polling booths, although 
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observer accounts reveal that women’s experiences of the elections were 
somewhat less positive than initially hoped for. Indeed early optimism that 
women would have more freedom of choice under LPV proved unfounded in 
that men continued to assert their rights over those of women, insisting that 
women remain their property and should therefore vote in accordance with their 
wishes.  
 
The proliferation of money politics, which we see as related to the 
introduction of LPV, gives cause for concern for a number of reasons, not least 
because it seems to have inflated the cost of elections and facilitated the 
heightened sexual activity reported during the election period. The changes to 
SHP political culture witnessed at the 2007 election thus warrant closer 
attention in terms of how they might be implicated in the epidemiology of the 
burgeoning HIV epidemic, especially as similar patterns have been noted as 
contributors to the spread of the pandemic in Southeast Asia in the early1990s.3  
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Figure 21.1: Koroba-Lake Kopiago  
District map 
21 RESULTS AT ANY COST? THE LEGACY OF 2002 IN KOROBA-
LAKE KOPIAGO OPEN ELECTORATE 
 
Nicole Haley 
 
In June 2007, the people of Koroba-Lake Kopiago went to the polls for the 
fourth time in five years. The election was of particular interest because 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago was one of the six open electorates in which the 2002 
general election had been deemed to have failed, and was one of the ten 
electorates around the country that had had an LPV by-election prior to the 
general election. It is also an electorate that has been subject to election studies 
in the past (see Haley 2002, 2004, 2006 and Robinson 2002) and for which 
there is consequently a great deal of comparative longitudinal data. This chapter 
draws upon observations and findings of both the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
by-election observation team (Haley 2006) and the 2007 Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
domestic observation team.1 It finds that the election was anything but fair, yet 
despite fraud and malpractice on a scale never before seen the election was 
widely held to have been successful and a significant improvement on 2002. It 
further suggests that the national government and Papua New Guinea Electoral 
Commission (PNGEC) were willing to accept results at any cost in order to 
avoid a repetition of the events of 2002 (Somare 2006:5), and advocates a more 
honest assessment of future elections. The integrity of elections cannot merely 
be asserted but must be demonstrated.  
 
Background 
 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago is one of 
eight open electorates in Southern 
Highlands Province. It is a large 
ethnically-divided electorate situated 
in the far north-western corner of the 
province, sharing boundaries with 
Enga, Sandaun, East Sepik and 
Western provinces (see Figure 21.1). 
The district comprises four local-
level governments (LLGs) for census 
                                                     
1 The by-election observation team included Richard Alo, Kenny Kendoli, Philip Moya, 
Ben Randa and Susan Ferguson, while the 2007 domestic observation team included 
Anna Alo, Susan Alo, Jenny Lundape, Kipu Piaro, Saki Alo, Rodney Aporia, Mex 
Bibila, Kenny Kendoli, Petrus Kilapa, David Lundape, Jim Siape, Justin Wandi and Eka 
Wek. Both teams were led by Nicole Haley. Given the prevailing security situation in 
the electorate in 2007 several of the team positions were split. The four local women, 
for instance, shared a position and made observations in their home areas where their 
personal security could be more likely guaranteed. 
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purposes — North Koroba LLG (26 wards), South Koroba LLG (23 wards), 
Lake Kopiago LLG (19 wards) and Auwi-Pori LLG (27 wards) — and three and 
a half LLGs for electoral purposes. Like several other LLGs in Southern 
Highlands Province, Auwi-Pori LLG is split between two open electorates, 
namely Koroba-Lake Kopiago and Tari-Pori Open.2 This has proved to be an 
ongoing source of confusion to voters and electoral officials alike. 
 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate extends northwest from Koroba and 
Mogorofugwa — two densely populated wetland basins inhabited by Huli 
speakers — towards the Strickland-Lagaip river junction, thereby taking in the 
country of the Duna, Hewa, Bogaia and Awi peoples. Much of the electorate 
(especially the northwest) is accessible only by air, or several days walking with 
hazardous river crossings. Political leaders (including many of the ward 
councillors) spend little, if any, time in the district and vast majority of public 
servants are also absent. As a consequence there is little by the way of 
government service delivery and armed conflict is commonplace, as are illegal 
weapons (see Haley and Muggah 2006).  
 
As at the 2007 election, the electorate was home to around 55,000 people,3 
although there were in fact over 48,700 names on the new electoral roll. Of the 
electorate’s residents approximately 33,500 (61 per cent) primarily identify as 
Huli, 18,065 (33 per cent) as Duna, 2,926 (5 per cent) as Hewa, 425 as Febi, 
335 as Bogaia, and 226 as Awi speakers. This ethnic mix has made for fiercely 
contested parliamentary elections in the past, with all the past candidates being 
of either Huli or Duna extraction. Except for the periods 1977-1982 and 2003-
2004 the sitting member has always been Huli. This is not altogether surprising 
as the Huli outnumber the Duna 2:1 and as such command a huge electoral 
advantage within the electorate.  
 
A history of violence 
 
Since 1997, when guns were first used to menace voters in Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago Open electorate (Robinson 2002), violence and intimidation have 
figured prominently in elections in this part of the Southern Highlands (see also 
Haley 2002, 2004). In 1997 for instance, guns were used to influence electoral 
outcomes by controlling the voting at particular polling stations and a helicopter 
                                                     
2 Auwi-Pori LLG comprises 27 wards. Thirteen wards vote in Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
Open electorate and 14 wards in Tari-Pori Open electorate. The Auwi-Pori LLG 
headquarters are at Tugu which is in the Pori sub-district. 
3 This figure has been calculated from the 1990 census figures using the national 
population growth rate of 2.7 per cent per annum. The 2000 National Census figures for 
the Southern Highlands are highly suspect having been grossly inflated (see Haley 
2004). 
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carrying the then sitting member, Herowa Agiwa, was fired upon by supporters 
of an opposing candidate during the campaign period. The latter incident 
resulted in over $US300,000 damage to the Hevilift helicopter (Haley 2004:19).  
 
By 2002 guns and violence were widespread: election related deaths were 
reported during the campaign period and in the aftermath of the elections; Ben 
Peri (a high profile Duna candidate) was kidnapped and held for ransom; 
another candidate armed his own militia; all air traffic was suspended following 
threats that planes would be shot out of the sky; and voters throughout the 
electorate were threatened and intimidated by candidates and their supporters 
(Haley 2004). These factors contributed to the failure of the 2002 elections. 
 
Post 2002, elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago have involved huge 
investments in security. Two thousand additional security personnel were 
deployed under a national call-out during the 2003 supplementary elections, 800 
additional police and Defence Force personnel were engaged during the 2006 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election security operations (Haley 2006), and an 
additional 2,500 security personnel were deployed to the Southern Highlands in 
2007. Despite the huge security presence and the imposition of a state of 
emergency followed by special police operations in the ten months leading up to 
the elections, guns remained present in the electorate in significant numbers. 
Indeed, members of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago observer team reported seeing 
both high-powered and homemade weapons throughout the electorate and a 
relative abundance of black market ammunition at pre-state-of-emergency 
prices (see chapter 8 and Haley and Muggah 2006). They also reported road 
closures, intermittent election-related violence; and an election related death in 
the lead-up to polling at Koroba. One observer was threatened and warned away 
from a polling station at Harereke by men armed with bush knives, and the 
brother of another observer was killed at Koroba. That said, there were few 
overt displays of weapons at polling places, and guns were not openly used to 
intimidate and influence the vote as they had been in 1997 and 2002.  
 
A history of fraud and malpractice 
 
I have documented in considerable detail the fraudulent electoral practices 
that have characterized elections in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate over 
the past decade (Haley 2002, 2004 and 2006). The 2007 election, like those of 
the past decade, lacked integrity and was marred by widespread cheating, fraud 
and malpractice. Key strategies effectively utilized in the past were once again 
employed. These included inflating the electoral roll, having electoral officials 
removed and replaced, diverting and impounding ballot boxes, using excess 
ballot papers, pre-marking ballot papers, and voting multiple times. Much of the 
malpractice witnessed in 2007, which is detailed in the following sections of 
this chapter, can be attributed to the poor state of the new electoral roll. 
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Key electoral personnel 
 
One of the ways candidates sought to control election outcomes in 2007 was 
through control of key election officials. This proved to be a particularly 
ineffective strategy as in-fighting between key election officials detrimentally 
impacted upon their performance and saw them effectively paralysed at key 
junctures. As a consequence, the security personnel stepped in, assuming 
responsibility for critical aspects of the election preparations (see chapter 8).  
 
Without exception, observers were critical of the key electoral personnel 
engaged to conduct the elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate. They were 
particularly critical of the Southern Highlands election manager, David Wakias, 
considering him to be both ineffectual and partisan. They observed that he could 
rarely be found in his office, ‘spent most of his time roaming around in his hire 
car’ and seemed ‘happy to let the politically appointed Provincial Returning 
Officer — Charles Ipa — run the show’. Another observer had this to say: ‘He 
is a good man, good at making excuses and delaying things. For example he 
didn’t allow people to check their names on the electoral roll to see whether 
they were enrolled or not’. 
 
Observers were equally critical of the returning officer and assistant 
returning officers. They too were considered partisan, politically compromised, 
and unfit to undertake their appointed rolls. The returning officer, Denny 
Hongai, and the assistant returning officers for North Koroba (Haddick 
Apiako/Sakopa), South Koroba (Don Piru/Palabu) and Awi/Lokayu (Jackson 
Kenamu) had all held their positions since 2006, and in particular had run the 
2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election. On this basis, one might have assumed 
a degree of confidence and the knowledge, skills and competency to run an 
election. Unfortunately this proved not to be the case.  
 
There were problems too at Lake Kopiago. In the lead-up to the election the 
assistant returning officer’s position changed hands several times. Steven 
Pauwini, the former council executive officer, had held the position during 
2006. Following poor performance during the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-
election he was replaced. Richard Bei/Pelaku took over the position of assistant 
returning officer for Lake Kopiago in early 2007 — and was observed to be far 
more competent than his predecessor. On 23 March 2007, however, Bei’s 
appointment was revoked and Jackson Hewape was appointed in his place 
(National Gazette No. G63 — 19 April 2007). Hewape’s appointment was 
subsequently revoked, and on 14 May 2007, Bei was reappointed to the 
position. There were rumours that Hewape was again reappointed to the 
position in mid-June, but no evidence of this could be found in the National 
Gazette. In any event both men continued to argue that they were the duly 
appointed assistant returning officer, both accompanied the ballot boxes and 
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ballot papers to Lake Kopiago, both sought to direct polling operations at Lake 
Kopiago on polling day, and both were present in the counting room. It is 
understood that in the week before polling the election manager instructed both 
men to work together, and that he appointed Jackson Hewape as assistant to the 
Lake Kopiago assistant returning officer. Needless to say this caused much 
confusion in the electorate and hampered planning and performance. It also 
caused considerable consternation in the counting room, resulting in much 
discussion about the integrity of the nineteen Lake Kopiago ballot boxes, and 
saw scrutineers for the various Huli candidates seek to have the boxes excluded 
from the count.  
 
Electoral rolls (past and present) 
 
In the wake of the 2002 election, new electoral rolls were created for each of 
Papua New Guinea’s 109 electorates. On the face of it the new Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago electoral roll, which resulted from a re-registration exercise undertaken 
in late 2005, appears more accurate than those used in 1997, 2002, and 2003. 
The new roll, for instance, has only 48,739 names as compared with the 2002 
roll which listed 60,300 enrolled voters. Appearances can be deceptive though. 
In the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case the electoral roll is grossly inaccurate, with 
many more enrolled voters than eligible citizens (see Table 21.1).  
 
Table 21.1: Comparison of electoral rolls and votes cast, 1992 to 2007 
Election Total 
population
Expected  
enrolments4 
Actual 
enrolments
Votes cast Votes as % 
of expected 
enrolments  
1992 36,920 18,460 NA 14,264 77 
1997 42,180 21,090 40,127 32,874 156 
2003 49,490  24,745 60,300 42,595 172 
2006 53,610  26,800 48,778 41,029 153 
2007 55,060 27,530 48,739 45,020 164 
 
As outlined in Table 21.1 above, enrolled voters have far exceeded the number 
of eligible citizens in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate for more than a 
decade now (see Haley 2002, 2004), with the original inflation of the roll dating 
back to the 1997 elections. In 1992 14,264 votes were counted. In 1997 there 
was a two-fold increase in the number of ballots cast, with 32,724 votes allowed 
(Haley 2002:134). Since then, over 40,000 votes have been cast at each election.  
 
                                                     
4 The expected enrolment is held to be 50 per cent of the total projected electorate 
population, calculated from the 1990 census figures using the national population 
growth rate of 2.7% per annum. 
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Based on population figures projected from the 1990 Census, and confirmed 
in many wards by a household census conducted in 1997 (Haley and Robinson 
1998; Robinson and Haley 1998a, 1998b) it is estimated that there should have 
been no more than 27,500 eligible voters in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate 
in 2007. The common roll created for the 2007 election, however, contained 
48,739 names, and is replete with gross irregularities, including: highly inflated 
voter numbers in at least one quarter of proclaimed wards; thousands of eligible 
citizens disenfranchised and not on the roll or allocated to the wrong wards; 
thousands of under-age voters, enrolled by virtue of fictitious birth dates; and 
thousands of duplicate entries.5 
 
In order to get a fuller sense of the problems associated with the new 
electoral roll, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago observer team undertook a careful 
analysis of ward rolls within the Lake Kopiago LLG area.6 This was done using 
census material collected in the past (Haley and Robinson 1998; Robinson and 
Haley 1998a, 1998b), on the basis of our own knowledge, and in consultation 
with community leaders. This close examination of the ward rolls for the 19 
wards within Lake Kopiago LLG — one of four LLGs within Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago electorate — revealed that only half (50.2 per cent) of the 10,351 
enrolled voters were actually eligible to enrol. Examination of the ward rolls for 
Lake Kopiago also revealed the following irregularities:  
• highly inflated voter numbers in many wards; 
• entire villages and hamlets assigned to the wrong wards;  
• 2,426 (23.4 per cent) enrolled voters who were not known in the ward; 
• 1,197 (11.6 per cent) underage voters enrolled with fictitious birth 
dates; 
• 744 (7.2 per cent) enrolled voters who did not meet residency 
requirement; 
• 664 (6.4 per cent) duplicate entries;  
• 243 (2.3 per cent) deceased voters who miraculously re-registered; and  
• at least 735 eligible citizens who do not appear on the new electoral roll. 
 
Put simply, there are gross irregularities with the electoral roll across the entire 
electorate. As well as wards in which enrolments are highly inflated, there are 
wards which are under-enrolled, and over-enrolled wards which are missing 
                                                     
5 For specific examples refer to the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election observation 
report (Haley 2006). Many of the irregularities identified therein were not rectified prior 
to the 2007 election. For the most part this had to do with the poorly implemented 
verification exercise, which saw a net reduction of only 39 names from the 2006 by-
election roll.  
6 In all there are nineteen wards in the Lake Kopiago LLG. One ward comprises Bogaia 
speakers, another comprises Awi speakers, four could be considered ethnically Hewa 
and the remaining 13 are Duna wards.  
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significant numbers of eligible citizens. In some cases this seems to have been 
due to administrative errors but in other cases because enterprising candidates 
successfully managed to ensure that their opponents’ supporters were 
disenfranchised. In Koroba-Lake Kopiago, and indeed elsewhere in the 
Southern Highlands, observers identified whole families and clans which were 
disenfranchised by being placed in the wrong wards or by being left off the roll 
completely. These irregularities meant that whilst some people were not 
included on the roll at all, others were included from two to six times. 
 
Based on the above analysis the Lake Kopiago LLG roll should have 
included some 6,000 names: the 5,196 correctly enrolled people (50.2 per cent 
of 10,351) plus the 735+ eligible citizens who were missing altogether. If one 
takes the 1990 census population for Lake Kopiago LLG, which is 
predominantly Duna speaking, and projects forward to 2007 using the national 
population growth rate, an eligible voting population of 6,200 should have been 
expected. On this basis the LLG was overenrolled by 67 per cent at the time of 
the 2007 election. Using the same methodology, the North Koroba and South 
Koroba LLGs, which are ethnically Huli, were over-enrolled by 79 per cent and 
84 per cent respectively,7 while Auwi-Pori LLG, where voters are Duna 
speaking, was over-enrolled by 71 per cent. Overall, the Duna speaking parts of 
the electorate are over-enrolled by 68 per cent while the Huli speaking parts of 
the electorate were over-enrolled by 82 per cent. This amplifies the electoral 
advantage the Huli command, and delivers to them nearly 15,000 additional 
ballot papers/votes, as compared to the 6,400 additional ballot papers/votes 
available to the Duna.  
 
Both the enrolment and verification exercises were highly problematic in the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate. Very few people actually saw the 
enrolment teams and even fewer filled out a claim for enrolment form. Correct 
procedure dictates that eligible citizens should have completed and signed a 
claim for enrolment form, in order to re-enroll. Observers across the electorate 
reported that teams of local men were employed to complete, sign and witness 
the forms on behalf of the wider community. In doing so these enumerators 
knowingly witnessed and signed off on thousands of forms in which false 
claims or declarations had been made. In the vast majority of cases there was no 
excuse for witnessing false declarations as the local men employed as village 
enumerators were from the wards in which they undertook the enrolment 
exercise and would have known who was under-age, who was long absent from 
the electorate (i.e. those who did not meet the legislatively proscribed residency 
requirements)8, and which of the would-be electors were actually dead.  
                                                     
7 Expected enrolments in North Koroba and South Koroba were 8,186 and 9,922 
respectively, while actual enrolments were 14,654 and 18,228.  
8 Section 55(1) of OLNLLGE requires that a person making a claim for enrolment must 
have ‘resided in the area of an electorate for a period of not less than six months 
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Across the electorate claims of political interference in the enrolment 
process, and claims that not enough forms were sent out were regularly 
encountered. There is seemingly some merit in these allegations in that there is 
huge over-enrolment in some wards and significant under-enrolment in others. 
Haredege ward, one of the most-populous wards in Lake Kopiago LLG is a case 
in point. Based on the 1990 census, a voting population of 463 was expected in 
2007, however the 2007 ward roll contained only 158 names; thus two thirds of 
eligible voters in the ward were disenfranchised.  
 
Observations made during the 2007 domestic observation reveal that the 
wider community was not complicit in the fraud that saw them placed on the 
roll multiple times. Indeed the vast majority of people did not personally place 
themselves on the roll, and prior to the civic and electoral awareness undertaken 
by Ima Kelo between November 2006 and April 2007 (see chapter 20) many 
were not even aware that new rolls had been created. Of the twelve domestic 
observers who live in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate and were eligible to 
enrol, only one had completed a claim for enrolment form, yet they were all 
enrolled — and most were enrolled multiple times. At least three of the 
domestic observers appeared on the roll three separate times. A survey of 200 
voters, undertaken during the campaign period, further revealed that only 12 
people (7 men and 5 women), 6 per cent of the survey respondents, had actually 
completed a claim for enrolment’ form.  
 
Like the enrolment exercise, the verification exercise was highly 
problematic. The rolls were not publicly displayed in the wards or in Kopiago 
sub-district. Our Koroba observers reported that the rolls were on display at 
Koroba district office but they disagree over how long for — reports ranging 
from one to seven days. In Mendi, the provincial headquarters, the rolls went on 
public display only 48 hours before the issue of writs — so that there was only a 
very small window of opportunity for voters to check whether their name 
appeared on the roll. For those who managed to check the roll, the exercise 
proved futile, because amendments made during the 48-hour window were not 
reflected on the final rolls. One of the observers, Kenny Kendoli, travelled to 
Mendi and sought to have his multiple entries removed. He annotated the 
verification roll in the presence of the election manager, and the Observation 
coordinator, yet he still appeared on the electoral roll in three places. At the 
                                                                                                                                  
immediately preceding the date of his [or her] claim for enrolment’ (s. 51(1)(a)). This 
means that clan members residing outside the electorate in the six months leading up to 
the enrolment exercise were not eligible to be enrolled. Linked to this, electors were 
required to be present at the time of enrolment. Page 7 of the Electoral Roll Training 
Manual outlines this aspect of the enrolment procedure in bold font, saying, ‘The elector 
must sign the enrolment form personally, or make their mark. An enrolment form 
cannot be signed by another person on behalf of the elector’. Where this did not happen 
procedure was clearly breached. 
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same time, he sought to have his four under-age children removed from the roll, 
by annotating their entries to the effect that they were under-age. All four 
children remained on the roll. They were included on the roll without their 
parents’ knowledge or consent, and all appear with fictitious birthdates (see 
Table 21.2 below).  
 
Table 21.2: Examples of underage voters with fictitious birth dates 
Ward 
name 
Elector 
ID 
Last 
name 
First    
name 
Sex Birth date  
on roll 
Occupation Actual  
birth date 
Age 
Hirane 76014203  Yuwi Rodney M 1 Dec 1983  Student 02 Nov 1989 17 
Hirane 76014262  Yuwi Jassin M 12 Feb 1985  Student 20 Sept 1992 14 
Hirane 76014314  Yuwi Melo9   5 Oct 1987  Student 19 Oct 1995 11 
Hirane 76000459  Kenny Mero M 10 Feb  Student 19 Oct 1995 11 
Hirane 76014377  Yuwi Bonica F 6 May 1989  Student ?? Oct 1999 7 
Source: Electoral roll made up to May 2007 
 
Two other observers collectively made several hundred corrections to various 
Lake Kopiago rolls on display in Mendi, in order to move disenfranchised 
voters to their correct wards. Similarly, these amendments were not reflected on 
the final rolls.  
 
Despite the fact that the rolls were not publicly displayed as they should have 
been, the assistant returning officers, with assistance from local enumerators, 
undertook a roll-cleansing exercise of sorts. In the Kopiago and Awi/Logayu 
LLG areas this saw enrolments decrease substantially, and in South Koroba it 
saw enrolments increase (see Table 21.3). 
 
Table 21.3: Summary of enrolments 2006 and 2007 
LLG area 2006 By-election roll, 
(verification roll)  
22 June 2006 
2007 Electoral roll,
(final roll) 
May 2007
Variation 
Kopiago 11,038 10,351 6% decrease 
Auwi-Pori 6,962 5,506 21% decrease 
North Koroba 14,824 14,654 1% decrease 
South Koroba 15,954 18,228 14% increase 
TOTAL 48,778 48,739  
 
The assistant returning officers for Kopiago and Awi/Logayu alleged a 
conspiracy on the part of the returning officer, claiming that while the North and 
South Koroba assistant returning officers were given plenty of forms, they got 
only a handful and so were not able to enrol missing voters during the 
verification exercise.  
                                                     
9 Melo, the youngest son, is included on the roll twice, under two different spellings of 
his name, and under both his father’s birth name and Christian name. 
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Table 21.4 below compares actual enrolments with expected enrolments, at 
the ward level, based on the 1990 census.10 It shows significant over-enrolment 
in a large number of Huli-speaking wards, and makes evident that enrolments in 
several already over-enrolled wards increased even further during the 
verification process, which took place between the 2006 by-election and the 
2007 general election. Enrolments in Tumbite ward, for example, increased 
from 1,299 in 2006 to 2,586 in 2007, while enrolments in Pubulumu 1 and 2 
increased from 796 to 2,485. At Tumbite inflation of the roll was achieved by 
duplication using different but similar spellings of the same name and by giving 
different birth years for each entry (see Table 21.13 in the Appendix of this 
chapter for examples). Amoung the Huli, ‘K’ and ‘G’, ‘P’ and ‘B’ and ‘Y’ and 
‘J’ are often used interchangeably. These regular variations form the basis of the 
duplication identified. 
 
Based on the age data in the 2000 census and projections from the 1990 
census, there should be no more than 600-700 eligible voters in Tumbite and 
around 900 voters in Pubulumu 1 and 2 combined. In 2007, enrolments at 
Tumbite and Pubulumu were three to four times greater than they should have 
been. These three wards formed the core of of Fr Matthias Olape’s base vote. 
Indeed he picked up 5,008 of the 7,978 first preference votes he received from 
these three wards alone. Olape was the National Alliance endorsed candidate in 
2006 and People’s Party endorsed candidate in the 2007.11  
 
Exceptionally high enrolments were also found in the base votes of the 
sitting MP (John Kekeno) and the former MP (Herowa Agiwa), and these 
likewise increased in the twelve months between the 2006 by-election and the 
2007 election. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is the most over-enrolled wards that 
demonstrated the highest degree of voting solidarity, with more than 90 per cent 
of the votes cast typically going to a single candidate. This suggests that 
inflation of the roll in these wards was deliberate and intended to benefit 
particular candidates (see Table 21.5). A consideration of enrolments over time 
seemingly confirms this. Over-enrolments in individual wards can be shown to 
be linked to the presence of a strong local candidate. For example, when Petrus 
Thomas contested the 2003 supplementary elections, enrolments at Aiyuguni 
and Wagia-Pogolaia, his mother’s and father’s home areas respectively, went up 
                                                     
10 The table is based on an investigative approach developed by Thelma Oberdorf, a 
specialist roll adviser from the Australian Electoral Commission, to help election 
managers identify and prioritise ward rolls that required cleaning. Oberdorf’s approach 
involved comparing expected ward enrolments, calculated using the age data contained 
within the 2000 census, with actual ward enrolments. Given that the 2000 census figures 
for SHP are generally regarded as highly suspect, I have based my calculations on the 
1990 census figures. 
11 Throughout the electorate voters consistently alleged that the assistant returning 
officer for South Koroba was a diehard Fr Matthias supporter. 
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from 540 (1997 roll) to over 1,300 (in 2003), and from 336 (1997 roll) to 582 
(in 2006). Similarly when John Kekeno contested the 2006 by-election, 
enrolments at Warukumu (Warukumu and Kenamu) went up from 599 to 911. 
When he ran again in 2007 they increased further, rising to 945.  
 
Table 21.4: Comparison of over-enrolled wards in North and South Koroba 
Ward(s) LLG Census
1990
Expected 
ward 
enrolmta 
Ward 
enrolmt 
2006
Ward 
percent 
2006
Ward 
enrolmt 
2007
Ward 
percent 
2007 
Votes 
cast 
2007 
Tumbite Sth Koroba  877 690 1299 188 2586 375 2583 
Teria 1&2 Nth Koroba  488 384 1289 336 1419 370 888 
Pubulumu 1&2 Sth Koroba  1182 930 796 86 2485 267 b2499 
Betege 1 & 2 Nth Koroba  670 527 1099 209 1171 222 1190 
Andiria 1&2 Sth Koroba  619 487 1175 241 1025 210 979 
Maria Sth Koroba  720 566 1022 181 1161 205 1061 
Ereiba 1 &2 Nth Koroba  819 644 1441 224 1312 204 881 
Gunu 1&2 Sth Koroba  671 528 1172 222 1056 200 890 
Topi Nth Koroba  156 123 250 203 238 193 243 
Aiyenda Nth Koroba  372 293 619 211 549 187 531 
Kenamo Nth Koroba  261 205 416 203 382 186 386 
Kagoma Nth Koroba  577 454 739 163 829 183 797 
Humburu 1&2 Sth Koroba  746 587 1099 187 1068 182 1079 
Magara 1&2 Sth Koroba  946 744 1567 211 1252 168 1264 
Hujanoma 1&2 Nth Koroba  962 757 993 131 1241 164 1254 
Kakarene 1&2 Sth Koroba  1250 983 1616 164 1495 152 1298 
Pandu Sth Koroba  603 474 599 126 721 152 612 
Hedemari 1&2 Sth Koroba 914 719 1148 160 1080 150 1084 
Mbuli Sth Koroba  974 766 1191 155 1141 149 1143 
Levani Nth Koroba  716 563 848 151 834 148  839 
Piagonga 1&2 Nth Koroba  685 539 799 148 769 143 778 
Tangimapu Sth Koroba  763 600 878 146 854 142 859 
Yatimali Nth Koroba  816 642 895 139 892 139 NIL 
Kelabo 1&2 Nth Koroba 702 552 948 172 749 136 691 
Hauwinda Nth Koroba  326 256 348 136 338 132 346 
Erebo Sth Koroba  673 530 668 126 649 122 653 
Jaguabi Nth Koroba  605 476 636 134 578 121 576 
Warukumu Nth Koroba  620 468 569 117 567 121 564 
Notes: a The expected ward enrolment in this case was held to be 50 per cent of the total 
projected population which was calculated from the 1990 census figures using the 
national population growth rate of 2.7 per cent per annum. b This represents four more 
papers than were collectively issued to these two polling stations, although in fact nine 
additional ballot papers found their way into the Pumbulumu 1 ballot box. 
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Similar patterns are evident elsewhere in the electorate. For example, 
enrolments at Maria and Humburu rose significantly when Matiabe contested 
the 2006 by-election: enrolments at Maria rose from 883 in 1997 to 1,018 in 
2006 and 1,161 in 2007, while those at Humburu increased from 840 in 1997 to 
1,092 in 2006. The inflation of the Pubulumu roll likewise coincided with Olape 
contesting the seat. Pre Olape, the enrolment for Pubulumu totalled 1,062 in 
1997; in 2003 it rose to over 1,200 and then to 2,485 in 2007. 
  
Table 21.5: Candidates benefitting from over-enrolled wards 
Ward (s) LLG Expected 
ward 
enrolment
Ward 
enrolment 
2007
Benefiting 
candidate 
Total 
votes 
cast
Votes 
received  
% of 
votes 
received 
Tumbite Sth Koroba  690 2586 Matthias Olape 2586 2554 99 
Pubulumu 
1&2 
Sth Koroba  930 2485 Matthias Olape 2499 2454 98 
Betege  
1 & 2 
Nth Koroba  527 1171 Herowa Agiwa 1190 1162 98 
Maria Sth Koroba  566 1161 Isaac Matiabe 1061 1003 95 
Ereiba  
1 &2 
Nth Koroba  644 1312 Herowa Agiwa 881 822 93 
Topi Nth Koroba  123 238 John Kekeno 243 228 94 
Kenamo Nth Koroba  205 382 John Kekeno 386 376 97 
Kagoma Nth Koroba  454 829 John Kekeno 797 767 96 
Humburu 
1&2 
Sth Koroba  587 1068 Isaac Matiabe 1079 973 90 
Hujanoma 
1&2 
Nth Koroba  757 1241 Herowa Agiwa 1254 1191 95 
Mbuli Sth Koroba  766 1141 Isaac Matiabe 1143 1079 94 
Piagonga 1 Nth Koroba  270 426 John Kekeno 432 424 98 
Tangimapu Sth Koroba  600 854 Matthias Olape 859 809 94 
Warukumu Nth Koroba 488 567 John Kekeno 564 562 100 
Kereniba Nth Koroba  700 1051 Herowa Agiwa 957 900 94 
Aiyukuni Kopiago 390 633 Petrus Thomas 638 634 99 
Hirane Kopiago 448 890 Ben Peri 845 844 100 
Wagia Kopiago 242 540 Petrus Thomas 539 526 98 
 
Another common practice the Huli have employed to boost their enrolments 
concerns splitting old census units into two separate wards. Over the past 
decade, fifteen locally constituted communities were split in this way. Such 
paired wards typically bear the same name. In North Koroba these paired wards 
include: Betege 1 & 2, Ereiba 1 & 2, Hujanoma 1 & 2, Kelabo 1 & 2, Kereniba 
1 & 2, Piagonga 1 & 2, and Teria 1 & 2, and in South Koroba they include: 
Andiria 1 & 2, Gunu 1 &  2, Hedemari 1 & 2, Humburu 1 & 2, Kakarene 1 & 2, 
Magara 1 & 2, and Pabulumu 1 & 2. In each of these paired wards enrolments 
are significantly inflated, with many individuals appearing on both ward rolls. 
In 2006 and 2007 the polling places for these paired wards were set up side by 
side and voters were repeatedly observed to move between polling stations, and 
to vote at both, often multiple times. 
 
Results at any cost?      335 
The 2007 candidates and their alliances 
 
Seventeen candidates contested the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open seat in 
2007. This was a smaller field than in 2002, when 19 candidates contested, and 
a smaller field than the 2006 by-election, which had been contested by a record 
20 candidates. Of the 17 candidates, 11 had contested this seat previously, and 9 
had contested the 2006 by-election, which had been conducted under LPV. No 
women contested the seat. For the first time ever, there were more Duna 
candidates than Huli candidates (see Table 21.6), and as in 1997 and 2002 
cultural identity and ethnicity figured importantly in campaigning.  
 
Table 21.6: Ethnicity of candidates 1997 to 2007 
Election 1997 2002 2003 2006 2007 
Total candidates 13 19 12 20 17 
Huli candidates 7 13 10 12 8 
Duna candidates 6 6 2 8 9 
 
Table 21.7 provides summary information concerning the 17 candidates who 
contested the 2007 election. Of these, 6 were serious contenders, namely: the 
sitting MP John Kekeno (MP 2006-2007), Petrus Thomas (MP 2003-2004), Ben 
Peri (runner-up 2003 and 2006), Fr Mathias Olape, Herowa Agiwa (MP 1992-
2002) and Issac Matiabe — brother of the late Aruru Matiabe (MP 1982-1992).  
 
Table 21.7: Candidate summary 
No. Candidate Ethnicity Area LLG Previous elections contested 
10 Paul Pora Wasdok Huli Koroba Sth Koroba  
11 Dokta Philip Pakalu Duna Kopiago Kopiago 1992 
12 Thomas Tupia Ape Duna Kopiago Kopiago  
13 Herowa Agiwa Huli Fugua Nth Koroba Successful 1992, 1994, 1997. 
Contested 2002; 2003; 2006. 
14 Agiru Hole Huli Tangi Nth Koroba  
15 Allan Limbawi Mone Duna Kopiago Kopiago  
16 Nane Petrus Thomas Duna Kopiago Kopiago 2002; 2003; 2006 
Successful in 2003 
17 Daniel Mapira Huli Koroba Sth Koroba 1982; 2006 
18 Ben Epe Peri Duna Kopiago Kopiago 1992; 1994; 1997; 2002; 
Runner-up in 2003 & 2006 
19 Paiyale Elo Duna Kopiago Kopiago 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992; 1994; 
1997; 2002. Successful 1977 
20 Issac Matiabe Huli Maria Sth Koroba 1994, 2006 
21 Waa Alfred Akope Huli Koroba Nth Koroba  
22 Ronald Kendopa 
Kulakua 
Duna Kopiago Kopiago 2006 
23 Mcnene Mai Paiale 
Elo 
Duna Kopiago Kopiago  
24 Matthew Magaye Duna Auwi Awi 
Logaiyu 
1992, 1997, 2002, 2006 
Runner-up in 1992 & 1997 
25 John Kekeno Kelewa Huli Tangi Nth Koroba Successful in 2006 
26 Mathias Olape Huli Pureni Sth Koroba 2002, 2003, 2006 
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All six candidates scored over 4,500 first preference votes and were the last six 
candidates left in the race. The same six had filled the top six positions in the 
2006 by-election, and Thomas, Peri, Olape and Agiwa had filled the top four 
positions in the 2003 supplementary elections. All six candidates benefited, to 
some extent, from the over-enrolments detailed in the last section (see Table 
21.5), although some more than others. 
 
Agreements and alliances were formed between several candidates, with 
some, namely Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye, and Paiele Elo and Ronald 
Kulakua, agreeing to share preferences, and others, particularly the weaker 
candidates, apparently standing to split the votes of stronger candidates. The 
reputed alliances and shared histories of the candidates are summarised below.  
 
Table 21.8: Reputed alliances and shared histories 
Candidate Alliances and shared histories 
Paul Pora 
Wasdok 
• no known alliances with other candidates 
• campaigned only for minor preferences and to be known for 2012 
Phillip Dokta 
Pakalu 
• no known alliances with other candidates 
• contested in 2007, because his wife had contested the 2006 by-
election  
Thomas 
Tupia Ape 
• close friend of Matthew Magaye 
• thought to be standing to split Ben Peri and Petrus Thomas’ vote and 
to capture preferences for Magaye 
Herowa 
Urape Agiwa
• former Member (1992-2002) 
• former patron of John Kekeno, although reputed to have fallen out 
• longstanding political opponent of Ben Peri 
• reputed to have orchestrated Ben Peri’s kidnapping in 2002 
• had supported Matthew Magaye in 1997 to split Peri’s vote  
Agiru Hole • widely reputed to have been funded by Ben Peri  
• thought to be standing to split John Kekeno’s vote 
Allen 
Limbawi 
Mone 
• a career public servant/administrator   
• former brother-in-law to Ben Peri, with whom he has been in dispute 
over non-payment of bride-price 
• key supporter of Matthew Magaye in 1992 and 1997 
• refused political appointment from Agiwa following 1992 elections 
• key supporter of Petrus Thomas in 2003 
Nane Petrus 
Thomas 
• former member (2003-2004) 
• related to but a political opponent of Ben Peri 
• related to Ronald Kendopa Kulakua 
 • previously supported by Matthew Magaye and Alen Mone in 2003 
Daniel 
Mapiria 
• former chairman of the National Gaming Board 
• no known alliances with other candidates 
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Candidate Alliances and shared histories 
Ben Epe Peri • closely related to, but a political opponent of, Petrus Thomas 
• related to Ronald Kendopa Kulakua 
• signed and MOU with Matthew Magaye to exchange preferences 
• class mate of Issac Matiabe, the two were said to have an alliance  
• close associate of Anderson Agiru, President of the United Resources 
Party and former SHP governor (1997-2002) 
Paiele Elo • former member (1977-1982) 
• widely reputed to have been funded by John Kekeno 
• thought to be standing to split Ben Peri’s and Petrus Thomas’s votes 
• encouraged supporters to give their preferences to Kulukua 
• closely aligned with the former SHP governor, Hami Yawari 
Issac Aruru 
Matiabe 
• brother of the former MP Aruru Matiabe (1982-1992) 
• class mate of Ben Peri’s  - the two were said to have an alliance 
Waa Alfred 
Akope  
• no known alliances with other candidates 
Ronald 
Kendopa 
Kulukua 
• related to both Ben Peri and Petrus Thomas 
• reputed to have been funded by Kekeno to split Peri’s and Thomas’s 
votes 
• encouraged supporters to give their preferences to Paiele Elo 
• publicly stated that he would work with Petrus Thomas, if he won 
McEnene 
Mai Elo 
• son of Paiele Elo, Member for Koroba-Lake Kopiago (1977-1982) 
Matthew 
Magaye 
• stood down in favour of Petrus Thomas in 2003 
• signed and MOU with Ben Peri to exchange preferences 
• closely aligned with the former SHP governor, Hami Yawari 
John Kekeno 
Kelewa 
• sitting Member (2006-2007) 
• former secretary to and business associate of Herowa Agiwa 
Mattias 
Olape 
• Catholic Priest – appealed to Catholics for support 
• strongest polling Huli candidate in 2003 supplementary elections 
• no known alliances with other candidates  
Table 21.8 continued 
 
At least four of minor ‘vote-splitting’ candidates were reported to be receiving 
financial support from the more serious candidates.12 Specifically, it was widely 
asserted that Agiru Hole was funded by Ben Peri to split John Kekeno’s base 
vote, and that Paiele Elo, Ronald Kulakua and McEnene Mai Paiale Elo were all 
sponsored by and/or receiving support from John Kekeno to split Ben Peri’s and 
Petrus Thomas’s votes. Thomas Tupia was also considered a vote-splitter and 
was widely held to be working with Matthew Magaye to split the Kopiago vote, 
which was expected to go to Peri and Thomas. It was not clear whether Tupia 
was receiving financial support from Magaye. 
                                                     
12 This strategy has been successfully employed in past elections in this electorate (see 
Haley 2002, 2004).  
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In the lead-up to the election Matthew Magaye, who had contested the seat 
on four previous occasions, being runner-up in 1992 and 1997, was 
acknowledged to have strong support in Auwi-Logaiyu. He was the sole 
candidate from that LLG area. However the 2006 by-election had shown that he 
lacked the ability to draw preferences from elsewhere in the electorate, and that 
his support was on the wane. Indeed in 1997, Magaye had gained 6,582 votes, 
yet in the 2006 by-election he had picked up only 4,449 first preference votes. 
Magaye sought to address his diminishing popularity by having Tupia stand to 
split the Kopiago vote and by seeking to capture preferences which might 
otherwise have flowed to the Kopiago candidates. He sought to achieve the 
latter by entering into an MOU with Ben Peri to exchange preferences. Both 
strategies failed as only 18 of Tupia’s 810 votes flowed to Magaye upon 
elimination (most flowed to Peri and Thomas) and Magaye himself was 
eliminated before Peri.13  
 
Not all the weaker candidates were merely vote splitters — some were 
standing to increase their profile in the electorate. Paul Pora Wasdok, for 
instance, was reputed to be standing so people ‘would know him in 2012’ while 
Kulakua was contesting to improve his standing for the LLG elections. In his 
case this proved an effective strategy, as he was elected Lake Kopiago LLG 
president in 2008. Phillip Pakalu’s reason for contesting was the most unusual. 
Evidently he was contesting because his wife, Lucy Pakalu, had contested the 
seat during the 2006 by-election, gaining 66 first preference votes, finishing 16th 
in a field of 20 candidates. Apparently she had challenged him to contest to 
demonstrate whether he could pull more votes than she had. Phillip who had 
previously contested the 1992 elections, gaining only a handful of votes, pulled 
only 47 first preference votes and finished 15 in a field of 17.  
 
Campaigning in 2007 
 
As expected, campaigning in the 2007 general election was generally 
accommodative, with candidates being able to campaign more widely and move 
around more freely than they had in either the 2002 national elections or the 
2003 supplementary elections — something that had also been observed in 
previous LPV by-elections (Standish 2006:8; Haley 2006:24). That said, 
candidates did not move around as freely as they had in the 2006 by-election, 
and few campaigned across ethnic boundaries.   Indeed, 2007 saw the return of 
                                                     
13 In the 2006 by-election Ben Peri had in fact entered into an alliance with, and had 
reportedly provided financial support to, Auwi-Logaiyu candidate Geoffery Kara, in an 
effort to split Matthew Magaye’s vote and that of Petrus Thomas. Thomas had picked 
up most of the Auwi-Logaiyu votes in 2003. The strategy was only partially successful 
in that only 147 of Kara’s 575 votes flowed to Peri on elimination. Of the remaining 
votes 193 flowed to Thomas, 145 to Magaye and 51 were shared between a further 
seven candidates. 
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Figure 21.2: Petrus Thomas on the  
campaign trail in Tari, 23 June 2007 
ethnically-closed campaigning (cf. 
Haley 2002; 2004; 2007), with Huli 
candidates campaigning in North and 
South Koroba — the Huli speaking 
parts of the electorate — and Duna 
candidates campaigning at Kopiago 
and in Auwi-Logaiyy — the 
predominantly Duna speaking parts 
of the electorate. Petrus Thomas 
proved to be the only real exception 
to this in that he spent several weeks 
at a time in the electorate, 
campaigning in both Duna and Huli 
speaking areas (See figure 21.1). None of the Huli candidates campaigned at 
Kopiago this time around, although several, including Matthias Olape and Isaac 
Matiabe, had during the 2006 by-election.  
 
Compared with previous elections, including the 2006 by-election, 
campaigning was a much more low-key affair. Few of the candidates spent 
much time campaigning in the electorate, relying instead on campaign managers 
and diehard supporters to campaign on their behalf. Active campaigning by 
candidates was confined to the later stages of the campaign period. Generally, 
candidates were observed to concentrate their campaign efforts on areas where 
they believed they had base support, and on attending rallies and opening 
ceremonies in areas where preferences were deemed to be on offer (see chapter 
20). 
 
Whilst it was evident from the way many of the not-so-strong candidates 
campaigned that they did not fully appreciate the importance of preferences, the 
top six candidates clearly did. All campaigned strategically, seeking first 
preferences in their home areas and minor preferences elsewhere, whereas the 
not so serious candidates campaigned mostly for minor preferences. Overall 
there was little concerted collaboration between candidates and no serious 
evidence of widespread preference swapping between parties or individual 
candidates, although compared with 2006 there was certainly more cooperation 
between candidates, which suggests a growing awareness about the way LPV 
works. For example, Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye entered into a MOU to 
exchange preferences, while Paiele Elo and Ronald Kulaka were observed to 
encourage their supporters to preference each other. Importantly, these latter 
agreements also reflected the widespread view that preferences should be 
retained within the same cultural, linguistic or ethnic group.  
 
It was also suggested that this was the reason John Kekeno provided support 
to three Duna candidates, in that he recognised that ‘Duna’ votes were unlikely 
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to flow to him in the form of preferences but was keen to see them exhausted so 
as to prevent them from flowing to the two strong Duna candidates — Peri and 
Thomas. If this was indeed his strategy, it did not prove particularly effective, as 
candidates have little control over the way their supporters allocate preferences. 
For instance, when Paiele Elo Ronald Kulakua and McEnene Mai Elo were 
eliminated, half of their votes were distributed to other Duna candidates, 
particularly Thomas and Peri. 
 
As in previous elections, candidates offered incentives of one kind or another 
— cash and promises of projects and future support — in order to secure votes. 
Several of the candidates gave out road maintenance and grass cutting contracts, 
while some funded or made arrangements for people living outside the 
electorate to travel home in order to cast their votes. Indeed in the days prior to 
polling there were constant streams of PMVs, reputedly hired by Ben Peri, 
Petrus Thomas, John Kekeno and Herowa Agiwa, ferrying voters into the 
electorate. The stronger candidates also put considerable effort into inflating 
electoral rolls in areas where they enjoyed base support, and into influencing 
key electoral officials. Much effort was also put into attempts to have key 
electoral officials removed and replaced at the eleventh hour — a strategy 
successfully employed in past elections (see Haley 2004:20).  
 
Influence of political parties 
 
As has been noted by observers of previous Papua New Guinea elections, 
including the LPV by-elections conducted under the Organic Law on National 
and Local-Level Government Elections 2002, party endorsement, where it 
occurs, often means very little on the ground (Standish 2006:10; see also Haley 
2004:18). Gibbs (2006:13), for example, notes that in the 2004 Wabag by-
election, only two candidates had party endorsement and that party affiliation 
‘was not a very significant factor in voting patterns’. Standish et al. (2004:6) 
also note that party policies are seldom discussed and that party politics is 
‘largely decorative’, being confined to ‘impressive nomination rallies’ and the 
occasional fleeting visit by party leaders or prominent ministers. Such 
statements ring true in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago context.  
 
In the 2007 general election, 10 of the 17 candidates contesting the Koroba-
Lake Kopiago Open seat had party endorsement. More particularly, the six top 
candidates — John Kekeno (People’s Action Party [PAP]), Fr Mathias Olape 
(People’s Party), Ben Peri (Pangu), Herowa Agiwa (PNG Country Party), Petrus 
Thomas (National Alliance) and Isaac Matiabe (New Generation Party) all had 
party endorsement.  
 
In the Papua New Guinea context, though, party endorsement in one election 
does not signal long-term association with a particular party. Instead it is viewed 
Results at any cost?      341 
as a temporary alliance entered into for the purpose of the election in order to 
gain funding and logistical support. For example, Petrus Thomas, the National 
Alliance endorsed candidate in 2007, had contested the 2006 by-election as a 
People’s National Congress (PNC) candidate, and was elected to parliament in 
2003 after running as a People’s Progress Party (PPP) candidate. Herowa 
Agiwa, the former MP (1992-2002), has similarly shifted party affiliation 
several times.  He had stood as a People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) 
candidate in 2002, a Pangu candidate in 2003, an independent in 2006, and was 
endorsed by the PNG Country Party in 2007. Likewise, Fr Mathias Olape was 
endorsed by the People’s Action Party in 2002, National Alliance in 2006 and 
the People’s Party in 2007. Even Ben Peri, who had contested the last three 
elections under the United Resources Party banner, changed allegiance in 2007, 
this time running with Pangu.  
 
As in earlier elections there was no evidence to suggest that party affiliation 
signalled an endorsement of particular political views or positions. Indeed all 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago candidates, party endorsed and independent alike, 
campaigned on similar platforms, asserting that they would be a good leader and 
would bring goods and services. Collectively they promised to support church, 
youth and women’s groups; to bring development; to ensure roads and airstrips 
were maintained; and to ensure that schools and health services were properly 
staffed and funded.   
 
Seemingly, party affiliation had little influence on voters. This is not to 
suggest that parties are completely irrelevant. To the contrary, strong candidates 
sought and were able to gain party endorsement, and those with party 
endorsement generally polled quite well. This is because parties seek to endorse 
likely winners, or those with a real chance of success. In the Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago context, party endorsement is viewed as part of the candidate’s broader 
deportment, which itself is seen to reflect their inner worth and likelihood of 
success at the polls (see Haley 2008, 2004). For this reason, Phillip Pakalu’s 
failure to gain party endorsement from Star Alliance gave rise to much 
discussion in the electorate and was seen to signal that his campaign was 
doomed to fail.  
 
In the final analysis, six of the ten party-endorsed candidates were the top-
polling candidates at the end of the first preference count and the final six 
candidates in the race. This, I suggest, had more to do with the overall 
popularity of those candidates than their party affiliations as such. Where 
candidates had party endorsement, this typically translated into some level of 
support with campaign expenses — such as candidate posters and voter cards, 
and in some cases vehicle hire.  
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Influence of guns 
 
Guns did not feature in this election to anywhere near the extent they had in 
1997 and 2002. They were, however, still out there. In fact, members of the 
observer team saw firearms during nominations, the campaign period, in the 
lead-up to the poll, and even on polling day, but these and other weapons such 
as bush knives tended not to be openly displayed at polling places (except at 
Kopiago — see below), or used to influence the vote, as they had been in the 
past. It should be noted, though, that weapons were close to hand at several 
polling places, having been hidden in the nearby bush should they be needed.  
 
At Koroba, where there was a strong security presence — notably armed 
PNGDF personnel (see chapter 8) — no weapons were seen at polling places, 
although several observers reported seeing candidates and supporters 
brandishing homemade weapons during the campaign period. Several high-
powered weapons including AR15s, M16s and an Ultimax 100 were also seen 
(see chapter 8). At Kopiago, however, where the security forces were unarmed, 
several observers reported the presence of guns, bush knives and axes at polling 
places. Not surprisingly these observers felt that the security situation was 
similar to that of the failed 2002 elections. The majority however felt that the 
security situation was significantly better, attributing this to the PNGDF 
presence.  
 
Influence of ‘money politics’ 
 
While guns played less of a role in this election, ‘money politics’ was more 
significant than ever. Several candidates spent huge amounts of money offering 
material incentives to voters, and two were rumoured to have spent as much as 
K2 million on their respective campaigns. Voters in Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
electorate capitalized on the huge amount of money available by courting 
multiple candidates and promising support in return for modest cash payments 
of up to K100. They also erected grandstands and conducted opening 
ceremonies as a means of generating money (see chapter 20). These 
rallies/opening ceremonies were organized by clans, church congregations, 
youth and women’s groups and school committees as a means of generating 
funds. Candidates were invited to speak at these events and were expected to 
pay for the privilege. Observers reported that hire rates ranged between K100 
and several thousand kina per speaking engagement. One rally at Guala, a week 
prior to the polls, netted K24,500 for the local Christian Brethren Church (CBC) 
community. Of this the sitting MP, John Kekeno, ‘donated’ K7,000 to the CBC 
community school, K9,000 to the CBC Headquarters, K3,000 to the CBC youth 
and K2,000 to the CBC Women’s group.  Seven candidates attended and spoke 
at this rally. A separate rally had been organized by the Guala youth a fortnight 
prior to this rally. It was attended by four candidates.  
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Observers also witnessed candidates and their supporters actually bribing or 
attempting to bribe voters with cash on polling day, and two observers 
witnessed vote-buying-related fights at polling stations. At Kakarene 1, a fight 
was observed to have erupted after a voter accepted payment from two separate 
candidates, while at Gunu 1 a fight erupted after a young man accepted money 
from a campaign manager then gave his first vote to a different candidate. At 
the same polling station a campaign manager seeking to gain votes for the 
sitting MP was seen to be promising blankets, stereos and spades in return for a 
first preference vote.  
 
Somewhat ironically, several candidates also complained to the observer 
team about the inflationary aspect of elections, saying that the large amounts of 
cash being splashed around would inflate people’s expectations in coming 
elections. Indeed it is evident that candidates are now having to rely on larger 
and larger networks in order to finance their campaigns, and that wealthy 
individuals (businessmen and community leaders) are financing and/or 
contributing towards candidates’ campaigns in order to create indebtedness and 
to ensure that the candidate is beholden to them should they win.  
 
Polling 
 
Since 1997 voter turnout in Koroba-Lake Kopiago has always been high, 
with votes cast being significantly higher than the number of eligible citizens 
(see Table 21.1), something facilitated by the poor state of the electoral roll. In 
this respect the 2007 election was no different from earlier elections. As noted 
earlier in this chapter, the 2007 Koroba-Lake Kopiago electoral roll, which was 
heavily inflated, contained 48,739 names. At the close of polling some 45,020 
votes had been cast, and of these 44,473 were determined to be allowable 
ballots. This represents around 17,000 more votes than there are eligible citizens 
in the electorate. 
 
Polling in the 2007 elections was far more peaceful than in recent elections, 
due in no small part to the huge security presence (see chapter 8). It remained 
generally chaotic, however, and was marred by widespread irregularities. 
Examples of election fraud and malpractice emerging out of the 2007 elections 
are both plentiful and diverse and demonstrate continuities with voter and 
candidate behaviour in the 1997 and 2002/2003 elections.  
 
Under-age voting (very small children, even babies, were seen voting or 
having votes cast on their behalf), multiple voting, ‘line-up’ voting, serial voting 
(that is, voting at different polling stations), ‘outside’ voting (voters from 
neighbouring electorates) and proxy voting were all commonplace. Almost 
without exception, voting took place publicly and there was no secret ballot. 
The indelible ink was not used or was used randomly, and excess ballot papers 
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Figure 21.3: Assisted voting at Koroba  
30 June 2007 
 
 
Figure 21.4: Seven polling stations in  
close proximity at Koroba Station. 
were used in many cases. Assisted 
voting, much of it seemingly forced, 
was commonplace and at several 
polling stations polling officials were 
observed to be issuing pre-marked 
ballot papers. In most cases, the 
electoral roll was not used properly, 
if at all, and at some polling stations 
(e.g. Tumbite, Pumbulumu 1 and 
Pumbulumu 2) groups of young men 
were issued with entire books of 
ballot papers, which were completed 
en masse.  
 
More than half (50/82)14 of all 
polling stations were set up within 
easy walking distance of another 
(less than 500m apart) and many 
were set up literally side by side. At 
Lake Kopiago, for instance, the 
Kopiago Station and Ayukuni 
(Alukuni) polling stations were about 
500 metres from each other and 
people were observed walking back 
and forth voting at each of them, 
sometimes many times. More 
extreme examples included four polling stations (Tumbite, Pubulumu 1, 
Pubulumu 2 and Tangimapu) being set up side by side on Tumbite airstrip at 
Pureni, and seven polling stations being set up on Koroba Government Station 
(Teria 1, Teria 2, Pandu, Andiria 1, Andiria 2, Koroba Station and Kereneiba 
Part 2). These seven polling stations were set up within metres of each other, 
and voters were observed moving backwards and forwards between them (see 
figure 21.3). Voters were similarly observed to move between Maria and Mbuli 
polling stations. There a relatively small number of people (approximately 300 
voters) managed to cast 2,204 votes, of which 2,082 went to a single candidate, 
Isaac Matiabe, while at Tumbite an amazing 5,941 votes were cast with 5,813 of 
them going to Fr. Mathias Olape. 
 
                                                     
14 In addition to the 36 wards which have paired names (e.g. Teria 1 and 2, Andiria 1 
and 2, Hedemari 1 and 2 etc.) there were an additional 14 wards which were paired on 
polling day, namely Mbuli and Maria, Kopiago Station and Aiyuguni, Ayenda and 
Kagoma, Hauwinda and Kudiebi, Kenamu and Walukumu, Pandu and Koroba Station, 
and Tumbite and Tangimapu. 
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Despite the many irregularities, there is also considerable evidence that 
people at the majority of polling places actually got to vote. Indeed men, women 
and children alike were observed to be lined up, in a reasonably orderly fashion, 
waiting for the opportunity to vote, and few reported being denied a vote. In fact 
many who wanted to were afforded the opportunity to vote several times. At 
Wurukumu, for instance, voters lined up, gave their names and then proceeded 
to the voting compartment where whole books of ballot papers were located. 
There they were permitted to fill out as many ballot papers as they liked, until 
the papers ran out. At this particular polling place all 562 votes went to the 
sitting MP, John Kekeno.  
 
In a post-polling survey of 200 voters (100 men and 100 women) at different 
locations throughout the electorate, 46 men and 12 women admitted to having 
voted more than once. Observations made on polling day suggest that the 
proportion of voters voting more than once was significantly higher. As part of 
the same post-polling survey 32 men and 34 women (a third of all respondents) 
reported having experienced intimidation while voting, while 20 men and 29 
women (a quarter of all respondents) felt that the 2007 election was worse than 
the failed elections of 2002.  
 
In spite of the intimidation experienced by a significant number of voters, the 
spread of votes at individual polling places suggests that a good number of 
voters were permitted to exercise choice when voting. At 25 of the 80 polling 
places (31 per cent) the candidate that secured the most votes gained less than 
50 per cent of the votes cast, and at a further nine polling places (11 per cent) 
the top-polling candidate gained between 51 and 60 per cent of the vote. At 
these polling places votes were typically shared between several candidates, 
suggesting voters were afforded genuine choice when casting their votes. That 
said, there were also 15 polling places (19 per cent) at which the top-polling 
candidate gained more than 96 per cent of the votes cast, and a further 8 polling 
places (10 per cent) where the top-polling candidate gained 91-95 per cent of 
the votes cast. In some cases (e.g. Hirane, Aiyukuni, Kakoma and Walukumu) 
this can be explained in terms of a base vote and we can assume a fair degree of 
community consensus (although I doubt total consensus), but in others (e.g. 
Tumbite, Pumbulumu 1, Pumbulumu 2 and Tobi) it represents a forced, coerced 
or controlled vote. At places such as Tumbite and Pumbulumu where the vote 
was forced, individuals were denied the opportunity to mark their own papers. 
Not surprisingly the places where block votes and controlled votes were 
registered were all heavily over-enrolled and in fact tended to coincide with the 
wards that were most over-enrolled (see Tables 21.4 and 21.5 above).  
 
Table 21.9 below compares the top-polling candidates’ shares of the votes by 
ballot box in 2003, 2006 and 2007. It reveals a significant increase in bloc 
voting and a decrease in the number of polling places where votes were 
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genuinely shared between candidates. Specifically, Table 21.9 shows a three-
fold increase in the number of boxes in which the top-polling candidate gained 
more that 90 per cent of the votes cast and an almost four-fold increase in boxes 
where the leading candidate gained between 96 and 100 per cent of the votes 
cast.  
 
Table 21.9: Comparison of leading candidates’ share of the vote in 2003, 2006, and 
2007, by ballot box. 
Leading candidates’ 
share of the vote 
       2003            2006          2007 
No. %   No. % No.  %  
96 – 100% 4 5.0 7 8.5 15 19.0 
91 – 95% 3 4.0 7 8.5 8 10.0 
81 – 90% 6 7.5 7 8.5 6 8.0 
71 – 80% 2 2.5 7 8.5 9 11.0 
61 – 70% 14 17.5 8 10.0 8 10.0 
51 – 60% 21 26.0 11 13.0 9 11.0 
< 50% 30 37.5 35 43.0 25 31.0 
 
That voters were afforded real choice at many polling stations can be 
demonstrated by comparing the way votes were allocated at Koroba Station 
(Table 21.10) and within Kopiago Basin (Table 21.11). Table 21.10 shows that 
the votes cast at the seven Koroba Station polling places were shared between 
six main candidates.  
 
Table 21.10: Summary of polling at the seven Koroba Station polling places, 2007 
Candidate Teria 1 Teria 2 Pandu Andiria 1 Andiria 
2
Koroba 
Station 
Kereneiba 
Part 2 
Ben Peri 13 24 16 12 2 11 14 
John Kekeno 142 75 116 131 33 67 19 
Mathias Olape 6 46 74 46 3 64 1 
Herowa Agiwa 66 214 89 66 4 51 336 
Isaac Matiabe 2 29 182 27 15 28 2 
Waa Akope 220 34 90 157 458 11 1 
Others 2 4 5 9 3 5 2 
TOTALS 451 435 417 457 518 237 375 
 
Table 21.11: Summary of polling at the eight Kopiago Basin polling places, 2007 
Candidate Hirane Aiyukuni Kopiago 
Station 
Suwaka Dolowa Wagia/ 
Pongolaia
Peragoia/ 
Mbatane 
Dilini 
Ben Peri 844 2 115 446 407 0 55 116 
Petrus Thomas 0 634 95 60 71 526 40 22 
Thomas Tupia 0 1 161 63 19 0 24 1 
Ronald 
Kulakua 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
John Kekeno 0 75 16 35 1 7 18 4 
Others 0 4 15 34 22 2 0 26 
TOTALS 844 637 403 638 520 535 138 169 
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The results 
 
The official election results are shown in Table 21.16 in the Appendix to this 
chapter. They reveal that the incumbent, John Kekeno, was returned, having 
gained 18 per cent of first preference votes and 37 per cent of the allowable 
ballot. By comparison, he had gained only 12 per cent of first preference votes 
and 30 per cent of the allowable ballot in the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-
election (see Table 21.14 in the Appendix to this chapter). Despite the gain in 
popularity, Kekeno still received a smaller overall percentage of the vote than 
Petrus Thomas did in 2003, the last election to be conducted under the first-
past-the-post system. Indeed in 2003 Thomas, who was one of only two Duna 
candidates running against 10 Huli candidates, gained 39 per cent of the 
allowable ballot (16,401 of the 42,595 votes cast).  
 
This is particularly noteworthy as it had been expected that with the 
introduction of LPV, the 2007 election would be more peaceful and see the 
election of MPs with wider and more representative mandates (Standish 
2006:197; Reilly 2006:189; PNGEC 1997:13). It was also suggested that LPV 
would reduce the number of candidates contesting elections and improve the 
chances of women being elected. The later proved unfounded in that men in 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago continued to assert their rights over those of women, 
insisting that women remain their property and should therefore vote in 
accordance with their husband’s wishes.  
 
Generally speaking, LPV has delivered larger mandates (see Anere and 
Wheen 2009:22-26). Nearly two thirds of the parliamentarians elected to the 
National Parliament in 2002 received less than 20 per cent of the vote under the 
first-past-the-post system. The 2002 election also saw the mean percentage of 
the vote required to win a seat down from 18 per cent in 1997 to only 16 per 
cent (Reilly 2006:189). Yet in 2007, under LPV, only 16 MPs (15 per cent) 
were elected with less than 20 per cent of the vote (Anere and Wheen 2009:23). 
 
Under LPV the average overall mandate typically doubled, with winning 
candidates receiving 35-36 per cent of the total allowable ballot after the 
distribution of preferences (see Haley and Anere 2009:60; Anere and Wheen 
2009)15. In this respect the Koroba-Lake Kopiago results are consistent with 
those elsewhere around the country. However, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case 
also demonstrates that the total number of candidates and where they are from 
plays a key role in determining the winning candidate’s overall mandate, as 
evident from the 2003 results. 
                                                     
15 The mandates for provincial seats were typically higher than those for open seats. 
Indeed successful candidates in provincial seats gained on average 41 per cent of the 
allowable ballot, while successful candidates in open seats gained only 30 per cent of 
allowable ballots. 
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It is arguably still too early to judge whether LPV will deliver larger 
mandates and more broadly supported candidates in the longer term, for this 
will largely depend upon two things: first, whether LPV attracts fewer 
candidates or gives rise to a proliferation of candidates, and, secondly, whether 
voters choose to make their votes count.  
 
The early indications from Koroba-Lake Kopiago are mixed. For instance, 
the 2006 by-election, conducted under LPV, attracted the largest field ever, and 
the 2007 general election saw a record number of Duna candidates contest the 
seat. It also saw a return to ethnically-closed campaigning, and this contributed 
in part to the proliferation of Duna candidates, in that John Kekeno (who is 
ethnically Huli) sponsored and gave support to three Duna candidates in order 
to split the vote of the two very strong Duna candidates and in an attempt to 
exhaust a significant proportion of Duna votes. Given that this strategy proved 
somewhat successful, it may well be adopted by other candidates in future 
elections, thereby contributing to candidate proliferation.  
 
What the Koroba-Lake Kopiago results do reveal is that a significant 
proportion of voters chose to make their votes count, by using their preferences 
far more strategically and effectively than they had in the 2006 by-election. In 
2007, 68 per cent of the formal votes remained live at the completion of the 
final count, while 85 per cent were still live immediately prior to the final 
exclusion. This shows that voters allocated their preferences to strong 
candidates with a likelihood of success, rather than to minor local candidates. 
By contrast, the 2006 by-election had seen 44 per cent of votes exhausted. On 
average, in 2007, across all 105 electorates for which there are election results, 
40 per cent of votes were exhausted (Anere and Wheen 2009:23).That a smaller 
proportion of votes was exhausted in Koroba-Lake Kopiago in 2007 will have 
contributed to the larger mandates witnessed by both the winning candidate and 
the runner up, as compared with the 2006 by-election.  
 
The Koroba-Lake Kopiago results also reveal that candidates have little 
control over the way their supporters allocate preferences. In short, preference 
deals did not work. Indeed although Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye entered into 
an MOU to exchange preferences, only 166 of the 1,252 votes Magaye gained 
flowed to Peri on Magaye’s elimination. By contrast 461 flowed across the 
ethnic divide to the sitting MP John Kekeno, while 408 flowed to Peri’s key 
rival Petrus Thomas. Similarly only 18 of Thomas Tupia’s 810 votes flowed to 
Matthew Magaye upon elimination. Instead the vast majority went to Petrus 
Thomas (288) and Ben Peri (279) and a good number (140) to John Kekeno.  
 
In both of these cases some votes initially captured by a Duna candidate 
flowed to a Huli candidate. Despite the widespread rhetoric that preferences 
should be retained within the same cultural, ethnic or linguistic group, a 
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significant proportion of votes flowed across the ethnic divide with each and 
every elimination (see Table 21.12). Overall some 44 per cent of the Duna votes 
distributed as the first nine Duna candidates were eliminated, flowed to Huli 
candidates. This suggests that for a significant proportion of voters enmities 
between rival candidates within the same ethnic group or the pulling power of 
money proved stronger than calls for ethnic unity. 
 
Either way, strong candidates (Huli and Duna alike) managed to gain a 
spread of votes and preferences across the electorate (cf. May 2006:118). John 
Kekeno, the winning candidate, picked up votes in 73 of 80 ballot boxes, and 
was the top-polling candidate at 19 polling places and the second highest 
polling candidate at 19 others. Peri and Thomas, the top polling Duna 
candidates both picked up votes in more than three quarters of all boxes – 61 
boxes in Peri’s case and 66 boxes in Thomas’s case. This is particularly 
noteworthy as only 26 of the 80 wards are Duna speaking. These results are 
consistent with the 2006 by-election results, where Kekeno picked up votes in 
74 boxes, while Peri and Thomas picked up votes in 72 and 65 boxes 
respectively. 
 
Table 21.12: Flow of preferences with each elimination 
No. Candidate Ethnicity Total 
votes 
received
Votes to 
Huli 
candidate
Votes to 
Duna 
candidate
Votes 
exhausted 
% votes 
to other 
ethnic 
group 
19 Paiyale Elo Duna 10 3 7 0 30 
22 Ronald K. Kulakua Duna 46 21 25 0 46 
11 Dokta Philip Pakalu Duna 48 16 31 1 34 
14 Agiru Hole Huli 130 98 32 0 25 
23 McNene Mai Elo Duna 142 76 65 1 54 
10 Paul Pora Wasdok Huli 663 454 208 1 31 
12 Thomas Tupia Ape Duna 810 211 594 5 26 
15 Allan Mone Duna 1097 289 801 7 27 
21 Waa Alfred Akope Huli 1168 1056 110 2 9 
24 Matthew Magaye Duna 1252 732 474 46 61 
17 Daniel Mapiria Huli 3086 2499 493 94 16 
20 Isaac Matiabe Huli 5776 3348 1363 1065 29 
16 Petrus Thomas Duna 6642 2093 2332 2217 47 
13 Herowa Agiwa Huli 8215 3939 845 3431 18 
18 Ben Epe Peri Duna 10619 3082 0 7537 100 
 
The garnering of broad-based support cannot, in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case, 
be attributed to LPV. Indeed it predates the switch to preferential voting. In 
2003 the winning candidate, Petrus Thomas, gained votes from 64 polling 
places. He polled particularly well at half of all polling stations, ranking first in 
respect of 23 ballot boxes and second in respect of a further 17 ballot boxes. The 
runner up, Ben Peri, had arguably even broader support, picking up votes in all 
but four ballot boxes. He gained the largest or second largest vote in just over 
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half the ballot boxes (43/80) — being the top-polling candidate at 16 polling 
places and second highest ranked candidate at a further 27 polling places. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 2007, fraud, malpractice and money triumphed yet again in the Koroba-
Lake Kopiago Open electorate. As a consequence, the election results lack 
integrity. Had the election been the least bit fair, the outcome would most likely 
have been very different. Certainly there would have been far fewer votes. It is 
worth noting, too, that during the 2003 supplementary elections the total number 
of votes cast in North and South Koroba was 16,385. This was because there 
was a huge security presence, and because the security forces did not allow 
multiple and under-age voting. Based on projections from the 1990 census the 
expected enrolment for these two LLG areas at that time was 16,280. In 2007, 
the expected enrolments for North and South Koroba were 18,110, yet 30,288 
votes were cast. These additional votes were surely enough to have changed the 
order in which candidates were eliminated, which in turn would have changed 
the flow of preferences and most likely the overall outcome.   
 
Two key factors contributed to and facilitated the cheating and malpractice 
(under-age voting, double and multiple voting, serial voting and outside voting) 
observed on polling day. The first was the poor state of the new electoral roll, 
which included children, dead people, and people from neighbouring electorates 
(particularly the Tari electorate), as well as thousands of duplicates, and the 
second was the location and positioning of polling stations. As noted above, 
polling places were often set up side by side to facilitate voter movement 
between polling stations.  
 
It is also worth noting that LPV affected the results in only one fifth of all 
electorates (Anere and Wheen 2009:27), and that in 80 per cent of cases, the 
candidate who led at the end of the first preference count went on to win the 
seat. In other words, preferences affected few outcomes. And yet in terms of 
electoral administration, LPV is more certainly costly and more difficult to 
administer. Overall the introduction of LPV has required a lot of effort and 
expense for very little gain, and it may be that in the longer term the negative 
consequences, such as the proliferation of money politics, will far outweigh any 
benefits.  
 
In the meantime, it is evident that the PNGEC was willing to turn a blind eye 
to the rampant fraud and malpractice witnessed in Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open 
electorate in 2007. Indeed there was a clear resolve, which came direct from the 
prime minister himself, to avoid a repetition of the events of 2002, and as a 
consequence the elections in SHP drew little scrutiny. Seemingly there was a 
willingness to accept the election results ‘no matter what transpired’; this is the 
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legacy of 2002. It is hoped that the electoral environment in 2012 will make for 
more honest assessments of future elections and that the PNGEC will not be 
scared to fail elections that should clearly be deemed to have failed. With 
development of the LNG project well underway, the stakes are much higher 
than ever before and this only serves to further fuel the win-at-all-costs 
mentality the has emerged over the last decade or so. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 21.13: Examples of duplicate entries on the Tumbite ward roll 
Ward  Elector 
ID 
Last 
name 
First name Sex Birth 
date  
on roll
Occupation 
Tumbite 76056181 ABRAHAM ALUYAS M  1966 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76008551 ABARAMA ALUYA M  1987 Student 
Tumbite 76056508 ABUHAYA EGE M  1964 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76008323 ABUHAYA EGE M  1959 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76056535 ABUHAYA ALBERT M  1970 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76056538 ABUHAYA HEBERT M  1968 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76056513 ABUHAYA ABRAHAM M  1972 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76008506 ABUHAYA ABARAMA M  1966 Pastor 
Tumbite 76056525 ABUHAYA JOSEPH M  1983 Student 
Tumbite 76008642 ABUHAYA JOSEPH M  1966 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76056523 ABUHAYA ISSAC M  1984 Student 
Tumbite 76008600 ABUHAYA ASIAC M  1964 Subsistence Farmer 
Tumbite 76056511 ABUHAYA MANABULE M  1950 Self Employed 
Tumbite 76008349 ABUHAYA MANABULE M  1966 Worker 
Tumbite 76008307 AGOBE TIMBAME F  1962 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056345 AGOBE TIMBAME F  1958 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76008414 AGOBE WAGILI F  1967 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056386 AGOBE WAGILI F  1962 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76006858 AGOBE WAYAMA F  1980 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056294 AGOBE WAYAMA F  1964 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76008324 AKOBE HELEN F  1967 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056347 AGOBE HELEN F  1952 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76008400 AKOBE ANNA F  1967 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056355 AGOPE ANNA F  1973 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76007865 AKOPE MEKEME F  1972 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056290 AKOBE MEKEME F  1965 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76007855 AKOPE WARALI F  1974 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056292 AKOBE WARALI F  1974 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056690 ALEMBO MBATAI F  1952 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76009491 ALEMBO MBATAI F  1948 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76010727 ALEMBO MAKONDO M  1956 Magistrate 
Tumbite 76056487 ALEMBO MAKONDO M  1952 Committee Member 
Tumbite 76009577 ALEMBO YAKAPI F  1980 Household Duties 
Tumbite 76056700 ALEMBO YAKABI F  1967 Household Duties 
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Table 21.14: Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate 2006 by-election results 
No. 
 
 Candidate name 
 
 
Party First 
prefs 
First 
pref.
%
Final
total
@
elim’n
Prefs
% of
final 
total
Final 
total
Final % % of 
allow. 
votes 
3 John Kekeno Kelewa PAP 4702 11.5 62.0 12388 54.1 30.3 
1 Ben Epe Peri URP 5978 14.6 43.2 10525 45.9 25.8 
7 Nane Petrus Thomas PNC 5226 12.8 8423 38.0 Excl 18 0 20.6 
8 Mathias Olape NA 4497 11.0 7992 43.7 Excl 17 0 19.6 
12 Issac Aruru Matiabe Ind. 3764 9.2 6290 40.2 Excl 16 0 15.4 
13 Mathew Magaye Ind. 4449 10.9 5485 18.9 Excl 15 0 13.4 
9 Herowa Agiwa Ind. 3238 7.9 4740 31.7 Excl 14 0 11.6 
6 Daniel Mapiria Ind. 2880 7.1 3453 16.6 Excl 13 0 8.5 
4 Benny Putari Ind. 2288 5.6 2388 4.2 Excl 12 0 5.9 
11 Anubi Herowa Ben Ind. 1086 2.7 1149 5. 5 Excl 11 0 2.8 
18 Ronald Kulakua Ind. 983 2.4 1034 4.9 Excl 10 0 2.5 
10 David Kelo Kikabu Ind. 659 1.6 683 3.5 Excl 9 0 1.7 
2 Walapi Kara Geoffrey Ind. 574 1.4 575 0.2 Excl 8 0 1.4 
5 Simon Haguale Gawa Ind. 235 0.6 246 4.5 Excl 7 0 0.6 
16 Johnson Balu Wangale Ind. 88 0.2 89 1.1 Excl 6 0 0.2 
19 Lucy Pakalu Ind. 66 0.2 67 1.5 Excl 5 0 0.2 
14 Ambu Michael Sone Ind. 50 0.1 50 0.0 Excl 4 0 0.1 
20 Kenwa Ikila Ind. 42 0.1 42 0.0 Excl 3 0 0.1 
17 Peter J. Harape Nagiria Ind. 37 0.1 37 0.0 Excl 2 0 0.1 
15 Anderson Andalu 
Wabira 
Ind. 0 0.0 0 0.0 Excl 1 0 0.0 
Total ballots remaining in count 22913       
Absolute majority 11457       
Exhausted ballot papers 17929 (43.9 of total allowable ballots)   
Total allowable ballot papers 40842       
Informal votes  187 (0.5 of total votes cast)   
Total votes cast  41029       
Source: adapted from results at www.pngec.gov.au and from Form 66B 
 
 
Table 21.15: Voting statistics Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate, 2007 
Number of registered voters  50876  
Total votes cast 45020  
Informal votes 547 ( 1.2% of total votes cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 44473  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 30066  
Total votes distributed 28656  
Exhausted ballot papers 14407 (32.4% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 15034  
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22 ELECTIONS AND CORRUPTION: THE ‘HIGHLANDIZATION’ OF 
VOTING IN THE MADANG OPEN AND PROVINCIAL 
ELECTORATES 
 
Patrick Matbob 
 
Introduction 
 
Elections in the coastal areas of Papua New Guinea are generally free, fair and 
orderly compared to the highlands provinces. This was again observed during 
the 2007 election, in which almost all coastal provinces experienced smooth and 
orderly conduct of elections. However, while most of the seats were declared 
before the return of writs, Madang was the only coastal province that could not 
declare its provincial seat because of a court injunction taken out by some 
candidates. The return of writs had to be deferred by a week until the court had 
ruled on the case, subsequently allowing the declaration of Sir Arnold Amet. 
The court dispute that delayed the declaration of the Madang Provincial seat is 
symptomatic of the influence that is coming into the province and is affecting 
local politics.  
 
In the last decade an increasing number of candidates originally from the 
highlands provinces have been contesting the Madang Open and Madang 
Provincial electorates. These candidates have brought with them the style of 
politics that is widely practiced in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. Standish 
(2002b:2) reports discussion of highlands-style politics experienced in some 
coastal electorates in 2002. Madang has recently been experiencing this 
highlands style of politics which has affected the electoral process. It includes 
massive inflation of the electoral roll, multiple voting, the use of large sums of 
money, and, in some cases, firearms. The so-called ‘highlandisation of coastal 
politics’ (Standish 2003:131) is created by candidates who are determined to 
gain public office at all cost and by whatever means. And if they are 
unsuccessful, they try to disrupt the process and challenge the duly elected 
member.  
 
Standish describes a similar situation in Chimbu as an ‘ethics-free zone’ 
where ‘candidates will do whatever it takes in attempting to grab state power’ 
(Standish 2002a:28). This has little to do with representing the interests of the 
people or following legitimate political processes to gain office, although this is 
the rhetoric that is publicly expounded. Money is a key issue, and usually if one 
is rich enough one can buy one’s way to power and pay off rivals and 
challengers to silence them (see Sinclair 2006:366). And if one has spent a lot of 
money only to lose, then one continues the challenge until there is a 
compromise with the winner and some cost is recovered. The study of Madang 
Open and Madang Provincial electorates in 2007 looks at some of these issues. 
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                 Figure 22.1: Madang District map 
 
 
                 Figure 22.2: Madang Province map 
Background to the Madang Provincial and Madang Open seats 
 
Madang Province 
 
The Madang Provincial seat was won by Jason Garrett in 1968. He later lost 
to cattle rancher Bruce Jephcott, who held the seat for two consecutive terms 
(1972–1982). A Madang man, Tom Pais, won the seat in 1982. Melchior Kasap 
originally won the seat in 1987 but was replaced by Tom Pais following a court 
decision in 1988. Pais was succeeded by Sir Peter Barter in 1992, Jim Kas in 
1997, and Sir Peter Barter again in 2002. Evidently, those who succeeded in the 
provincial seat were the ‘better known’ candidates, either because they were 
businessmen like Barter who had the resources to campaign widely, or people 
like Melchior Kasap, whose job in Catholic Church education enabled him to 
have wide contact with the people in the province. Madang’s diverse geography 
has meant that to cover all parts of the electorate, one needed to travel by air, 
sea and land, and that made it too expensive for many candidates to campaign 
widely. 
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Although regional/provincial members have represented Madang since 1968, 
after independence they did not to have much influence in the province. The 
provincial governments introduced after independence became the centres of 
power and diminished the role and mandate of the national parliamentarians — 
in particular the backbenchers. This eventually led to the call for provincial 
government reforms (Gupta and Ivarature 1996; May and Regan 1997).  
 
Table 22.1: Members for Madang Open and Madang Provincial since 1968 
Madang Provincial  Madang Open 
1968 Jason Garrett 1968 John Middleton 
1972 Bruce Jephcott 1972 Angmai Bilas 
1978 Bruce Jephcott 1978 Angmai Bilas 
1982 Tom Pais 1982 Paul Kamod 
1987 Tom Pais 1987 Paul Kamod 
1992 Sir Peter Barter 1992 Stanley Pil 
1997 Jim Kas 1997 Jacob Wama 
2002 Sir Peter Barter 2002 Alois Kingsley 
2007 Sir Arnold Amet 2007 Buka Malai 
 
From 1978 Madang had in place an active provincial government system 
headed by the first premier, Bato Bultin. Bultin was succeeded by Max Moeder, 
Andrew Ariako and Mathew Gubag respectively. On 19 July 1995 provincial 
government reforms were certified, taking full effect on 16 October 1997. One 
of the changes was to replace the office of the premier with a governor. 
Unfortunately, for Madang the reform had a negative effect, especially with the 
quality of leadership displayed by governors, which caused widespread 
embarrassment and disillusionment amongst the voters. Regional member, Sir 
Peter Barter, who became governor immediately after the reform, was the ideal 
people’s choice; however, he had to relinquish the post when he became 
Minister for Inter-Government Relations, and the governor’s position went to 
Usino-Bundi MP George Wan. 
 
In 1997, Jim Kas defeated Sir Peter Barter and became the governor of the 
province. A university graduate from Simbai, Kas worked as a provincial 
government officer before entering politics and epitomized the emergence of the 
new breed of well-educated young leaders in Papua New Guinea. However, the 
promise was short lived; barely a year later Kas was gaoled for four years for 
‘endangering the free and safe use of an aircraft at Madang Airport’ (Sinclair 
2005:371). Deputy Governor Pengau Nengo took over as acting governor until 
1999 when Kas was released. Despite opposition from the provincial assembly, 
who wanted him removed as governor, Kas was able to resume his position. 
Soon he was in trouble again, this time being involved in a road accident in 
which a person was killed. Although Kas’s conviction over the airport incident 
was set aside by the Supreme Court, he was convicted of a serious breach of 
Papua New Guinea’s Leadership Code and was removed from the office of 
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governor. Pengau Nengo took over as acting governor. There followed a 
struggle between former governor George Wan and Rai Coast MP Stahl Musa 
for the governor’s post, with Musa eventually emerging as the governor. He 
remained in the position until 2002. 
 
Sir Peter Barter won back the governor’s seat in the 2002 election but again 
opted for a ministry in the national government, and was replaced by the new 
member for Rai Coast James Yali. Yali, the adopted son of the late cargo cult 
leader Yali Singina, became a controversial figure and did not last long. In 
January 2006 he was convicted and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for 
raping his sister-in-law (see The State v James Yali, 2005). The province was 
again under the care of an acting governor, Bunag Kiup, up until the 2007 
national elections. The behaviour of the governors since the reforms, and also of 
other Madang MPs such as Jacob Wama who was jailed for eight years in 2002 
for misappropriating K150, 000 of public funds (The State v Jacob Wama 
Kelewaki, 2001), tarnished the image of leaders in Madang. People viewed the 
political leadership with cynicism, and there was even a belief that the 
governor’s seat had become cursed.  
 
Madang Open 
 
The Madang town electorate is divided into three local-level government 
(LLG) areas: Madang Urban, Ambenob and Transgogol. Madang Urban caters 
for the town and some of the Bell people in the islands and around the town; 
Ambenob covers Amele, the rest of the Bell, and the north coast as far as Vidar; 
Transgogol covers further south and extends into the hinterland of Madang.  
The large number of languages (164) in the province is also an indication of 
the fragmentation of ethnic groups (SIL 2009). This has caused factionalism 
during elections, with villagers splitting up their votes. The candidates with a 
wider appeal tend to do better. Since 1992 MPs for Madang Open have been 
people from other provinces residing in the town who have had support from 
both the urban and rural areas of the electorate.  
 
When explaining the misconceptions of ethnicity, Nelson (2006) writes that 
while a large number of languages indicates diversity, it does not ‘justify the 
slide from language groups to ethnic fragmentation and explanations of political 
process’.  
 
What confounds democracy in most electorates is not ethnicity, but 
smaller groups, often called clans and formed by people who have 
or assume a common ancestry (Nelson 2006:10). 
 
Nelson uses an example from the highlands to show that in contemporary 
politics there is a link between voting blocs and groups that form alliances in 
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defence and aggression. However, the coastal Madang people have enjoyed a 
peaceful existence well before the arrival of European explorers. Alliances for 
tribal warfare, or even against colonial invaders, are generally unknown. 
Candidates in Madang, however, face the same problems that those in the 
highlands encounter, which is to maintain the support base of their home clan or 
tribe (Gibbs, cited in Nelson 2006:10). The limited number of voters in clan and 
language groups also means that for candidates to do well they have to attract 
support beyond their support base.1 Therefore, those who can appeal beyond 
their base votes have done well in the national elections since independence. 
Successful candidates have also been endowed with characteristics that Nelson 
(ibid.) has highlighted, such as personality, the capacity to bring material 
benefits, and religious appeal. Of course, those who have succeeded were also 
known to have given handouts in cash and kind to villagers and community 
groups. 
 
Voters in Madang are generally free to choose who to vote for without 
pressure from family or clan members. The choice may, however, be limited by 
lack of knowledge of candidates, which is why those who campaign widely tend 
to do well. Sometimes family or clan groups may consult and agree to vote for 
certain candidates. The choice of candidates increased in the recent election 
because of LPV. 
 
Issues influencing the outcome of the 2007 election 
 
Madang Province is made up of diverse groups of people living along the 
coast, on the islands, and up in the highlands of Usino-Bundi and Middle Ramu 
electorates, which border Simbu, Western and Eastern Highlands and Enga 
provinces. Those living in the highlands of Madang are ethnically related to 
people in Chimbu and Western and Eastern Highlands while those furthest north 
have ties with East Sepik people. Cross-border relationships also exist for 
southern coastal people with Morobe and West New Britain. Similarities were 
reported in the style of politics displayed in the highlands of Madang to the 
politics of the highlands region — for example, in Usino-Bundi candidates built 
‘election houses’.  
 
Land and squatters 
 
It was the Russian naturalist Mihlouho-Maclay who called the Madang 
coastal region which is part of Madang Open, the ‘Archipelago of Contented 
People’ (Sinclair 2005:8). Those who have followed have found the description 
to be generally accurate. The people living in the area have had a peaceful 
existence with their neighbours, trading clay pots, garden produce and seafood, 
                                                     
1 Similarly, see May (2006). 
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and traditional artifacts and ornaments, within and beyond the boundaries of the 
present-day Madang electorate. European explorers and colonial administrators 
have found the people of Madang generally willing to accept outsiders and share 
their homeland. 
 
In recent times, though, there has been growing discontent amongst the local 
people over land issues in Madang town and the influx of squatter settlers, 
leading to evictions. While these issues have existed in the past, the people 
affected by them had lived in fragmented groups and were not able to 
collectively voice their concerns. The Madang town land issue is a complex one 
dating back to the era of German colonial administration and concerns the 
manner in which large tracts of land within the present-day Madang Open 
electorate were ‘purchased’ without the knowledge or consent of the local 
people (Sinclair 2005:19). As a result, there have been disputes ever since 
between the colonial administration and the local people and also amongst the 
landowners themselves.  
 
Further, with the growth of Madang town, migrants from within Madang 
Province and from neighbouring provinces, mainly East Sepik, have moved into 
Madang town and settled on vacant state land. The squatter population was 
estimated at 8,120 in 2005, of whom 6,000 were from East Sepik. They occupy 
portions of state land that are needed for development purposes (Sinclair 
2005:375).  
 
Initially, land issues and eviction were left to the provincial government and 
the police to deal with as a law and order problem. However, recently 
landowners and different ethnic groups in Transgogol and Ambenob have begun 
collaborating to deal with the issues, resulting in a protest march in support of 
evictions in 2003. One of the key leaders advocating the eviction of squatters 
was Morris Ban, a candidate for Madang Open in 2007. Issues of land and 
eviction have become a unifying factor for the fragmented groups of Madang 
people — primarily from South Ambenob, Madang Urban and parts of North 
Ambenob LLGs — and their actions ultimately had an effect on the 2007 
election.  
 
Kam man versus asples 
 
In Madang, the Tokpisin term used to describe a squatter settler or someone 
not originally from Madang is kam man, literally a person who has come from 
outside the local area or province. The term asples refers to a landowner or a 
person originally from Madang. Asples and kam man became key words in the 
discourse leading up to and during the election.  
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The Madang Open and Madang Provincial electorates have been contested 
by kam man candidates, especially those originally from the highlands, for more 
than a decade. In fact, the Madang Open seat has been held by a kam man since 
1992 (Jacob Wama originally from East Sepik, Stanley Pil from Western 
Highlands, and Alois Kingsley from Southern Highlands).  
 
There has been a growing discontent amongst the asples people about the 
kam man MPs who have been voted in since 1992 and who the people felt had 
not really represented their interests. First, the fact that no asples candidate was 
able to win the seat for three terms of parliament was a blow to the pride of the 
local people. Then, the actions and behaviour of MPs angered the local voters. 
As noted above, Jacob Wama (1997-2002) was gaoled for misappropriating 
funds meant for local projects, while poor public behaviour by Alois Kingsley 
(2002-2007) was the subject of adverse media reports on several occasions. 
Governors Kas (1997-2002) and Yali (2002-2007) were also in trouble with the 
law at the time.  
 
The domination of the open seat by the kam man became an issue in the 
2007 elections. The different ethnic groups within Madang began to express a 
united voice, which became the votim asples campaign (vote for the local 
Madang person rather than the kam man). LPV’s feature of encouraging 
cooperation amongst candidates seems to have helped in enabling the local 
Madang candidates to unite against the outsiders. The votim asples feeling was 
strong amongst locals, although a number of villagers still chose to back the 
kam man candidates or vote along party lines because of benefits they have been 
receiving. The votim asples campaign was mainly championed by candidates 
and voters of the Transgogol and South Ambenob areas, while those in Madang 
Urban LLG and North Ambenob displayed a more tolerant attitude. There were, 
however, North Ambenob candidates who urged people to vote for an asples 
leader. The votim asples campaign was, however, up against some well-funded 
candidates who were determined to buy their way to victory. 
 
Highlandization of coastal politics 
 
In talking about the ‘Highlandization’ of coastal politics, (Standish 
2003:131) identifies ‘the mass inflation of the electoral roll, multiple voting and 
the use of large sums of money and, in some cases, firearms’. In Madang there 
has been growing evidence of the highlands style of politics creeping into the 
province. This is not surprising since Madang is one of only two coastal 
provinces connected to the highlands by road. As a result there has been an 
influx of highlanders into the province, encouraged by the betel nut trade as well 
as markets for fresh highlands vegetables. There are also employment and 
business opportunities in the province because of the development of resource 
projects. The aggressive behaviour of highlanders seeking to participate in 
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business, and in obtaining property and land, has alarmed the people of Madang 
who suspect that some of the highlanders’ activities have not been transparent.  
 
Evidence of highlands-style politics in Madang has included incidents of 
bloc voting, roll stacking, multiple voting, large sums of money, and the use of 
firearms. While the incidents in Madang are isolated and insignificant in 
comparison with more dramatic events in highlands elections, nevertheless they 
have been notable in the quieter politics of Madang. For example, as will be 
discussed below, an attempt was made to inflate the roll in Ward 5 by a kam 
man candidate originally from the highlands. Instances of multiple voting in 
Madang have been reported in the media. The distribution of large sums of 
money by candidates was also noted before and during the campaigns, and the 
use of firearms in the election became a concern when certain candidates and 
their supporters, mainly from the highlands provinces, tried to use weapons to 
influence the outcome of the elections.  
 
In Madang early observation suggests that the creation of a new roll based on 
the local government council wards effectively controlled the possibilities of 
roll inflation. However, the Madang Open and Madang Provincial seats cover 
the urban area where there are large numbers of people. With the constant 
movement of people in and out of town, it is difficult to identify the exact 
number of people living in the wards. Assistant returning officer of the Madang 
Urban LLG, Laki Tonngi, saw this as a problem and said the urban wards’ 
census books should be updated every six months and that full-time recorders 
were needed. Currently, ward recorders are on a K40 monthly allowance which, 
he said, was not sufficient; anybody could come and enroll and it would be hard 
to verify their residential status. 
 
The study of the 2007 election in Madang 
 
This study draws on direct observation of the 2007 election in parts of the 
Madang Open, Madang Provincial and Sumkar Open electorates, from 
enrolment up to the return of writs. A mini questionnaire survey was also 
distributed to Divine Word University (DWU) and Madang Technical College 
students to obtain data on student voter behaviour, and random interviews were 
done with voters in Sumkar electorate (the home electorate of the candidate who 
was favourite for the Provincial seat, Sir Arnold Amet).  
 
The student questionnaire (of which only 42 were returned) was distributed 
after it was learnt that certain kam man candidates were trying to mobilize 
students’ support and were offering them inducements in cash and kind. The 
questionnaire was divided into three parts, dealing with enrolment, 
campaigning, and the polling period. The findings of the study are summarized 
below. 
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Votim asples campaign 
 
The Votim asples campaign was carried out by a group of candidates mainly 
from South Ambenob LLG on the outskirts of Madang town. There was a 
strong feeling against kam man candidates amongst both the Madang villagers 
and people from other provinces residing in Madang, who questioned the 
character and intentions of some of the candidates and were of the view that 
local politics should remain in the hands of the asples people. 
 
The Transgogol candidates campaigned throughout the electorate and their 
message was that while the kam man were welcome to live and work in 
Madang, they should stay away from politics which was only for the asples. At 
the close of nominations in May, at Madang Bates Oval there was a 
confrontation between the South Ambenob group of asples candidates led by 
former police officer Jim Namora and a former Madang MP, Stanley Pil — a 
kam man. The former MP turned up at the oval but did not proceed to the 
nearby Madang District Office to nominate. Instead, he summoned the Madang 
District Returning Officer, Gol Damud, to his rally to nominate him in front of 
his supporters, who were mainly settlers from the Gav Stoa area. This angered 
the Transgogol group who moved their supporters up next to the former MP’s 
gathering and disrupted his campaign. Open anger was expressed by the South 
Ambenob group, who said that outsiders who came into Madang for business or 
work, or were married to local women should stay away from local politics. The 
confrontation resulted in the former MP being led away by his supporters to 
another part of the oval.  
 
The campaign of the South Ambenob group continued throughout the 
campaign period. Morris Ban, a Madang Open candidate and member of the 
Transgogol group, told me that they would not tolerate kam man candidates and 
barred them from campaigning in South Ambenob and Transgogol areas. 
Although I had no opportunity to visit that part of the electorate, people from 
the area confirmed that kam man candidates did not campaign there. A 
journalist from the NBC told me that during the nomination period, a big name 
kam man candidate’s campaign at the popular Four-Mile market in South 
Ambenob was disrupted when the local people pelted the campaigners with 
objects and chased them back to town.  
 
Campaign against vote buying 
 
There were civil society and candidate campaigns against vote buying and 
voters were asked to ignore candidates who attempted to bribe voters with cash, 
food and other goods. Candidate Jim Kas told voters that although food and 
money would be given to them, people should vote, using their heads, for an 
asples candidate. Similar sentiments were expressed by candidate Sam Aloi, 
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who criticized the voters who were going after food and money because it was 
not the ‘custom’ of the Madang people. Aloi was also the only person who 
campaigned on the dangers of HIV/AIDS. Candidate Tony Birra told voters that 
they should not expect handouts from him because it was not the local custom. 
He said according to ‘custom’ people are rewarded with a celebration after an 
achievement — in this case an election victory. The irony of this was that some 
asples candidates were also guilty of offering inducements for votes. 
 
Deals over preferences 
 
Deals were most apparent amongst candidates and voters from South 
Ambenob. The group not only campaigned together and asked voters to share 
their preferences amongst them, but also campaigned against kam man 
candidates. A notable development was the series of meetings held amongst the 
asples candidates to reduce their numbers in order to increase their chances of 
winning. A local leader told me that at least three public meetings were held in 
South Ambenob and Transgogol and some candidates, including Catherine Mal, 
the only female and a popular asples candidate, stepped down as a result. 
However, Catherine subsequently supported a kam man candidate whom her 
people were campaigning against. It was obvious that the kam man was trying 
to attract Catherine’s supporters in South Ambenob and Transgogol.  
 
Inducement to win votes 
 
A number of candidates within Madang Open, Madang Provincial and 
Sumkar used inducements in cash and kind to win votes. As usual in the period 
leading up to the elections, candidates sponsored sports teams, community 
groups, and events such as sports tournaments. One candidate even set up youth 
organizations called Youth-link. Various amounts of cash were dished out just 
before polling began at villages such as Yabob, Riwo, Siar and along the north 
coast. This was obvious at DWU campus, which had some 800 eligible voters; 
students were the target of certain kam man candidates who distributed cash and 
promised benefits. The mini-survey conducted amongst 42 students (23 females 
and 19 males) revealed that 23 of them had accepted inducements offered by 
kam man candidates, who asked for their vote. The inducements included cash 
amounts of from K2 to K600 and other benefits such as alcohol and free entry to 
dances.  
 
Students enrolled by candidate 
 
Of the 42 students surveyed, 29 were enrolled to vote; however, 12 said that 
they did not enrol themselves. Of the 12, 9 said they were enrolled by a 
highlands candidate while 3 said they had no idea how their names got on to the 
list. One said he had already enrolled himself but later found someone had re-
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enrolled him using incorrect data for birthdate, etc. Some students said they did 
not want to vote in Madang and therefore had not enrolled, but were surprised to 
find their names on the roll. In fact, a check through the ward roll revealed more 
than 104 entries repeated, some more than three times. Other ward rolls in 
Madang did not show any multiple entries. Under the electoral law, those 
qualified to vote must complete and sign an enrolment form for their names to 
be included on the ward roll in their electorate of residence. This did not happen 
in Ward 5; the highlands candidate collaborated with the ward recorder to enrol 
the students. A student who is a provincial group leader told me that a particular 
highlands candidate had invited her and other group leaders to his residence for 
a meeting and asked them to give him a list of their student members so that he 
could enroll them. She said this is how the names of students were obtained. 
She said in return the student leaders were offered free entry to the candidate’s 
nightclub. Cash and liquor were also offered. Most of the students interviewed 
accepted the inducements and said that they were poor and needed the cash and 
benefits. They said it was an opportunity not to be missed.  
 
Eviction threat 
 
Madang’s population of settlers, mainly from East Sepik, again became a 
target in the campaigns of kam man, who promised that there would be no 
evictions should kam man candidates won. The night before polling, one 
confident campaigner told the settlers at Gav Stoa that he wanted their second 
preferences only and asked them to sell their first preference votes to the highest 
bidder. He promised them that after he had won the election and become 
governor he would ensure that they would not be evicted from their current 
location. (Plans had been made to demolish the Gav Stoa settlement in order to 
make way for a Maritime College.) 
 
LPV and female candidates 
 
The votim asples campaign seems to have overshadowed any vote-for-
women campaigns in the Madang Provincial and Madang Open electorates. As 
noted, Catherine Mal, a candidate who was runner up in 1997 election, stood 
down after a meeting of Ambenob and Transgogol candidates. Two other 
women contested the Open seat: Agatha Yama, wife of People’s Labour Party 
leader Peter Yama, and Dr Cecilia Pakule. Both women’s main vote base was in 
Madang Urban, which was shared by many candidates. They were further 
disadvantaged by not being asples, so the votim asples campaign went against 
them. In the Provincial seat Mary Kamang seemed a strong candidate because 
of her position as the president of the Provincial Council of Women. She was 
also an asples from Yabob village on the edge of the town. Kamang was relying 
on the women’s vote and also hoped to capture preference votes. However, she 
was up against a field of strong candidates and did well to manage fourth place.  
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Multiple voting 
 
Multiple voting is a common problem in the highlands provinces but occurs 
in coastal provinces as well. A policeman providing security at a polling booth 
in Madang confided that he had voted more than once — most likely in 
collaboration with other polling officials. In parts of Madang Urban electorate 
scrutineers were on the lookout for people trying to vote more than once, 
especially by impersonating others. Two female students were caught and 
arrested by police (The National 5 July 2007), but generally there were few 
instances of multiple voting in Madang Open and Madang Provincial 
electorates, where scrutineers were vigilant and secret ballot voting was 
enforced. At Sisiak, a suburb noted at times for its lawlessness, scrutineers were 
actively monitoring every single voter and challenging those whom they 
suspected. After some minor disturbances during the day involving highlands 
voters trying to pressure polling officials, there was a heavy police presence 
and, we were told, police locked up a number of people trying to cause trouble.  
 
Use of firearms 
 
During polling in Madang Urban, supporters of a prominent highlands 
candidate discharged firearms at the popular Machine Gun beach, assaulted a 
polling official, and kidnapped a policeman. The kidnapped policeman later said 
he did not see any firearms in the vehicle in which he was transported but had 
seen bush knives, axes and other weapons. An open confrontation between the 
police and the candidate’s supporters was averted and a security force 
contingent from Lae was brought in to maintain law and order. Police also 
reported that supporters of the same candidate were seen along the Ramu River, 
dressed in police and army uniforms, waiting to intercept ballot boxes coming 
down the Ramu River. However, when they realized that a policeman was 
escorting the ballot boxes, they jumped into the vehicle and fled. A candidate 
also told me that the same group of people tried to forcibly take a ballot box 
after polling in a remote location in Bogia but the presiding officer and an 
unarmed policeman guarding the polling booth prevented them.  
 
Assessing the outcome 
 
The introduction of LPV, according to Standish (2006:196-198) was 
intended primarily to address the declining mandates held by members of 
parliament elected under first-past-the-post voting. Its introduction was an 
attempt at political engineering to ‘change people’s electoral behaviour or 
political culture, and in particular to break down the intense localism found in 
most areas of Papua New Guinea’. He also listed other arguments for LPV, such 
as making campaigning more accommodative and less confrontational, 
lessening violence, easing tensions, giving women candidates a better chance of 
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election, and allowing MPs to be elected with an absolute majority (though only 
a majority of the live votes at the final count).  
 
Observations of the Madang Open and Madang Provincial seats revealed that 
some of these changes have taken place. There have been changes in people’s 
electoral behaviour and in the political culture, especially in allowing preference 
sharing by candidates and their supporters. Winning candidates can also claim a 
majority victory. However, there has been no indication of reduced tension, 
indeed the ‘highlandization’ of politics seems to have increased tensions 
somewhat in Madang, with the assault of polling officials and use of firearms on 
the Madang waterfront.  
 
Women’s chances have not improved at all. The votim asples campaign 
seems to have worked against voting for women. 
 
Candidates who are up against a strong and popular opponent sometimes 
resort to smear campaigns in the hope of increasing their chances of winning. A 
candidate campaigning at a settlement in Madang town described his opponent, 
Sir Arnold Amet, as a waitman in blak skin who did not understand pasin 
Madang (a ‘white’ Papua New Guinean who did not understand the Madang 
culture). This unfortunate slur was used against Sir Arnold throughout Madang 
by his opponents. Sir Arnold was well aware of it and referred to it when giving 
his inauguration address after his win. However, there was popular support for 
the former Chief Justice, especially in his home electorate of Sumkar. People 
had confidence that he could use his professional skills and experience in 
government to bring change to Madang. Compared to Sir Arnold, the other 
candidates had little to offer.  
 
Addressing problems 
 
The issue of ‘highlandization of coastal politics’ can only be effectively 
addressed when voters become aware of what is actually going on. Some 
awareness took place in Madang in 2007 and candidates have used the avenues 
provided by LPV, such as preference sharing, to unite in addressing the issue. 
The asples campaign for the Madang Open and Madang Provincial seats 
succeeded in getting local candidates elected. There has been some grumbling 
amongst the asples candidates themselves over the eventual winner of Madang 
Open, whom they did not see as someone particular endowed with leadership 
qualities, but people will have to live with their choice.  
 
On the other hand, there is general satisfaction with the election of Sir 
Arnold Amet, who many thought was the ideal candidate for the governor’s 
position. Even his opponents acknowledge that he has brought stability to the 
troubled Madang governor’s seat. But there is a challenge to his victory from 
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one of the losing candidates, citing bribery, undue influence, intimidation, and 
errors and omissions by counting officials. Amongst the accusations against 
Amet is that more than 3,000 ballot papers marked for Peter Yama were found 
at Meiro dump near the town. Prior to 2002 interference with ballot papers was 
a problem largely confined to highlands electorates, but a similar incident 
occurred in Madang in 2002. The same candidate has been involved on both 
occasions; it was also his supporters who were involved in the attempts to hijack 
ballot boxes along the Ramu River and inland of Bogia in 2007. These matters 
need to be investigated and dealt with appropriately. The election-related use of 
firearms is still limited and effective police operations and the peaceful nature of 
the Madang people ensured that this remained the case. 
 
Ward recorders and voters have generally worked together to avoid inflation 
of rolls, but the attempt to inflate the roll in Ward 5 by multiple entries of names 
of students at DWU must be dealt with before the next election. There were 
attempts at multiple voting in Madang in 2007, but incidents were few and 
mostly controlled by the introduction of ward rolls which are easier to 
administer and easier for scrutineers to monitor. Proposals for permanent ward 
recorders to regularly update the rolls should be considered. An accurate ward 
roll is crucial for elections and useful for ward development and administration. 
 
Some candidates in Madang Open and Madang Provincial seats spent large 
sums of money on their campaigns; this is reflected in the disputes that have 
occurred after the election. While money is an important factor, it did not seem 
to influence the outcome of the elections in Madang. The tendency of Madang 
people to vote asples candidates, and the opposition to the ‘highlandization’ of 
Madang politics, had a major influence on the election in Madang in 2007.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 22.2: Voting statistics Madang Open electorate, 2007 
Number of registered voters  53851  
Total votes cast 36053  
Informal votes 931 (2.6 % of total votes cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 35122  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 15751  
Total votes distributed 21659  
Exhausted ballot papers 19371 (55.2% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 17562  
 
Table 22.3: Voting statistics Madang Provincial electorate, 2007 
Number of registered voters  224303  
Total votes cast 157371  
Informal votes 5111 (3.2 % of total votes cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 152260  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 95169  
Total votes distributed na  
Exhausted ballot papers 57091 (37.5% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 47586  
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23 WHAT IS HOLDING THEM BACK? REFLECTIONS ON ONE 
WOMAN’S LOSS AT THE POLLS: USINO-BUNDI OPEN  
 
Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
 
Women's struggles for equity continue to be frustrated in Papua New Guinea 
and other Pacific island nations (Dickerson-Putman and Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
1994; Macintyre 1998). Issues such as gender violence are largely ignored by 
male politicians (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997d; Bradley 1998; Dinnen 2000; 
Human Rights Watch 2005) and everywhere women suffer political setbacks 
(Kidu 2006). In Papua New Guinea, only three women served in parliament 
concurrently in the decade following independence in 1975. From 1987 to 1997, 
there were no women in parliament and few in provincial offices. In 1997, two 
women were elected to the 109-member parliament, with one — the white 
widow of Sir Buri Kidu — staying on to represent one of the national capital 
electorates (Moresby South) for a second term. Lady Carol Kidu was recently 
re-elected for a third term, once again as the only female member of Papua New 
Guinea's National Parliament. 
 
As Papua New Guinea women bear many of the burdens of development, 
their virtual absence in politics is troubling. At a World Bank conference in 
Madang in 2006, it was noted that mining is not gender-neutral and that women 
are rarely included in plans to encourage sustainable development or given 
equal access to justice, education, health care or economic resources. In surveys 
at the Ramu Nickel project in 1995 and 2000, I observed that men routinely left 
women out of genealogical data which might qualify the women as landowners. 
The same men expected their wives and unmarried sons and daughters to 
maintain newly-made gardens and house sites in the sparsely populated 
rainforest while they — the husbands — were in town using land compensation 
monies to buy second wives and things of no benefit to those left behind 
(Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2001). In a keynote speech given at a dinner hosted by the 
Solomon Islands prime minister in Honiara, Lady Carol Kidu argued that, ‘To 
waste half of the intellectual capacity of Melanesia by excluding women from 
our highest decision-making institutions is madness’, calling for affirmative 
action to make Pacific parliaments more inclusive democratic institutions (Kidu 
2006). 
 
While proposals such as Lady Kidu's merit attention and it is evident that 
male dominance makes it difficult for female candidates, the question arises: 
why do not more women vote for female candidates? What congerie of factors 
and circumstances prevent women — who are capable actors in most realms of 
life — from becoming strong political actors both as 'women' and as Papua New 
Guinea citizens?  
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In 2006 I received word from a friend that she intended running for 
parliament in the 2007 national elections. A self-made businesswoman, actively 
engaged in promoting small-scale rural development and helping families (that 
is, both men and women), my friend seemed poised for victory over most other 
candidates — who promised big payouts from large-scale developments they 
had little control over and who reeked of corruption and indifference to gender 
issues. Returning to Papua New Guinea in 2007, I theorized that factors such as 
race, class and gender might play a decisive role in Betty's campaign and its 
ultimate success or failure. Previously, I had written that Papua New Guinea's 
male leaders helped marginalize the national women's movement (as well as 
mock women's aspirations in their own class) by promoting a myth opposing 
‘chaste and selfless’ village women with ‘promiscuous, Westernized’ women 
living ‘selfishly’ in town with their rich white husbands or lovers (Zimmer-
Tamakoshi 1993). I argued that in widening the gulf between rural and educated 
urban women and appealing to mass prejudice, leaders deflected attention from 
the interests of all women as well as their own weaknesses in representing their 
constituencies. 
 
To understand better why women do not mobilize on common issues, I 
intended to explore further the politics of tradition and modernity as they relate 
to race, class and gender. In Melanesia, ‘tradition’ is associated with women and 
village mores while ‘modernity’ is associated more with men and Western-style 
business success and social endeavours (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1995). In a 
seminal work on race and modernity, Bashkow (2006) shows how ‘whiteness’ 
is a moral concept signifying (for the Orokaiva at least) both success in modern 
terms and failure in maintaining traditional exchange relations. ‘Whiteness’ is 
now separable from white people and applicable to men of a certain class. While 
the Orokaiva have little to say on women and ‘whiteness’, my friend has been 
called ‘white’ and has suffered discrimination because of her white husband and 
unusual business success (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997c). Even so, in 2007 she felt 
sure it was the right time to run against men who lived in urban opulence and 
socialized more with Papua New Guinea's international elite. Unlike her 
opponents, Betty spends much of her time attending to her fish farm and tourist 
business on Mount Wilhelm as well as other rural activities and exchanges. I 
was interested to see both how she would set herself apart from the other 
candidates on key issues such as corruption, inequality, poor rural services and 
health care, and how various constituencies would perceive her framing of self. 
Would her opponents be perceived as more ‘white’ and less moral than she? 
Would women and young men see her as the embodiment of culture heroine 
Dobume (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997a, b) who set Gende society on the right path 
by enabling her brother to marry and have children (something their mythical 
father had overlooked)? Would ordinary women who sacrifice to see that their 
children prosper (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1996b; 1998) feel kinship with a woman 
who can easily afford better schools for her children and overseas trips? Either 
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way, I expected my examination of the roles of race, class and gender in my 
friend's campaign would broaden discussion of race and modernity to include 
women and their political and economic situations. As it is, women are often 
left out of or lumped together in works on modernity and globalization (Knauft 
1999). And understanding modernist dimensions of power and disempowerment 
is important to understanding the challenges Papua New Guinea women face. 
 
The candidate  
 
Betty Higgins was born in Goroka in 1958, the first child of ‘houseboy’ 
Ruge Angiva and his second wife Elizabeth. Born at a time when few migrants 
were accompanied by their wives and children, Betty started out life receiving 
much attention from her parents and those of her father's clan brothers who were 
part of their urban household. Often Betty's young uncles would babysit her 
while Betty's mother worked odd jobs for whites or gambled for money. Fluent 
in Pidgin, unafraid of white people and generous, Elizabeth was a focal point in 
the Goroka migrant community. She counselled others on the intricacies of 
keeping the white masters and their wives happy and used whatever earnings or 
handouts she received to support her husband's brothers when they arrived in 
town seeking their fortunes. Elizabeth was from the beginning an important role 
model for Betty.  
 
When Betty was a toddler, Ruge brought her and his two pregnant wives 
back to his home village of Yandera to stay. With his own father near death, 
Ruge took over the running of his father's household. As the oldest male in his 
generation, Ruge received ample support from his father's younger brothers in 
the way of garden land and brideprice for a third wife. His uncles also paid off 
Elizabeth's brideprice as well as childwealth payments for Betty and her 
younger siblings. Investing heavily in their deceased brother's son, the uncles 
expected that when their own sons were of an age to marry, Ruge and his wives 
would be obligated to help them with brideprice pigs. Beyond that, they could 
also expect to receive portions of Ruge's daughters’ brideprices. Being part of 
others' investment strategies, Betty was soon at the centre of their disputes. 
When Elizabeth enrolled Betty and her sister in the new boarding school at 
Bundi, it was against the protests of her uncles, who feared the consequences of 
two young girls living apart from their kin and developing any kind of 
independence. Ruge did not want to disagree with his uncles and so stood by 
while Elizabeth undertook the weekly trips to Bundi to take food to her girls and 
to help other parents plant gardens for the school's foreign teachers. 
 
Although many students were homesick, Betty enjoyed her studies and the 
camaraderie of dorm life. When her mother left her father, Betty refused to go 
with her. Her only support during this time came from her maternal 
grandmother and several farseeing women who took pity on Betty. When it 
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came time for Betty to transfer to a high school on the coast, her father refused 
to pay her airfare or school fees, urging her to stay home and work in the 
gardens to repay the debts her mother had walked out on (Gende women are 
expected to repay their brideprices). Again, it was women who put together the 
cash for Betty's airfare. When Betty and the other children arrived at Madang 
airport, the headmaster discovered that Betty did not have tuition money. He 
arranged for Betty to earn her own school fees doing some housekeeping for 
two teachers. 
 
When Betty was not busy with schoolwork and chores, she enjoyed visiting 
the children’s ward at the Madang hospital and giving fruit and flowers to the 
children who seemed most lonely. Betty was herself very lonely, feeling 
abandoned by her parents. On one of her hospital visits, Betty passed by the 
open room of a middle-aged white man. Although she was afraid, she was 
drawn into the room by the man's sad face. Putting flowers on his bedside table, 
she then fled without a word. The next time she visited the hospital, the head 
nurse took her to the man’s room where Betty's beneficiary thanked her for 
cheering him up on what had been his birthday. The man gave Betty candy his 
wife and children had sent from Australia. Overcoming her shyness, Betty told 
the man her story and he decided to help her. Taking her to Australia during the 
summer holidays, he paid her tuition and gave her a regular book and clothing 
allowance throughout the remainder of her high school years. When the family 
returned to England on leave, Betty went with them. 
 
After graduating from high school, Betty worked at several jobs before 
applying for a job at Air Niugini. With her good looks, intelligence, and charm, 
Betty enjoyed the heady life of an Air Niugini air hostess. Travelling between 
Port Moresby, other parts of Papua New Guinea and various Pacific capitals, 
Betty developed a sophistication few men and even fewer women possess. 
Shopping for bargains in Singapore and Hong Kong, enjoying the night life in 
Brisbane and Sydney, or caught up in the international whirl of Honolulu, Betty 
saw and did many things. Expected to wear makeup and dress fashionably, 
Betty attracted male attention. Though she dated Papua New Guineans, she 
preferred expatriates — feeling as many air hostesses and educated women did 
at the time (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993) — that Western men were kinder and 
more generous than their Papua New Guinean peers. 
 
Meeting her first husband on a flight from Australia, Betty moved out of the 
Air Niugini flats and into the spacious home of her Australian father-in-law, a 
car dealer in Port Moresby. Given the run of the house and a generous budget, 
she turned the house into a Mecca for other Gende who were in town for short 
visits or looking for work. Although her husband and father-in-law were 
unenthusiastic about the crowds of Gende who passed through their home, they 
were even less prepared to deal with Betty's parents. Not long after she started 
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work for Air Niugini, Betty had brought about her parents' reunion. Once they 
realized her good fortune, Elizabeth and Ruge visited Port Moresby regularly 
and were a source of tension in Betty's marriage. They even demanded that their 
son-in-law and his father pay brideprice for Betty. Betty, however, preferred 
‘paying for herself’ and ‘being her own woman’ and sent her parents back to the 
village. 
 
Eventually a child was born and Betty named her Lisa, after the wife of a 
Chinese restaurant owner in Port Moresby. Close friends, the couple often took 
Lisa with them on trips to Hong Kong and Singapore. Since Betty continued 
working for Air Niugini, she arranged for her younger sisters to babysit Lisa. 
Soon, however, her mother moved back with her, claiming she could better look 
after Lisa. Another purpose was to make better use of Betty's prosperity. As 
Ruge many times described his and Elizabeth's relationship with their daughter, 
‘Betty is our business. We helped her grow up. We did many things for her. 
Now it is time to reap the profits’. Back in Yandera, Ruge directed departing 
migrants to Betty's house, calling it ‘his home’. The irony of Ruge's expecting 
to control Betty's resources when he had contributed little to her education was 
not lost on Betty. She, however, chose to indulge him as long as he treated her 
mother fairly and because her father had become a very important bigman who 
could, if he wished, jeopardize Betty's plans to one day return home to the 
village to stay. 
 
Meanwhile, disenchanted with her husband because of his substance abuse, 
Betty moved back to the Air Niugini flats. For several years she dated a 
succession of men. To her mother's disappointment, Betty refused the proposals 
of well-to-do Papua New Guineans in favour of another Australian, this time a 
man with several grown children from a previous marriage. An engineer at the 
Yonki dam site in Eastern Highlands Province, Ken was soon popular with his 
in-laws because of his generosity and his support of Betty's plans to return to 
Yandera to start a business and to raise her children away from the crime of Port 
Moresby. A dry-weather road had recently linked the Gende to urban markets in 
the highlands and north coast. Investing her own and her husband's savings in a 
new pickup truck, a generator, freezer, and stereo and video equipment, Betty 
hoped to build a large coffee-buying business and other income-generating 
activities for herself and her relatives. Within a few months of her return in 
early 1986, Betty was buying coffee and transporting the beans to distant 
markets, selling beer and other alcoholic beverages in the village club she built, 
and charging villagers admission to weekend discos and video shows. Plans to 
sell vegetables to town markets did not materialize but Betty did open a well-
stocked tradestore at one end of the five room log cabin she and her family lived 
in. With the generator she was able to keep and sell frozen meats along with a 
regular supply of fresh eggs from the chickens she penned up beneath her house. 
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For as long as they continued, Betty's business operations brought a measure 
of prosperity to Yandera village. Betty paid her father for the use of the land on 
which she built her home. She paid her father and other villagers K5,000 for the 
materials and labour they put into building her house and the drinking club. Her 
mother ran the tradestore and kept most of the profits. Some two dozen women 
and children earned cash for carrying bags of coffee from Yandera to where the 
new road ended. And Betty hired two men as regular drivers and mechanics for 
the day-long trips to town. She made it easier than ever for villagers to sell their 
coffee. And there were more children enrolled in the local school as result of 
their being able to earn their own school fees doing small jobs for Betty. 
 
The good times were soon over, however. Betty was giving out more than 
she was earning. She was, in fact, subsidizing village 'development' and getting 
nothing in return for her K30,000 investment. The causes of her failure were 
Betty's unfulfilled expectation that villagers would reciprocate her generosity 
and help build her business empire, and the Catholic mission's apparent 
opposition to any attempt to break their monopoly of business opportunities in 
the Gende area. Having to pay even close relatives to keep her supplied with 
such necessities as clean drinking water, Betty learned that villagers do not feel 
compelled to achieve a balance of exchange in their relations with more 
prosperous migrants. Village sentiment was summed up by one woman: ‘When 
Betty and her husband stay in town they spend over K100 a night for a room in 
the Bird of Paradise Hotel. That is more money than most of us have in a year's 
time’. Competing with the mission, Betty paid villagers the same price per kilo 
of coffee even though she had the added cost of paying cartage to where her 
truck was parked (a charge villagers did not make against the more distant 
mission tradeposts). The foreign worker who did most of the coffee buying for 
the mission and was in charge of all government-funded work in the area, 
compounded Betty's difficulties by stopping work on the road into Yandera until 
after Betty had given up on her local business aspirations. A church catechist in 
Yandera was instrumental in closing down Betty's village pub. 
 
After leaving Yandera, Betty and her husband purchased land on the slopes 
of Mount Wilhelm that is near enough to an all-weather road to make the sale of 
fresh vegetables, a vineyard, and other agricultural projects feasible money-
makers. By 1989 and 1990, Betty was supplying fresh vegetables to Anderson's 
Foodland stores in Lae and Rabaul and by 1994 she was raising trout and 
chickens as well as considering the possibility of raising rabbits for meat. The 
land was near enough to Gende territory that Betty's relatives could work for her 
and still maintain gardens and other village-based enterprises but far enough 
away that they did not control vital aspects of Betty's business operations such 
as land, labour, and road access. For several years Betty's father (until his death 
in 1991) and mother helped oversee her business while Betty divided her time 
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between Yonki and the farm. By 1994 Betty and her family were living at the 
farm fulltime. 
 
Still angered by the Catholic mission's lack of support for local entrepreneurs 
in her homeland, in 1989 Betty ran an unsuccessful political campaign for a seat 
in the Madang Provincial Government. As the first Gende woman to run for 
high office, Betty encountered prejudice from both men and women for acting 
‘like a man’ and putting herself too much in the public eye. Nevertheless, many 
villagers considered her a serious candidate and those persons who had 
jeopardized her earlier coffee-buying business by their heavy demands now 
supported her election bid in the hope that she would bring more government 
funds and development projects to Yandera and other Gende villages. That she 
did not win was the result of the fragmentation that characterizes Papua New 
Guinea politics: people tending to vote for candidates who are related to them 
on the assumption that the winning candidates will reward wantok before 
passing on largesse to more distant associates. The most votes Betty received 
were from her own clan and village. She did, however, receive other votes and 
some were given precisely because she is a woman who is generous towards all 
Gende, regardless of kin affiliation and because she appears to be genuinely 
interested in promoting others’ welfare. Far from giving up her political 
ambitions, Betty bided her time, building up both her business ventures 
(including a tourist lodge on her Mount Wilhelm property) and the trust and 
support of many persons. She continued to run her business operations in ways 
that benefitted many Gende and she has continued to be her own woman – 
beholden to no one and generous to all. And therein, ironically, may be one of 
the very reasons she suffered a second political loss in 2007. 
 
Her nomination and campaign 
 
I arrived in Papua New Guinea on 9 April 2007 for the first of two stints of 
fieldwork. In addition to wanting to observe Betty's campaign for Usino-Bundi 
Open, I had two other ongoing projects to attend to. At the start it was difficult 
to locate Betty. She had left a garbled message on my home phone while I was 
flying across the Pacific and now none of the contact numbers she had given me 
earlier was working. For several days I tried unsuccessfully to connect with her 
via her mobile phone, her email address, her second home at Mount Hagen, and 
the farm. On 12 April I received a hurried call from her saying all the phones up 
at the farm (and ‘The Lodge’) had been out for two months, that she could call 
out but no one could call in, that she was calling from Mount Hagen but on her 
way back to the farm, and that she would come down to Madang to get her 
mother and travel up to Yandera with me. I flew up to Madang the next 
morning. As it turned out she did not come down (some tourists showed up 
wanting to climb Mount Wilhelm) and I went up to Yandera to work on another 
project. Returning to Madang after a week, I waited for Betty's next call, 
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knowing that the 'bush telegraph' would keep both Betty and me informed of 
one another's whereabouts. There were many Gende moving about because of 
the upcoming elections and I received almost daily news when I ran into them 
on the streets of Madang or they sought me out. 
 
Betty's next call was on 25 April. Betty was now planning to walk down 
from Mount Wilhelm through the Gende homeland to the Ramu, where her son 
would meet her with her truck and they could then come into Madang to begin 
the nomination process. Her idea was to do some politicking along the way. The 
next day I ran into her mother, Elizabeth on the street on her way to ‘find’ me. 
For over a week, Elizabeth and I hung out together (and with other Gende), 
discussing the upcoming election, the candidates and their chances of winning 
(or not), and when exactly Betty would show up. Finally, we heard she was 
coming on Sunday, 6 May. Elizabeth rushed off to prepare a special meal for 
her but Betty didn't show up until late in the evening, too late for me to join the 
meal. The next morning, around 7:30 a.m., Betty and her entourage showed up 
at the house where I was staying. I had only a few minutes to throw my camera 
and a few other things in my backpack. Then we all crammed into her truck and 
drove around town getting money out of the bank for her nomination fee, 
buying phone cards for her mobile phone, shopping for supplies and sleeping 
bags for her campaign trail, picking up nomination paperwork, and all the time 
running into potential supporters. No matter how rushed we were – Betty 
intended driving up to Brahmin by nightfall to gather female supporters to go 
with us the next day to her nomination at the district headquarters in Walium – 
she stopped to discuss her platform. A number of listeners (including me) gave 
Betty cash contributions and Elizabeth bought a fancy bullhorn for her daughter. 
 
At the bank we ran into Agatha Yama, who was planning to run for the 
Madang Open seat. I was talking with Agatha when a bank customer she knew 
walked up to her and gave her a check for K1000 saying he hoped she would 
win. Yama said her campaign was running on providence; that she had no 
money to live on and support her children as her husband had struck her name 
off their bank accounts. When we left the bank, Betty said the woman's husband 
was a bad man with several wives who was violent with Agatha. Both women 
were appealing to women on women's issues, but Betty said she was appealing 
less on issues of domestic violence than on the power of women as mothers and 
community members; women as faithful, caring, forgiving, concerned citizens 
who rarely drink and harm their families and who always think of their 
children's wellbeing. 
 
As the day wore on, excitement mounted as different convoys of nominating 
candidates and their supporters drove through the streets and the crowds 
swelled. It seemed that everyone ― or at least most of the men — had come 
down from the villages. Elizabeth began berating Betty for not giving cash 
7
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handouts to the voters, saying that they would otherwise never vote for her. 
Betty, however, was intent on running a clean campaign, free of ‘bribes’ and 
‘corruption’. In the past, several important Gende politicians had made personal 
use of funds reserved by the big Ramu Nickel project for 'landowners', giving 
large sums of cash to those who supported them and failing to distribute the 
funds to other, legitimate 'landowners'. The misappropriated funds were said to 
be in the millions of kina. Betty preferred the more generalized and 'clean' 
hosting of small feasts to which everyone — men, women, and children — 
would be invited. Betty argued that giving bribes and relying on the wantok 
system was a thing of the past; that corruption started in the village because the 
people were poor and everyone wanted bribes for their votes. Clearly, her 
mother did not see eye to eye with her daughter and her hectoring continued. 
 
While Elizabeth kept pushing the virtues of 'investing' in the voters so they 
might reciprocate with their votes, Betty received a phone call from Lae inviting 
her to attend the Agricultural Innovation Show and the 10th Celebration of the 
Papua New Guinea National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) in two days 
time. As a founding member of NARI, Betty's travel expenses were being 
covered and she was to pick up her ticket that day. As we rushed around with 
yet another set of tasks to accomplish I was reminded of how important Betty 
has been as both a role model for women in business and as an innovator 
(Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1996a). Betty was the first Papua New Guinean to farm-
raise trout, at her Mount Wilhelm farm back in the mid 1990s, taking huge 
financial risks but travelling to Japan and other locations to learn about the 
process and to order her first fingerlings (baby trout). Betty's trout are sold in 
restaurants all over Papua New Guinea. Elizabeth was unimpressed, however, 
and kept haranguing her daughter until finally Betty ordered her out of the truck. 
As her mother walked away and we headed off to Brahmin, Betty remembered 
all her mother had done for her and her sisters, how she had basically raised 
them on her own and how her father had hurt her mother and his other wives so 
many times. We turned back to get Elizabeth and it was near dark when we 
finally arrived at the `Pukpuk' bridge at the Ramu crossing.  
 
Along the way, there had been much talk among the truck's occupants — 
Betty, her son and mother, me, and several men and women who worked for her 
at the farm and who were going to assist her on her campaign trail. Several 
issues predominated: corruption, the virtues of female candidates, and the pros 
and cons of old and new ways. Throughout, the discussion was grounded in 
issues of race, class, and gender. Betty, a member of the educated elite, saw 
corruption as originating in villagers' poverty and misconceptions of how 
Western business worked. Others saw the corruption as pure greed and the 
trickery of educated Papua New Guineans who allegedly worked on their behalf 
but in fact made deals with outsiders and stole from their own kin. Betty's son, 
the product of privilege and his mother's marriage with a white Australian, 
384      Election 2007 
 
argued that anyone who gave bribes for votes was stupid and that Papua New 
Guineans must follow the ways of the 'whites' who didn't allow sympathy or 
extortionist demands for bribes effect their choices and behaviour. Expanding 
upon the topic of corruption it was agreed by all in the truck that women are far 
more moral than men, putting their children and family above their own needs, 
and that they would never waste development funds on drinking and chasing the 
opposite sex. A male school teacher railed against old customs arguing that 
brideprice was a trap for women and villagers' constant feasting and demands 
for exchange payments for land rights and death and so much else were a drain 
on townsmen's limited resources. In the midst of all this talk, Elizabeth fell 
asleep muttering ‘you must give them money’ for their votes. 
 
It was dusk when we arrived at the bridge and the gate was locked. Erected 
by the missionaries after floods had washed away part of the bridge, the gate 
prevented cars and trucks from crossing the bridge at night when it would be 
difficult to navigate what was left of the bridge. As no one was around to unlock 
the gate, two of Betty's party and myself hopped over the gate and walked to the 
mission several kilometers away. A man was sent back with the key and the rest 
of the group arrived at the mission, quickly dispersing to nearby houses to spend 
the night and prepare for the next day's nomination ceremony. In the morning, 
Betty set about renting several vehicles to help carry men and women to 
Walium. In the meantime, her son ferried people from the meeting spot at 
Brahmin to the Pukpuk bridge where we all waited for the convoy to begin. 
Once again the conversation turned to matters of race, class, and gender. Betty's 
son reiterated that ‘white men think you are stupid if you vote for corrupt 
politicians’. Betty distanced herself from townsmen and male politicians by 
focusing on how she lived in a rural area and often visited her home village (‘mi 
meri bilong ples’), and that like all 'good women' she worked for the betterment 
of her family and community (‘mi meri wok long famili’). 
 
When over a hundred supporters had gathered at the bridge, the convoy of 
three trucks took off for Walium. When we arrived, we all got out and waited 
near a store for others to join us. Women decorated themselves with leaves and 
flowers, painting their faces — some half white, half black — and talking 
among themselves about why they were supporting Betty. Their rhetoric 
centered on how it was their time now (‘em taim bilong yumi’) and how women 
concentrate on service and not self. Some of the younger women were made up 
to look more like men with beards, shouting ‘mipela kam up man’ (‘we are men 
now’). When the group finally took off by foot to the district office with Betty 
in the lead, there was much singing and dancing by the women. When the 
procession came to a halt outside the district office, their refrain was picked up 
by Betty who repeated that she was a woman of the people, who lived off the 
land and whose only purpose was to work for her family and community, local 
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development projects, education, better health and social services, and stronger 
families. 
 
After another long wait, it was finally Betty’s turn to sign the nomination 
papers. Only a few of us were allowed in to the office with Betty; the rest were 
glued to the open windows watching their candidate sign in. The moment was 
affecting. Having followed Betty's accomplishments for twenty-five years, I 
fumbled with my camera, my eyes misty (Betty too shed a tear). Elizabeth stood 
erect behind her daughter, dry-eyed but never more proud. On either side of 
Betty were a man and woman: the man a former local government counselor 
and 'brother' of her deceased father; the woman one of the women who had long 
ago helped pay Betty’s school fees. 
 
Her loss and its analysis  
 
After returning to Madang, Betty hurriedly bought some new shoes and 
clothes to wear to the NARI event and then rushed to catch a plane to Lae. Her 
son took the truck back to Mount Hagen and arranged to have election posters 
made up. Her mother and other Gende women, some visiting town for the 
nomination festivities, met to plan a big feast for Betty when she began her 
campaign in the villages. I continued with other research and then moved on to 
Port Moresby and Canberra before flying back to the United States at the end of 
May. I returned to Papua New Guinea in July and August to carry out a census 
and survey in Yandera village. Betty’s mother Elizabeth assisted me and the 
other four members of my team (all from Papua New Guinea but none of Gende 
background) and I had daily opportunities to talk with Elizabeth and other 
villagers (and later, migrants in Madang and Port Moresby) about the outcome 
of the election. Betty herself was busy with work up at the farm and Lodge, and 
after an exhausting campaign walking from village to village in the 
mountainous terrain and then losing the election, disinclined to come down to 
the village to participate in the survey in person or to talk about the election. 
With over two hundred families to survey I never found the time to go up to Mt 
Wilhelm myself. But in gathering her mother's testimony and that of other 
Gende (in addition to the testimony of some of her workers who came down to 
participate in the survey), I feel I have a solid enough perspective on the causes 
of her loss as well as what it meant to her and others in the wider Gende 
community. 
 
When the Electoral Commission posted the election results as of 25 July, the 
winner of Usino-Bundi Open was Samson Kuli with 2,535 first preference votes 
(11.9 per cent) and 5,263 votes (62.0 per cent) after 34 counts. The runner-up 
was a distant second with only 1,200 first preference votes (5.7 per cent) and 
3,223 second and third preference votes (38.0 per cent). Betty was excluded in 
the 14th count with 371 first preference votes (1.8 per cent). While she fell into 
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the 23rd place in a race that ended up with 36 candidates pulling in first 
preference votes, Betty did hold her own against the only other female 
candidate, Margaret Yagum Sawi from Ramu Sugar who pulled in only 87 first 
preference votes (0.4 per cent). Her brother-in-law and staunch competitor for 
Gende votes, David Duavu Tigavu, pulled in 944 votes (4.5 per cent) and was 
not excluded until the 27th count, but Betty did beat fellow Gende and well-
known writer Joe Koroma who received only 110 first preference votes and was 
excluded in the 9th count. 
 
The election results generally produced a sense of gloom among the Gende. 
Peter Yama, the former Usino-Bundi member lost his race for the Madang 
Provincial seat to Sir Arnold Amet and was said by many Gende to be holing up 
in Australia and plotting revenge against those Gende who did not reciprocate 
his 'generosity' with votes. Some townsmen had fled back to their home villages 
and garden settlements for that very reason. Agatha Yama did not win the 
Madang Open. And David Tigavu, allegedly holding millions of kina for the 
Ramu Nickel landowners, did not win the Usino-Bundi seat. With no Gende in 
the national government, the Gende were in a weak position in any negotiations 
they might consider with the two big mineral resource projects (Ramu Nickel 
and Marengo Mining in Yandera) now in their midst. The most frequent 
comment about the election was that the Gende had wasted their votes by 
dividing them and voting for too many different candidates. Many voters were 
angry, with themselves and with the candidates. Candidates were accused of not 
combining their efforts to produce one or two strong candidates who might have 
stemmed the Ramu flood. Voters berated themselves as 'stupid' bush people 
who gave their votes away for a few kina or a piece of cooked pork. A number 
of men and women brought up the notion of forming two or three main parties 
rather than the many that now enter uneasy alliances in order to form a national 
government. Others felt that tribalism and the wantok system stood in the way 
of Papua New Guinea becoming more like Western nations. For her part, Betty's 
mother continued to complain about Betty wasting her money (and others' pigs) 
on small feasts instead of making direct cash handouts to voters. She excoriated 
those who had eaten at the feasts as ‘ol i kaikai nating’ (‘all ate without 
reciprocating’) and bemoaned the rubbish customs of today's young people who 
allowed their children to stuff themselves at the feasts and then gave their votes 
to other candidates. 
 
When I asked about Betty's campaign strategies and what people did or did 
not like about her as a potential member of parliament, no one expressed 
concern about the race of her husband or her mixed-race children. While race 
may have played a part in their judgements of Betty in the past (when she lived 
in Port Moresby), the facts that she and her family were committed to rural 
development and that Betty was a frequent visitor to the villages (unlike many 
educated migrants who have become soft and prefer their urban comforts) made 
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her a true meni bilong ples in their eyes. Neither did people seem offended by 
her class — again, for the same reason: that she was willing to use her 
knowledge and extensive contacts to better the lives of local people. What did 
seem to matter was gender-related. Some of those villagers who admitted they 
did not vote for her, and others who did, asserted that the primary reasons she 
lost were her lack of political experience and her failure to develop political ties 
with other politicians and local leaders. Most felt she was too individualistic in 
her style, focusing on her many accomplishments and intentions but lacking the 
networks of political influence necessary to be an effective leader whether 
traditionally or in the contemporary context of national politics. To be fair, 
many did admit that most other candidates had also run individual, divided 
campaigns. But Betty was a woman and women, according to some voters, do 
not cooperate well in political settings. More recently, in 2009, two of Betty’s 
male political opponents — Anton Yagama (who came in second after the 
winner Samson Kuli) and her brother-in-law David Tigavu (who came in tenth) 
— and former Usino-Bundi member Theo Tuya commented to me that Betty 
lost because politics is a “man’s world” and that she did not exhibit the 
necessary networking skills. This sentiment, while difficult to justify in light of 
Betty’s business successes and her friendliness, was widely expressed to me by 
both men and women in the years since she lost the 2007 election. 
 
Conclusion: women as political actors  
 
While the aforementioned comment would appear sexist, there may be a 
grain or two of truth in considering Papua New Guinean women as political 
actors in both traditional and contemporary settings. It is indeed true that long-
term co-wives often cooperate with one another to promote the polygynous 
household's overall political and social wellbeing as a means of also promoting 
their own and their natal families' interests (see Zimmer 1985; Zimmer-
Tamakoshi 1997a). But virilocality (the most common post-marital residence in 
Papua New Guinea) and the absence of bonding, much less structured bonding, 
of women in female initiations (as opposed to male initiation practices) does not 
support groups of politically united women. There are well-known incidents of 
women coming together to fight for certain issues: the thousands of women who 
took to the streets in Port Moresby to protest the rape of an expatriate woman, 
and the Wok Meri movement in the highlands, in which market women from 
different language groups created a network of' savings associations that 
allowed them to invest in various businesses but as importantly ‘showed men’ 
how they too should be investing their money (Sexton 1986). On a smaller 
scale, Gende women have in the past joined together to end a development that 
did not benefit their interests (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1996b). While some 
individual Gende women have achieved great influence as a result of hard work 
and investments in others, few (except individuals like Betty and Elizabeth) dare 
stand up and speak to large crowds. Although there have been the exceptional 
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women in parliament (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993), most Papua New Guinea 
women do not participate in overtly political groupings. Given this situation, 
proposals such as Lady Kidu’s to affirmatively set aside a certain number of 
seats in parliament exclusively for women may be a necessary part of a more 
comprehensive plan to enable more women to learn the rules of the game and at 
the same time attend to the interests of half the population. Women would still 
have to run against one another for these seats and it is to be presumed that the 
more politically savvy would indeed win, thereby providing models and 
incentives for those coming up the ladder. 
 
A different but related issue has to do with women's campaign rhetoric and 
goals. For the most part, Betty ran on a service platform, focusing on caring for 
family and community and small-scale developments. Few persons brought this 
up as a reason they didn't vote for Betty, but the few who did felt that it wasn't 
necessary to have a member in parliament to benefit from or invest in small-
scale development but that it was necessary to maximize benefits from massive 
projects such as Ramu Nickel or to argue the need for road-building and 
extensive electrification projects. While Betty is admired for her business 
successes, her vocal indifference to the success or failure of Ramu Nickel and 
Marengo's nascent project alarms some men who are relying on the success of 
these two projects to provide them with the money needed to pay off the 
exchange debts they are incurring as they make multiple marriage and land 
deals with one another (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2001, 2004, 2007). Also, many 
migrants are returning to the villages and rural areas to find work at these two 
large-scale developments. Given these broader interests of the voters, it would 
be wise if the affirmative action did not limit female politicians to so-called 
‘women's issues’ and that both women and men be educated in the importance 
of all forms of development and services to every man, woman, and child in 
Papua New Guinea (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2008). De-gendering the work of 
parliament at the same time as women are affirmatively brought into the fold 
will take a massive education program in how what happens to one part of a 
community directly affects for good or ill all the other parts. Should Papua New 
Guinea decide to take on such an innovative restructuring of its political system, 
it would stand above most other nations — certainly not an impossibility for a 
nation that has managed to survive quite a few challenges already. In the 
meantime, the Gende need to achieve a separate electorate from the Ramu half 
of the Usino-Bundi seat given that the two mining operations — if they continue 
to live up to their promise — will one day be providing major amounts of 
income to the national government and the Gende will deserve to see some of 
that income stream provide services that they greatly lack. This issue is one that 
Gende men and women are increasingly concerned about. 
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Figure 24.1: Yangouru-Saussia map 
24 ORGANIZATION TAKES THE SPOILS: THE ELECTION IN 
YANGORU-SAUSSIA 
 
Leo Yat Paol and Patrick Gesch 
 
Those writing for the newspapers do not understand the realities of 
village elections. You can’t win without komiti and they need a 
reward. It is hard work (Peter Waranaka, Hwarapia, 29 May 2007). 
 
The above words of the governor of the East Sepik Province were programmatic 
for his election campaign in the Yangoru-Saussia electorate in the 2007 election. 
He had his komiti; they got their rewards; it was definitely hard work, and quite 
expensive, for him to satisfy the demands of the village voters. The outcome for 
the governor was a contentious return to the National Parliament. In April 2008 
a petition by the losing candidate, who accused the governor of bribing voters 
during the campaign, was upheld; however Waranaka appealed the decision and 
in March 2009 was reinstated (see below). The question remains: did Waranaka 
in 2007 accurately describe the realities of village campaigning? Is there any 
other way to come out on top in national elections? 
 
The Yangoru-Saussia electorate lies along the south side of the coastal 
mountain range leading north of Wewak. The mountains are as densely 
populated as any area in Papua New Guinea, giving the resulting settlement 
pattern of hamlets dispersed throughout the bush with few major gathering 
centres in villages. The terrain is continuously mountainous and flat areas are 
found only in the less-populated kunai grass plains leading down to the Sepik 
River. There are four local-level government (LLG) areas: Numbo, Sausso, East 
Yangoru and West Yangoru. The returning officer for Yangoru-Saussia was 
recruited from the public service in Yangoru, and the four assisting returning 
officers were based in the LLG 
offices.  
 
For the 2002 elections, East Sepik 
Province had 193,276 voters 
according to estimates based on the 
2000 national census, but there were 
286,716 names on the 2002 electoral 
roll1. The new electoral roll for the 
2007 elections had 237,070 voters, of 
whom 37,020 were enrolled for 
Yangoru-Saussia. The total number of 
votes cast in Yangoru-Saussia in 2007 
                                                     
1 John Nonggorr, ‘Challenges of the electoral roll’, Post-Courier 27 March 2007, p.12. 
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was 26,332 — 71 per cent of those enrolled. The electorate does not cover a big 
area, and although the roads are in poor condition, it was possible to cover most 
centres with the use of a four-wheel-drive Suzuki. The bitumen road through the 
middle of the electorate, the common language in about 80 per cent of the 
electorate, and the nearness of this area to the urban centre of Wewak all go to 
make for an electorate which can be considered quite manageable by Papua 
New Guinea standards. 
 
Fifteen candidates contested the Yangoru-Saussia seat in 2007, six of whom 
had contested a by-election for the seat in 2004 after the sitting member, 
Bernard Hagoria, had been found guilty of misusing public funds and dismissed 
from the National Parliament. The candidates included three former members of 
parliament (Gabriel Dusava, Hagoria and John Jaminan) as well as the sitting 
member, Waranaka. 
 
The Yangoru-Saussia election was full of compromises with what might be 
thought of as legally free and fair elections. Is this simply the reality of applying 
universalizing systems to the separate universes of the Papua New Guinea rural 
village? Some people say that we have come a long way from a concern 
whether we are applying the Westminster system to Papua New Guinea, the 
land of a thousand villages.2  How could it be otherwise? How much 
compromise should be institutionalized now to be able to shepherd future 
electoral developments along the ways of freedom and fairness? 
 
In what follows we will consider five issues that emerged from our 
observation of the election in Yangoru-Saussia.  
 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the election was the use of gifts, giving 
and demanding. The question arises: when was it just the social tradition, as 
claimed, and when did it constitute undue influence?  
 
The Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) clearly had 
difficulties in getting an electoral roll prepared on time and catering for all the 
needs of the electoral process. Allowances for officials seemed to become a 
bottomless source of expectations. 
                                                     
2 ‘PNG presents not as a state struggling to adjust “tradition” to “alien concepts”, but as 
a developing country adapting to its own governance, by its people, for its people. The 
issues are no longer (if ever they were) about whether ‘Westminster democracy” was an 
appropriate import, but about how Papua New Guineans are building their own 
relationships between each other, and especially between citizen and authority. Whilst 
each place, province, electorate has its own pace in that process, the stories follow the 
same themes.  Elections, in other words, are now part of the culture in PNG’ (Institute 
of Policy Studies et al. 2004, Sec.8, p.30).  
 
Organization takes the spoils      395 
 
Voter behaviour was another cause for concern, with brawling, underage 
voting, and no scope given for secret balloting. 
 
With few exceptions political parties were used as labels to help the 
legitimacy of candidates but with little commitment to policies. Few parties 
formed lasting alliances. In this atmosphere parties barely disguised the 
independent stand of so many candidates. Although general approval was 
expressed for the new limited preferential voting (LPV) system, it was not used 
to any effect in Yangoru-Saussia, where effort was spent more to void the power 
of preferences than to employ them. 
 
The counting of the Yangoru-Saussia votes involved a great waste of time, 
taking about four full working days in a fourteen day working period to produce 
a result from only 27,000 votes. This dispute-ridden process was barely kept on 
the rails, and some major clarification of the role of candidates’ scrutineers is 
needed. 
 
Voting inducements 
 
Yangoru has seldom seen a festival like the nomination of Governor Peter 
Wararu Waranaka3 on 9 May 2007. A solid stage had been built on the old 
airstrip and the district administration building was decorated with an 
assortment of flowers and palms inside and out. The returning officer and his 
assistants were ready for the arrival of the dignitaries. Although the candidate 
Patrick Harricknen was also nominating at Yangoru on this the last day of 
nominations, his singsing group was soon swallowed up by the groups coming 
in to support the National Alliance. A number of police cars arrived from 
Angoram with Arthur Somare and Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare and his 
wife Veronica, and about twent-five auxiliary police from Angoram. They 
accompanied the governor to the stand for speeches, where he acknowledged 
the epithet ‘Minister for Transport and Funeral Services’ because he had given 
as many as twenty-five expensive cars to various agencies in Yangoru, and had 
always made generous contributions to families when their loved ones had died. 
We recognised amongst the thousands congregated on the airstrip, people who 
had walked more than three hours from the Numbo side and five hours from the 
kunai plains for the day’s celebrations. Peter Waranaka nominated, and Arthur 
Somare gave a data-filled election speech for National Alliance before Sir 
Michael departed by the waiting helicopter. There was no doubting where the 
strength lay on nomination day. 
 
                                                     
3 I am told Wararu is Peter’s personal name, while Waranaka is a name taken from his 
forefathers. The change for the new election did not seem troublesome to anyone. 
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A few days after the nomination celebration, there followed a bizarre 
incident on the Sepik Highway. On 12 May Waranaka became involved in car 
smashing and insult hurling incidents between Passam and Munji on the Sepik 
Highway when his relative, senior reporter for The National newspaper, 
Yehiura Hriehwazi, was challenging Waranaka’s secretary and other relative, 
Joe Kiliawi, with electoral questions and corruption charges (Post-Courier 18 
May 2007, p.6.) One of Hriehwazi’s group ended up seriously injured in 
hospital. However, the maternal kin (wawenku) of Waranaka were outraged on 
Waranaka’s behalf,4 and made a customary presentation to him of two pigs, said 
to be worth K1,200 and K1,500. Waranaka was obliged to return double the 
cost to his uncles with food and beer above that. K40,000 was demanded from 
Hreihwazi’s group to pay for the car damage. This event was exploited for all its 
potential as a campaign event for the next couple of weeks, as part of the ‘taim 
bilong fri kaikai’ (time for eating free, a widely acknowledged term for the 
election period). 
 
There were general complaints from the supporters of other candidates that 
Waranaka was distributing money and 5,000 mobile telephones as part of his 
early campaign. When he took delivery of his election posters on 29 May, a 
large crowd gathered at his home hamlet in Hwarapia Village. Waranaka arrived 
very much stressed from Wewak, and declared that there would be no 
campaigning that day, as it was simply a day to get the list of komiti correct, and 
to distribute the candidate posters. Five men and women komiti from every 
village in the Yangoru neighbourhood then approached the table together with 
other witnesses from their village in order to ascertain that the typed list was 
correct. Beside every name on the computer list, there was the amount K100 in 
the next column. Waranaka announced that part of this money was to complete 
the payment due from the previous election for which only K20 per person had 
been paid to this date. The rest was for tea night gatherings and as reward for 
the task of ‘guarding the poster’ in the villages. There was intent to pay more 
when it became possible. Also as part of his public statement Waranaka 
expressed his disappointment that people were distorting his intentions about 
giving out the 5,000 mobile telephones. This was being done because he was the 
local member; the new relay broadcast tower had just been completed on the top 
of nearby Mount Turu, and Michael Somare had urged him to roll out the 
service utilization that would make the facility active. It was a distortion to call 
this voter inducement. The fact that the road past Waranaka’s hamlet was being 
                                                     
4 An explanatory example goes like this: a man cut off the tip of his finger in the garden 
and his mother’s brother was there to see the accident. The injured man paid his uncle 
K50 because it was his mother’s blood that had been spilled. Although it sounds like 
adding insult to injury, this is all part of the lifelong significance of the mother’s 
brideprice, as was Waranaka’s visible social injury. The mother’s brothers always give 
food, and the sister’s son always returns money or valuables. 
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graded all that day by a newly acquired second-hand grader did not get a 
mention. 
 
Then followed the distribution of money, K100 each to five komiti per 
village from all of the Yangoru villages. I asked Waranaka whether this meant 
that we had K13,000 with us in the village at this moment. He agreed, and said 
that a similar amount had been distributed in Wewak earlier this morning to the 
Numbo and Sausso people. 
 
A reliable witness informed me two weeks later that their village in the 
Wilaru area had received K5,000 from the National Alliance campaigners 
during this same period. A young man saw his mother holding K100 and told 
her as she hid the money, ‘Oh mama, em i braibim yu nau’. There were 
persistent stories that Waranaka’s campaigners would visit villages such as 
Sima, Kworabri and Malimbanja the night before the polling took place and 
give money. One Dusava supporter said that an old lady in Malimbanja sat 
looking at her K10. She had wanted to vote for Dusava but now felt she was 
compelled to vote for Waranaka. 
 
This then, would seem to be the substance of what Waranaka meant by the 
realities of village campaigning. During polling time, it was understood that he 
had ceased the distribution of mobile phones, because the gift was being 
misinterpreted as voting inducement. He continued to be dogged by violence 
during the campaign period. One of his electoral cars ran off the road resulting 
in the deaths of four men. A young man in his hamlet committed an apparent 
suicide. This was all put down to sanguma attacks that a bigman must suffer 
together with his people. A family member told me, ‘In Church we are always 
being urged to pray for a good leader. Now one is given to us, and no one 
recognises him’. 
 
Waranaka was not the only candidate to spend money on the campaign. 
David Nelson told us that he would reimburse coffee nights by his supporters, 
often in excess of K100 each time. He was also seeking to give villagers a 
source of income and for this he distributed black polythene bags together with 
cocoa seedlings to promote their self-reliance. He estimated that this venture 
cost him about half a million kina at election time.  
 
It seemed a matter of necessity that candidates provide food at their rallies. 
This action was usually in the hands of their supporters, and we do not know 
how many of these supporters were later reimbursed by the candidates. Greg 
Maisen, the New Generation Party’s Provincial candidate, threw a large final 
rally for his party, including Godfrey Raushem of Yangoru-Saussia, where 
many pigs and much food was distributed; other candidates, too, could count a 
few pigs that they had funded. A number of candidates refused to do any large-
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scale feeding of supporters, saying they could not afford it, although plates of 
food would be supplied at their homes. Former long-term member of parliament 
John Jaminan solved the problem of fri kaikai by keeping always on the move. 
He would walk alone the back roads of Yangoru and through Wewak, with only 
a loud hailer over his shoulder, and proclaim his message to whoever might 
listen. 
 
Waranaka was not the only candidate who claimed to have a komiti system. 
Vitus Wafi was confident that his delegates were active throughout the Numpo 
and Sausso LLG areas, but in fact his votes were limited to his home area. 
David Nelson made similar claims about his organization, but received votes 
only from his broader home area. The two leading candidates, Waranaka and 
Dusava, were the only ones to score evenly across the entire electorate, and 
were the only ones likely to have had a truly effective village campaign 
structure. 
 
How are we to evaluate the bestowal of gifts during the election period 
against the proposal that there is a culture of gifts and reciprocity in Papua New 
Guinea, which is all but impossible to avoid? Yangoru-Saussia is an area with a 
long history of cargo cults (Gesch 1985:115-126) in which the material element 
of social interchange was a key to the hermeneutic of the meeting of cultures 
that was involved: ‘If you love me, then give me something to show it’. But of 
course the gift entails a return obligation and this is understood in a simple way 
without any feeling of cunning or deceit. A Gaikorobi man explained this to me 
during election time: ‘If a big man gives me a kakaruk for no reason, I wait to 
hear what he wants from me’. More explicitly, another Sepik man explained: 
‘Olsem kalsa bilong mipela stret: man i givim yu kakaruk, bai yu mas bihainim 
dispela kakaruk stret na givim vot long dispela man, no ken givim long narapela 
man’ (‘If someone gives you a chicken you must do what the chicken leads you 
to, you must give your vote to this man and no other’). The problem becomes, 
how to shake your hands free of the gift or erase the record, which is easier for 
an individual than for a community. 
 
A Madang statement on this is: ‘Gifts were and are exchanged and/or 
reciprocated in order to maintain, enhance, mend, or initiate relationships. The 
kind of gifts offered/exchanged would include food and cultural valuables. 
Kinship ties, tribal and clan alliances, and trade-partnerships were and still are 
the network through which gifts were exchanged. Tribal survival, continuity and 
security were three significant purposes for such exchanges’. In the light of this 
thinking, voter inducements are more than just the buying of votes. They imply 
patronage of the bigman and his group. The candidate has to maintain the 
solidarity of his own group and they must relate to others as larger groupings 
within villages. The elected member is in a relationship to the voters, and is not 
just a representative in a technical sense. 
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Electoral Commission difficulties 
 
Although it was impressive that the PNGEC was able to respond to 
recommendations for radical changes, the resulting difficulties with untested 
procedures occurred on all sides. It was a marvel that the PNGEC could simply 
decide to abandon the previous common roll and draw up a new electoral roll 
for the whole country. The farcical statistics for the Chimbu by-election in 2004 
made such action the only reasonable way to go. In that election, best estimates 
from the 2000 census put the voting population in Chimbu at 170,425 but the 
enrolled voters numbered 451,775 – almost triple the real number; it was almost 
impossible to make sense of polling results tainted by such fraud and deception.  
 
The change in the form of ballot papers also seemed an incredible move at 
such short notice. The reasoning was convincing: how do illiterate voters make 
sense of a ballot paper for Wewak Open, say, with 43 photos of people they 
have never seen before and then assign three preferences among these 43 
candidates. How much extra handling would be necessary with such papers? 
However, the idea that an electorate with many illiterate people could be 
counted on to write numbers or names on the new shorter ballot papers seemed 
incredible. These mandated changes worked somehow, but with many of the 
difficulties that could be expected to occur. 
 
We took delivery of an East Sepik Province electoral roll on CD (costing 
K150 for some unknown reason), which yielded 237,070 names. We obtained 
this in Port Moresby only ten days before polling was due to commence and 
were able to print off the enrolment lists for three villages, from Numbo, 
Sausso, and East Yangoru. The villagers who checked these lists found them 
largely reliable, with only three or four dead people still on the list and as many 
again known to be under-age. The remote village of Komotogu, included in the 
Kiniambu village list, had more than a dozen names declared to be dead, but 
with such an out-of-the-way place, there was no reason to consider deception 
lay behind this. Hwarapia roll recorded one person twice – the governor, as 
Waranaka and Wararu, but electoral officials told us, ‘It’s OK. We know his 
face’. Spot checking other electorates gave the impression that there were a lot 
of double names recorded – two names from the same place, with the same 
occupation and about the same age; but this appeared to be over-reporting by 
the PNGEC rather than intentional deceit. 
  
The new electoral roll came too late for any but the most astute to be able to 
view a copy before the elections. In Baimuru village, the councillor held up 
voting for hours at the start of the day’s polling because he had found six names 
missing from the village roll. He said he had previously pursued this with the 
returning officer on earlier drafts of the roll and had been told it would be fixed 
up. But in the final copy it was not fixed. It turned out that there was a story 
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behind these six people: they were connected with the Finance Department 
investigation in the East Sepik Province, and the leader of the group says his 
name was kept off the roll by the returning officer because this leader had 
exposed systemic misdirection of funds by the leaders of the province.  
 
Other domestic observers in our group were present in villages where the 
electoral roll was hotly disputed. The villagers felt the problems could have 
been overcome if a member of the village had been in the recording team: 
spelling was misleading and married women were recorded in place of birth as 
well as place of marriage. 
 
In the event the ballot papers arrived in the nearest LLG office, Tangori, on 
30 June when polling should have been starting. In the presence of police and 
many bystanders, the ballots were sent out to the other LLG. In Yangoru the 
ballot papers were distributed the next day, Sunday, in cellophane packed 
bundles. There was a story going around that the voting could not begin on 
Saturday because the Seventh Day Adventist church could not participate on 
that day, but the actual situation was that the papers were late. It was at Tangori 
on 30 June, also, that the electoral roll appeared in hard copy for the first time. 
At Tangori a couple of days earlier, we had seen the first real candidate posters 
on the door of the LLG. 
 
Other delays were also laid at the feet of the Electoral Commission. The 
returning officer said it was not possible to do voter education much before June 
because he was expecting money from the Provincial Electoral Office. The 
provincial election manager denied that any such money was needed. It was said 
that Yangoru Saussia people were already familiar with LPV through the 2004 
by-election, though in fact they had not seen the new ballot papers, and few 
could follow the counting and elimination rules. Counting of ballots was also 
delayed because no trainers of electoral officials had come to Wewak five days 
after voting had finished. There was also doubt about the venue for counting 
votes, with no arrangements for telephones, security and power in firm place. 
However the failure of these arrangements was attributed to the Provincial 
Steering Committee, who, in hotly debated scenes in the Wewak Electoral 
Office were told that they had no legal status. 
 
Voter behaviour 
 
The voting period in Yangoru-Saussia was marked by a certain amount of 
problematic behaviour, but only once did this go so far as the 
safeguarding/hijacking of a ballot box. There was frequent fighting, under-age 
voting, wagering on the results, and an almost complete lack of secret voting. In 
response to questionnaires, voters said that they had received education about 
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HIV/AIDS but could not see any relevance to the voting process, and none was 
evident to us. 
 
At Baimuru the National Alliance supporters were accused of having voted 
in Wewak before coming home to the village. This turned into a punch-up for a 
while, with the auxiliary police ignoring the fight and forming a ring around the 
ballot boxes. Voting was resumed. The day ended with the smashing of a truck 
window, which was said to be an internal dispute of the Waranaka camp.  
 
Under-age voting was visible and in Kworabri our observers counted 42 
school boys and girls blatantly casting votes. Few people seemed to be disturbed 
at this matter; as one father said of his daughter, ‘It is not her fault that her name 
is on the electoral roll, and besides, she is only abiding by the Constitution in 
casting her vote, given that her name is on the roll’. One 14-year old we 
observed barely touched his ballot paper as a guardian took it from his hands, 
filled it in and deposited it in the ballot box before sending the boy away. In 
other places boys were sent forward when the names of the dead or the absent 
were called. Occasionally some under-age would-be voters were stopped by the 
electoral officials and sent away. 
 
There were a few cases of people caught out double voting. One woman we 
observed seemed genuinely confused whether she could vote at home as well as 
in her marital village, since her name was called again the second day. Another 
was caught removing the indelible ink from her finger with what was termed 
‘PNG lime’ (probably Citrus acida)5. In Gwinyingi two voters were observed 
being allowed to vote although their names were not on the electoral roll, 
because the councillor identified the people as genuine villagers and the polling 
officer allowed them to go ahead. 
 
The biggest loss in the voting process was in relation to secret balloting. 
Although it was possible for strong young men and women to go directly and 
vote alone, almost everybody consented to a ‘witness’. This term was chosen in 
preference to ‘helper’. In one village the witness was a young pastor who was 
summoned by name by many voters. In other villages the witness was a party 
official who was there to bear witness to the party that this voter had done what 
he or she promised. The end result in Kwahwie was lists of voters’ names we 
saw who were known with certainty to have voted for the National Alliance, and 
would therefore share in the benefits that were to come. In Boem Sara two 
                                                     
5 Ron May put this to the test and could not see that the indelible ink was being removed 
(personal communication, Port Moresby 11 April 2008). This evidence is not likely to 
affect the widespread belief that lime juice takes the mark away. My own experiment 
was inconclusive: within fifteen minutes of being inked and resorting to lemon juice and 
soap scouring, I could wash most of the ink away from my white skin; however, eight 
hours later it was visible. 
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village men stood one meter behind the voters all day long, but in other villages 
either police or electoral officials were hovering over the booths the whole day. 
The motives seem to have been: to be sure who the party member voted for; to 
help illiterates; to make sure other villagers were clear on what to do; and just 
generally, to see what anybody was doing. No more that 5 per cent of citizens 
voted alone. Some women expressed their resentment at this afterwards. 
 
Even with all of this assistance, 44 Open ballots were put into Provincial 
boxes. But the total number of informal ballots was only 74 for the whole 
electorate – surely a very positive result. The Open and Provincial ballots were 
much too similar to each other. One was lightly printed pink and the other 
lightly printed blue. The ballot boxes were similar, and it is a wonder that a lot 
more cross balloting did not take place.  
 
Despite regular newspaper advertisements listing electoral offences from the 
Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections Part XVII, in 
which the penalty for wagering on an election result was set at K400,6 the laying 
of bets played a role in Yangoru Saussia voting. Immediately voting ceased at 
Suandogum a bystander raised some hundreds of kina and asked, ‘Who will 
hold our bet?’ The police told him to go away. In Kworabri the issue became 
more dramatic. Voting ended with the cry, ‘Let’s bet’. The National Alliance 
people quickly found K1,000 and asked the Dusava people to meet that bet. As 
dusk fell in Yangoru two tightly knit chanting groups with loud slaps on the 
earth went past bringing a total of K1,200 each to a local storekeeper, and to the 
police to hold as witnesses to the wager. 
 
Political parties 
 
There is not a whole lot to be said about political parties in the Yangoru 
Saussia election. Twelve of the fifteen candidates were listed as having party 
endorsement, but parties were only as strong as the candidates themselves, apart 
from the National Alliance. Gabriel Dusava was a leading candidate, but 
appeared initially in the official biodata as an independent. Towards the end of 
the campaign period the Electoral Commission clarified that he had enrolled as 
a People’s National Congress candidate, although this name did not appear on 
his poster. Another candidate said he had tried one party only to be put off by 
corruption issues, while his second attempt collapsed because promised millions 
from overseas were not forthcoming, and his final choice of party yielded none 
of the election posters he had been expecting from them. 
 
Among the few candidates to feature their party allegiance was Godfrey 
Raushem of the New Generation Party. But even Raushem wryly admitted, 
                                                     
6 See, for example, The National, 26 June 2007, p.10. 
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while on the stage of the final New Generation rally of Provincial candidate, 
Greg Maisen, that Maisen could barely afford to be seen on the same platform 
as Raushem because of continuing charges made of Raushem by rumour that he 
was either convicted for stealing money, or was escaping bail from a court case 
— all of which he explicitly denied. Patrick Harriknen stood for the People’s 
Freedom Party (PP) and campaigned with fellow lawyer and PFP leader Moses 
Murray, a candidate in the Provincial contest. 
 
Much on people’s minds was the history of failed elections and lengthy court 
challenges in Yangoru Saussia. Everyone was unanimous: ‘We don’t want 
another by-election’. Starting in 1972 Mathias Yaliwan had lost his seat when 
he found that the House of Assembly was unwilling to acknowledge his 
essentially God-given mandate as one-person “Gavman” of Papua New Guinea, 
and failed to attend parliamentary sittings, thus forfeiting his 83 per cent polling 
majority (see Winnett and May 1983). His lacklustre deputy, Linus Hepau, 
replaced him in a by-election. In 1987 John Jaminan, the sitting member since 
1977, was dismissed from parliament when convicted of a rape charge and sent 
to prison. He was later pardoned and returned in the 1992 election. In 2000 
Gabriel Dusava lost his seat on a recount of the 1997 votes, and Bernard 
Hagoria was sworn in without a by-election.7 Dusava’s conviction in 1996 of 
misuse of funds while Secretary for Foreign Affairs was finally confirmed by 
the courts in 2000 (Geno 2005: Annexure 4, p.3). Hagoria himself was 
dismissed in 2003 for mishandling of funds and Peter Wararu Waranaka won 
the by-election in 2004 (ibid.: Annexure 4, p.4). 
 
A number of candidates (Raushem, Dusava, Hagoria) faced as first comment 
in their campaign rallies the question, ‘If you win, will the Ombudsman 
Commission hold you?’. Hagoria had a letter of clearance from the Ombudsman 
Commission (OC) on the basis of the lapse of three years since conviction. 
However, unfairly, when the OC wrote at the end of the letter that it was unable 
to comment on any other challenge or charges, villagers took this as a sign that 
there were indeed hidden charges. Waranaka also said that his method of 
campaigning had been challenged in the Wewak local courts, and he had been 
cleared. Two candidates (Jaminan and Parapi) walking along to Waranaka’s big 
poster event commented, ‘Yes, about 75 per cent of us stand to be challenged by 
the Ombudsman Commission if we win’. 
 
Counting the votes 
 
The delay from a Saturday to a Monday in starting the polling affected three 
out of the four LLG areas adversely. The assistant returning officers from the 
three areas decided to skip the most distant places, which had been listed first 
                                                     
7 http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGLT/2003/1.html . Accessed 14 June 2007. 
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for voting, and to go ahead with the schedule as planned for the remaining days. 
There were 19 polling teams with one Open and one Provincial ballot box each, 
meant to cover five or six polling places (which embraced from one to four 
villages or centres each) in as many days. That meant that the most distant 
places had to be handled last and in isolation using helicopters to minimize the 
long and difficult trips out and back. This left some uncertainty about the return 
of ballot boxes into the following week. Probably one of the distinctive features 
of East Sepik balloting was that all polling teams were accompanied by sets of 
six or so police, made up of regular, reserve and auxiliary police. These also had 
to be moved out to the bush. Auxiliary police have become so significant in East 
Sepik Province that 300 of them were sent to the highlands to help elections up 
there. 
 
Nevertheless it was announced that all the ballot boxes would be taken from 
Yangoru to Wewak in a grand public procession for counting on the last 
allowable day of polling. In fact they were delivered a couple of days earlier in a 
manner that alarmed many candidates. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the provincial steering committee was in charge of 
making arrangements for the counting of votes in Wewak. When there was a 
change of venue from the army barracks at Moem to the Golf Course, an angry 
crowd challenged the committee at the Electoral Office. The provincial 
administrator reversed the decision, but still some days had to be spent on the 
training of those counting the votes and general preparation of the counting 
venue. It was generally acknowledged that security was better at Moem, and the 
army imposed their own rules as well as those of the police. At this stage the 
provincial election manager was very hard to find. The story was that serious 
threats had been made against him and he had retired to his home village on 
Kairiru Island. The Yangoru-Saussia returning officer scorned that idea, saying 
that he also had received threats on his life, and the election manager was just 
being lazy. 
 
Once started, the counting of votes went rapidly: informal votes were 
identified and votes meant for the Provincial box were taken out. Checking for 
the signature of the polling officer was done thoroughly. However, after the 
boxes were opened and ballot papers were distributed by the officials to the 
fifteen candidate trays, very little further checking of the ballot papers was done. 
As officials counted the number of ballots that had been put in the tray under 
their supervision, they often counted while looking at the reverse side only, and 
no scrutineers asked to see the face of the ballots. We saw one first preference 
marked ‘[1] Peter’ which lay unquestioned in Peter Waranaka’s box. Only 
Waranaka’s scrutineers were looking at that tray. We wanted to question 
whether votes marked [22] were going into box [23] but it all went too quickly 
to question. 
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Scrutineers told us throughout the voting process that they had full control. 
Voting and counting could only begin and go ahead when they decided so. The 
electoral officials clearly thought otherwise and sought to manage the 
scrutineers as best they could. Scrutineers began making loud complaints on the 
third day of counting, taking up a complaint from the Provincial counting at 
Kaindi, in Wewak town. They said they had numbers from the field for votes in 
boxes which differed by 178 and 222 from the total number of votes that had 
been counted from specified boxes on the previous days. They also claimed that 
the number of ballots in Open boxes in Moem and in parallel Provincial boxes 
in Kaindi were different, which indicated tampering with a number of votes. 
The returning officer disallowed all these objections, telling us that the total 
number of ballots used on any voting day had to be kept secret; there was no 
way anyone could know the total number of ballots that ought to be in a box. An 
Electoral official in Kaindi apparently did not know about this secrecy rule, and 
was announcing the total number of votes in ballot boxes. One scrutineer 
making a loud fuss admitted that he did not understand, but needed to be seen to 
be making a statement on behalf of his candidate. 
 
A bottleneck occurred in the counting when all the Open boxes had been 
counted, and a number of misplaced Provincial votes were on hand. Clearly an 
equivalent number of Open votes could be expected to be in the Provincial 
boxes, but the voting was going much slower in Kaindi. Everyone was 
dismissed for a number of days until the 44 Open ballots were brought along. 
Then the primary vote could be completed, and the elimination rounds begin. 
These were completed in a day and a half. 
 
In the event, Waranaka was the declared winner with 8,633 votes, ahead of 
Dusava on 7,916. Harriknen (4,752)came in third , Raushem (4,087) fourth, and 
Hagoria (3,490) fifth. Jaminan (923) was a distant eighth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our judgement is that the Yangoru-Saussia election was for the larger part 
free and fair. Concerns must be voiced about a verifiable electoral roll, prepared 
in time; about the demise of the secret ballot; and most of all about the 
distribution of voter inducements. However, the electoral officials were 
sufficiently neutral and business-like to ensure that the process could go ahead 
as planned. The police presence was convincing enough to allow the presiding 
officers to take charge of the village voting, and there were always many people 
on hand to be sure that the transfer of votes and boxes proceeded in an orderly 
manner. A speeding Landcruiser on the river road to Yangoru with all lights 
flashing convinced us to clear the way before the transfer of votes at the end of 
the day. We were welcomed as domestic observers and given a good reception 
by all candidates. Given the good number of talented candidates, concerned 
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about the welfare of Papua New Guinea and their electorate, the first part of the 
political legitimization process went well. 
 
The winning candidate received 32.8 per cent of the votes cast, which is 23.3 
per cent of enrolled voters in Yangoru-Saussia.8 2,128 of his final votes were 
from preferences, which was 123 fewer preference votes than the runner-up, 
who received 30.0 per cent of votes cast. Clearly preferences had little influence 
on this election. The woman candidate who had been assured that she had many 
preference votes waiting for her in the 2004 by-election was eliminated in fifth 
place, by which time she had gained only 20 preference votes. The winner 
gained votes from all over the electorate apart from Bernard Hagoria’s base. It 
seems no one understood better than he how to organize the village vote. 
 
Postscript 
 
At the end of March 2008 the National Court in Wewak started hearing an 
election petition filed against Waranaka by Gabriel Dusava (The National 28 
March 2008, p.5). Five instances of bribery were were alleged: K2,000 
presentation to Oscar Manihau for an auxiliary police station opening; K3,800 
to Alois Maniura of Soli Warahembe; K50 to Markus Paringu of Wamaiang 
village; another K50 plus an election poster to Noah Kukune of Niakandogum, 
and promise made to deposit K5,000 into a passbook account of a women’s 
group of Niakandogum village (The National 4 April 2008, p.7).  
 
Waranaka’s defence was that these people were his supporters and voted for 
him, therefore they could not be said to have been bribed. He said that ‘all 
monies given out were approved by the joint district planning and budget 
priority committee (JDPBPC) and that he had nothing to hide’ (The National 31 
March 2008, p.4). It was the third of these charges which was sustained. The 
outcome of the court case was proclaimed on the front page of both daily 
newspapers: ‘K50 bribe costs MP Parlt seat’ (Post-Courier 24 April 2008, p.1). 
It was reported that Waranaka drove a government vehicle to Wamaian village. 
‘There he saw Paringu. He drove closer to him to converse with him, then 
moved closer to him and slipped a K50 note into his hand, and said: “Yu holim 
dispela moni na tingim mi” (you take this money and think of me). He showed 
the money to others who were there, and then instructed his son, daughter and 
wife to vote for Wararu’ (The National 24 April 2008, p.1f.). Waranaka’s 
election was thus declared null and void, but Waranaka ‘told his supporters it 
was only one allegation of K50 that had ended his election as Member and he 
                                                     
8 These results can be compared with the results from the by-election in 2004 where 
Wararu gained 4524 primary votes (19.0 per cent of the votes cast) and won the election 
after preferences with 7073 votes (51.2 per cent of the votes cast) with Dusava trailing 
by much the same margin as in 2007 (Electoral Commission www.pngec.gov.au 
accessed February 2007). 
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would be instructing his lawyers to appeal that decision’ (Post Courier 24 April 
2008, p.8). In March 2009 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, 
overturned the National Court ruling, arguing that ‘the trial judge failed to 
establish the intent of the K50 and erred in his judgement’ (Post-Courier 6 
March 2009), and Waranaka was reinstated as the member for Yangoru-Saussia 
and provincial governor. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 24.1: Voting statistics for Yangoru-Saussia Open electorate, 2007 
Number of registered voters  36861  
Total votes cast 26406  
Informal votes 74 (0.3% of ballots cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 26332  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 16549  
Total votes distributed 14162  
Exhausted ballot papers 9783 (37.2% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 8276  
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 Figure 25.1: East Sepik Provincial map 
25 THE RETURN OF THE CHIEF: EAST SEPIK PROVINCIAL 
 
R.J. May 
 
In 2007 the East Sepik Provincial seat was held by the prime minister, Sir 
Michael Somare. In fact, Sir Michael had held the seat since 1968, for nineteen 
of those forty years as prime minister. In 2007 most observers expected Somare 
to be re-elected, but within the province there appeared to be some groundswell 
of anti-Somare sentiment, fuelled by a belief that although East Sepik had 
provided the country’s prime minister, and a good share of its cabinet ministers, 
for much of the post-independence period, the province had fallen behind other 
parts of the country in terms of economic and social development. Somare’s 
home base in the Murik Lakes of the Lower Sepik was said to be divided over 
its support for the National Alliance. In 2002, Somare had been opposed by 
seventeen candidates, including a young businessman from the populous 
Wosera area, Allan Bird, who had promoted the introduction of vanilla as a cash 
crop during the boom in vanilla prices. At one stage of the count in 2002 Bird 
was actually ahead in the polling, having outvoted Somare in the populous 
Ambunti-Deikikir, Maprik, Wosera-Gaui, and Yangoru-Saussia open electorate 
areas. Somare was re-elected in 2002, but his share of the first-past-the-post 
vote dropped from 61 per cent in 1997 to 23 per cent in 2002. Bird did not stand 
in 2007, but ten other candidates stood, and with the introduction of limited 
preferential voting (LPV) there was some speculation that preferential voting 
might bring a change. It was not to be. 
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The electorate 
 
East Sepik Provincial is one of the country’s largest electorates. At over 
44,000 km2, East Sepik is, by area, the second biggest province in Papua New 
Guinea. The electorate’s boundaries extend along the north coast from just 
below the mouth of the Sepik River to a point about 70 kilometers west of the 
provincial capital, Wewak, including the islands of Mushu, Kairiru. Walis, 
Tarawai and the Schouten group and reach back south to the foothills of the 
central highlands and west along the Sepik River to within about 35 kilometers 
of the border with Indonesia. Geographically, the electorate is dominated by the 
Sepik River and its major southern tributaries, the Keram, Yuat and Karawari. 
Between the river and the coastline the Prince Alexander and the Torricelli 
ranges, which to the north are thickly covered in rainforest but whose southern 
foothills give way to secondary forest and grasslands which merge with the 
Sepik floodplain to the southeast (May 1997:230). The size and geography of 
the electorate pose problems for electoral administration and campaigning. 
 
Most of the province’s population — an estimated 341,583 at the 2000 
census — is concentrated in the southern foothills of the Prince Alexander 
Range and along the north coast, although there is a sizeable population in the 
grasslands south of Angoram and along the Keram and Yuat rivers and in a few 
big Sepik River villages. The Maprik District accounts for over 40 per cent of 
the province’s population, with population densities of over fifty persons per 
square kilometer in the Wosera area. In contrast much of the Ambunti district 
and parts of the Angoram district are sparsely populated. 
 
Within East Sepik there are six open electorates: Ambunti-Dreikikir, 
Angoram, Maprik, Wewak, Wosera-Gaui and Yangoru-Saussia. Prior to the 
election in 2007, two of these seats were held by NA members (Angoram by Sir 
Michael Somare’s son, Arthur),  two by the Peoples Action Party, one by the 
Pan Melanesian Congress, and one by the National Transformation Party. 
 
The candidates 
 
Eleven candidates contested the East Sepik Provincial seat. Apart from 
Somare, four (Maisen, Murray, Kemaken and Samban) had stood in 2002. 
 
Greg Maisen, aged about 47, with a BA degree from the University of 
Papua New Guinea, was formerly deputy provincial premier under Bruce 
Samban. From Miamboru village in West Yangoru, Maprik District, Maisen 
expected to receive strong support in the populous areas of Maprik, Wosera, 
Dreikikir and Yangoru-Saussia as well as through his membership of the New 
Apostolic Church. Maisen had stood for the provincial seat in 1997 and 2002 
and in the Yangoru-Saussia by-election of 2004, as endorsed PPP candidate. In 
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2007 he was approached by PPP (and also, he said, by the PNGP), but decided 
instead to stand as a New Generation Party candidate. 
 
Elizabeth Simogun Bade, aged 59, was the sole woman candidate in East 
Sepik Provincial.1 The daughter of a famous Sepik leader from the Boiken-
Dagua (West Coast) area, Elizabeth Simogun Bade was herself a distinguished 
public servant before resigning to contest the 2002 national election in Central 
Province. She returned to Wewak in 2003. Like the majority of East Sepik 
candidates, Simogun Bade was a member of the Roman Catholic Church, and 
was also associated with the National and East Sepik Councils of Women 
(currently as executive officer of the latter) and with Help Resources (a local 
NGO). She had stood unsuccessfully for The East Sepik Provincial electorate in 
1987 and in the Kairuku-Hiri (Central Province) electorate in the national 
elections of 2002; in 2007 she stood as an independent, hoping to poll well 
along the West Coast and to attract the women’s vote – fully aware, however, 
that women do not always support a female candidate. Simogun Bade was 
assisted as campaign manager by her half-sister, a former policewoman, and did 
some joint campaigning with Greg Maisen and Alfred Jambran. 
 
Peter Bimare, aged 46, is a former journalist with the Wewak-based Wantok 
newspaper, and had founded a local paper, Toktok. He is from Magopim village 
on the West coast near Dagua.  
 
Samuel Lamin, aged 42, followed a Grade 10 education with a diploma in 
religious studies, and trained for a while with the Capuchin fathers. He 
described himself in 2007 as a store keeper and street vendor and was also a 
village court magistrate. He had contested council elections in Wewak Town in 
1997, unsuccessfully. Lamin was born at Yangimangua in Wosera-Gaui 
electorate but lives in the Wewak village of Nuigo. His wife is from Maprik. He 
sought, but was declined, endorsement from PDM and stood as an independent, 
expecting to get support from Nuigo and, through his wife’s connections, 
Maprik and Wosera. His campaign, such as it was, was linked to those of 
Francis Kemaken and Alfred Jambran. 
 
Alfred Jambram, aged 38 and described as self-employed, was the sole 
candidate from the populous Dreikikir area to the west of Maprik where he was 
involved in vanilla growing and buying. He had stood unsuccessfully in the 
Ambunti-Dreikikir electorate in 2002. 
 
Gabriel Laku, from the large Sepik River village of Timbunke, heads the 
local branch of Redress Association International (which pursues compensation 
                                                     
1 Five other women contested in East Sepik: three in Wewak Open and one each in 
Wosera-Gaui and Yangoru-Saussia. 
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for victims of Japanese occupation during the Second World War) and used this 
network to mobilize votes. He was endorsed by the Peoples Resources 
Awareness Party. 
 
Moses Murray, 53, is a Port Moresby-based private lawyer with a degree 
from the University of Papua New Guinea. He comes from Kairiru Island, off 
the coast from Wewak, but spent part of his early life in Maprik, and is married 
to a woman from Passam village, outside Wewak. Murray had contested the 
East Sepik Provincial electorate, as an independent, in 2002, coming third 
behind Somare and Bird. In 2007 he stood as leader of the People’s Freedom 
Party, and claimed to be in alliance with Greg Maisen, Elizabeth Simogun Bade 
and Alfred Jambran. His campaign was linked with that of Patrick Harriknen, 
another lawyer and PFP-endorsed candidate contesting Yangoru-Saussia. A 
number of voters, however, regarded Murray as a ‘Moresby man’. 
 
Silas Suagu, 54, is from Kinaguie village in East Yangoru. He was endorsed 
by the Stars Alliance Party, but I did not catch up with him during the campaign 
and no other information was available. 
 
Sir Michael Somare, aged 71 in 2007, had been the member for East Sepik 
Regional/Provincial since 1968. He had become chief minister in 1972 and led 
the country to independence in 1975 as prime minister. Somare’s home village 
is Karau, at the mouth of the Sepik River in the Angoram electorate, of which 
his son, Arthur, is the sitting member. Somare was a foundation member of 
Pangu Pati but following a dispute within the party formed the National 
Alliance in 1997 and has been its parliamentary leader since its foundation. 
With the introduction of a local honours system in 2005, Somare became Grand 
Chief. 
 
Francis Kemaken, aged 45, with secondary education and diplomas in 
religious studies and mission foundation from the Philippines, is a social worker 
with the Roman Catholic Church in Wewak, and a member of Caritas PNG, 
Help Resources, the East Sepik Council of Women, and the East Sepik Land 
and Environment Foundation. He stood unsuccessfully for East Sepik Provincial 
in 2002. Kemaken is from Chambri on the Sepik River but lives in Wewak and 
expected most of his support to come from Wewak town, where there is a large 
Chambri community. He was campaigning (on a modest scale), as an 
independent, with two other candidates, Samuel Lamin and Alfred Jambran, 
who had agreed to direct preferences to one another. 
 
Bruce Samban was a last-minute nomination (having initially thought about 
standing in Wewak Open). Samban, aged 52 and with a grade 10 education, was 
an NBC announcer before becoming provincial premier in 1987. In 1991 his 
government was suspended; subsequently the provincial headquarters building 
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was burned down, and Samban spent three years in the Boram Corrective 
Institution. Born in Kaminabit on the Sepik River, Samban lives in Wewak but 
has strong links, through a second wife, to the West Coast (where he is related, 
by marriage, to another Provincial candidate, Elizabeth Simogun Bade). Samban 
stood unsuccessfully for the Provincial seat in 2002, with endorsement (but no 
financial assistance) from the PLP. He is a member of the Roman Catholic 
Church and a founder of the locally-based Sepik Solidarity, a group which 
describes itself as being committed to exposing corruption in the province. 
Samban stood as an independent. 
 
The parties 
 
In the lead-up to the election, the coalition parties resolved that they would 
not endorse candidates against Somare in East Sepik, and there was no apparent 
evidence that any of them supported ‘undercover candidates’ in the provincial 
electorate. Of the eleven candidates who stood, five (Somare, National Alliance; 
Maisen, New Generation Party; Laku, People’s Resource Awareness Party; 
Murray, People’s Freedom Party, and Suagu, Stars Alliance Party) had party 
endorsement; two (Somare and Murray) were party leaders.  
 
The NA had its headquarters in a modest building near the airport, which 
served as a meeting place for candidates and scrutineers as the election got 
under way, though Somare conducted his campaign from his home in Wewak.  
 
Bart Philemon visited Wewak early in the campaign to support Maisen and 
the six New Generation Party candidates standing in open electorates in East 
Sepik. He also visited Somare’s home base of Karau, in the lower Sepik, and 
planned to hold a rally on the Prince Charles Oval in Wewak to launch the East 
Sepik branch of the NGP, but was told by police that he had no authorization to 
do so and would be arrested if he proceeded; the rally was cancelled. Many 
people, even NA supporters, felt that the police reaction was inappropriate — an 
editorial in the Post-Courier described it as ‘shameful’ — and that it was 
evidence of the NA’s undue influence over public officials in the province. The 
prime minister and the NA, however, denied any involvement and condemned 
‘a few unruly people’ who had disrupted the NGP’s activities in Wewak. (See 
Post-Courier and National 9, 10 January 2007.) 
 
Otherwise, apart from a few posters there was little evidence of party 
activity. Maisen said he had received K30,000 and some posters from the NGP, 
and that the NGP and PFP were waging an ‘aggressive’ campaign against 
Somare, but it appeared to be low-key. Murray, like the independents, was self-
funded.   
 
414      Election 2007 
 
The campaign 
 
The campaign in East Sepik in 2007 was fairly subdued. Posters were on 
display on buildings around Wewak and in the various district headquarters, and 
in some villages, and candidates were moving around the province, mostly 
addressing small rallies or village meetings arranged by their supporters. 
Elizabeth Bade probably travelled most widely, assisted by her son, a helicopter 
pilot. As the only woman candidate, and with associations with both the 
National and the East Sepik Councils of Women, Simogun Bade hoped to be 
able to mobilize a ‘women’s vote’, and several observers suggested that some 
mobilization did take place, especially in the Wewak islands, but Simogun Bade 
herself had modest expectations. According to some observers, however, she 
alienated voters by her aggressive criticism of Sir Michael Somare. Maisen, and 
to a lesser extent, Murray, Samban, and Suagu covered a good part of the 
province, mostly by vehicle, and had networks of supporters, including open 
candidates and in Samban’s case former provincial members, campaigning on 
their behalf. Somare travelled within the province by vehicle and helicopter, 
sometimes in the company of his son, the member for Angoram, but seemed to 
be running a somewhat low-key campaign. A planned NA rally in Wewak a 
week or so before polling commenced did not eventuate. There were allegations 
that the NA was handing out funds, and specific reference to the release of 
K600 million for special infrastructure projects in the province (see Sydney 
Morning Herald 19 March 2007; Post-Courier 4 May 2007), but I saw no 
evidence of handouts — indeed at one point NA supporters staged a brief 
demonstration outside campaign headquarters protesting that they had not 
received food. There seemed to be none of the candidates’ vehicles covered in 
posters and equipped with loudspeakers that characterized earlier elections. Five 
candidates (Bimare, Lamin, Laku, Kemakin and Jambran) seem to have made 
little attempt to campaign at all outside their immediate support base. 
 
At the few rallies I attended there was the usual talk about why East Sepik 
Province had fallen behind in development (in 2002 the same complaints were 
made, though the province was at the time enjoying a vanilla boom), and 
complaints about declining service delivery and corruption. Most candidates 
promised local development. Somare spoke about prospective development 
projects in the province, including large-scale sago processing, and extensions 
to the Wewak wharf and airstrip. Samban, campaigning along the West Coast, 
pointed to local roads that had been constructed during his term as premier but 
had been allowed to deteriorate by subsequent administrations and promised to 
address the question of local service provision. The one mention I heard of 
HIV/AIDS was from a candidate who dismissed HIV/AIDS as a ‘lifestyle issue’ 
which was not relevant to village people in the Sepik, who would rather see 
money spent on ‘development’; he was warmly supported in this view.      
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A topic of common concern was the growing Asian influence in the province 
(and nationally). A number of voters suggested that the Somare government 
(and indeed the Somare family) was too closely associated with Asian interests. 
One candidate in the Wewak Open electorate, a local businessman of Malaysian 
Chinese origin (married to a niece of Somare), was said to be an ‘undercover 
candidate’ for the NA; when votes were counted and preferences distributed, he 
was  placed third in a field of forty-three candidates. Another alleged NA 
‘undercover candidate’, who subsequently won the Wewak seat and promptly 
joined the NA, was rumoured to be receiving financial support from a local 
‘Chinese’ business — which some voters described as ‘namba 2 benk bilong 
dispela gavman’. The sitting members for Maprik (a minister in the outgoing 
coalition government) and Ambunti-Dreikikir were also said to be receiving 
support from a local Asian enterprise.2 The resentment towards Asians was 
directed less towards those with a long history in the province, however, than 
towards recent arrivals from mainland China who generally displayed little 
sensitivity to local culture or society. 
 
Although the election was generally quiet, a supporter of the sitting member 
for Wewak Open was killed by supporters of a rival candidate when he 
attempted to campaign in their village outside Wewak, and there were at least 
two separate incidents in the Maprik electorate, in which a young man allegedly 
disrupting voting was shot in the leg by police and a police vehicle was 
damaged when villages accused its driver of acting on behalf of the sitting 
(coalition) member. Paol and Gesch (above) also describe some relatively minor 
confrontations between candidates and their supporters in Yangoru-Saussia.  
 
Several of the provincial candidates campaigned in association with 
sympathetic open candidates as they moved around the province, and there was 
some talk about exchange of preferences between provincial candidates (Bade-
Maisen; Jambran-Bade; Maisen-Bade-Bimare;3 Murray-Bade-Jambran;4 
Kemaken-Lamin-Jambran, and perhaps others), but there does not seem to have 
been much discussion of preferences during campaigning – even though six of 
the candidates (Bimare, Lamin, Jambram, Suagu, Kemaken and Samban) shared 
membership of Sepik Solidarity, an anti-corruption (and in effect anti-NA) 
alliance. Most candidates asked for first preferences, or second preferences if 
they were in villages where there was known to be a favoured local candidate. 
When pressed on the question of preference strategies, most candidates or 
campaign managers admitted that their general advice to voters was to ‘vote 1’ 
for them and to give the second and third preferences to minor (or rabis) 
                                                     
2 Both businesses were actually owned by ethnic Chinese families from Indonesia. 
3 Maisen said he was happy to swap preferences with anyone except Somare, Suagu and 
Murray. 
4 Bade said she made an approach to Murray about preference swapping but got no 
response. 
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candidates. But while candidates adjusted their advice on preferences according 
to their audience, candidates’ posters mostly showed the candidate’s number 
and/or name against the ‘1’ but left the spaces beside ‘2’ and ‘3’ blank, a 
practice which some observers feared might cause confusion and lead to a high 
informal vote.  
 
Electoral administration 
 
Awareness 
 
Prior to the election, an awareness campaign was conducted in the province, 
primarily by electoral officials. Civil society organizations played a minor role. 
A limited survey, conducted as part of the Domestic Monitoring exercise, 
suggested that most people in Wewak had had some exposure to the awareness 
campaign, which focused on the technical aspects of LPV, and felt fairly 
confident in their understanding of the new system and their ability to cast a 
valid vote, but that the campaign had not reached the more remote parts of the 
province. In the Yangoru-Saussia electorate voters had already experienced 
LPV, through a by-election in 2004, and seemed to be generally more confident. 
During the election campaign, most candidates tried to explain the LPV system 
to prospective voters, perhaps to make sure that potential support was not 
wasted in informal votes. Although the awareness campaign appears to have had 
limited impact, informal voting was fairly low (overall 2.3 per cent).  
 
Training of electoral officials 
 
According to the provincial electoral manager, training of electoral officials 
had been conducted satisfactorily, though the release of funds from the PNGEC 
headquarters was somewhat tardy. The polling officials, who comprised about 
50 per cent women in Wewak and a smaller number in rural polling stations, 
certainly conducted a thoroughly professional operation, not without some 
problems as it became apparent that a number of voters’ names were not on the 
roll (see below). There was a little apprehension on the eve of counting, and the 
training consultant was brought up to Wewak to give a refresher briefing to 
officials on the eve of counting. The counting I witnessed (of Wewak Open and 
East Sepik Provincial ballot papers in Wewak) was well set up, transparent and 
orderly; officials again showed a good deal of professionalism and patience as 
losing candidates tried to disrupt the counting (see below). 
 
Logistics 
 
Preparations for the election seem to have been generally good, though some 
of the polling materials arrived only a day or two before polling was due to 
start. East Sepik Provincial is a large electorate with a number of remote polling 
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places, and transport can be difficult, especially when the Sepik River is low, as 
it was in June-July 2007. Consequently, helicopters were used and some polling 
officials had to walk in to polling places. On the eve of polling, the helicopter 
company sub-contracted by the principal company contracted by the Electoral 
Commission informed a meeting of the provincial coordinating committee that 
aviation fuel, provided by the contractor, had only just been loaded onto a ship 
for transportation from Lae and would not be available to start operations on 
time. Fortunately, the sub-contractor, previously unaware of this arrangement, 
had already deposited fuel at strategic points, but was reluctant to begin 
operations without a guarantee of payment for the fuel it provided. This 
potential crisis was resolved in time for polling officials and materials to be 
lifted out to their destinations with only a minor delay, but there were 
conspiracy theories that since Sir Julius Chan was a director of the principal 
contractor, the fuel issue was an attempt to disrupt the election in the prime 
minister’s province. A fuel shortage in Wewak also threatened to affect road 
transport, though any impact seems to have been minimal. Otherwise, things 
seemed to go fairly smoothly, except that the day polling commenced the 
electoral manager, whose home village was on Kairiru, disappeared to Kairiru 
and did not return until counting was nearly completed (he later claimed he had 
been ‘threatened’). In his absence, the provincial returning officer had to take 
effective charge of the election and resolve disputes that arose.  
 
As usual in Papua New Guinea elections, after polling, some electoral 
officials claimed they had not received their full allowances, but in at least one 
instance this appeared to rest on a misunderstanding.5 
 
The roll, and polling 
 
As in other provinces, new rolls had been drawn up prior to the election and 
sent out for verification. In East Sepik the number of names on the roll was 
reduced significantly, from 286,716 in 2002 to 237,070 in 2007. In the limited 
survey conducted as part of the Domestic Monitoring exercise, most 
respondents said they had registered to vote and had verified their names on the 
preliminary roll sent around before polling (though there was anecdotal 
evidence that in some villages people refused to register). When it came to 
voting, however, a number of people who claimed to have enrolled (around 10 
per cent of voters at polling places surveyed in Wewak but up to 20 in some 
rural polling places) were unable to find their names on the ward rolls. In some 
cases it was discovered that individual names had been put in the wrong village, 
or villages in the wrong ward, and with some effort people were able to vote. In 
                                                     
5 In Wewak polling took place on one day (with a carry-over to a second day at one or 
two polling stations); officials were paid for four days, but claimed they were entitled to 
allowances for fourteen days, and staged a protest outside the provincial electoral office.  
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one district, the returning officer reverted to the preliminary roll, which was 
more accurate. 
 
Despite this, voting in the province was generally peaceful and orderly, and 
what grievances arose were handled mostly without rancour, though disgruntled 
would-be voters in Wewak at one stage during the counting threatened to burn 
down the Wewak council chambers which was serving as the local media 
centre.  
 
In Wewak, people queued up to vote throughout the day, and at a few 
locations polling was extended till around 6 p.m. or resumed the next day, to 
ensure that voters were not denied their vote. In many rural villages voting was 
conducted by having the presiding officer call out the names from the roll, and 
also any nominated ‘assist’ and ‘witness’ (who in many cases were young 
women) for voters requiring an assisted vote. Voters then came forward, had 
their fingers checked to make sure they had not voted already, and were given 
ballot papers. This made the whole process quite transparent and any attempt at 
cheating would have been fairly obvious. Nevertheless there were some reports 
of underage voting and multiple voting at different polling stations. The 
requirement of separate polling compartments for women and men was not 
observed in East Sepik, but no one seemed to object to this. In some 
communities people said they had discussed how they should vote and would 
vote as a bloc, but I saw no evidence of voters being pressured on how to vote 
(though some observers believed that ‘witnesses’ were often checking, on 
behalf of candidates, on how people voted).    
 
Security 
 
Security for the election was provided by the regular police force stationed in 
East Sepik and several hundred community police. Moem Barracks in Wewak is 
home to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force’s 2nd Battalion RPIR, and the 
PNGDF was represented on the provincial election coordinating committee, but 
PNGDF personnel were not deployed during the election in East Sepik, except 
as security when counting took place for the Wewak and Yangoru-Saussia open 
electorates at Moem Barracks. Police accompanied polling teams (two police to 
an eight-person polling team) and there were generally several community 
police on hand at polling stations. Relations between police and polling 
officials, and with voters, seemed to be generally good, and I saw none of the 
heavy-handedness which reportedly marked the police presence at some 
highlands polling stations. 
 
The elections in East Sepik were expected to proceed peacefully in the 
province, but a few places were identified as potential trouble spots, including 
the area along the East Sepik-Enga border (where groups from Enga have 
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regularly sought to cast votes in East Sepik), some villages along the Biwat 
River (a southern tributary of the Sepik), around Yangoru, and along the Dagua-
West Coast. In the event, there were no major problems.  
 
Counting 
 
As voting proceeded, there was an intensified debate about where to do the 
counting. Several venues discussed as counting places were later dropped due to 
non-availability or concerns by some candidates about security. Eventually it 
was decided to count the Wewak votes at Moem Barracks, where security was 
tight, and to count the Provincial ballots at the Divine Word University campus 
(formerly St Benedict’s Teachers’ College) at Kaindi, on the outskirts of 
Wewak.  
 
Counting was scheduled to commence on Saturday but did not get under way 
until 7.45 p.m. on the Monday. The counting room was well laid out, security 
was strict, the counting officials were competent and the whole process was 
transparent. Figures were carefully balanced and as each ballot box was counted 
the figures were displayed on a large blackboard, relayed to Port Moresby, and 
subsequently put on display outside the local media centre. 
 
In a few cases figures did not balance and had to be recounted. Most of the 
Provincial ballot boxes contained a few ballots for the Open electorate; these 
were put aside and later exchanged with Provincial ballots that were found in 
the Open ballot boxes. 
 
Soon after counting commenced, however, the scrutineers of some losing 
candidates began to raise what seemed to be rather minor objections,6 and 
walked out. The provincial returning officer felt obliged to halt counting. With 
the election manager unavailable, the provincial returning officer reluctant to act 
without backing from higher up, and a legal adviser to the PNGEC present but 
generally unhelpful, it eventually fell to the regional police commander from 
Lae (who was previously provincial commander in East Sepik and was well-
known and respected in the province) to order that counting recommence, which 
eventually it did, with some scrutineers not attending. As a result of these 
interruptions, counting officials sat around for long periods with nothing to do, 
and on a couple of occasions counting went on till 4 a.m. They were remarkably 
patient.  
                                                     
6 The principal objection was that the plastic seal on one of the ballot boxes was broken 
– as happened in a number of cases throughout the country; but there had been no 
objection raised when the box was brought in and the broken seal explained. One 
scrutineer confided to me that the NA had been altering the figures inside the ballot 
boxes; when I asked him how this could be done, he replied that (as I surely knew) it 
was done through blak paua (magic). 
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The result 
 
As the first votes were counted, Somare’s opponents’ hopes of an upset 
began to fade. In the first forty ballot boxes (all from the Wewak district) 
Somare was a clear winner in all but six (in which Bade, Murray, Samban and 
Maisen pulled in votes from their support bases), and had about 40 per cent of 
the total vote.   
 
When first preference votes had been counted, Somare led strongly, with 
60,653 votes, almost twice the number received by his next nearest rival 
(Maisen on 31,460) and about 35 per cent of the total allowable votes. However, 
it took a full elimination of candidates to decide the outcome (see Table 25.1).  
 
Table 25.1: Distribution of preferences, East Sepik Provincial electorate 
Excl Cand. Maisen Bade Jambram Murray Somare Other Ex’ed 
ballots 
 Total 
1 Bimare 34 92 33 32 48 74 3 316 
2 Lamin 107 111 260 112 103 231 2 926 
3  Laku 293 372 214 507 196 261 9 1,852 
4 Suagu 429 462 160 522 443 235 41 2,292 
5 Samban 492 594 225 720 515 303 125 2,974 
6 Kemaken 641 1,073 540 1,117 798 - 366 4,535 
7 Bade 3,896 - 2,238 5,937 3,826 - 1,643 17,540 
8 Jambram 7,035 - - 10,927 3,123 - 6,482 27,567 
9 Maisen - - - 19,817 5,602 - 18,982 44,401 
 Total 12,927 2,704 3,670 39,691 14,654 1,104 27,653 102,403 
 
On the first elimination, Bade received the largest share (almost a third) of 
Bimare’s meagre vote, and on the second, Jambram was by far the greatest 
beneficiary from Lamin’s elimination, with the other four prominent candidates 
sharing in the remainder of his preferences. On every other preference 
distribution — as first Labu and then Suagu, Samban, Kemaken, Bade and 
Maisen were eliminated — Murray gained the largest share of the growing 
number of preferences. On each of the third to sixth eliminations Bade got the 
second largest share; unfortunately for Bade, however, despite her success in 
winning preferences her primary vote was well below that of four other 
candidates and after the sixth distribution she was eliminated. Almost 6,000 of 
Bade’s preferences went to Murray, with Maisen receiving about the same 
number as Somare (3,896 to 3,826). In the last two eliminations (Jambram and 
Maisen) Murray received 30,744 preferences to Somare’s 8,725, but Somare’s 
share was sufficient to give him a narrow victory — relative to his early lead — 
by 75,293 to 67,437. Of the 170,380 allowable ballots, a high 142,727 [84 per 
cent] remained in the count up to the final elimination, a percentage which is 
generally regarded as indicative of a ‘good’ use of preferences by voters. 
Somare’s winning vote represented 44 per cent of the total allowable ballots 
cast.  
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Murray lodged an appeal, but it was dismissed because the petition had not 
been served within the time period required by court rules (John Nonggorr, 
personal communication 8 October 2009).  
 
Subsequently, as the leader of the party with the largest number of seats 
Somare was invited to form a government, and when the National Parliament 
sat in August Somare was reelected as prime minister. 
 
Assessment of the electoral outcome 
 
Sir Michael Somare, the long-serving prime minister, the member for East 
Sepik since 1968 and the man who led his country to independence, is a popular 
figure in the province, though perhaps one whose popularity has been on the 
wane over the past few years, as many East Sepiks complain about lack of 
development in the province and suggest that the Somare family (Sir Michael 
and his son Arthur, the re-elected member for Angoram) wield too much power, 
provincially and nationally. Given that the contest in East Sepik Provincial was 
in effect a contest between Somare and ten candidates who might be described 
as ‘anti-Somare’, it is perhaps not too surprising that preferences flowed fairly 
consistently away from Somare, though he eventually received enough to 
achieve re-election. LPV thus did not bring about a different result in the East 
Sepik Provincial electorate from what, on the basis of first preferences, a FPTF 
vote might have delivered, but it did reveal a growing antipathy towards the 
sitting member which might not have otherwise been evident. 
 
The sole woman candidate, Elizabeth Simogun Bade, could take 
encouragement from her strong showing on preferences — which might have 
reflected a (qualified) women’s vote —  but it was again demonstrated that 
preferences are of little use if a candidate does not do well enough in the 
primary vote. 7 
 
Several candidates expressed the view that LPV had made for a ‘more 
friendly’ election, though, as noted, there was little evidence that the new 
system produced a tendency towards strategic alliances through preference 
swapping. 
 
Elsewhere in the province, four six of the sitting open members retained their 
seats. After the independent Jim Simutab (Wewak Open) had joined the 
National Alliance, the East Sepik’s seven MPs comprised four National 
Alliance members and three PAP. 
                                                     
7 A similar result had been seen in the Yangoru-Saussia by-election in 2004, in which 
the sole woman candidate was unable to take advantage of a strong preference vote 
because her primary vote was relatively low.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 25.2: Voting statistics for East Sepik Provincial, 2007 
Number of registered voters  240551  
Total votes cast 174215  
Informal votes 3835 (2.2% of ballots cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 170380  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 142730  
Total votes distributed 81984  
Exhausted ballot papers 27650 (16.2% of allowable ballots) 
Absolute majority (50%+1) 71366  
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Figure 26.1: Gazelle District map 
26 POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ELECTION IN GAZELLE 
 
Elly B. Kinkin 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will look at the Gazelle Open electorate in the 2007 election, with a 
focus on political parties. The significance of political parties flows from the 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) 
which was enacted in 2001, with the primary objective of strengthening the 
political party system on the eve of the 2002 election. The OLIPPAC was later 
replaced with a revised version, which came into force on 15 October 2003.  
 
The changes brought about by the OLIPPAC and the replacing of first-past-
the-post (FPTP) voting by limited preferential voting (LPV) will be discussed 
together, as they tended to dominate the election in the Gazelle electorate. The 
OLIPPAC and LPV generated a lot of interest, anxiety and general concern 
among voters and candidates alike around the country and within the Gazelle. It 
is against this backdrop that the conduct of candidates and political parties in the 
Gazelle will be discussed.  
 
The chapter begins with some background about the Gazelle seat, highlights 
some aspects of political parties in the electorate and how they have fared, and 
then looks at the 2007 election in the Gazelle in the light of data derived mainly 
from a survey and an exit poll undertaken to see how the preferences were 
distributed. 
 
Background 
 
The Gazelle seat is one of the 
largest in the country, in terms of area 
and population size. Geographically, 
it covers about a third of the Gazelle 
Peninsula, and at the 2000 census 
included 41 per cent of the population 
(89,664); at an average annual growth 
of around 3 per cent, the population 
would have increased to just over 
100,000 in 2007. The other three 
electorates within the province 
account for the other 59 per cent (National Statistical Office 2000). East New 
Britain was one of the provinces that the Boundaries Commission had 
recommended for redrawing of electoral boundaries and the addition of another 
electorate, specifically to cater for the Bainings (pers. comm., John Kalamorah, 
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Port Moresby 2007). The National Parliament, however, rejected the 
recommendations of the Boundaries Commission just before the 2007 election. 
 
The dominant ethnic groups within the Gazelle electorate continue to be the 
Tolais, followed by the Bainings and then other non-Tolais from other 
provinces who are commonly referred to in the local dialect as vairas 
(foreigners); the latter are mostly second generation settlers and occupy pockets 
of land towards the inland Baining. These non-Tolais have become more 
politically conscious of their rights and have organized themselves to participate 
in the political process, voting as a bloc. 
 
Overview of political parties 
 
In order to better appreciate political parties in the electorate, it is necessary 
to trace their origins. In most democratic forms of government, parties are an 
important vehicle through which like-minded individuals come together to 
pursue common goals and objectives.   
 
In Papua New Guinea, the Pangu Pati was formed in 1967 primarily to press 
for independence, while most other parties opposed it and during the period 
1968-1975 political parties were polarized by the clearly different positions they 
took.  However, after independence in 1975 political parties did not have 
substantive policies which differentiated them from each other. Although parties 
continued to exist within parliament, they tended to exist in name only; most 
often they were the means by which individuals gained access to the 
government. Parliamentary votes of no confidence characterized the later part of 
the 1980s and the whole of the 1990s. Members of parliament were 
continuously looking for opportunities to get into government. There were 
factions within parties and ‘party hopping’ was frequent. Party machinery was 
virtually non-existent; leaders were the driving force — as Hegarty (1983) 
observed, parties revolved around the personalities of their leaders. This 
continued up to the 2007 election. 
 
While political parties were formed in the late 1960s and 1970s to pursue 
specific issues and purposes, ‘what was missing…was an underlying culture to 
galvanize support and purpose for the parties among the voting public’ (Okole 
2004:38). This is true for the Gazelle electorate, where issues have surfaced, 
been supported by some individuals, groups and political parties, and then 
allowed to die as newer issues arose and people moved on. The pattern of 
political party behaviour at the national level played out at the provincial level, 
preventing political parties from establishing firm roots in the village, and 
rendering their activities meaningless. Saffu (1982:261) commented: 
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What is clearly indisputable from observations so far is the fragility 
and virtual irrelevance of political parties to the operation of Papua 
New Guinea’s political system. 
 
While there may not have been any political culture in the strictest sense of the 
term, there were characteristic features of the political system of Papua New 
Guinea, including a culture of reciprocity. As pointed out by Okole, ‘people 
vote for candidates not so much that they would be lawmakers for the country. 
Rather, they are to be deliverers of tangible goods and services’ (Okole 
2004:34). This relationship can only be terminated if the candidates refuse the 
demands of the voters; however, most candidates are prepared to secure voter 
support at any cost. Looking at this another way, candidates once elected are 
bound to repay the loyalty shown by voters. The culture of reciprocity is deeply 
ingrained in Papua New Guinea; if there is any cultural trait that characterizes 
the political system, then it is reciprocity. People vote for candidates in the 
expectation that they will in turn be assisted by them. 
 
Political party support base  
 
Because political parties restrict their activities to elections and votes of no 
confidence and have not seriously attempted to cultivate a constituency for their 
policies, then it becomes difficult to gauge how they will perform in any 
election.  
 
The electorate is not homogeneous but is made up of different groupings. 
The groups identified within the Gazelle electorate include the following: the 
Tolais, the Bainings and people from other provinces (mostly in the Momase 
and Highlands regions);1 church denominations; women; smallholder settlers 
and plantation workers; professional groups and business houses, and the 
working class. None of these groups appears to have been linked to any of the 
political parties, either in the past or in the 2007 election. Any links that might 
have existed probably had more to do with individual candidates or party 
officials than with parties. In effect, the parties lacked a support base and looked 
for candidates who had a support base with which to support the party.  
 
All the political parties in the Gazelle were linked to either an individual or a 
family, rather than to any of the major groupings identified above. Interestingly, 
individuals and families previously associated with political parties have tended 
to move to the newer parties. 
 
                                                     
1 People from other provinces, but especially these two regions, have welfare-oriented 
associations.  
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 A number of observations were made concerning the support base of 
candidates: 
• All candidates, except for three from outside the province, pegged 
their local areas as their support base. Of the three candidates from 
different provinces, at least two appealed to people from their home 
provinces and other ‘outsiders’ (vairas) to support them. 
• Although all the candidates attempted to attend church services and 
mid-week fellowships around the electorate, it was the Melanesian 
Liberal Party candidate, Malakai Tabar, a passionate Christian, who 
tried to secure the Christian vote throughout the electorate. 
• A number of candidates presented themselves as part of the ‘new 
generation’ and appealed to youth, calling for a change of 
leadership. Their slogan was, ‘New times demand new leadership’.  
• Three of the candidates appealed directly to the ethnic Bainings vote, 
which constituted a large bloc.  
• The sole female candidate (Odelia Virua) did not aggressively 
pursue women voters, as was expected of her; she decided to focus 
on the Bainings group, smallholder settlers, and those sympathetic to 
the environment (especially NGOs).  
 
Party-endorsed candidates since 1987 
 
The Gazelle seat is one of a small number in the country where fewer than 
ten candidates have contested at each election since independence. In 2007, 
sixteen candidates contested. Table 26.1 shows the number of party-endorsed 
and independent candidates at each election since 1987. The rise in the number 
of party-endorsed candidates may be attributable to the introduction of the 
OLIPPAC in 2001.  
 
Table 26.1: Party-endorsed candidates at elections since 1987 
Year of election Party-endorsed 
candidates
Independents Total no. of 
candidates 
1987 3 4 7 
1992 2 2 4 
1997 1 5 6 
2002 6 3 9 
2007 10 6 16 
Source: Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission. 
 
The only party that has consistently endorsed a candidate for the Gazelle seat 
since independence has been Pangu. Independent candidates have been a feature 
of every election for the seat since 1987, which is perhaps a reflection of the fact 
that independents could always join a party after the election and perhaps 
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become a member of the government. There was nothing to lose by being an 
independent and everything to gain. As Okole et al. (2003:33) have observed:  
 
Independent status is also more desirable since individual MPs can 
join parties at a later date and propel changes to party alignments 
that might elevate them to ministries and other coveted positions.  
 
It is often quoted in Papua New Guinea politics that ‘Candidates do not win 
because they are endorsed by parties; rather parties endorse candidates who are 
going to win’ (Okole et al. 2003:44). In the Gazelle seat, prior to the enactment 
of OLIPPAC, political parties have had problems identifying potential winning 
candidates or convincing them to run under their party platforms.  
 
It seems to be the case that the leadership qualities of party leaders (which 
include charisma) held parties together in the period from 1975 to 2002. In most 
instances there was a feeling of loyalty to the party leader on the part of the 
members. A number of the candidates who have run for the Gazelle since 
independence have had close ties with the party leaders. 
 
Gazelle Open in 2007  
 
Sixteen candidates ran for the Gazelle seat 2007. Ten were endorsed and 
supported by a political party. The remaining six ran as independents but four of 
the six had some form of association with a political party. This is shown in 
Table 26.7 in the Appendix to this chapter. 
 
 It is important to consider the role and influence of the political parties prior 
to the OLIPPAC and after the OLIPPAC. In 1997 there were only six 
candidates with more than ten political parties fielding candidates nationally. In 
2002, with 43 registered political parties the three independents could have 
easily picked up endorsement from a political party. In 2007, too, with 34 
political parties the six independents could have been accommodated by any of 
the political parties.  
 
The relatively small number of candidates running since 1987 is indicative of 
the conservative nature of the electorate, which does not allow just anybody to 
run in the election for the sake of running, as is the case in other parts of the 
country. Low winning margins in other parts of the country have encouraged 
some individuals to try their luck. A candidate intending to run for the Gazelle 
seat must have standing in the community, must be supported by a good cross-
section of leaders in the electorate, and must have the resources to fund his/her 
election. 
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Support from political parties 
 
The influence of political parties in the Gazelle seat was not as strong as one 
might have expected given the changes to the OLIPPAC. The assistance given 
by political parties varied. Basic assistance ranged from the payment of the 
nomination fee, to posters, T-shirts, hosting of rallies, and hiring of vehicles 
(two of the party-endorsed candidates, Sinai Brown and Patrick Varagat, were 
able to provide a convoy of vehicles during the campaign period). Of all the 
party-endorsed candidates spoken to, only one revealed the total amount the 
party gave him. The rest were disappointed with their parties but refused to 
reveal the amount they had received. 
 
Coordination of activities by political parties was lacking. There were no 
party activities. The party machinery observed in other countries to promote 
candidates to the voters was missing. The candidates were left on their own after 
nomination.  
 
From the time nominations were opened up to the declaration of results, only 
five leaders from the ten political parties visited the electorate to campaign for 
their candidates. While most of the political parties had regional and provincial 
branches in the province, it was difficult to establish whether party executives at 
the national level visited their candidates in the province. Table 26.2 below 
summarizes this data.  
 
Table 26.2: Visits by party leaders, Gazelle, 2007 
Name Party Party leader Visit by 
party leader? 
Malakai Tabar Melanesian Liberal  Dr. Allan Marat Yes 
Sinai Brown* National Alliance Sir Michael Somare Yes 
Joseph K. Willie Independent - - 
John Sambie Independent - - 
Henry Ningo PNG Party Sir Mekere Morauta No 
Henry Saminga People’s National Congress Peter O’Neill No 
Herman Remas Independent - - 
Henry Kubak People’s Progress Party Sir Julius Chan Yes 
Dominic Rangan United Party Bire Kimisopa No 
Philip Kameng PANGU Party Sir Rabbie Namaliu Yes 
Benroy Miliok Rural Development Party Mosses Maladina No 
Peniel Niligur Melanesian Alliance Party Sir Moi Avei No 
Patrick Varagat New Generation Party Bart Philemon Yes 
Odelia Virua Independent - - 
Simon Kambiu Independent - - 
Abraham Yako Independent - - 
*Sitting member 
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While it is difficult to quantify the influence of the party, the presence of the 
party leader in the electorate should boost the standing of candidates. Sinai 
Brown, the sitting member for the Gazelle seat, hosted the prime minister and 
senior executives of the National Alliance for several days, and they appeared 
on the nightly news, giving him an advantage in terms of media coverage. Dr. 
Allan Marat, the founder and leader of the Melanesian Liberal Party (MLP), was 
in the province and his visits to the three electorates helped his MLP collect two 
seats (Rabaul and Gazelle). MLP candidates for the Provincial and Kokopo 
seats finished second and fourth respectively. 
 
Other party leaders who visited the electorate and campaigned for their 
candidates included Sir Rabbie Namaliu (Pangu), Sir Julius Chan (PPP), and 
Bart Philemon (New Generation Party). But although their visits were marked 
by a lot of feasting and celebration, the support shown at rallies was not there in 
the tally rooms. For example, the visit by Sir Julius Chan in support of his 
candidate Henry Kubak was well covered by the media and well attended, but 
Kubak picked up only 5.6 per cent of the total formal first preference votes cast. 
The visit of Bart Philemon, the leader of the New Generation Party, who had 
declared war on the National Alliance and whose visit to the province was well 
attended and talked about, did little for his candidate who collected only 3.5 per 
cent of first preference votes. 
 
In the final analysis, the brand name of the political party, the party leader 
(who was potentially prime minister), party policies, campaign strategies, and 
the alliances that the parties entered into regarding distribution of preferences, 
had little impact in attracting undecided voters or securing second and third 
preferences. 
 
The policies of the ten political parties were broad and general; most were 
reduced to slogans. ‘Free education’, ‘good governance’, ‘honest leadership’, 
‘new leadership’, ‘anti-corruption’, ‘a time for change’, ‘focus on rural 
development’, ‘restoring confidence in the public service’, and ‘infrastructure 
development’ were some of the catchphrases used. These phrases were good but 
they lacked strong supporting policies to realize the bold, broad statements. 
 
The role played by political parties during the election was more symbolic 
than policy-oriented. Attempts by candidates to differentiate their policies from 
those of other candidates and political parties did not filter down to the voters. 
The level of scrutiny of party policies was very low, and candidates escaped 
from having to explain and elaborate their policies, instead appealing to the 
voters’ emotions on issues such as greater autonomy for the province, securing 
good prices for cash crops (although it was not clear how this was to be done, 
given that prices are dictated by world markets), reclaiming plantations from big 
businesses and the churches and passing them on to the people, the building of a 
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fish cannery (put on hold by the national government), fast-tracking the 
upgrading of the airport to international status, and improving the deteriorating 
roads, to name a few. 
 
It would have been interesting to have attempted a costing of what was 
promised to the people, as an indicator of how realistic the promises were. The 
National Research Institute, and in particular Dr. Alphonse Gelu, has been 
pushing this idea. 
 
Political party alliances 
 
There was only one instance of political party alliance, namely between the 
PNG Party of Sir Mekere Morauta and the New Generation Party of Bart 
Philemon. This alliance was observed at the provincial and electorate levels, 
where resources, intelligence and information were shared. During polling, 
supporters were encouraged to exchange preferences. It was difficult, however, 
to trace the preferences, in the absence of data from the Electoral Commission. 
 
However, alliances were built amongst the candidates, who shared a strong 
desire to remove the sitting member. Throughout the province candidates 
ganged up against the incumbents; this was clearly evident in the Kokopo, 
Rabaul and the Gazelle contests. 
 
The sitting member, Sinai Brown, although collecting most first preferences 
(5,045 (18 per cent) compared to Malakai Tabar’s 4,612 (16 per cent), 
eventually lost because after the fourteenth exclusion Tabar was able to collect 
4,161 preferences to amass a total of 8,773, while Sinai Brown collected only 
2,634 preferences, bringing his count  to 7,679.  
 
Another important feature of the 2007 election was the alliances that were 
built between candidates contesting open seats and those contesting the 
Provincial seat. One observation was that the candidates for the Provincial seat 
chose not to differentiate themselves from each other on the basis of their 
parties but to work with open seat candidates. For the Provincial seat 
candidates, it was suicidal to campaign along party lines with their counterparts 
from the open seats, as open seat candidates could retaliate by campaigning 
against them. The candidates running for the Provincial seat thus tended to 
abstain from interference in the Open seats.  
 
Leo Dion, the National Alliance governor of the province, chose to run on 
his track record as governor and asked the province to judge him by his 
performance in the previous term. He did not regularly campaign with Sinai 
Brown, the sitting National Alliance member for the Gazelle, fearing a backlash 
if he pushed the party line. The National Alliance had not supported a fish 
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cannery in the electorate, which was potentially a big money earner for the 
province as well as the company. The national government had also been slow 
to upgrade the provincial airport to international status. As evident from the 
media (especially talk-back radio shows) the people of the province were not 
happy that the national government, with three members from the province in 
the National Alliance and the support of Dr Allan Marat and Sir Rabbie 
Namaliu, had not fast-tracked some projects in the province.  
 
The limited preferential voting system 
 
LPV was part of the electoral reforms which sought to widen the 
representative base of winning candidates as well as secure cooperation from 
rival candidates and their supporters in the distribution of the second and third 
preferences. As outlined by John Nonggorr, lawyer for the Electoral 
Commission, the LPV was meant to deal with law and order problems and to 
change the behaviour of candidates and supporters to ensure the success of 
elections (Post-Courier 20  March 2007:2). 
 
The success of the various by-elections, using LPV, after the 2002 election 
accomplished at least two main things: there was reportedly greater cooperation 
among candidates and their supporters, and the introduction of preferences gave 
voters the opportunity to vote for more than one candidate, which reduced the 
level of dispute amongst family and community members (see Standish 2006). 
 
Table 26.3: Candidates and winning margins 
Year* Candidate Party Winning vote (%) 
1987 Esorom Burege Peoples Progress Party 26.3 
1992 Nakikus Konga Pangu Pati 39.9 
1997 Nakikus Konga Pangu Pati 48.6 
2002 Sinai Brown National Alliance 37.6 
2007 Malakai Tabar Melanesian Liberal Party 17.0 (primary vote) 
53.3 (after preferences) 
Source: Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission 
*This does not include two by-elections.  
 
The winning margin for the Gazelle seat over the last two decades has been very 
convincing. Since 1987, the support base of the winning candidates has always 
come from their respective areas (for Esorom Burege and Nakikus Konga, from 
the North Coast part of the electorate; for Sinai Brown, from the Toma area. 
Martin Tovadek, who held the seat from 1977-1987 is from the Toma area).  
 
The winning vote was always above the 25 per cent mark, while in other 
electorates around the country winning margins were often reduced to single 
digit numbers. However this does not deny the importance of local loyalties: the 
people of the North Coast area have always voted for candidates from their area, 
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while people from the Toma area have always voted for a Toma candidate; the 
Bainings have always voted for Bainings, and the people from other areas of the 
Gazelle Peninsula have done the same. When there is no candidate from their 
area, people have tended to support their relatives from the other areas. 
 
Survey and exit poll 
 
A questionnaire was administered during polling to determine the basis upon 
which voters gave their preferences. Two questions were asked. First, ‘What 
was the basis for giving your first, second and third preferences?’. Secondly, 
‘Which of your preferences did you give to the only woman candidate?’. 
 
The first question offered six possible responses: Relatives (pressure to vote 
along family lines is immense; failure to do so can result in isolation — some 
families have been known to have stopped talking to each other for several 
years); Leadership Qualities (if no relatives are standing, then, according to 
informants, voters look for leadership qualities such as experience, charisma, 
educational qualifications and integrity); Churches (churches are very important 
institutions within the electorate and have been known to influence voters); 
Party Affiliation (selected because it is the focus of this paper); Business 
Acquaintance (this does not necessarily refer to business dealings but includes 
social and cultural activities that bring people together, such as marriages, 
deaths, initiation rituals and feasts that involve villages); Others (to cover 
factors that have not been otherwise accounted for). 
 
The questionnaire was drawn up after discussions the author had with a 
number of public servants, one local-level government (LLG) president, two 
councillors and a number of ordinary villagers who had been involved in past 
elections. The survey was conducted during the polling period, which was one 
week, for only one LLG within the electorate — the Toma-Vunadidir LLG; its 
president Mr. David Piamia, assisted with the survey.  
 
Preferences were not necessarily distributed between the five variables: for 
example, a voter with two relatives standing might allocate his/her first and 
second preferences under the Relatives category.  
 
The factor that accounted for most first preferences was Relatives, which 
received 35 per cent. This was followed by Church (27 per cent) Leadership 
qualities (18 per cent), Business acquaintance (7 per cent), and Others (10 per 
cent). Party affiliation received the lowest, with just over 2 per cent. 
 
On second preferences, surprisingly Relatives again received the largest 
share, with 39 per cent (clearly some voters had several relatives standing as 
candidates). Leadership qualities followed with 20.5 per cent, Church 17 per 
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cent, Others 11 per cent, Business acquaintances 9 per cent, and Political party 
affiliation again last on 3 per cent. 
 
The bulk of the third preferences, interestingly, went to Others, which 
collected 37 per cent. A possible explanation for the high percentage is that 
many voters met their social and cultural obligations with their first two 
preferences and decided to ‘give away’ the third preference. Church accounted 
for 21 per cent of third preferences, Relatives 16 per cent, Leadership qualities 
and Party affiliation each 11.5 per cent, and Business acquaintance 2 per cent.  
 
Overall, Relatives was the determinant of how respondents distributed their 
preferences, followed by Church. Notwithstanding the fact that the province had 
gone through a number of awareness exercises which listed ‘leadership 
qualities’ as the principal criterion that voters should look for, Leadership 
qualities was a relatively minor influence on the distribution of preferences.  
 
To the question, ‘Which of your preferences did you give to the only woman 
candidate?’, out of the 122 respondents (39 females and 83 males) the female 
candidate received only eight second preferences. Six of those preferences came 
from female voters. One can only speculate about the basis on which voters 
distributed their preferences for the female candidate; it was certainly not along 
policy lines, as her stated policy goals were to assist the Bainings people, who 
are a disadvantaged group in the electorate, and to help settlers in the Keravat 
area obtain basic government services (such as technical and financial assistance 
in the agricultural sector).2 The fact that she was married to a person from the 
Momase region does not appear to have made a difference, though people from 
Momase constitute a very big segment of the population within the electorate. 
 
Table 26.4: Basis for giving first, second and third preferences, by men and women 
Pref. Relatives Leadership 
qualities 
Church Party 
affiliation
Business 
acquaintance 
Others Total 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F  
First 28 15 18   4 23 10 2 1   5 4   5   7 122 
Second 34 14 20   5 12   9 4 0 10 1   3 10 122 
Third 17   3   9   5 15 11 8 6   3 0 31 14 122 
Total 79 32 47 14 50 30 14 7 18 5 39 31  
Notes: Relatives includes: in-laws; kinsman; same ethnicity; cultural relations. 
Leadership qualities includes: honesty; integrity; proven track record; education; 
experience. Church includes: same church; Christian principles; active church member. 
Party Affiliation includes: leader of party; party policies. Business Acquaintance 
includes: workmates; sport and social networks; professional associates; friends of 
friends. Others includes: pressure from spouse, relatives; sympathy vote; etc. 
                                                     
2 Although I did not speak to the candidate herself, I spoke to her husband who 
highlighted some of her policies and what she stood for.  
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It also appears that women, who constitute over 40 per cent of the voting 
population in the electorate, did not support the sole woman candidate. She was 
one of the first three candidates to be eliminated. And the evidence from the 
survey suggests that she would have done no better if she had been endorsed by 
a party, since voters gave little weight to party affiliation. For a very affluent 
electorate, with easy access to the media and good awareness, the poor 
distribution of preferences to the only female candidate speaks a lot about the 
plight of female candidates. 
 
Comparing the 2002 and 2007 election results  
 
Although the introduction of LPV means that the elections of 2002 and 2007 
are not strictly comparable, it is worth looking at the similarities and 
differences. 
 
No changes were made to the boundaries of the Gazelle seat. The number of 
registered voters was 27,482 in 2002, and 27,938 in 2007, an increase of 456. 
 
Nine candidates stood for election in 2002, of whom six were endorsed by 
political parties. In 2007 sixteen candidates stood, of whom ten were party-
endorsed. Party-endorsed candidates received little support from their respective 
parties; in general, they were no better off than the independents. 
 
The sitting member, Sinai Brown, won the seat in 2002 with 10,107 votes 
(37 per cent of the total). In 2007 he led on first preferences, with 5045 votes 
(18 of the total) — a drop of just over 50 per cent on the 2002 vote — but 
eventually lost to Malakai Tabar, an agriculturalist and lecturer by profession.  
 
Table 26.5: The Gazelle Open electorate, 2002 
Candidate Party Votes polled % of votes polled 
Sinai Brown National Alliance 10,107 37.6 
Norbert Kubak People’s Progress Party   6,606 24.6 
Henry Ningo People’s Democratic Movement   3,554 13.2 
Thomas Kalas Independent    1,917   7.1 
Isaac Wartovo Independent   1,643   6.1 
Elly Kinkin Independent   1,378   5.1 
James Anjo People’s Labour Party     989   3.7 
Jack Sion People’s Action Party     360   1.3 
John Rarau Independent     326   1.2 
Informal votes      602  
Total votes             27,482  
Formal votes  26,880 100 
Source: http://www.pngec.gov.pg/results/Report18.html  
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From the figures, it is clear that all candidates collected votes from their support 
bases but could not widen their appeal to other constituents. Tabar was able to 
collect votes from his home area, his wife’s area, church groups (he is a devout 
Christian), the working class, and ordinary villages with whom he had daily 
contacts over two decades.  
 
As noted above, all the candidates ganged up against and campaigned 
against the sitting member and successfully prevented the flow of preferences to 
him.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no party in Papua New Guinea that has anything that 
remotely resembles a nation-wide organization with an ideology or 
an image, cadres of activists and a persistent, mobilized mass 
support (Saffu 1982:261). 
 
Unless and until there is a party with an ideology that guides its conduct, and 
deep roots within a focused political support base across the country, then it will 
be very difficult to talk about political parties. Political parties can only be 
understood within the context of a political system that interacts with them. 
When the personalities of candidates and members of parliament dominate the 
system, political parties are largely irrelevant.  
 
In the case of the Gazelle seat, Pangu Pati, the only party which has been 
fielding candidates since independence, was not able to build a political base. It 
might be argued that without OLIPPAC it was not possible for parties to 
develop, but with OLIPPAC designed to strengthen parties, and office bearers 
of political parties now being paid from public funds, some effort might have 
been made to build a party support base within the electorate. The survey and 
exit poll showed that while people are concerned about leadership qualities, they 
are not prepared to ignore their relatives or candidates from their areas, or the 
churches. LPV has allowed the option of accommodating their relatives and 
other primordial associations but at the same time voting for a good leader who 
will have wider support from the electorate.  
 
References 
 
Hegarty, D., 1983. ‘The 1977 national elections in Papua New Guinea: an 
overview’, in D. Hegarty (ed), Electoral Politics in PNG: Studies on the 
1977 National Elections. Port Moresby: UPNG Press.  
 
National Statistical Office, 2000. Papua New Guinea 2000 Census: Preliminary 
Figures. Port Moresby: National Statistical Office. 
438      Election 2007 
 
Okole, H., Narakobi, B., and Clements, Q., 2003. ‘Strengthening a 
parliamentary Democracy for the 21st Century: Legislative Needs 
Assessment Report’. Port Moresby: National Parliament of Papua New 
Guinea. 
 
Okole, H., 2004. ‘Coalition politics: a culture of reciprocity’, in Papua New 
Guinea Yearbook 2004. Port Moresby: The National, pp.33-40.  
 
______, 2005. ‘Papua New Guinea’s brand of Westminster: democratic 
traditions overlaying Melanesian cultures’, in H. Patapan, J. Wanna and 
P. Weller (eds),  Westminster Legacies: Democracy and Responsible 
Government in Asia and the Pacific. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
 
Saffu, Y., 1982. ‘Aspects of the emerging political culture’, in Proceedings of 
the 1982 Politics Conference: Evolving Political Cultures in the Pacific 
Islands. Hawaii: Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young 
University, pp.256-279. 
 
Standish, B., 2006. ‘Limited preferential voting in Papua New Guinea: some 
early lessons’, Pacific Economic Bulletin 21(1):195-211. 
 
 
Appendix  
 
Table 26.6: Voting statistics Gazelle Open electorate, 2007 
Number of registered voters  52418  
Total votes cast 28310  
Informal votes 1157 (4.1% of total ballots cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 27153  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 16452  
Total votes distributed 17496  
Exhausted ballot papers 10701 (39.4% of allowable ballots)  
Absolute majority (50%+1) 8227  
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 Figure 27.1: Manus Province and District map 
27 BETWEEN EAGLES AND FLYING FOXES: ELECTIONS FOR THE 
MANUS PROVINCIAL AND OPEN SEATS 
 
Steffen Dalsgaard1 
 
People in Manus often speak in metaphors or in tropes (Tokpisin: tok piksa), 
particularly when referring to the politics of traditional ceremonies at the village 
level and in wider provincial forums. One of the prevailing metaphors of the 
2007 election was that of the ‘flying fox’ (blak bokis); this was most eloquently 
expressed in a speech by Dr Gabriel Kulwaum, one of the candidates for the 
Manus Open seat. The flying fox is a migratory fruit-eating bat. It comes when 
the fruits are ripe and leaves when it has eaten them. In contrast to this animal is 
the eagle (tarangau). In the context of the election the eagle represented the true 
leader, who does not migrate but stays and looks after its territory. When 
potential voters were asked what kind of leadership qualities they were looking 
for in a candidate, most people said, ‘looking after others’ (lukautim ol), that is, 
being generous and helping others when they are in need. 
                                                     
1 I thank the people in Manus and the candidates, the Electoral Commission office in 
Manus and the provincial administration, whose assistance was invaluable. I am also 
indebted to the Institute of PNG Studies and the National Research Institute in Port 
Moresby. The paper has benefited from comments by colleagues in the Department of 
Anthropology, University of Aarhus, participants in the Asia-Pacific Week 2008 at the 
Australian National University, and the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Program at the Australian National University. I also thank two of my supervisors, Ton 
Otto and Mark Mosko. The research was made possible by grants from Denmark, 
namely the Faculty of Arts at the University of Aarhus, Bikuben Fonden, Carlsbergs 
Mindelegat for Brygger J.C. Jacobsen, and an EliteResearch travel stipend provided by 
the Danish Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation. 
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In 2007, seven candidates contested the Manus Provincial seat, while 
twenty-five nominated for the Manus Open. Several of them had tried their luck 
before, but many were newcomers to politics, returned to Manus from 
influential positions in the urban centres of Papua New Guinea. The main 
contenders for the Provincial seat were expected to be the incumbent, Dr Jacob 
Jumogot, the previous governor, Stephen Pokawin, and the Lorengau mayor, 
Michael Sapau. The Open seat literally seemed more open with the large 
number of candidates, but former MP Memel Pohei and a former Lorengau 
mayor, Job Pomat, were the names most frequently mentioned. As usual, the 
Manus seats were the first ones to be declared. This happened on July 14 and 15 
respectively, when Michael Sapau and Job Pomat came out victorious. 
 
Political and historical background 
 
Manus is the smallest province in Papua New Guinea both in terms of land 
mass (less than 2000 square kilometres) and population (approximately 52,000 
people2 that can be divided into thirty-odd ethnic or linguistic groups3).  
 
Manus provides two electorates for the National Parliament: Manus 
Provincial and Manus Open (Manus is unique in that its provincial electorate 
coincides geographically with its one open electorate). Administratively, this 
means that the provincial administration also functions as a district 
administration, and the province has been allocated a proportionately larger 
number of local level governments (LLGs) than the other provinces — one 
urban LLG (Lorengau) and eleven rural LLGs (see map in the Appendix to this 
chapter). 
 
Along with the other parts of what is today the New Guinea Islands Region, 
Manus was colonized relatively early, first by the Germans and later by the 
Australians. People in Manus went to the polls for the first time in 1964, when 
the National Assembly was established. Since then, one can discern two notable 
political features in national elections in Manus, which people referred to often 
during the course of the 2007 election. First, in every election there are people 
of Manus descent or people born in Manus, who have lived for a prolonged 
period outside of the province but return to contest the election without 
                                                     
2 The 2000 census figure was 43,387. Projection of the 1980-2000 growth rate of c. 2.6 
per cent per annum gives 52,000. 
3 There has been argument as to the number of groups and languages, which depends on 
which definition one decides to use (Carrier and Carrier 1989:34). One of the latest 
(local) publications states the number as 30 (Minol 2000). For the purpose of this 
presentation I presume the different Manus groups to be quite similar in terms of 
political concerns and I distinguish between groups only when referring to specific 
practices. For a discussion of similarities and differences between Manus groups see 
Schwartz (1963; 1995), who argues in favour of regarding Manus as one ‘areal culture’. 
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spending enough time to be reacquainted with the state of affairs in the 
province. These returnees had never been successful in contesting until 2002, 
where Dr Jacob Jumogot returned and defeated the incumbent provincial 
member and governor, Stephen Pokawin. Several well-educated emigrants 
seemed to have been inspired by Jumogot’s win and to have judged that Manus 
people were now ready to vote for a returnee. Hence the popular reference to the 
metaphor of the flying foxes. The second feature is that Manus people have 
never re-elected a person once he or she has lost his/her seat, though every 
recent election has seen one or more attempting a comeback. 
 
The metaphor of flying foxes also relates to the economy of Manus. Local 
sources of income have dwindled over the years, in part due to a devaluation of 
the Papua New Guinea kina, and neither copra, cocoa nor vanilla has provided 
the continuous returns that were originally hoped for. The most substantial 
economic activities in Manus today are logging, which is mostly based on the 
West Coast, and bêche-de-mer harvesting, which is seasonal but in season is a 
bonanza for good divers. However, even though these enterprises have provided 
cash to villagers, they have not been enough to sustain people without 
supplementary access to subsistence foods (gardening or fishing). The financial 
capacity of the Manus provincial government is severely limited too, and 
tangible developments are rare. Several Manus groups therefore rely on 
remittances from wage-earning kin in other provinces to achieve material 
improvement of their lives. This funds a large part of consumption in Manus. 
Money from remittances is distributed in traditional exchange ceremonies (cf. 
Carrier and Carrier 1989), and often covers expenses such as school fees. 
Expensive acquisitions such as boats, motors or housing materials are rarely 
purchased directly from Manus, because only a few people in the province make 
enough money to obtain such goods. 
 
Prologue to the election 
 
Speculation about who would be candidates was abundant already a year 
before the election. A group of Manus people with access to the Internet 
discussed the issue vehemently in a forum on the web (www.pngscape.net.pg). 
Everyone was of course curious about whom they would be able to vote for, and 
in the provincial capital of Lorengau one heard rumours every now and then of 
yet another person who had told someone that he or she would contest the 
election. These rumours and speculation were by no means coincidental. The 
candidates themselves needed to test their chances beforehand by examining 
their support without promising too much. Several candidates considered the 
response of their kin and close associates in particular to be crucial. Their close 
relations were the ones who were expected not only to vote for the candidate, 
but also the ones who would carry the campaign to their relations. 
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As part of these preliminary manoeuvres, some candidates tried more or less 
discretely to influence voters on different occasions when they had a chance to 
speak or act in public. Those who had left Manus to live and work elsewhere 
but intended to return to become candidates could every now and then be 
spotted at the market in Lorengau making themselves publicly visible. Others 
tried to deter rival candidates from contesting the election by convincing them, 
either directly or via mutual kin, to step down, or by spreading rumours to 
create cleavages between possible candidates and politically influential people 
who were known to be allies. Some potential candidates did step down, possibly 
because their chances of exercising political influence would be greater if they 
threw their support behind others. Several of those who had themselves been 
candidates in the 2002 election were thus seen as key supporters of new 
candidates in 2007. 
 
The Open seat 
 
Inspiration from Jumogot’s victory as a returning migrant was not the only 
source of inspiration for the first-time candidates. There was much speculation 
that the Open seat would be up for grabs since the incumbent MP, Charlie 
Benjamin, was rumoured to be intending to challenge Jumogot for the 
provincial seat. But six months before the election, Benjamin was found guilty 
by a Leadership Tribunal of having violated the Leadership Code. He was 
dismissed from parliament and banned from contesting elections for three years. 
The open seat was thus vacant and drew twenty-five candidates. Two of these 
were women. Six had previously contested a national election. More than half of 
the twenty-five normally resided outside Manus or had recently been retrenched 
and moved back to their native village. Most of the candidates (including those 
for the Provincial seat) were well-educated and had made significant 
achievements in their fields. Several gave up well-paid jobs to contest the 
election; an article in the Post-Courier’s election special referred to the 
elections in Manus as ‘the battle of the brains’ (Post-Courier, Election Special 
June 2007).  
 
The contest for the open seat saw a significant increase in candidates 
compared to recent elections.4 Among the major contenders were the runners-up 
in the previous two elections (Job Pomat and Memel Pohei), but a couple of 
first-time candidates were given good chances because of their educational 
backgrounds and successful careers; these included Ted Sitapai, former 
secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and Les Roai, who had worked as a 
college administrator in Lae. Roai was the first serious candidate in a national 
election from the remote Western Islands. However, with the large number of 
                                                     
4 In 2002, 12 candidates; in 1997, 15. For numbers of candidates in elections prior to 
1997 see Pokawin and Rooney (1996:127). 
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candidates and the new LPV voting system, many saw it as anyone’s game, and 
there was much speculation about what would be determining factors. Most 
LLGs had several candidates, and it was inevitable that most candidates’ base 
votes would be divided. The Balopa LLG had the most candidates (six) relative 
to its population (1342 enrolled voters), with many close relatives contesting. 
The north coast of Manus Island was also well represented (four candidates) as 
was the west coast (six), but both of these areas had larger numbers of enrolled 
voters. 
 
The Provincial seat 
 
I have noted that Manus people have never re-elected a person who has lost 
his/her seat. Stephen Pokawin was aware of this historical fact when he decided 
to challenge Jumogot, and even said during his campaign that he would see if he 
could be the first one to regain a Manus seat. Memel Pohei, who had contested 
every election since he was an MP in 1992-93, always finishing second or third, 
tried for the Open seat again in 2007. Another heavyweight contestant for the 
Provincial seat was the mayor of Lorengau and deputy governor Michael Sapau. 
Sapau had severely criticized the incumbent governor with whom he had had 
strong disagreements in the (provincial) Lapan Assembly, where he was a 
member as the mayor of Lorengau. He was expected to perform well because he 
was believed to have the support of the Catholic community, which is the 
largest religious denomination in Manus. Lawyer Ben Lomai, Dr Peter Sapak (a 
UPNG lecturer), Leslie Menei and Keliwin Sasa were the other four contenders. 
Generally, people expected the contest to be between Jumogot, Pokawin and 
Sapau, with Lomai and perhaps Menei as dark horses — Lomai because he was 
deemed to be wealthy enough to run a comprehensive campaign, and Menei 
because he had finished third in the 2002 election. However, since Lomai and 
Sapak came from the same area in Manus, their base vote would be split, and 
Menei’s previous election promises had since been undermined by accusations 
that they were ‘cargo cultist’, because he promised social services such as 
unemployment benefits. The contest for the Provincial seat thus saw a decrease 
in the number of candidates compared to recent elections, undoubtedly because 
many perceived Jumogot, Pokawin and Sapau to be very difficult to beat. 
Sapau, Lomai and Sapak were contesting national elections for the first time. 
 
The characterization of the Open seat as a contest amongst educated ‘flying 
foxes’ applied also to the Provincial seat; only Sapau and Sasa had been living 
in Manus for a long period up to the election. Even the governor and Provincial 
member, Jumogot, had been criticized for often being away in Port Moresby 
rather than being close to people in Manus, listening to their requests and 
attending to their needs. Jumogot defended himself by saying that only in Port 
Moresby could he do what he was supposed to do, which was to attract 
resources that could develop Manus. He had criticized his predecessor Pokawin 
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for being too much in Manus and not doing anything. After the 2002 election 
Pokawin had disputed the result because Jumogot allegedly had used his 
position as head of the Papua New Guinea Gaming Board to distribute money 
and thus ‘buy’ votes, but the case was dismissed because of lack of evidence. 
After losing to Jumogot, Pokawin too had been away from Manus — most of 
the time as general secretary of the National Alliance or as adviser to Prime 
Minister Sir Michael Somare. 
 
The period from 2002 to 2007 had seen some notable physical developments 
in Manus. In return for letting Australia run the detention centre for asylum 
seekers in Lombrum, AusAID had provided upgrades of some of the schools in 
the Los Negros LLG, from whence Jumogot came. The upgrading was carried 
out while Jumogot was governor, but the deal had been set in place under 
Pokawin.  
 
What came to be one of the most important issues in the election campaigns 
of both Jumogot and Pokawin was the issue of the Manus Highway. The 
highway is a gravel road that runs from Lorengau inland connecting the villages 
of the interior of Manus Island with the provincial capital. For twenty years the 
road had been potholed and difficult to navigate without four-wheel drive, 
especially in wet conditions. However, while Pokawin was still governor the 
World Bank had agreed to finance reconstruction of the road against 10 per cent 
counterpart funding by the government. No work was carried out before 
Jumogot became governor, though, and now they both strove to take credit for 
the reconstruction. Some saw the reconstruction as evidence of the delivery of 
government services while others, especially those without relations inland, 
questioned why such a large sum should be spent on the road: it would only 
help inland people, who were few in number compared to the coastal or island 
dwellers in the province, and 10 per cent of the total cost was still a large 
proportion of the total funding available to a province with a small budget. 
Pokawin’s campaign in the area covered by the highway may have been boosted 
by alliance with Pohei, who came from the inland of Manus and was endorsed 
by the NA, and it probably benefitted from a visit by Sir Michael Somare, who 
spoke to people in the village of Tingou and promised a donation to the local 
health centre. Jumogot located a part of his campaign launching in nearby 
Kawaliap, where he had several supporters. Former prime minister and leader of 
the PDM, Paias Wingti, was supposed to attend, but could not. Nevertheless, the 
Kawaliap people decorated Jumogot with symbols of traditional leadership, and 
string bands from the area created songs to honour him (including one about 
voting for ‘white gravel’, referring to the road reconstruction, which used gravel 
from the Los Negros LLG). This concern for demonstrating one’s achievements 
in office was not confined to the Provincial seat. Prior to being indicted, Charlie 
Benjamin had bought cars for the police and the hospital with the District 
Support Grant at his disposal. Both of these cars carried writing on the side 
Between eagles and flying foxes      447 
 
stating that they were ‘donated by Hon. Charlie Benjamin MP member for 
Manus’. Prior to being convicted, Benjamin was regarded by people I spoke to 
in Lorengau as a good leader, for which the cars were seen as evidence. 
 
The role of parties in Manus 
 
Prior to the election, several candidates could be seen ‘shopping around’ for 
party endorsement. To most, this was a matter of obtaining funding to run a 
campaign. Rumour had it that some of the candidates expected to put this 
funding in their own pocket and campaign simply by talking to people at the 
smaller markets in Lorengau. But there were also a few faithful, who had been 
long-time members of their respective parties, such as Pokawin for NA and 
Jumogot for PDM. Also Ronny Knight had joined the New Generation Party 
(NGP) for its cause rather than opportunism. 
 
Party affiliation was not very important in peoples’ voting. Only one person I 
talked with said that he had given one of his preferences to Ronny Knight, 
because he liked the NGP. Otherwise I did not hear much mention of party 
preference. The party with the best organized campaign in Manus was the NA. 
The two candidates appeared on a poster together, and Sir Michael Somare 
came to Manus to endorse them at events in Lorengau and Tingou; generally 
they tried to give the appearance of loyal cooperation. The other party which 
fielded candidates supporting each other was the NGP. Bart Philemon came to 
endorse them and gave a speech at the Lorengau market and in two villages 
close to Lorengau, which seemed to impress a lot of people. Several people told 
me that if Philemon had contested in Manus they would have voted for him, but 
they were not so sure about his candidates in Manus. PPP and PAP also had 
candidates for each seat in Manus, but they did not seem to campaign together. 
 
Launchings and nominations 
 
An important part of many of the candidates’ efforts were events 
surrounding the launching of their campaign and nomination. 
 
Several candidates hosted large-scale launching feasts where relations 
(extended kin, colleagues, etc.) and neighbouring villages were invited. All 
participating groups brought some food as a contribution, but were also fed by 
the candidate — either with pork or sea turtles, which are the ceremonial meats. 
Groups were also given food and typically betel nuts to take home. During the 
launching event, invited speakers of standing would praise the candidate — his 
qualities as a leader, his knowledge, his experience and how they knew him.5 
The candidate would also speak, mostly trying to be humble but also presenting 
                                                     
5  I did not witness either of the two women candidates host such an event. 
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some of his visions. In between the speeches, traditional dancers, string bands or 
choirs would entertain, the latter with songs written about the candidate to 
honour or praise him. These launching feasts did not resemble any traditional 
type of feasts in particular, but they included several elements that could be 
classified as strongly traditional, such as the way food was distributed. 
Additionally, in some cases, the event involved the cutting of a rope of betel 
nuts and distributing the branches — one to each participating group as a way to 
urge them to support the candidate. In the past, such distributions of betel nuts 
were seen as acts of compulsion — whoever accepted a rope of betel nut 
indicated that he would support the donor. Ton Otto (1992b: 275-76) has 
described how this was an issue of contention in 1987, since many thought that 
the ‘ways of government’ should be kept separate from the ‘ways of custom’. In 
2007 I witnessed no such disputes. Because of the LPV system, some people 
actually argued that it was all right to accept betel nuts from more than one 
candidate, since there were three preferences to be given. These three 
preferences were in fact mostly seen as three votes in their own right. One man 
even told me, ‘a little bit of government, a little bit of tradition (kastam), that is 
all right’. 
 
Organizing such a feast requires large resources — usually in terms of both 
money and a network of kin and allies who are willing to come and give support 
with their presence and contributions. In that regard it is comparable to the 
demands of traditional ceremonies (wok kastam), which in many places is the 
hallmark of the traditional (entrepreneurial) leadership (see Schwartz 1963; Otto 
1991). 
 
Likewise, during the nomination period, almost half of the candidates came 
to the Electoral Commission’s office in Lorengau, not just with a procession of 
supporters, but also wearing at least some kind of traditional decoration. A 
couple of candidates wore ‘crowns’ made with shells or dog teeth, while others 
were followed by several hundred people carrying adornments symbolizing 
traditional leadership and cultural artifacts important in traditional ceremonies. 
Some were accompanied by a log-drum (garamut) ensemble on the back of a 
truck with a troupe of dancers escorting the candidate to the door. Some of the 
nomination processions displayed significant parallels to processions involved 
in traditional ceremonies, brideprice in particular. 
 
All this testified to the importance of references to traditional culture, which 
have become increasingly visible in provincial politics over the years. On the 
one hand, such references can be seen in the naming of the provincial assembly, 
Lapan Assembly (referring to traditional leaders), in the drafting of legislation 
that attempts to protect traditional culture (Dalsgaard 2007), and in introducing 
traditional leaders as chiefs into the legislature (see Otto 2002). The latter 
reflects expectations of good leadership. On the other hand, such references 
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relate to the significance of kastam (tradition or custom), with its plethora of 
meanings from mortuary rituals and ceremonies relating to marriages or births 
to a general set of values and institutions that one should follow to be successful 
and to live up to correct ethical and moral standards, or even to a domain of 
kalsa (culture) that seems to change in its emphasis on traditional practices 
according to a global culture of performative practices (see Dalsgaard and Otto 
forthcoming). 
 
Of the candidates for the Open seat, Albert Punjimill was the paramount 
chief for the Nauna people, but while being a traditional leader commands 
respect, leadership rarely carries weight outside one’s group or territory, and I 
did not meet anyone who voted for Punjimill because of his title. Other 
candidates, too, claimed to be from lapan lineages, but it is unclear whether this 
affected voters’ choices, though to command the vote in a specific village it was 
important to be on good terms with, or at least acknowledge, the local leaders, 
who were expected to be able to carry votes.  
 
Strategies of campaigning and voting 
 
Campaigning for both seats was done in numerous ways. References to 
tradition and the ambiguous relationship between emigrants and those who 
stayed at home in the villages were two central discourses influencing the way 
candidates presented themselves as potential leaders. These strategies have been 
alluded to above, and will be referred to again in explanations of why people 
voted as they did. 
 
The candidates I interviewed said that they depended on their kin to carry 
their campaigns, but using former or present colleagues or even old school 
mates was also seen as a way to mobilize support. Most candidates had a 
campaign coordinator. Some had a couple of regional coordinators too — for 
instance, one for central Manus, one for the West Coast, and so on. Some of the 
most serious candidates had even more elaborate systems, including a campaign 
komiti for each LLG or even each village in the areas where they were strong. 
The task of these komiti was to estimate the amount of votes the candidate could 
expect in the local area, provide a place to stay if the candidate came on a visit, 
and arrange for the candidate to deliver a speech or hold a campaign meeting in 
the local community. 
 
Even if they did not have a komiti, most candidates had contacts in all LLGs 
around Manus, and used these contacts to introduce them on the campaign trail. 
However, some voters told me that this did not always give the best impression: 
they were afraid that if a particular candidate won, only the local contacts(s) 
would benefit. Visiting a village through one’s relatives, rather than openly as a 
candidate who would represent everyone, was seen as having a negative and 
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clandestine aspect. Local disputes were very decisive in voters’ impressions of a 
candidate, and a candidate who was introduced by the wrong person could 
impair his/her chances rather than benefit from a local contact. Not all 
candidates travelled though the electorate, some because of limited funding. The 
Western Islands (Wuvulu, Aua, Nigoherm group) were far away, and some 
candidates reportedly travelled by speedboat together (Post-Courier 29 June 
2007). The candidates who did not have the resources to travel mostly remained 
in Lorengau, counting on having a name that people throughout Manus already 
knew, or using radio advertisements. Others campaigned in selected areas where 
they knew they had support and counted on winning by mobilizing this base 
vote. 
 
All candidates had produced some kind of poster, leaflet and/or business 
card that they handed out to their campaign coordinators for distribution to 
potential voters. Some candidates were severely hampered, however, because 
Air Niugini for several weeks in a row did not have space for extra cargo and 
some did not get their posters before the last week of campaigning. 
 
When speaking to people, the candidates stressed a variety of issues 
depending on who they were, what they had done, and who they were speaking 
to. Those who had stayed away from Manus for longer periods emphasized 
what they had learned or accomplished while away. Jumogot simply listed 
everything he claimed to have done as governor — a list which was also 
reproduced on his campaign leaflet.6 Other candidates told people about their 
degrees, or tried to show that they were knowledgeable about the political 
system and the administration in Waigani. Moses Taian, for example, had been 
general secretary of PANGU and emphasized that Waigani too was a ‘bush’ that 
one had to know in order to find ‘the food’ that one needed. Peter Sindra 
responded to the flying fox accusations by asking who had paid for the 
corrugated iron roofs and the speedboats anchored at the coast. The flying fox 
left its droppings behind which could make things grow — in other words, 
Manus people who went abroad remitted money or goods to help their kin and 
home village, and their knowledge had effect. Some candidates felt an urgency 
to remind people that they were always there for those of their kin who needed 
help and that they were good at looking after others. Sometimes such praise for 
the candidate would be voiced by his or her campaign coordinator or another 
important person supporting the candidate. Most candidates also spoke about 
ideas they had for development, and how they thought Manus could be 
improved. A few used metaphors and symbolic expressions, but did not always 
get the message through. 
                                                     
6 The leaflet claimed that he had attracted projects worth well over K500 million to 
Manus during his period in office, though adding together the value of each project he 
had listed, the amount did not even reach K100 million.  
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However, claiming knowledge was not always enough. Those returnee 
candidates who had not put their knowledge to use by providing something for 
their kin or fellow villagers in Manus were regarded precisely as flying foxes. 
Knowledge is and has always been regarded as important in Manus (cf. Otto 
1992a), but people who do not apply knowledge in practice can be seen as 
arrogant or even a nuisance. For example, a man who had spent three years 
trying to understand voting behaviour in Manus, and was the most educated of 
the contenders for the provincial seat in 1992, found himself finishing last in 
that contest (Pokawin and Rooney 1996:140). One of the 2007 candidates, 
Lemen Polau, claimed to know about the functions of government, which he 
had learned as an LLG president and previous to that as an aide to the late 
Martin Thompson, former MP for Manus, but Polau also reflected a particular 
stance on leadership which I observed in Manus. He distinguished between a 
leader of knowledge (save) and a leader of heart. To him, the latter was 
preferred, and that was what he claimed to be. Generally, good leadership was 
referred to as having a ‘heart’ for people, and was sometimes associated with 
being a lapan. This kind of leader not only shared his wealth with others and 
‘carried their worries’, but could also talk, eat and sleep with people — in other 
words, he did not distance himself from the grassroots person. To some, the 
discourse on good leadership contained references to God, and being a ‘God-
fearing leader’. Job Pomat was a devout Seventh Day Adventist; Luke Polongou 
referred to his faith as a member of the Evangelical Church; Peter Sindra had 
studied to become a Catholic priest; and Michael Sapau was known for his large 
donations to the Catholic Church. 
 
Since intermarriages between groups of all kinds and levels (kin, village, 
ethnic, religious) are frequent in Manus, people usually have relatives that speak 
a different tokples, identify with a different ethnic group, or are members of a 
different religious denomination. Consequently, prediction of voting based, in 
particular, on ethnic affiliation or LLG is at best difficult; nevertheless it can 
give an indication of a possible outcome, and most candidates, campaign 
coordinators and potential voters tried to calculate the likely result accordingly. 
For candidates, it was also a means of estimating their own chances and 
deciding where to focus their campaigning. Most ethnic groups were divided 
over candidates, and religious divisions seem to have been of limited 
significance in the Open seat. Thus, Job Pomat received support from both the 
former member, Charlie Benjamin, and 2002 candidate, Poruan Sapulai. Pomat, 
Benjamin and Sapulai are from different parts of Manus, but are all Seventh 
Day Adventists, and Pomat contested as a candidate for the People’s National 
Congress, of which Benjamin was a party member. Similarly, Michael Sapau 
seemed to rely on a Catholic vote. 
 
As Wanek and Wormald have noted (1989:191), elections in Manus are seen 
by many as a mobilization of one’s extended family and a struggle for those 
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people ‘in-between’ who are related to several contestants. This was a dilemma 
for several candidates who were fairly close relatives (in two cases, cross-
cousins), and this was seen as likely to reduce their chances. The point has been 
put by Pokawin and Rooney (1996:137) that a candidate, in order to be a serious 
contestant, must first secure his or her ‘base vote’ (as bilong basket or simply 
asbasket), that is, kin, people from one’s village or LLG, and in some cases 
(such as Michael Sapau) one’s religious community. In order to win, it is also 
necessary to get votes outside one’s own area and possibly from across Manus. 
 
Obtaining votes is about creating relations. In traditional exchange 
ceremonies people position themselves in relation to those who distribute by 
explaining how and through which common ancestors they are related. This is 
referred to as finding a ‘road’ through the kinship network. The same applies to 
electoral politics. If possible, a candidate will explain to people in a village how 
he/she is related to them, or will find a road by appealing to other identifications 
such as inhabiting the same local government area (LLG)7 or sharing church 
affiliation, or will have a friend or ally (a schoolmate or a colleague) explain to 
people how they knew the candidate, and thus create the link. The more formal 
part of candidates’ speeches focuses on their achievements and ideas for 
development, and perhaps criticizes rivals, depending on the standing of the 
rivals in the village. Most candidates quickly realized that cooperation with and 
praising of rivals was a more fruitful strategy than criticism. When visiting each 
others’ strongholds, candidates often praised the perceived preferred choice of 
the people to whom they were speaking, and then humbly asked for the voters’ 
second or third preferences. A few candidates failed to practice this, perhaps 
because they had not clearly understood the consequences of the LPV, or 
perhaps because they took their own popularity for granted, and that may have 
contributed to their downfall. Jumogot and his close supporters were convinced 
that they would win on the first count, and he was seen by some as arrogant and 
immodest, because he talked only about his achievements and did not show 
respect for his rivals. Pokawin, on the other hand, was good at giving credit to 
other candidates where he thought it was due, adjusting his speeches to the 
audience, and emphasizing the good qualities of some of his rivals — knowing 
that criticism could be seen as back-stabbing or mud-slinging, and could deter 
voters from giving him their second or third preferences. It was generally seen 
as good manners if a visiting candidate told a village that their preferred 
candidate (if they had one) was a good man, and that the visiting candidate 
respected that the first preferences of the village were already spoken for. 
 
Campaigning in Lorengau was a bit different from campaigning in the 
villages because audiences comprised people from all over Manus — especially 
                                                     
7 People in Manus have begun to identify with LLGs as political and administrative 
units, which also affects voting (see Pokawin and Rooney 1996:125-26). 
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at the central market. Speeches at the central market were less targeted to a 
specific audience and more about giving a general impression. Not all 
candidates went there, perhaps because there was a fee of K100 to use the 
venue. An NGO, ‘Manus Development Forum’,8 invited all candidates to debate 
at the market one Friday afternoon. Six candidates from the two seats accepted 
the invitation, presented themselves, gave their opinions on an issue related to 
development, and answered people’s questions. 
 
The candidates that were expected to have the best chance for the Open seat 
were Pomat and Pohei; both had relatively large and unchallenged base votes. 
Several candidates tried to split each other’s base votes, or at least get their 
second or third preferences, and there was a focus on the LLGs that did not field 
candidates – Los Negros in particular. The incumbent governor, Jumogot, was 
from Los Negros, and several candidates for the Open seat accepted his 
invitation to speak to his supporters. This led to speculation that some 
candidates were contesting either to help others (for example, a candidate for 
the Open seat who tried to align himself closely with the governor and always 
mentioned him in his speeches), or to ruin the chances of others. One might 
think that vote-splitting would be more difficult under the LPV system, perhaps 
needing three candidates to prevent a rival from getting the second or third 
preferences, but vote-splitting still seems to have occurred. Another strategy that 
could have come into play with the LPV system was ‘vote-pulling’: fielding a 
candidate who could pull in second preferences. Both vote-splitting and vote-
pulling depend on voters supporting a specific person, and not only giving their 
first preference to their primary candidate but also following his or her advice 
on second and third preferences. It is uncertain how well that worked in Manus 
since the results showed that preferences were distributed among several 
candidates. 
 
Finally ‘giving’ could be seen as an immensely important aspect of both 
campaigns and the impression of voters. This was evident in the discourse on 
flying foxes and the notion of reciprocity, and in relation to the Manus 
Highway, which was symbolic of government services. Typically, a good leader 
must be effective in attracting resources. Several candidates brought at least a 
rope of betel nut when they went to a village. In order not to abuse the 
hospitality of villagers, most travelling candidates brought food as well, or 
perhaps money in return for being allowed to stay overnight in the village. 
There were rumours of outright vote-buying, and of clans accepting money from 
candidates in exchange for promises of support, but it is difficult to determine 
the fine line between being generous and ‘buying’ votes, and difficult to say 
whether such behaviour affected the results. One candidate told me: ‘Your 
                                                     
8 The NGO was founded in January 2007 and changed its name twice before the 
election, which caused some confusion about the aim of the group. 
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campaign begins when you are born, and it is what you do throughout your life 
and what you give throughout your life that determines people’s impression’. 
Transactions involving money must be seen in the context of demands for 
evidence of generosity, and such transactions are often part of long-term 
relationships. Generosity can be shown in many ways, such as giving feasts, 
feeding people, giving small sums to help people pay their school fees, or 
simply offering tea, scones, betel nut or other kinds of refreshment. Candidates 
and their supporters did their utmost to entice voters in this way until the very 
last minute. Particularly in Lorengau, a colourful landscape was created around 
the polling places by stalls representing several of the important candidates. 
Some candidates also used this as a way to conduct their own ‘exit poll’, 
observing which stalls voters visited. Some voters were ‘educated’ on how to 
vote by having someone write down the names of their preferred candidates on 
a slip of paper or on the palm of their hand. 
 
The electoral roll, the casting of ballots and potential irregularities 
 
Fraudulent practices, violence, and other election irregularities that have 
been noted especially in the highlands — in particular in Southern Highlands 
Province in 2002 (see Gibbs, Haley and McLeod 2004) — are rare in Manus. 
One person admitted to me that she had voted in the name of another person 
because she was not enrolled herself. Another person (in a south coast village) 
was arrested by the police and gaoled for having done the same thing, when 
someone recognised him. There were reports of people voting more than once. 
The supporters of one of the candidates for the provincial seat were said to have 
enrolled both in Lorengau and in their home village in order to vote twice, but I 
did not speak with anyone who admitted having done that. Multiple voting 
should be prevented by the application of indelible ink on the little fingers of 
those who had voted, but a persistent, though according to Ron May (personal 
communication) dubious, rumour has it that it is possible to wash the ink off 
with a lime. 
 
The electoral roll generally appeared to live up to expectations. Skimming 
the roll for those villages where I knew people, I found examples of people 
enrolled twice under different names, though that did not mean that they voted 
twice. Some people complained that they had not voted because they were not 
on the roll, although they claimed to have enrolled. This was also reported by 
several polling officials. A total of 21,312 ballots were cast for each seat, in 
comparison with 23,380 voters enrolled, which does not seem unrealistic 
although a bit low in relation to the projected population of approximately 
52,000 people if one assumes that 50 per cent of the population is eighteen and 
above. 
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Several polling teams reported that the plastic seals for the ballot boxes had 
been cut when they had travelled between polling places. Their explanation was 
that the padlocks on the ballot boxes were too heavy and the seals were broken 
as a result of the bumpy conditions of roads, and large waves encountered when 
travelling in speedboats. Since this happened to several polling teams, it is 
likely that the seals did indeed break in this way and that polling officials did 
not tamper with the ballots.∗∗ Besides, there were mechanisms in place to 
account for all ballot papers, as each paper was numbered and the numbers 
noted when papers were put in the box at each polling place. If polling officials 
were to cheat, they would have had to have done so as teams, which seems 
unlikely, since members of polling teams often supported rival candidates.    
 
There was some suspicion of irregularities in the counting process, since the 
electoral officers at the counting tables for the Open seat included kin of the 
candidate who won that seat. However, the runner-up (Ronny Knight) did not 
pursue the case. 
 
The number of informal votes suggests that the late decision to have a poster 
with candidate names, photos and numbers and a separate ballot paper, had a 
significant impact, not so much because people had to write the numbers or 
names of their preferences,9 but because it was easy to mistake the two ballot 
papers and to write in the preferences for the Open seat on the ballot paper for 
the Provincial seat, and vice versa. In 2002 approximately 0.5 per cent of the 
vote was informal (92 out of 18,780 for the Provincial and 97 out of 18,772 for 
the Open seat), and in 1997 between 0.6 per cent and 1.1 per cent (185 out 
17,113 and 108 out of 17,115 respectively). In 2007 it exploded to 904 informal 
votes out of 21,312 (4.2  per cent) for the Provincial and 677 out of 21,312 (3.2  
per cent) for the Open. This was even larger than in the first national election in 
1964, when the percentage of informal votes in Manus was less than 1 per cent 
(Hughes and van der Veur 1965:420). Only in the Aua/Wuvulu and Tetidu 
LLGs were the percentages fairly low (1.5 and 1.1 per cent for Aua/Wuvulu and 
1.3 and 0.9 per cent for Tetidu).10 It could be that the awareness had been 
particularly effective in those areas, or that there had been less awareness in 
many of the other areas than the electoral officials claimed. The Ombudsman 
Commission, Transparency International and the Electoral Commission 
conducted an election awareness workshop in Lorengau, but, apart from that, all 
                                                     
∗∗ Experience in other parts of the country reinforces this view [rjm, ed.] 
9 Preferential voting had been used in Manus in the past when electing the premier and 
Manus has a high proportion of literate people by Papua New Guinea standards. Even if 
illiterate themselves, most people had someone who could help them, although I was 
asked twice by a polling official to assist a voter, since I was the only one who was 
deemed to be neutral by both the officials and the voters in question. 
10 I do not have the number of informal votes for each LLG for the 1997 and 2002 
elections, so I cannot conduct a detailed comparison. 
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awareness was carried out by the provincial electoral office, which mostly 
employed public servants from the provincial or the LLG administrations. From 
my interviews it was clear that several voters had difficulty understanding how 
the vote would be counted. Some people thought that if no one had a majority 
after the first count, the second preferences on all ballot papers would be 
counted, and so on; some even thought that they had three votes rather than 
three preferences. A man who was a member of the provincial assembly talked 
about his preferences as if he thought that when the candidate who received his 
second preference was eliminated that preference would count as an extra vote 
for the first preference candidate, who was still in the race. These perceptions 
had an impact on voting strategies, and would help explain why some voters 
wanted to get rid of their second and third preferences by giving them to 
candidates that they expected would be eliminated quickly. Even people with an 
understanding of the counting procedures persisted with this strategy, because 
they felt that giving even a second or third preference to a rival of their first 
preference candidate would be a threat to him. If their first preference candidate 
was eliminated, they could then not be said to be voting for someone else if 
their second or third preferences were out the race. 
 
What worked well in Manus was the respect for privacy in the casting of 
votes. I did not see anyone (scrutineers, officials or other voters) try to observe 
how others voted except in those cases where illiterate people needed assistance. 
However, the secret ballot did create uncertainty in the exchange between voters 
and candidates. As mentioned above, eliciting votes from people was frequently 
attempted by traditional means of obliging support and reciprocity (feast-like 
campaign launchings, distributions of betel nut, etc.), but since the ballot was 
secret the candidate did not know for certain who voted for him or her, and the 
voter could not prove that he or she had cast a vote for a candidate as promised. 
Elsewhere, non-literate voters were happy to have the opportunity to bring along 
an assistant of their choice to the polling booth (Foster 1996:164-65). 
 
There was no real violence, but there were a couple of reports of threats. 
People who were strong supporters of Peter Sapak, a West Coast candidate for 
the Provincial seat, said that Jumogot would not be allowed to campaign in their 
home area, after a fight over someone switching affiliation, but I did not hear 
about Jumogot changing his campaign schedule because of that. Some West 
Coast people tried to evoke a ‘West Coast identity’ in order to maintain a 
‘balanced Manus’ with a seat in their area, now that Charlie Benjamin 
(originally from a West Coast village) was out. One candidate was said to have 
threatened that if he did not win, others would force people off their land 
(implying that he was the only one who could protect them from being evicted). 
A riot squad of non-Manusian police was present during the election, but they 
did not seem to be busy.   
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 Another kind of ‘violence’ that some candidates feared was sorcery, and 
they employed different protective measures against it; others were reported to 
be using divination to predict when to go where. The most conspicuous — 
although non-violent — incidents occurred after it became obvious that the 
incumbent Provincial member had not won. People from Loniu — Jumogot’s 
village — attempted to block the road between Lorengau and Momote Airport 
with trees across the road (and also nails when Michael Sapau returned after 
being sworn into parliament). The police anticipated the trouble, however, and 
raced ahead of the convoy of government vehicles to remove the obstacles. 
Some Loniu people had also attempted such ‘protests’ after the 1997 election, 
when their candidate finished only third in the contest for the Open seat. This 
time the Loniu seemed to be so convinced that their candidate would 
successfully defend his seat that no one attempted to block the road until after 
the election, and then it was merely an expression of their disappointment. 
 
Analysis of the results 
 
When the first preferences had been counted, it was clear that there was an 
overlap between the distribution of votes and categories of ethnic affiliation or 
residency. Candidates got the largest vote in their home area (LLG). Some 
voters said that their village should split their vote between the most promising 
candidates so that whoever won, the winner would be obliged to help them 
because they had voted for him or her. I am not sure whether that happened, but 
it adds perspective to the perception of reciprocity between political leaders and 
their constituencies. Generally, it was my impression that people voted for 
candidates to whom they had a relation, but not necessarily a kinsperson if that 
person was not generous or did not have a good reputation. There were 
examples of people choosing generous non-kin over non-generous kin against 
whom they had a grudge. 
 
During the counting, it also became clear that both Western Islands and West 
Coast people had bloc-voted for their local candidates in both seats. For the 
Open seat, a very large percentage on the Western Islands had chosen Les Roai; 
among the West Coast people Ted Sitapai was the preferred choice. For the 
Provincial seat, most West Coast people preferred Peter Sapak or Ben Lomai; 
when Sapak was excluded, most of the vote went to Lomai. Voting in other 
areas of Manus was more widely spread, in part due to the larger number of 
candidates. 
 
In the Open seat, Roai, Knight and Pomat seem to have appealed to voters in 
most LLGs. Roai, Sitapai and Pohei received strong support in their own area, 
but it was not sufficient; Sitapai especially got little support outside his own 
area, and Roai’s small base in the Western Islands was outweighed by Knight’s 
general popularity and by Pomat’s larger base vote from the more densely 
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inhabited area of Lelemasih-Bupichupeu LLG. Pomat eventually secured the 
seat. 
 
For the Provincial seat, Jumogot and Pokawin received approximately the 
same amount of votes as in the 2002 election, suggesting that their bases had 
remained largely intact, but Sapau proved to be a more popular candidate, 
drawing on a base in Lorengau and the Nali area as well as among Catholics 
throughout Manus. The battle between Jumogot and Pokawin for credit for the 
reconstruction of the Manus Highway does not seem to have moved many 
voters. Sapau received the most votes from the areas in the proximity of the 
highway. 
 
Thus it was people who had stayed in Manus for a long period of time that 
won. Both winners had the support of their religious communities and as a 
Lorengau businessman (Sapau) and an important landowner in the vicinity of 
Lorengau (Pomat), they both had sustained relations to a large number of 
people. Through business and land one can gain a reputation for looking after 
others, either by providing employment or giving donations or simply letting 
people live on one’s land. A few candidates accused of being flying foxes did 
well too, probably evidence of their ability to negotiate a relationship with 
villagers and live up to their expectations. 
 
With regard to the impact of the LPV system, Ruth Mandrakamu was the 
only one to improve their relative position when preferences were allocated, 
jumping from 14th place after the first count to finish in 11th place — perhaps 
because some women did give her their second or third preferences. Some 
candidates made significant advances when someone from their own ethnic 
group, LLG or extended kin-group was excluded, only to see other candidates 
follow suit when a candidate from their area was excluded. Judging from the 
first preference vote, LPV did not change the outcome significantly from what it 
would have been under first-past-the-post. Both winners, Pomat in the Open 
seat and Jugomot in the Provincial were leading on first preferences. People did 
not yet know how to use the system effectively; they tried to vote strategically 
for candidates they thought would win rather than candidates they would have 
liked to support. Afterwards, people were saying that they would have voted 
differently if they had known what the outcome would be. 
 
The election showed that voters could relate to three candidates instead of 
just one. However, LPV voting is not just a matter of trade between a candidate 
and a voter, but also between candidates promising each other their supporters’ 
second or third preferences as if these could be commanded by the candidates. It 
is not uncommon that people follow the ‘advice’ of traditional leaders, or in 
Lorengau their employers, on who to vote for. Some people wanted only one 
vote, and there were examples of people giving their second and third 
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preferences to candidates considered certain losers. There was also confusion 
about how the counting would be done, which informed the way some people 
voted: some thought that all preferences would be counted — even on the 
ballots whose first preferences had not yet been excluded. 
 
In the end, the result was perhaps not very surprising, given a knowledge of 
where each candidate was from, what each candidate was known for, how the 
candidates had campaigned (and how much, and where), how they had fared in 
previous elections, and what people ‘on the street’ said about them. The biggest 
surprise was Ronny Knight’s finishing second in the race for the Open seat. 
Many people saw him as a dark horse. Though he claimed to have a base vote 
among his wife’s kin from Ahus, in Lorengau, where he resided, and among the 
Mouk people (in Rapatona and Balopa LLGs), most believed that, as a white 
person, he was without a real base vote. However, it seems that several elders 
and traditional leaders had chosen to support him. He was well-known all over 
Manus, and was known in several places for helping people in need. People 
often stressed that as a white man who had grown up in Manus, he knew what it 
was like to be Manusian because he had shared the same hardships as everyone 
else. Rather than vote for a kinsman who could not be trusted to share the ups 
and downs of life, many people chose Ronny Knight because he had proven to 
belong. Being white, he may have been seen by some as being above the 
wantokism that is widely seen as dominating Papua New Guinea politics — 
even though some said that Knight too protected his own ‘boys’ when they were 
in trouble.11 People may have been careful about openly stating their support for 
Knight, due to the expectations of various kin. Several candidates were 
surprised about their own poor showing, but the ‘deceit’ of pretending to 
support the candidate you are ‘supposed’ to support (due to kinship, exchange 
obligations, etc.), or at least not revealing your favourite candidate, is not 
uncommon in Manus (cf. Pokawin and Rooney 1996). 
 
Another unexpected outcome was the poor showing of Simeon Malai, the 
former provincial administrator, in the contest for the Open seat. However, 
considering that he had left Manus immediately after quitting his job as 
provincial administrator, and returned only six months before the election, 
without the large retrenchment payout he was rumoured to have received, even 
some of his own kin referred to him as ‘the prodigal son’. Malai had worked 
closely with Pokawin and was in the eyes of many people still closely 
associated with him — which may have affected peoples’ choice.  
 
Another candidate told me that he felt his own poor result to be a vote-of-no-
confidence in him as a leader of his descent group. Several candidates had 
                                                     
11 For comparison with another white person contesting elections in Manus, see Wanek 
and Wormald (1989). 
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expected to do better than they did. In part this may have been due to one of the 
characteristics of Manus electoral politics that Pokawin and Rooney (1996) have 
labelled the ‘deceit of hospitality’. People in villages usually show hospitality 
towards all visiting candidates (unless of course they are in a direct conflict with 
the person or his perceived group) and having heard the candidate speak, 
someone will often say something that will encourage the candidate, simply to 
make sure that he or she is not disappointed about the meeting. Consequently, 
several candidates returned from village meetings believing that they had 
secured votes in that place. Such ‘deceit’ is practical: offending someone who 
might later win may cut the community off from government services (see also 
Pokawin and Rooney 1996:133-34). In addition, people claimed that hospitality 
was a tradition (kastam), and anyone who took up the challenge of the election 
deserved respect as a ‘bigman’. 
 
The aftermath 
 
Job Pomat, the winner of the Open seat, as a member of PNC became a 
minister in the Somare government. Michael Sapau, the winner of the regional 
seat, joined the NA before the formation of government. There has been some 
speculation that NA in reality had two candidates. Different stories were 
circulating about why Sapau and Pokawin ended up contesting the same seat. 
One was that Sapau, as a financial member of NA, was supposed to have been 
that party’s candidate for the Open seat, but that he switched to the Provincial 
because of a grudge against Jumogot; another story was that the NA party 
machinery had decided to endorse Pokawin, forcing Sapau to contest as an 
independent (see Post-Courier 25 July 2007). The confusion about Sapau’s 
party affiliation, since the Rural Development Party had claimed that he was 
their candidate, led Jumogot to make an appeal to the court of disputed returns. 
The appeal was dismissed a few months after the election.  
 
Because LLG elections were not conducted simultaneously with the national 
election, the terms of the members of the Lapan Assembly ran out immediately 
after the national election. This led governor Sapau to appoint seven members to 
the Lapan Assembly in order to approve a budget for the province. These 
appointments are reported to have been controversial, since appointed members 
consequently outnumbered the elected representatives in the assembly.12 
 
Despite the complaints and grievances that emerged, the election in Manus 
was to the best of my knowledge generally fair. There may have been slight 
irregularities, but these would not have changed the final outcome.  
 
  
                                                     
12 See reports on NBC Radio (January 22 2008; January 23 2008, www.nbc.com.pg). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 27.1: Voting statistics Manus Open electorate, 2007 
Number of registered voters  26918  
Total votes cast 21314  
Informal votes 679 (3.2% of total ballots cast) 
Total allowable ballot papers 20635  
Total ballot papers remaining in count 11174  
Total votes distributed 12639  
Exhausted ballot papers 9461 (45.8% of allowable ballots)  
Absolute majority (50%+1) 5588  
 
Full results for Madang Provincial were not available. Summary results can be 
found at the end of this book. 
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28 LOOKING TO 2012: LESSONS FROM 2007 AND ARISING ISSUES  
 
Ray Anere and Katherine Wheen  
 
The consensus that emerges from this volume is that the conduct of the 2007 
Papua New Guinea general election was an improvement on the previous 
general election in 2002.  
 
The prioritization of security, especially in the Highlands Region (chapters 6, 
7 and 8), the improved whole-of-government coordination through the Inter-
Departmental Election Committee (chapters 2 and 5), and the increased 
recognition of the role of community engagement through electoral awareness 
(chapter 4) and domestic observation (chapter 5), are three stand-out 
improvements in 2007.  
 
Each of these improvements clearly demonstrates that elections are multi-
stakeholder events and not purely administrative exercises coordinated by the 
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC). This recognition that 
electoral events require partnerships between multiple government agencies, 
political parties, non-government groups, churches, aspiring candidates, sitting 
members of parliament (MPs) and the various security forces reflects a growing 
maturity in the approach to elections in Papua New Guinea.  
 
However, as chapter 5 on electoral administration explains, to be a success 
this thinking must be translated into much improved administration, planning, 
logistics and implementation. The many problems that are highlighted 
throughout this volume — late arrival of materials, late or inadequate training of 
electoral officers, partisan appointment of electoral officials, delayed release of 
funds, inadequate planning of polling day logistics, poor communications and 
transportation, and late implementation of electoral reforms (especially in 
relation to the creation of a new electoral roll and new ballot paper) — cut 
across the many agencies involved, but are felt most acutely within the PNGEC, 
an agency that struggles in terms of both capacity and funding.  
 
It is not the intention of this chapter to make specific recommendations on 
how to improve the elections in 2012. These can be found elsewhere (Haley and 
Anere 2009; Anere and Wheen 2009; Nonggorr, Sepoe and Raga 2010; and 
Ladley, Holtved and Kantha 2010a, 2010b). Rather, this chapter acts as a 
summary of the issues and themes that emerged around the 2007 election and as 
an update on issues that are emerging as the current political cycle unfolds.  
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Political reform 
 
Chapter 3 notes that the 2007 elections followed a period of significant 
political reform in Papua New Guinea, the two largest reforms being the 
introduction of limited preferential voting (LPV) and the Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC, popularly known as 
the Integrity Law).  
 
The political will that underpinned both reforms was a very admirable desire 
to improve governance and political stability.  But changing laws does not 
necessarily change behaviour. Reform at a political level if it is intended to 
solve complex cultural problems at a community or administrative level will 
always be of limited success and scope — as has been the case with LPV and 
OLIPPAC.   
 
Though structural reforms have their place, the message of many authors in 
this volume is that emphasis must be on administrative preparedness and 
community engagement in elections. Both are more likely to yield longer-term 
gains than the perceived silver bullet of structural reform. 
 
Introduction of LPV 
 
LPV has proved a popular system, with members of the community 
frequently expressing to election observers the perception that LPV had 
contributed to safer and better elections (although this is impossible to measure 
when you consider the increased investment in election security in 2007).  
 
The real impacts of LPV will take a long time to unfold. Certainly, it is 
increasing the ‘mandate’ of elected officials, who are winning office with a 
greater proportion of votes after preferences are distributed. Whether this 
greater ‘representativeness’ makes elected members more accountable to their 
voters remains to be seen.   
 
What is immediately clear is that the LPV system is much more complex and 
this has many associated costs. It requires major ongoing investments in 
electoral education. Overall, there is very limited knowledge by voters and 
candidates of how preferences work, aside from a basic understanding of the 
need to make three choices instead of one.  
 
Preference sharing agreements and/or strategies by candidates were not 
common, though present in a few electorates, often based on the imperative to 
‘use preferences to vote for locals not outsiders’. There is even less knowledge 
of how preferences are treated in the counting process. 
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Counting procedures themselves have become much more complex, lasting a 
number of weeks in larger provincial electorates, contributing to post-election 
tensions. The fact that at the time of writing (May 2011) it was still not possible 
to analyze full election results from 2007, suggests that much needs to be done 
to improve the conduct and transparency of the scrutiny process.  
 
The new voting system, combined with the introduction of a new ballot 
paper (which required voters to write down a candidate name or candidate 
number for each preference), appears to have also contributed to even higher 
levels of assisted voting. 
 
The real and/or perceived status of LPV as a ‘fairer system’ may indeed 
influence political culture in Papua New Guinea to become more 
accommodative over time, but it has increased, and will continue to increase, 
the costs of planning, counting, training and awareness. This must be factored 
into all future elections.  
 
The Integrity Law, political parties and candidates 
 
The new Integrity Law, the OLIPPAC, contained a range of measures that 
were intended to improve political stability. As chapter 9 describes, these 
measures did not totally prevent party-hopping (in part due to the poor 
understanding and selective implementation of the new legislation by the 
speaker of parliament), and appear to have had no effect on post-election horse 
trading to form government. However, the OLIPPAC certainly improved the 
stability of government — leading to the Somare government lasting a full 
parliamentary term in 2002-2007 and remaining in office from 2007 to date, and 
creating more stability in ministerial appointments in the period up to July 2010.  
 
However, from the moment the OLIPPAC was passed into law, a number of 
measures looked certain to be challenged in the courts. The most controversial 
were those that regulated the parliamentary behavior of MPs, forcing them to 
remain a member of and vote in accordance with their respective political 
parties for the duration of their term. In July 2010 these sections of the 
OLIPPAC were ruled unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, headed by Chief 
Justice Salamo Injia ruled that the restrictions placed on MPs were ‘unheard of 
in any democratic country’ and were ‘not reasonably justifiable for the purpose 
for which they [had] been enacted’ (Post-Courier 8 July 2010). This decision 
led almost immediately to a return to political party instability including shifting 
party alliances and party membership, ministerial reshuffles and prolonged 
adjournments of parliament to avoid votes-of-no-confidence.  
 
Political parties in Papua New Guinea remain entities that are constituted 
solely for the purpose of gaining election and forming governing coalitions. 
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They remain unstable, unrepresentative, and in many instances poorly governed 
(exemplified by the number of parties failing to submit financial returns — see 
chapter 3), despite regulations within the OLIPPAC aimed at improving party 
governance and transparency.  
 
There remains only one dominant party, the National Alliance (NA), which 
has been successful in selecting popular candidates to contest elections and 
appealing to independents, once elected. This is due in some part to the 
continued leadership of Sir Michael Somare. However, as this political cycle 
unfolds, the NA will struggle to contain the competing personalities within, 
especially as the retirement of the prime minister appears likely (though by no 
means certain) in this term and potential successors position themselves 
accordingly.  
 
Somare has lately been suspended from office for two weeks, after being 
found guilty of thirteen counts of misconduct in office relating to his failure to 
lodge financial returns, as required under the Leadership Code, over a period of 
twenty years (Post-Courier 25 March 2011).  
 
Large numbers of candidates contesting elections continued in 2007 with 
2759 candidates contesting. These large numbers of candidates — a feature of 
the political culture in the highlands and in other parts of the country — will be 
difficult to restrict without facing some of the same challenges as the OLIPPAC. 
Both issues sit on the fine line between political stability and political freedom.  
 
New provinces and changes to electoral boundaries  
 
One impact of the lengthy adjournments of parliament that have occurred 
during recent parliamentary sessions has been delayed decisions on legislation. 
This is certain to make a big impact on election administration and planning in 
the lead-up to 2012. The complex pieces of legislation, requiring multiple 
readings and large majorities, include the introduction of the two new provinces 
of Hela (now part of Southern Highlands Province) and Jiwaka (now part of 
Western Highlands Provice); the clarification of electoral boundaries and the 
status of provincial electorates in general; and the proposed introduction of 22 
reserved seats for women.  
 
Delays in passing legislation, and poor implementation of decisions in 
relation to either of these two issues — but most especially the two new 
provinces — have the potential to cause increased volatility in 2012 in problem 
areas such as the Southern Highlands. The proposed new, oil-rich Hela Province 
is the home of major new LNG developments and is for this and other cultural 
reasons considered a hotspot for election-related violence if the introduction of 
the new province is not managed smoothly (McPherson 2009). For more 
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information on the special challenges of the Southern Highlands Region see 
chapters 6, 19, 20 and 21.   
 
The 2002-2007 political cycle also left some uncertainty as to the status of 
provincial electorates. Previously, under the Morauta government and in the 
early period of the Somare government, there had been a consensus (albeit 
temporary) to abolish provincial electorates. This was only partially achieved in 
terms of the required legislative changes, before the Somare government then 
decided to retain provincial electorates.  Ensuring all the relevant legislation is 
now consistent with this position, and ensuring that the constitutionally required 
number of open electorates (currently 110-120) is consistent with the actual 
number (89) is an urgent task for the current government. 
 
Although it is unlikely to be implemented in this political cycle, the problem 
of open electorate boundaries will remain on the political horizon. Open 
electorates remain significantly unequal in terms of their relative population 
size, yet their boundaries are very difficult to change and remain as they were at 
independence.  This impasse is due to the vested interests of the very people 
that, under the constitution, must vote to change boundaries — the elected 
members themselves.  
 
Women’s participation and representation 
 
One of the key assumptions of LPV was that it would increase the likelihood 
of women candidates being elected. This view was misplaced. While LPV can 
be seen to increase the proportion of votes that women receive after preferences 
are distributed, in all but one case, the low primary vote for female candidates 
saw them excluded early in count in 2007 before they had a chance to attract 
preference votes (see chapters 10, 15 and 25). Even the sole female MP elected, 
member for Moresby South, Dame Carol Kidu, received fewer preference votes 
than her nearest (male) rival.  
 
The male-dominated political culture of Papua New Guinea, deriving from 
the male-dominated leadership culture of most communities, continues to make 
it extremely difficult for women to compete with men for political office. 
 
To rectify this electoral imbalance after 2007, Dame Kidu initially 
championed the introduction of three nominated female members of parliament, 
using existing constitutional provisions. This measure failed to win the support 
of a great number of MPs including the opposition. The reasons were varied but 
there proved to be much discomfort with the notion of having unelected MPs. 
Instead, a working group proposed new legislative changes to create 22 
reserved, elected seats for women — one for each province. Passing these 
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changes through the male-dominated parliament in itself will be a challenge, let 
alone implementing the changes around the country. 
 
Election security 
 
The mobilization of security, especially in the Highlands Region, was 
arguably the greatest success of 2007. Chapters 6, 7 and 8  record the 
experiences of security forces on the ground in Southern Highlands and Chimbu 
and describe in detail their achievements and challenges.   
 
The pre-deployment of security two weeks before polling for reconnaissance 
was a particular success, as was the impressive discipline, on the whole, 
observed in each of the forces. 
 
The notion of a rolling election through the Highlands Region, in order to 
concentrate on different highland provinces separately, also allowed greater 
numbers of security personnel on the ground. But as with most election 
logistics, this could have been much better planned and implemented. One-day 
polling, however, proved impossible from a security perspective.  
 
2007 also saw the security forces becoming involved in administering 
polling, and not simply maintaining the security of polling and counting areas 
(see chapter 8). Despite the fact that many security officials willingly took on 
this role and stepped in where electoral officials were failing, the security 
officials had limited knowledge of election processes. The lesson for the future 
is to conduct election-specific training for, and increase the resources to, 
security forces in order to better perform this role. The simple fact is that 
security forces tend to be better disciplined, better educated, have better 
communications, and appear to be more impartial than many electoral officials 
hired in local areas.  
 
There is a major emerging threat to security mobilization in the lead-up to 
2012. The rise of the private security industry, both in the nation’s capital Port 
Moresby, but more recently to secure massive new resource projects including 
LNG project infrastructure across the country, has seen the widespread 
recruitment of under-paid and under-resourced police and defence force 
personnel. These developments have the potential to absorb much of the 
security capacity that needs to be deployed during the 2012 elections. 
 
Resource development companies across the country will also have to 
become election stakeholders and make a contribution to election safety and 
security, if they want to see their current and future investments protected from 
the disruption of elections. How these companies might take to this pro-active 
partnership role remains to be seen.  
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IDEC 
 
The success of the security operations can also be attributed to the whole-of-
government-approach coordinated by the Inter Departmental Election 
Committee (IDEC). There is a strong sense that the whole-of-government 
approach encouraged cooperation, collaboration, coordination, accountability 
and sharing of information between the security forces, electoral commission, 
and other departments.    
 
Keeping up the momentum and enthusiasm to participate in the IDEC by all 
relevant agencies will be the challenge for 2012.  
 
The electoral roll  
 
The creation of a new electoral roll for 2007, although an improvement on 
the 2002 roll, was not a success. Although the re-enrollment exercise reduced 
the number of names on the roll, it is clear that especially in the Highlands 
Region the roll ‘does not provide a credible link between eligible electors and 
the votes counted during an election’ (Ladley, Holtved and Kantha 2010a, 
quoted in chapter 5).  
 
Chapters 5 overviews the major flaws in both the re-registration and 
verification exercises in 2006-2007 and most of the electorate-specific chapters 
in the second half of the book detail roll-related problems around the country, 
especially chapter 21 on the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate. The late 
commencement of the exercise was one handicap; partisan officials, poor 
planning, and a cultural disrespect for the roll all played their part.   
 
As Ladley, Holtved and Kantha (2010a) have outlined in their post-election 
analysis of the problems with the electoral roll that ‘there are no quick fixes for 
improving the electoral roll and voter identification in Papua New Guinea’. The 
employment of technological options, including photo identification and/or 
fingerprint systems, which had been canvassed after 2007, will only work once 
much groundwork is done. 
 
Instead, good management systems at the national, provincial and ward 
level; enrolment, verification and updating procedures that can be depended on; 
and, significantly, the support of the people when registering to vote and on 
polling day, are all needed first. This requires a holistic approach to improving 
the electoral roll and much improved capacity and funding for the PNGEC 
(Ladley, Holtved and Kantha 2010a). 
 
To its credit, the PNGEC has placed much greater emphasis in 2010 on 
building the capacity of provincial election managers in relation to management 
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and verification of the roll, and has piloted initiatives aimed at structuring the 
roll to better match clan systems within communities.  
 
However this activity is not yet on the scale that is required for wholesale 
improvements to roll-related systems. What does happen between now and the 
election in 2012 will again occur late in the electoral cycle.  
 
What is certain, as Haley writes in chapter 5, is that ‘attention must be given 
to the electoral roll as a matter of urgency, in order to: ensure political equality 
between citizens; restore confidence in the PNGEC; and ensure that the 
elections have integrity’.  
 
Community engagement in elections  
 
Community engagement and awareness is emerging as an important part of 
elections in Papua New Guinea. Community engagement can be understood as 
everything from delivering electoral education on how to vote correctly, through 
conducting activities to build demand in communities for fairer elections and 
good governance, to encouraging community participation in elections through 
activities like domestic observation.  
 
As chapters 4 and 5 outlined, these activities were first implemented on a 
national scale in the lead-up to 2007, and significantly supported by the 
AusAID-funded Electoral Support Program Phase 2.  
 
As with any new initiative, the community engagement programs faced a 
range of teething problems, particularly with encouraging traditional election 
actors, especially within the commission, to see non-government groups as 
complimentary partners, rather than competitors for resources. Indeed in many 
respects the best community engagement towards encouraging fairer elections 
was done by non-government actors, who are themselves much closer to 
communities (see chapter 11).  
 
This aspect of election planning relied heavily on donor support and donor 
coordination. In the lead-up to 2012, it will be important to enhance this aspect 
of elections. It will also be important for the PNGEC to take more ownership 
over coordinating these important partnerships and acting in closer contact with 
communities.  
 
Electoral administration 
 
Finally, what has infused much of the discussion above is the overall 
significance of good election administration and planning on the conduct of 
successful elections.  
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The list of areas where administration could be improved is long and 
includes better coordination of human resources including training, production 
and distribution of polling materials, communication and transportation 
arrangements, and timely release of funds, to name just a few.  
 
The PNGEC and the chief electoral commissioner have the unenviable job of 
managing an organization that must transform from some 60-odd staff in normal 
operating periods to a nation-wide organization that engages, organizes and 
directs thousands of officials around the country during elections.  
 
The increased allocation of financial resources to the PNGEC in last year’s 
budget, announced in November 2010, reflected a growing realization that the 
PNGEC needs to be resourced throughout an electoral cycle to make the needed 
improvements and conduct the necessary strategic planning to administer 
elections. More funding is beginning to be secured. Now it is strategies for 
improving the human and institutional capacity of the commission and its 
people around the country (but most especially in the highlands) where the 
greatest emphasis should be placed in electoral reform in the lead-up to 2012 
and beyond.  
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Election 2007
The Shift to Limited Preferential 
Voting in Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea’s general election in 2007 attracted partic-
ular interest for several reasons. Not  only did it follow what 
was widely acknowledged as the country’s worst election 
ever, in 2002 (in which elections in six of the country’s 109 
electorates were declared to be ‘failed elections’), it was the 
first general election to be held under a new limited preferential 
voting (LPV) system; it also followed the first full parliamentary 
term under the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates, which had been introduced in 2001 in an attempt to 
strengthen political parties and create a greater degree of sta-
bility in the National Parliament, and was the first to embrace 
a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to electoral administration, 
through an Inter-departmental Election Committee.
This volume provides an analysis of the 2007 election, which 
draws on the work of a Domestic Monitoring Team organized 
through the National Research Institute, and several visit-
ing scholars. It addresses key issues such as voter education, 
electoral administration, election security, the role of political 
parties, women as candidates and voters, the shift to LPV, and 
HIV transmission, and provides more detailed accounts of 
the election in a number of open and provincial electorates.
It is generally agreed that the election of 2007 was an im-
provement on that of 2002. But problems of electoral admin-
istration and voting behaviour remain. These are identified in 
the volume, and recommendations made for electoral reform.
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